American Enterprise Institute

February 7, 2007

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

10:15 a.m.	Registration
10:30	Panelists:	Frederick Z. Brown, Johns Hopkins SAIS
		Joshua Kurlantzick, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
		Alexander Vuving, Harvard University
	Moderator:	Christopher Griffin, AEI
Noon	Luncheon and Keynote Speech
	Speaker:	Raymond Burghardt, East-West Center
1:00 p.m.	Adjournment

Proceedings:

[Start of Panel I]

Christopher Griffin:  Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to go ahead and get started.  Please take your seats.  Good morning and welcome to the American Enterprise Institute.  My name is Chris Griffin, I’m a research associate here in Asian studies, and I'm honored today to welcome you to this panel of distinguished speakers on a very interesting topic. 

First off, I thank all of you for braving the elements to come out today.  Quite the winter storm that we have had and I’m afraid to let you know that one of our scheduled speakers for today, Josh Kurlantzick, got trapped up in Baltimore with the snow and will not be able to join us.  But still we should have a very good discussion with two eminent speakers, the first of which is Fred Brown, a research fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.  Dr. Brown’s experience with Vietnam is extensive and impressive.  He was in the country between 1968 to 1973, first with the US military and then as a consul-general in Danang.  After leaving Vietnam, he was a senior country director for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and after 1991 was the first director and founder of the Southeast Asia Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS and is now back at SAIS as a research fellow.  Alexander Vuving, who will be speaking second, is a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Security Affairs at Harvard University.  He recently completed a dissertation on Vietnam’s Grand Strategy and is currently working on [indiscernible] that into a book.  So this should be a very good panel.  And without further ado, Dr. Brown.

Frederick Z. Brown:  Thank you.  Thank you very much, Chris, and thanks to AEI for organizing this very timely and, I think, important conference.  It is a topic that really does not get very much discussion. 

I want to thank Chris for letting me pinch-hit for Lewis Stern of the Pentagon OSD who is really the guy who knows all the details of the US-Vietnam relationship from the security point of view.  Lewis Stern has been working this problem ever since 1976, I guess, and is really the person who should be -– it would be well for you to hear him on this topic.  In any event, I'm grateful for this opportunity.  It is an honor to have a change to talk about what I think is the most underappreciated success of US foreign policy in recent decades, the formal normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in July 1995. 

And then, I think that that is very important because it could have gone wrong -- the gradual improvement of -- this gradual, steady improvement of relations over the past 12 years.  The United States has gained access to a small but expanding market for our business community.  We have helped shape a modern market-oriented economic system in Vietnam that will raise the standards of the Vietnamese people and we have improved our geopolitical position in Southeast Asia in a cautious, balanced manner using a pragmatic combination of market economics and diplomacy.  We do not always do it that well, actually.  In July 1995 after diplomatic normalization, there was a favorite saying, “Well, that is done.  Now the hard part starts.” 

Indeed, I think that was the case.  Not long ago, Vietnam was mired in a decaying Marxist economic system, entangled with the Soviet Union in the waning days of the Cold War and piecing back together a tattered relationship with China.  It has been a remarkable accomplishment for Vietnam to get from where it was in the 1980s to where it is today.  I think it is something that many of us in this room doubted it would actually take place.  First question on the agenda -- and I'm going to follow your agenda, Chris.

What are Vietnam’s priorities in its relationship with the United States?  I take the liberty offering my point of view with the Vietnamese Embassy present in the room.  In my view, a short answer is really quite simple:  Cementing the bilateral connection to the United States.  Soon after 1975, some in the Hanoi leadership recognized the reality that the United States was the key to what I would like to call Vietnam’s “joining the world;” that is to say, being accepted by the international community, particularly the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as a non-threatening constructive player on the Asian scene.  The other reality -- and there is no secret here -– was, of course, China. 

Back then, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach was the spark plug; some called him pro-American.  In truth, he was intensely and uniquely pro-Vietnam in his conviction that a solid American connection was an essential ingredient of Vietnam’s national security.  We have somebody here, Nayan Chanda, formerly of the Far Eastern Economic Review, now with Yale, who interviewed Nguyen Co Thach I'm sure many many times, and knew him well.  After 1978 and the failure of the first effort to normalize relations, Vietnam became a third- or fourth-ranked foreign policy concern of the United States.  Until 1991, Cambodia and Vietnam’s inadequate cooperation on the POW and MIA issue were major impediments that had to be resolved; to a very large extent, they were resolved.  Vietnam adopted a so-called omni-directional foreign policy, which gained momentum with the collapse of Euro-communism in the early 1990s. 

In 1995, as I mentioned, came normalization with the United States and on the same week, induction into ASEAN, or acceptance by ASEAN.  The key building blocks of bilateral relations today are trade and, more broadly, structural economic reform or renovation in Vietnam itself, without which trade and foreign direct investment would have been impossible.  In 2000, a sweeping Bilateral Trade Agreement, the BTA, was signed and approved by Congress in 2001.  The United States extended conditional Normal Trade Relations, NTR, to Vietnam, and in return Hanoi agreed to arrange trade liberalization measures and market-oriented reforms.  Trade, primarily imports from Vietnam to the United States, rose to more than six billion in 2004, about four-and-a-half times the level it was in 2001, the year before the BTA took effect.  [Indiscernible] to this, repeating –- using a paragraph that I would not have used if our excellent other speaker, Josh, had been here so I'm putting this back in.  Today, the United States is Vietnam’s largest export market with two-way trade in 2006 of about $10 billion.  Full economic normalization took place in December 2006 when Congress approved permanent NTR just after the APEC Summit in Hanoi.  One month ago, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization.  This is, in my mind, a definitive marker that Vietnam has indeed joined the world. 

Another building block, of course -- official visits between Hanoi and Washington that have increased in frequency and escalated in rank; two presidents in the past six years.  Many countries do not get one presidential visit in six or eight years.  Six presidential visits in the last six years and every SecState and every SecDef in recent administrations have visited Vietnam.  Their counterparts have come here; Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited Washington in June 2005.  Vietnam is one of the largest recipients of US assistance in East Asia.  It is something that is not well-known.  US aid in fiscal year 2005 surpassed $50 million and in 2006, the total, I am given to believe, was close to that.  All fine and good. 

Vietnam, it seems to me, has achieved its major priorities for now.  Question is how to consolidate and perhaps expand them.  It is clear to me that Vietnam is indeed hedging.  Indeed, it would be foolish for us not to expect Vietnam to hedge.  Every country in Southeast Asia is hedging, and so is the United States.  These are very uncertain times.  Now, how can -- this is another question that was raised by the conference organizers.  How can Vietnam, a country emulating the Chinese model of political and economic development, expect to be a “true” US security partner? 

We can talk separately if you want about Vietnam following the Chinese model.  Let me just say it to suggest that our two countries can be “true security partners” puts a very heavy burden on the security aspect of the overall bilateral relationship.  Partners, yes, in the sense that most nations seeking to live in peace and security are partners in the search for security; and Vietnam can certainly be counted in that group.  I doubt very much, however, that Vietnam is waiting to join Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines as a “major non-NATO ally;” I do not think that is in the cards.  Even being labeled as an ally of the United States is sometimes embarrassing.  The security relation has moved ahead step-by-step pretty much in tandem with trade and economic relations.  Military-to-military issues have been on the table, actually, since the early days of normalization, but not very well advertised. 

We have talked about a strategic dialogue for years; now, the dialogue, I am told, actually takes place at the middle levels.  And, of course, at any time the top leaders meet as it should.  That was evident in the joint statement issued on November 17, 2006 after the meeting between President Bush and the new Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in Hanoi.  Another question posted on the agenda is how can the US manage an agenda with Vietnam that does not sacrifice such priorities as human rights and democratization while fostering a “potential stronghold against Chinese domination of Southeast Asia?” 

On human rights and religious freedom, Vietnam has accommodated to a significant degree the US perspective -- nay, requirements -- on a few specific issues such as forced reunification of faith, home churches, treatment of Protestants in central highlands and certain problems involving the Catholic Church.  This has been done through relatively quiet negotiations surrounding the visit of Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s visit in June of 2005.  In November 2006, Vietnam was removed from the list of countries identified as countries of particular concern; there are seven or eight of them.  Some of them are very close friends.  CPC was eliminated from that, dropped from that list just before President Bush’s trip to Hanoi for APEC.  I do not think all problems -- I’m sure all problems relating to religious freedom have not been solved, but the key element here in the CPC equation is “progress” in improving the status of religion in Vietnam.  Because it did make significant progress, Vietnam is the first country so designated to have the CPC designation removed. 

Now, I cannot see Vietnam as a potential “stronghold” against Chinese domination of Southeast Asia.  Vietnam and China are neighbors and have a very close engagement, a very thick, long-standing relationship; no news there.  They have a well-established party-to-party relationship with constant and intimate contact at all levels.  They have a parallel government-to-government relationship.  It has plenty of tensions and basic irritants; some are rather longstanding, such as the sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands and other parts of the South China Sea. 

There is an issue that involves Vietnam’s ASEAN neighbors -- Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, et cetera, as well.  The United States would not wish to become a supporter of Vietnam in that complicated intra-ASEAN football match.  What the US wants among other things is freedom to navigate on the high seas, of which South China Sea could be counted as one.  Sovereignty in the South China Sea is a complex regional issue that has no end in sight.  There is always a chance for an unintended clash, for example, over hydrocarbon exploration that could lead to serious consequences.  Let us be realistic about China and its neighbor to the south, the lesser dragon.  What we are talking about is an asymmetrical relationship between China and Vietnam that has been playing out for the past thousand years.  The players on both sides are well familiar with the ground rules.  They know each other quite well.  When one side sees the other as violating the rules, as in Cambodia in 1978-79, there are severe consequences for the weaker party. 

Brantly Womack of the University of Virginia is a leading scholar on both China and Vietnam who has written very cogently on the asymmetrical relationship between the two countries.  Let me paraphrase one of Brantly’s observations.  Although China is clearly more powerful than Vietnam, China cannot easily force Vietnam to do what China wants.  Why?  Because at a certain point, Vietnam’s motive for resistance will be survival and this will always be stronger than China’s motivation, which is domination.  So there are realistic limits.  I’m simplifying, obviously, but I think this is rather fundamental. 

Now, the fact that Vietnam has become a member of the international community in good standing and, indeed, is the poster child for the IMF, the World Bank, UNDP; a member of ASEAN, APEC and almost any other reputable organization, not to mention a candidate for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, all this provides Vietnam a measure of protection in the international community, it seems to me.  But having a great power friend also helps if the great power friend understands the ground rules.  A senior member of the Vietnamese National Assembly has put it this way:  “We, Vietnam, have been living next to China for millennia.  We engage with China, of course.  But our heads are working and our eyes are open.” 

Now, this is a polite way of telling Americans not to lecture Vietnam on the China threat, so-called.  Vietnam is unlikely ever again to side with one great power against another as it did with the Soviet Union.  From 1986 onward, Gorbachev gave Vietnam the stiff arm.  I have heard many stories from Vietnamese friends about the downside of that client-patron relationship, especially when China was breathing down Vietnam’s neck.  I suspect if the US were to suggest publicly an alliance, or to go ahead to get ahead of the game, then the Vietnamese would give us the stiff arm, too.  I do not know.  We would discuss that.  But I wonder if we really need to think, or really should think, in these terms.  It seems to me that the last thing the Vietnamese want is a confrontation with China in which way the United States might intervene.  Whose side would we choose?  The care and precision with which defense matters have been discussed so far between Hanoi and Washington tell me that both sides are aware of the sensitivities involved, not the least of which is the Vietnamese military establishment’s residual mistrust of the United States. 

It is obvious that both we and Vietnam are worried about the rise of China.  Within this mutual strategic interest, we can expect Vietnam to be cautiously positive towards United States as long as the United States does not get too flamboyant in its rhetoric.  Already there has been quite a bit of progress -- international military education, for example.  [Indiscernible] training for Vietnamese officers and English language has been approved at a modest level.  Other military-to-military or personnel exchanges can be certainly increased.  Ever since the first US navy ship visit to Saigon in 2003, port calls by our ships in Vietnam have become routine and quite successful in establishing a benign atmosphere.  Search and rescue exercises at sea between the two navies, I am told, have been suggested.  We will see where that goes.  And one can imagine additional middle-middle [sounds like] projects. 

My bottom line is this:  Whatever strategic role the United States plays, security and middle-middle matters should be but one aspect of a bilateral relationship that has many other valuable components.  I see no reason why we cannot continue to make progress on issues of interest to the Unites States, such as human rights and religious freedom, while refining the security aspects of relations.  In security matters as well as the other aspects, there is certainly room for prudent, careful American diplomacy to maneuver.  The November 17 joint statement in Hanoi emphasized the “new bilateral cooperative spirit” that has evolved not only with regard to regional security issues - I guess you could read China into that -- but also regarding other Asian issues such as the situation on the Korean peninsula.  That is a very good omen, and I think here is a place where Vietnam can certainly be very helpful. 

A couple of years ago, a senior Vietnamese diplomat made a statement that has remained in my mind.  It was at a conference we held at SAIS here in Washington and one of the organizers [indiscernible] is over here of that conference.  The context was the war in Iraq which was then six months old.  The Bush administration was pressing other nations to join the fight against international terrorism.  I quote the diplomat who made this remark really quite emotionally.  I was surprised:  “The United States and Vietnam do have certain common interests, and Vietnam is willing to cooperate.  But if and when the United States says, ‘You are either for us or against us,’ I can assure you that Vietnam will not go along.”  It seems to me that in the coming decades as we practice the art of triangular diplomacy between the US, Vietnam and China, it seems to me that that piece of advice is pretty good to remember.  Thanks very much.

Christopher Griffin:  Thank you very much, Dr. Brown.  Alex?

Alexander Vuving:  Thanks, Chris.  And thank you, American Enterprise Institute, for inviting me.  I was asked to give some remarks on three questions.  The first is what does Vietnam seek from its interactions with China and the United States?  The second is how is Vietnam hedging its bets with these two great powers?  And the third question is what does this mean for US interests?  To answer this question, I think the key is to know what strategic game Vietnam is playing in its interactions with the outside world.  Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam has been playing two fundamentally different grand strategic games.  One is the anti-imperialist game and the other is the integration game.  The purpose of the anti-imperialist game is to protect the socialist regime; to do that the main foreign policy task is to oppose US imperialism.  The foreign policy lynchpin of this grand strategy is to forge a strategic alliance with China on ideological basis.  The purpose of the integration game is to modernize Vietnam; to do that, the key is to integrate it into the international order, which is still Western-dominated. 

The foreign policy keystone of this grand strategy is a friendly and cooperative relationship with the West and memberships in such groupings as ASEAN and WTO, the World Trade Organization.  These two games cannot be seen, however, as a deliberate hedging policy of a monolithic actor.  To understand how fundamentally different these two grand strategic games Vietnam is playing, I think it is useful to look back at how they emerged.  The two Vietnamese grand strategies emerged from two defining moments in the mid- to late 1980s.  The first defining event was the socioeconomic crisis which drove the country to near-collapse in the 1980s. 

This crisis began right after the end of the Vietnam War in the late 1970s and reached its climax in the mid-1980s.  The experience of this crisis was coupled with the experience of the rise of newly industrialized countries in Asia, countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, which were disrespected by the Vietnamese as new types of colonies of US imperialism, but now [indiscernible] as Asian miracle.  Out of these experiences emerged a new Vietnamese grand strategy.  According to this grand strategy, the new grand strategy game that Vietnam is to play is one of economic and institutional modernization and international integration.  This new grand strategy was based on a new world outlook apparently influenced by Gorbachev’s new thinking in USSR. 

This new world view no longer sees the world in terms of a class struggle between socialism and imperialism but in terms of a single world market, in terms of the impact on every aspect of human life of the scientific technological revolution, in terms of what we now call “globalization,” but then called “internalization,” and in terms of the primacy of national interest and pragmatism as opposed to class interest in Marxist-Leninist ideology.  The policy implications of this world view are that Hanoi must join the world -– the international order, which is still Western dominated.  And it must seek cooperation with the West and other capitalist countries in the Asia-Pacific region where the driving forces of globalization are concentrated.  And already in 1989, Hanoi signaled its willingness to join ASEAN and [indiscernible] with the capitalist world outweighed its [indiscernible] with the Soviet bloc.  But soon came the second defining event that revived the old grand strategy that Vietnam almost abandoned after 1986. 

In August 1989, the Solidarity won the first free election in Poland and from the first non-communist government in a socialist state.  This prompted the old thinkers to action and even got the reformist General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh back to the old thinking.  These people felt a mortal threat to a frightening change emanating from the West.  They believed that Western countries led first of all by the UN, United States, and CIA were pursuing the strategy of peaceful evolution aimed at throwing the communist party out of power.  And thus, they believed that US and the West were the real authors of regime collapse in Poland, Hungary and other Eastern European countries that took place in the last months of 1989.  But contrarily, the new thinkers argued that it was not external attacks but internal errors, not plots of imperialism but an obsolete model of socialism that was the primary source of the regime collapse in Eastern Europe. 

So after six months of fierce debate within the Vietnam communist party, in March 1990 the old thinkers emerged as the winner.  The victory of the old thinkers was symbolized by the removal of [indiscernible] who was a member of the Politburo and the loudest advocate of reform and democratization from the Party Central Committee.  The old thinkers and the new thinkers came [indiscernible] to compromise that economic reform must be continued and the country needs to be cautiously open to the world.  The result was a grand strategic dualism that would characterize Vietnam’s post-Cold War policies.  This is the dualism of protecting the socialist regime and modernizing the country, the dualism of fighting Western influence and joining the Western-dominated international order.  But this is, however, not symmetric dualism, but it is an asymmetric dualism.  After 1989, the first priority was given to protecting socialism from Western attacks and more emphasis was given to the fight against Western attempts of regime change. 

Economic and institutional modernization and international integration were relegated to the second priority.  This explains why in July 1992, at the same time as Hanoi declared that it wanted to make friends with all other countries in the world, it assumed the national security strategy that stipulated that the country should determine its friends and foes on an ideological basis.  As always, throughout the 1990s China was regarded as the strategic ally, and America the strategic enemy.  All this changed, however, after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which demonstrated the reality of a unipolar world.  In July 2003, the Vietnam communist party passed a new national security strategy that stressed the primacy of national interest.  It stipulated that the question of friends and foes will be determined on a pragmatic basis, not on an ideological basis. 

Accordingly, Vietnam considers as partners whoever supports its goals and it considers as opponents whoever opposes its goals.  This paved the way for deepening ties with the US and its allies.  In the remaining months of 2003, Hanoi sent four ministers, including the defense minister and a deputy prime minister to Washington.  Also, Vietnam hosted the first ever US Navy ship visit since the end of the Vietnam War.  After Premier Phan Van Khai’s visit to the United States in June 2005, Hanoi ceased to call the US an enemy and began to call it a friend.  In October 2006, Vietnam and Japan officially declared their relation as a strategic partnership.  The change in strategic orientation also gave the decisive push for Vietnam’s bid to join WTO. 

Today, the primary grand strategic game Vietnam is playing is modernization and integration, while anti-imperialism is relegated to the second place.  So what does this mean for Vietnam’s relations with China and United States?  In both the post-1989 and the post-2003 periods, Vietnam tried to keep a balance position between the two great powers.  But a balanced position does not mean equidistance.  In the post-1989 period, Vietnam’s objective was a strategic alliance with China that does not antagonize the United States.  Now in the post-2003 period, Vietnam’s dream which also poses a dilemma to it is a strategic partnership with the United States that does not antagonize China.  What does this mean for US interests?  I think that with the rise of the integrationists and the decline of the anti-imperialists, there will be no fundamental disagreement on strategic issues between the United States and Vietnam. 

So I think the best policy that promotes US interests is comprehensive engagement with Vietnam.  This means [indiscernible] economic and trade relationship but also full-fledged military and security partnership.  I think a security partnership between the United States and Vietnam is quite possible.  The major obstacle, however, on the road toward a security partnership between the two countries is a mutual distrust between some in the two governments that is the remnant of the decades-long hostility.  Many in Vietnam still believe that the US government stands behind separatists and anti-government activities both in and outside Vietnam.  I think that trust-building would be crucial to foster a security partnership between United States and Vietnam.  Thank you for your attention.

Christopher Griffin:  Thank you very much, Alex.  Now we get to transition to the question and answer period.  We will briefly take advantage of the prerogative of the moderator and just ask a pair of very quick questions to both of our speakers.  First to Fred.  You mentioned the growth in US aid to Vietnam since normalization.  Just looking at the figures there, that seems to be almost entirely in the category of OD humanitarian aid and almost no development assistance.  And just looking at some of the announcements coming from the Chinese government, in particular on development assistance compared to humanitarian aid where they can do so much more than we can there.  And in particular, mostly due to legal restrictions, the United States still has very little. 

Do you see any prospects for switching to development aid with Vietnam?  Do you see any necessity for that?  And then quickly for Alex, with the breakdown that you made between the anti-imperialists and the integrationists within the Vietnamese government, we would be very interested to know in those two categories on foreign policy issues, how do they relate back to domestic politics and some questions of internal reform?  Thank you.

Frederick Z. Brown:  On assistance, I’m told that about four-fifths of the US assistance goes to health-related matters and programs in Vietnam, particularly the President’s initiative on PREFAR, it is called, on AIDS control, HIV-AIDS.  So very heavily in the direction of humanitarian assistance or health and medical matters.  On development aid I do not know what the thinking is; perhaps Ambassador Burghardt can tell us that.  But I think there is no reason why you cannot at least think about that and maybe move in that direction.  I do not know what the current status is, but you are quite right; humanitarian aid is the thrust.  And under the IMED thing there is mainly for –- it is a very small amount; it is under $100,000.  It is all for training with, perhaps, a little bit for so called non-lethal assistance.  But you are talking about a pittance, a very small thing.

Alexander Vuving:  The label I gave to anti-imperialists and integrationists is mostly related to foreign policy, their policy strategy.  But they are related to two different grand strategies, which are two full packages of both foreign policy and domestic policies.  So related to domestic policies, because the two grand strategies are based on two fundamentally different world views, the view about how the world operates and how the world is organized.  And so, also on two different visions of not only the world order but also domestic order. 

And so it can be said that in domestic issues, integrationists tend to promote liberalization in economic liberalization and reform in governance issues, such as they promote the establishment of the rule of law and democratization.  I think that democracy and democratization is very much in the interest of the Vietnamese government; not everyone in the Vietnamese government but at least liberal elements in the Vietnamese government.  So, they are advocating reform of the political system, which includes the establishment of the rule of law and moral democracy within the [indiscernible] system.

Frederick Z. Brown:  Just let me add to what Alexander said, some of the money that is included in the assistance goes to non-governmental organizations such as the Asia Foundation for very, very viable training or assistance in helping the Vietnamese regularize their system of –- or their economic system.  It is very, very valuable to have this done.  And in addition to things like Civil Society and assistance with the National Assembly, Vietnam gets a lot of assistance from many countries with regard to its legislative system.  But that would be included in the assistance package that I mentioned of somewhere around $50 million.

Christopher Griffin:  All right.  Well, thank you.  On question and answer, I see a couple of you who have been to AEI regularly.  Just very quickly, three ground rules, that please state your name, your organization, affiliation.  Please ask one question at a time.  I was not a good model for that, but please do the same yourselves.  And then last on the questions, sort of like Jeopardy, please state your statement as a question that it is always greatly appreciated. 

And if we can start with the gentleman at the back.  Also, please wait for the microphone.  For the transcript, if you could wait for the microphone.  Thank you.

Julian Harriet [phonetic]:  Julian Harriet.  I’m a documentary filmmaker.  A pro-capitalist communist regime sounds to me like an oxymoron.  So my question is what are the implications of a rapidly-growing entrepreneurial class –- let us call it a bourgeois class for lack of a better term.  What are the implications of that for the security of the one-party state in Vietnam?

Alexander Vuving:  All right, I think this question is related to my thesis about the two grand strategies within the Vietnamese party.  Vietnam is still a one-party state and it is still officially a Marxist-Leninist state.  But to say so is not the whole picture because since at least the mid- to late 1980s, there is a powerful movement within the system itself to reform it, not only economically but also politically, s¬o what characterizes Vietnamese politics is not its monolithic Marxist-Leninist facet but the contest and compromise inside the system between two different grand strategies. 

One is to preserve the old nature of the system; another is to reform it, to make it more adaptive [indiscernible] to the world or today.  So, it is an oxymoron because there is two competing trends or competing currents within Vietnamese politics which pushes and pulls Vietnamese politics, not only foreign policy but also domestic policy in two different directions.  So, they still retain their one-party system, but there are lots of movement beneath that facet that I think the considerable portion of the political establishment wants to reform it, to change the system itself.  So, I think it is the system in transformation, I think there will be a lot of change in the future.  So we have seen a lot of change in the last 20 years and so it is still in transition.

Frederick Z. Brown:  I would certainly agree with that.  I think it is quite clear that the party does not accept the idea of pluralism in the political system.  That does not mean that there is not plenty of pluralism in Vietnam, much more so now than, let’s say, 10 years or certainly 20 years ago.  You can see that in the way the National Assembly operates in which many voices are heard.  Nobody is calling for pluralism in the National Assembly but what you hear are many different points of view with regard to social and economic matters that are raised. 

Likewise, to the extent that we know what is going on in the Communist Party and the congresses, etcetera, certainly there is a huge diversity of opinion; you can call that a form of pluralism if you want.  It is all kept within the Communist Party for the large part, but nonetheless there is various –- the complexity of Vietnamese society now is vastly greater than it was a few years ago.  This is being -- this can only be due in part to the changes in the economy.  Right now, you can say that maybe 10 or 20 percent of the Vietnamese people are benefiting directly in terms of cash in their pocket from the economic changes that have been made.  But that is growing and there is a certain trickle-down effect; certainly the rice bowls are now full in Vietnam for most people.  But that was not the case. 

The poverty level in Vietnam has fallen according to UN figures from -- I believe it is now under 20 percent.  That is very, very important, and I think that the economic changes that you are talking about, the rise of an entrepreneurial class can only speed the increase of diversity.  Now, when that will be or if and when that will be reflected in the political party system, we have to wait and see.  My personal feeling is that the change is going to come within the Communist Party first.  You certainly see plenty of diversity in the party as Alexander has described.  So, the situation is evolving and I think -- let me just stop there, okay?

Christopher Griffin:  Every good Q&A session needs someone to break the ice so that they could [indiscernible] good question and good answers.  Yes ma’am, in the white.

Jean Montgomery [phonetic]:  As a followup -- Jean Montgomery.  As a followup to that question, could you be more specific about the various forces that you are identifying as pluralism within the party?  [Audio glitch] assume businessman would [audio glitch] in that and [audio glitch] could you be -- flesh that out in a little more detail?

Alexander Vuving:  [Indiscernible] especially after the Tenth Congress which was convened last year, 2006, and since it is Tenth Party Congress, there is a lot of new voices from among the regime people demanding -- so they identified error in the system itself.  The system [indiscernible] refer to regime and the socialist regime in Vietnam.  So they identified errors in the system itself and so their implication is that the system should be changed.  So -- and these -- the new is that these voices are not suppressed but they are brought into leading newspapers which are still controlled by the Party.  So I think that is a quite new development.

Jean Montgomery:  [Inaudible]

Alexander Vuving:  Some -– the points of view converge on the question of system error, that they see a lot of failures in governance and economic management which emerged in the last 20 years, such as corruption and ineffective management of the state.  And so, the convergence of opinion, of this opinion on identifying errors in the system, they are still not concrete in identifying which error.  But because I think one of the reasons is that they are still cautious about that, so they try to be abstract in their criticism.  But the message is clear that the error is in the system, so the system should be changed.

Christopher Griffin:  Okay, gentleman in the red tie.

Lee Kuo Kwan [phonetic]:  My name is Lee Kuo Kwan.  I’m a local governance specialist.  I just came from Vietnam to US here.  Today, we are talking about the US and Vietnam relationship and we understand that the US is the home of two million Vietnamese overseas, and during the New Year time, nearly 200,000 Vietnamese overseas here in United States come back to Vietnam.  And you see when Bush came to Vietnam last month, he talked to the Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.  He is the member of the Politburo.  I think now ranking about number three; he is the most important guy in Vietnam.  He said that, “I am very happy because your children have come to United States to study and one of them already married with Vietnamese-American people.” 

So my question is to Dr. Frederick Z. Brown, how do you evaluate the personal relationship of Vietnamese in here in United States and Vietnam in our country, in my homeland country in their US and Vietnamese relations?  Thank you very much.

Frederick Z. Brown:  I think the role of the overseas Vietnamese community -- and, I guess, the majority reside in the United States -- is extremely important.  I sensed -- and this is from conversations with people in the Vietnamese-American community.  I sensed that there is a greater acceptance of the fact that there is a communist regime in Vietnam, that it is not going to be displaced in the near future and that change is occurring in Vietnam compared, let’s say, to the attitude of Vietnamese-American community 10, 15, 20 years ago which was predominantly hostile to the Hanoi regime.  I think you have more of an acceptance now among Vietnamese-Americans and a greater willingness certainly to begin to make their investments in Vietnam.  That has already happened; a lot of money going into Vietnam.  The remittances to Vietnam now are somewhere in the $2 to $4 billion range legally or illegally. 

I think the Vietnamese-American community is very important and I think -- by the same token, I sensed that there is more understanding by the Hanoi regime of the need and the desirability of cultivating the overseas Vietnamese community.  And that, as Alexander said, has been a lot of tug-of-war -- ideological among the old folks and the new folks in Vietnam -- regarding the overseas Vietnamese community.  I think there is now an understanding that, “Look, we have to not only get along with these people, we have to incorporate them as Vietnamese into our society again.” 

So I think that is a hopeful sign and I hope I’m not being too optimistic.  But I sense that and I think the community can play a very important role.  There may be a small majority who are trying to go about regime change in a violent manner, but I do not think they are anywhere near as important as they were a few years back.  So, I think that is on the upward slope, if you want.  I think it is very, very important that, for example, there be recognition that the people who fought on the losing side deserve a decent burial in Vietnam.  I think that is a place where the reconstituting of cemeteries for the urban [sounds like] and even for the popular and regional forces in Vietnam who died in this war have a place.  And I think all this is moving slowly, but I think headed in the right direction.

Christopher Griffin:  Thank you.  Mr. Chanda?

Nayan Chanda:  Thank you.  I’m Nayan Chanda from Yale University.  This is a question for Mr. Vuving.  I really enjoyed your remarks; very insightful.  I have a question about the Chinese reaction to the Vietnamese strategy, in the Chinese official statements as well as, perhaps, private conversations.  How do you see they are reacting to Vietnam’s approach?

Alexander Vuving:  I think, first, the Chinese reaction to the new developments in Vietnam, especially to the warming in US-Vietnamese relationship -- I think this should be seen in the wider context of China’s peripheral diplomacy which was given more emphasis after, I think, the [indiscernible] incident in 1999.  So before 1999, the emphasis of Chinese foreign policy you saw on great power strategy [indiscernible].  And then after 1999, the Chinese realized that there is the reality of the unipolar world, that the United States is more powerful than they estimated because at the early 1990s, the overall estimation in Chinese foreign policy calculation is that the US is on decline and the world is heading towards a multi-polar world.  But now they realize there is a unipolar world, and then they changed their grand strategy towards and the emphasis on peripheral diplomacy.  And then they tried to make nice with all their neighbors, including Vietnam. 

So, China’s Vietnamese policies should be seen within this wider context and so there is a chance to improve US-Vietnamese relationship because now China has much lower leverage in putting weight into US-Vietnamese relationship.  There is still significant tension in China-Vietnam relations, such as the incident in Tonkin Gulf in which nine Vietnamese fishermen were shot.  But overall, I think China react very less assertively, less aggressively to any improvement in relationship between Vietnam and Western countries such as -- so the declaration of the strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan occurred in this context, and China did not write any significant negative reaction to that.  So that encouraged the warming of relationships between Vietnam and the United States and its allies.

Allan Wendt:  Allan Wendt.  My question is directed to either or both speakers.  One of you alluded to corruption as an issue.  In the press in the last year or so, there has been a lot of publicity given to some notorious examples of corruption that the regime apparently did seek to punish.  The question is this:  Is endemic corruption in Vietnam today any worse than elsewhere in Southeast Asia?  Is it a serious problem that the regime is taking seriously, lest widening corruption interfere with economic development in the country and prevent the normal economic incentives of a growing market economy from being developed?

Frederick Z. Brown:  I cannot be comparative with regard to corruption in Vietnam versus the Philippines or Indonesia.  I will not take that on, Allan.  I do think that corruption is one of the very important issues in Vietnam if only because the Communist Party says it is; they have certainly made no secret of that.  You recall the farewell speech of Phan Van Kai to the National Assembly in which he apologized; he apologized for his failure to curb corruption, and really quite remarkable.  So I think this is -– actually, corruption ends up being an agent for change, it seems to me, because the Vietnamese people who are suffering from incidences of corruption -- let’s say, lack of adequate development of social resources in Vietnam because of corruption, they must –- there can only be one party that is responsible for it, the Communist Party.  So who do they blame?  They can only blame one party for it.  So it seems to me this is a very important element in social maturation -- I will not dare say evolution -- of the system in Vietnam, but I think it is very important.

Alexander Vuving:  I do not know much about corruption in other Southeast Asian countries, so I am not in position to compare the degree of corruption in Vietnam with other countries. But you can take some index which is issued by institutions like Transparency.  So Vietnam’s place is on the same category with the Philippines, Indonesia in Southeast Asia.  How the party perceived corruption as a threat to regime? 

I think that corruption is taken very seriously.  Only in 1994 the Vietnamese Communist Party identified four major threats to the regime survival.  One is by [indiscernible], which is the -- Vietnam’s lagging behind other countries in the region.  The second is corruption.  The third is the deviation from the socialist path and the fourth is peaceful evolution.  And they stressed that no one threat is more important than the other, so there is equal importance for the four threats.  So that left a wide leeway for interpretation.  It depends on your world view.  It depends on your own perception that you emphasize one among these four threats.  But in the recent years, there is an increasing awareness, not only in the populace but also in the elite, that corruption rose to be the number one threat to regime survival.  And I think that -- especially Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung seems to be quite aware of that and he pushes for much more anti-corruption campaign.

Frederick Z. Brown:  Let me add to that one bit.  I have never been able to figure out the extent to which newspaper coverage in Vietnam -- any stories on corruption are used as a tool among power brokers in Vietnam and the Communist Party to get at their rivals for one reason or another, and that is really inside baseball.  Foreigners have very difficult time figuring that out if they want to figure it out.  So I would be delighted to hear anybody in the audience who could tell me to what extent the corruption stories in the paper are used as weapons against rival factions.  I think that is a fascinating  possibility.

Christopher Griffin:  Thank you.  Let’s see, I will take  one from the back.  The gentleman in the blazer.

Viet Lam [phonetic]:  I am Viet Lam of Radio Free Asia.  I have a question to Dr. Alexander Vuving of Harvard University.  In your speech, you suggested that the United States to build trust and engage comprehensively to Vietnam.  My question is that in light of such policy, should the United States make it low priority the issue of promotion of human rights and democracy in Vietnam?

Alexander Vuving:  I think that it is in the fundamental interest of the United States to promote human rights and democracy all over the world.  So, what you refer to, I think, is the tactics in United States foreign policy, how best to promote human rights.  I think the goal should remain the promotion of human rights and democracy in Vietnam, but the question is how.  Fred Brown has mentioned in his speech about the Vietnamese remark on the way the United States gathered alliance all over the world after Iraq war –- or before that.  I think that the Vietnamese prefer kind of indirect approach. 

So, I think it would be [indiscernible] go to promote kind of a dialogue on human rights and democracy issues between the United States and Vietnam.  But you should avoid the impression of the United States intervening in domestic issues because, for the Vietnamese, sovereignty is very highly-valued.  And so you should avoid that.  You want to intervene in Vietnam’s domestic issues and you want to change the government of Vietnam, that is not productive; that is counter-productive.  I think that you can sit down and conduct a dialogue with Vietnamese government but you should not say that, “In my view, my system is the best,” and so and so.  But you can say differently.  You say that, “I’m not sure which system is the best but I have this and this experience and we can share our experience.”  So I think that approach is more productive than saying, “Whether you are with me or against me.”

Frederick Z. Brown:  I think it has always been a problem defining what democracy is, and I think it can be oversimplified.  I do not like bandying around and arguing for “democratization” all the time.  I think participatory governance in the society is what should be attempted.  And in Vietnam, the Vietnamese have a way of doing things.  It is not the American way.  The Vietnamese people are clearly anxious to have a better life and they want to participate in their governance system right now that is filtered through the Communist Party.  Two or three percent of the people in Vietnam are members of the Party and the power rests pretty much with them.  They are subject, of course, to pressures of the other 97 percent, and that is increasingly the case with the rise of local organizations, such as “associations,” they are called, in which the Fatherland Front, which is the vehicle for the Communist Party [indiscernible] the countryside, is unable to answer the needs of the people.  They form their own organizations which are not political in nature but they are social in nature.  They bring about a degree of participatory governance, if you want; at least, it seems to me they will over time. 

That should gradually make change, but I think democratization is just a neat term to be pushing that kind.  As Alexander has said, that can be very counter-productive and has to be handled very carefully.  I think the human right’s dialogue -- I do not know if it includes only specific human rights cases -- is interesting but it is not really going to move matters ahead a lot.  What you need is a dialogue which does take place among think-tanks and increasingly in the society that this is where the discussion should be held.

Christopher Griffin:  The gentleman up front there, please.

Ken Worthy [phonetic]:  Ken Worthy.  I’m a Professor of Law at American University as well as an independent consultant.  I think it is interesting and I want to ask this question that there are two themes here that need to converge.  Is it not true that transition economies who are trying to make the transition between the socialist, centrally-planned economy type and the entrepreneurially-driven investment-based free market economy face two paradigms?  And in my experience, I see these two paradigms, having lived in China and having gone to some other countries.  One paradigm is the Chinese paradigm, which over the last -- since the rise of Deng Xiaoping has been characterized by economic and commercial liberalization and decentralization of the governmental power, and maintenance of a political stability framework, you might say, in the retention of the Communist Party. 

And you look at Russia on the other hand, which is another paradigm where it broke all apart, where all of a sudden you had no political framework of -– no effective framework for a while of political stability, nor did you have any economic or commercial stability either.  And these are the two paradigms these countries in transition are looking at.  And when you mention democracy, of course, that has to do with the paradigm of how are you going to govern a country and what framework of stability for economic and commercial activities are you going to have as opposed to that.  So my question to you is which are the better frameworks and which should we be looking at in terms of trying to influence Vietnam?

Frederick Z. Brown:  Do you really think we can influence Vietnam that much is my first question.  I think the problem in Vietnam, as I understand it -- one of the problems is the fate of the state-owned enterprises and the extent to which the so-called “equitization” -– it is not privatization; it is equitization -- is really fair and equitable.  I do not know the answer to that.  I wish we had Josh here to give that a try.  But it seems to me there has been a tendency to take the assets of the state-owned enterprises and make sure they end up in the hands of certain people at the provincial level or at the national level, which in a way perverts and diverts the equitability of renovation.  The Party obviously knows that it has to reduce the scope of the state-owned enterprises and it is going about it slowly. 

One of our professors at SAIS, James Riedel, has spent a lot of time on this.  He thinks the state-owned enterprises should not be simply dissolved.  What they have to do is be put in competition with private entrepreneurialship, as it was the case in Taiwan or in South Korea.  I think this is a legitimate way of looking at it.  The point is the Vietnamese are very –- the leadership is not stupid.  They understand that they have to get their fair share.  I think that is a real danger because I’m not sure that the private entrepreneurs in Vietnam are getting a good break.   [Indiscernible] the United States policy is trying very hard, as are other people at the World Bank, et cetera, are making efforts to improve the equitability of renovation.  But I think it is a real problem for the Party.  They cannot end up having Party members, or wives of Party members, owning all the state-owned enterprise assets.  So I think it is a real problem.

Alexander Vuving:  I think it is different to discuss the question of which paradigm is better at the abstract level and at the concrete level.  I think that Vietnam has its own particular conditions.  So, which paradigm is better for Vietnam?  I think neither the Chinese model nor the Soviet model, or the Russian model, is the best for Vietnamese conditions.  But there is a lot of similarity between Vietnam and China, and so it seems to outside observers that Vietnam is following the Chinese model.  But in reality I do not think that is true because -- there is a lot of similarity and so they just follow a kind of rational solution to the same problems. 

So, the similarity in what Vietnam is pursuing and what China is doing is not in that Vietnam has followed the Chinese model but in that they have the same similar conditions and then they are similarly rational.  I think from the reality of Vietnamese conditions, I think, in question of reform, economic reform should have priority at certain earlier time of the reform process.  But if you just perpetuate that, you always have economic priority before the reform of political system, then at certain point in the process you should have a kind of a crisis that because the two are mutually supportive or destructive.  So it depends on the timing, and I think right now the Vietnamese leadership has increasingly been aware of the need for political reform.  I believe that in the near future, in 5 or 10 years, there will be a big change in Vietnam regarding political reform.

Christopher Griffin:  It always seems that bringing up the Russian model is a little bit unfair ¬because nobody really wants to vote for the Russian model, seeing what they experienced.  Very quickly, I had promised the last question but just very quickly transition there, that -- just one idea.  Thinking of outcomes, what comes to mind is a question of almost the Polish model that you do have a small economy that is more or less successfully reformed, moderately prosperous, more or less capitalist as a leverage to this relationship with the United States at the security level to be able to engage its regional giants in a little bit more secure manner.  But just another thought.  But ma’am, please.

Female Voice:  Thank you.  [Indiscernible].  I just want to follow up on the points that two speakers mentioned, the interesting phenomenon with different forces within the Party in Vietnam that it is a struggle between the reform-oriented and the more conservative thinking.  I would like to say that it is not rare.  I mean, we see that in other countries including China.  I personally was fortunate to witness debates between the reformers and the conservative side of the court system in China.  We had a rule of law reform project in China. 

However, my question is how influential is the reform-oriented force within the Party?  What is your sense of the willingness of the government in Vietnam?  Even receiving information; for example, we mentioned corruption is a big problem there.  The government realized the importance of doing anti-corruption work, but what is the willingness that they have?  Because it is not a regime change attempt; it simply could be providing information on the best practice around the globe on anti-corruption.  What is your sense of their willingness?  Thank you.

Alexander Vuving:  [Indiscernible] your question.  Can you repeat your question?  I just –- sorry, I just lost the idea.

Female Voice:  Yes.  I guess to put it in another way is that it seems like there is a consensus that corruption, for example, is a big problem in Vietnam.  The government, according to your remarks earlier, realized that and they are willing, sounds like, to work on it.  So my question is that where there is an international practice, whenever some government team in a certain country is working on corruptions, some of them are willing to learn from the best practices around the globe.  My question is what is your sense of the Vietnamese government now knowing they need to work on the corruption issue?  Was there willingness to accept international communities’ information on what other countries have been doing?  What are the failure stories?  What are the success stories?

Alexander Vuving:  I think the pressure that is exerted on the Vietnam government regarding corruption comes mainly from inside, from the populace, not from this.  There are also pressures from the international community in terms of eight conditions and the country’s overall image which affects the country’s standing and its effectiveness of diplomacy on the international stage.  But the major pressure comes from the population.  And so, corruption hinders the effect -– destroys the effectiveness of governance at all levels in Vietnam.  It hinders the economic growth, which is one of the high priorities of the Vietnamese government.  Corruption destroys the trust that the population has about the government, and thus people in the Vietnamese government now realize that corruption is a mortal threat to regime survival. 

And so, I think there are top leaders who are very aware of that and they -– it seems to me that they sincerely are pushing for anti-corruption campaign but they are afraid with the heavy bureaucracy which has its parochial interest in corruption because of the obsolete weight in salary system in Vietnam.  No officials in Vietnam live from their salaries.  So I think one of the crucial questions is to reform the salary system to give the state officials real incentives in working effectively and more -- to clean the bureaucracy.

Christopher Griffin:  And that brings us to the conclusion of our panel.  Sorry for all those who were not able to ask your questions.  We will take a short -- about 15- to 20-minute -- break so we are going to have chance to grab a sandwich.  Ambassador Burghardt will give some comments around 1:00.  Thank you very much.

[End of Panel I]

[Start of Panel II]

Danielle Pletka:  Hello?  If I can get everybody’s attention?  Good afternoon everybody.  I'm Danielle Pletka.  I'm the Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies here at the American Enterprise Institute.  I have to say, I'm a little bit reluctant to interrupt all of you.  It is rare that we have such a convivial grouping and everybody is having such a good time eating their lunch.  I hate to interrupt it with substance, but that is our job here and so I will do just that. 

It is really a great pleasure for me to introduce Ambassador Ray Burghardt to speak here today for this conference on US-Vietnam relations.  Ambassador Burghardt has a more than rich history dealing with Vietnam.  In fact, he was ambassador to Vietnam.  But prior to that, he served in his first political posting for the foreign service in Vietnam and like a recidivist, kept going back to, not just Vietnam, but to the issue to Southeast Asia; and so we are really honored to have him here today to talk about this issue.  In addition to all of these postings, he also speaks fluent Vietnamese. 

So, while we have to insist that you speak in English here today, we really are lucky to have someone with such great credentials and this is enormously important.  We spent the last panel talking about the question of how our allies and friends in Southeast Asia can confront the question of a rising China.  How do they at once embrace an important economic neighbor and how do they, at the same time, not repel but perhaps contend with the strategic challenge of a neighbor that does have enormous ambitions in Pacific to be the regional hegemon not only against our interest -- something that is potentially quite clear -- but even against the interest of those countries in the region.  It is an important and difficult balancing act and walking on that fence is not always easy; countries find themselves with the job often falling off onto one side or the other.  In any case, without further ado, let me turn to Ambassador Burghardt, thank him for being here and give you the podium.

Raymond Burghardt:  Thank you very much.  Great to be with all of you today.  It is a big turnout.  Several people said, well, last night, there probably would not be many people here since it was snowing.  It was going to snow.  As in New York, I was reminded of the old New York joke about Washington, which is -- we have many New York jokes about Washington.  But this one is that, you know, it snows there every year and every year they are surprised.  I would like to sort of -- the remarks this morning were great.  Frankly, Fred Brown particularly, I think covered the security relationship and covered how the triangle works and how it needs to continue to work -- about as well as anyone could. 

What I would like to do is talk a little bit about how we got there, and so there will be a little bit of history, not too much.  I think it is necessary in order to see what the two countries expect of each of other and how those expectations have evolved and gotten to the point where they are.  It has been remarked a lot yesterday or recently by people writing about US and Vietnam, it is quite extraordinary that two countries that fought such a long and bitter war with each other now have such a friendly relationship.  In fact, other people have observed, if you look around the world, we seem to have a bit of tension with some of our old friends in the world.  We can think of some in Europe and some others.  And here you have two countries that are once were bitter, bitter enemies and yet seem to be getting along very well. 

It was an interesting comment by Steve Bosworth and Morton Abramowitz in a very good article they wrote about US-Asia Policy recently in which they said, “Ironically, Vietnam may be the most pro-American country in Southeast Asia.”  There is probably a lot to that.  My own observation is, if you go to Vietnam, one of the things you see is that American soft power which has been discussed so often lately in terms of having eroded in many places in the world seems to be quite strong still in Vietnam.  If you walk into a bookstore in Hanoi or in Saigon, half of the books on display seemed to be about Bill Gates.  He is obviously idolized by young people in Vietnam.  They practically overwhelmed him when he came there. 

The good relations, I think, between US and Vietnam, I attribute to two factors.  One is that, I think, if you go back to the process of normalization which began long, long before the formal normalization of 1995; that process, all along from the very beginning until now, what has marked that process has been a very pragmatic, very generally non-ideological approach by both sides in order to use the relationship with each other, both the formal one after ’95 and the informal one before ’95, in a way to solve problems that the two sides have and the way to benefit from each other.  There was a remarkable ability to focus on the present and the future rather than on the past.  Secondly, more recently, and like Alex, I dated tonight to 2003 and the party plenum in 2003. 

More recently, there has been the convergence between United States and Vietnam to realizing that, you know, we do not have any strategic conflict with each other.  In fact, we actually have some very important areas of strategic convergence.  So, let's go back to ’95 and even before ’95 and how we got to normalization.  I think there are two things that characterize that process, which are quite, to me, have always been very interesting.  The first is that the US-Vietnam normalization process was more than most examples of international relations I can think of. 

But also, I think, in many ways, a precursor of international relations’ trends in the 21st century, was a process that was driven by non-government actors.  It is very important that you had the families of POWs/MIAs.  You had veterans groups, particularly the veterans groups that wanted reconciliation with Vietnam.  There are other reference groups that did not.  And then you had Vietnamese-Americans which was largely a force-resisting normalization, but still an important player in the picture.  And then you had companies that wanted to do business there.  You had universities that were interested in establishing relationships with Vietnam.  University of Hawaii, for example, was well into doing business in Vietnam in the early 1980s.  You had groups like John McAuliff  and his Fund for Reconciliation, very important and very early on in the normalization process.  Even artists, lots of very interesting people -- good friends of mine -– who, very early on, were involved in setting up exhibits of Vietnamese art in United States, exhibits of American art in Vietnam, all part of this process of building trust. 

And then the second point I would make:  So, there was sort of a non-governmental factor.  The second point which kind of follows from the first, in some ways, is that the normalization process between Vietnam and United States has been one of layers; of setting a layer to deal, first and foremost, to the POW/MIA issue.  I went to Vietnam on behalf of the State Department with Rich Armitage, who was then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, in March 1982 for the first negotiations we had in Hanoi about resolving the POW/MIA issue because we knew we had to get that issue out of the way before we can get on to anything else. 

So, it was that layer.  It started and we had sent teams from the Pentagon to work in Hanoi on that issue in the early 90s, long before normalization.  They stayed there because these layers continue.  They continue on.  And then we had to deal with other historical issues:  Reuniting families.  People whose families had fled here or fled to Australia or wherever and they still have relatives left behind.  We set up an office to deal with that issue, the refugee office in Saigon, also in the early 90s, also long before formal normalization; and that process also goes on.  And then, there were all the humanitarian efforts:  The veterans’ groups that got involved there on mine clearance and on providing prosthetics.  Those efforts now also continue, but with a lot more US government help than in the past. 

So, what we had was sort of “single-issue interest groups” who had these issues they wanted to deal with and then eventually the government got involved in that process and it led toward the normalization in ’95.  So while the US was sort of this collection of single-issue issues, and I would say very importantly in the pre-2003 period, for the most part, I would say it is important to see that the US involvement in normalization in Vietnam was not really driven by a strategic objective in this stage.  It was remarkably non-strategic in its approach.  From the point of view of Vietnam, I guess, a lot of Vietnamese for the most part speak for themselves on what motivated them.  But from our perception of what seemed to be motivating Vietnam, I would say it was access to US markets was the motivation. 

And then there was the realization that, as Vietnam, in the manner that Alex described very well, Vietnam is sort of becoming more interested in joining the world, integrating with the world.  Seeing that in many cases, the US held the ticket toward membership in a lot of these key clubs which included the World Trade Organization, APEC, et cetera.  Then, as you moved toward the post-normalization period after ’95, I think one trend you can see that is very important is that, as we move away from dealing with these historical issues, we are still doing them -- remember those layers -- but they are no longer the focus.  And so, the focus shifts toward the economic relationship.  It shifts toward investment in Vietnam, toward building up trade. 

And we saw -- we see that huge growth in that economic relationship since the bilateral trade agreement was signed at the end of ’01.  I think trade has gone up at least five times in that period of time.  And of course, many other agreements were rapidly signed:  The agreement on textiles; the agreement on civil aviation, we now have direct flights between the countries; and, the US is now Vietnam’s biggest trade partner.  The US investment to Vietnam has grown more slowly.  There were some frustration in Vietnam over that at the beginning.  Of course, Vietnam’s trade figures are a mess.  Actually, US-Vietnam -- investment in Vietnam is much greater than the figures would lead you to believe, that is another long story.  Most of the big US investments in Vietnam are counted in Vietnam’s official figures as Singapore investment including, among other things, $1 billion from ConocoPhillips.  That is because they are done through American subsidiaries in Singapore.  But even allowing for that, the figures were still sort of behind what they could be, considering the size of the US economy. 

That started to change.  Just in the last couple of years, you have seen a huge growth of American investment in Vietnam, and you are now seeing what are known as industry leaders moving in; and others will follow.  And most important there, I think -- two most important were Intel’s announcement of investment, first of 600 million, now, they are saying, now  it is going to be one billion for a testing and a chip factory in Ho Chi Minh City. 

Another one very important investment decision and this one was brought to my attention by a Vietnamese leader recently.  He said, you should make it sure that you remind people of the importance of Vietnam’s decision in 2005 to give the contract for its very first satellite project to Lockheed Martin.  It did not have to go to American company.  And a satellite is a sensitive issue; obviously, with military sensitivities, as well as, intelligence sensitivities.  But it was very deliberately given to a leading American defense contractor.  All of this is healthy for the relationship.  Among other things, the business community is an important constituency in the relationship.  Sort of a basic principle of international relations that you need a constituency for your relationship with other countries, and the business community is an important one.  You want CEOs who feel that they are willing to pick up their phone and call a senator about an issue involving that country.  If you do not have that, you end up with the relationship jerked around by issues at the moment that suddenly come up like human rights issues, for example. 

I would say that while the business issues and economic issues became the sort of new focus of the relationship in the early part of this decade, the humanitarian issues and educational relationship continue to deepen and widen.  Fred mentioned the huge amount of American aid given to on health issues, particularly HIV-AIDS.  Part of that was seeing that Vietnam had handled the SARS epidemic in a very responsible way, much more responsible than the certain other large country nearby.  The other thing that is important is the educational relationship.  The US spends more US government dollars or taxpayer dollars in Vietnam on higher education programs than in any other country in the world.  It is now more than $10 million a year:  Fulbright Programs plus the Vietnam Education Foundation, the special program for science and engineering students. 

Let's go to the second phase, post 2003.  I would argue that until then the pace of normalization was sort of measured, was good, but it was kind of slow.  When I went out to Vietnam as Ambassador in 2001, the people who most cared about the relationship, people like Senator Kerry, Senator McCain, Rich Armitage said, we are not fully normalized.  So what do you mean we are not fully normalized?  He said, well, we have formal normalization, but we are not doing things with each other that we are doing with other countries in Southeast Asia, particularly in the military area, intelligence-sharing, law enforcement.  We are not having strategic level discussions with each other; and see what you can do to get some of that going.  I did not make a lot of progress for a while.  What needed to happen was, as Vuving mentioned, what needed to happen was the party plenum in 2003.  What also needed to happen was a bit of a change in attitude of the United States. 

I think what is very interesting is that period -- if you look back at that period in 2003 -- it was not just at Vietnam.  It was in both countries where there was beginning to be a certain amount of strategic reassessment.  I have to here get in to sort of US-China relations also.  I mean, very briefly, if you remember, this was the administration that came in the office determined to take seriously the fact that the relationship with China was fundamentally a competitive one.  And then it came, September 11, 2001, and you saw the whole focus on working with China on those things.  And you start to hear certain phrases over and over again like the best relationships in ’79 with China and the best relationship ever with China and so forth.  Then we started to get -- that started to wear itself out by 2003.  One of the interesting reasons was that those of us who were out there working with countries surrounding China started to hear a lot of complaints. 

That was one of the most fascinating things about, I think for me, about that time in Vietnam is that Vietnamese -– the important Vietnamese -- would come up to me and say, “You know, you have been totally distracted to counter terrorism on Iraq.  You are not paying any attention to this part of the world.”  In their really honest moments they would say, “You know, nothing is ever going to really get solved over there in those areas.”  But meanwhile, the whole center of attention, the whole center, the whole focus of growth in the world is all here in Asia.  And by the way, while your attention has been totally distracted, the Chinese have been eating your lunch and you need to redirect your attention back here to this part of the world.  Some of these was self-serving, but that is all right. 

There is a lot of self-serving statements in diplomacy.  But mostly, it was quite serious and quite honest, and the Vietnamese would particularly express concern about increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.  And the countries they particularly were looking at were Cambodia, Laos, Burma otherwise known as Myanmar, and even Thailand.  There was a lot of concern about Thaksim as being utterly oblivious to increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, and probably making money often.  So we were hearing the same thing from Indonesia, from Japan, from India, particularly those countries; and, of course, most caustically and most wittily from Singaporeans.  Now, Americans are not very good at listening, but sometimes we do.  So these thoughts started to penetrate Washington, I would say, sometime toward the end of the first Bush administration.  And you started to see also, frankly, the whole reliance on China for dealing with terrorism to be considered somewhat less important. 

And so, you start to see a shift.  And so, now our relationship with China is now complicated.  Now, we talk about hedging.  And so, what happened -- very quickly to sort of move toward today -- what happened was, as Fred and others have said, you started to see thing happen very quickly, all of a sudden.  We were approached and said, “Remember that request for a ship visit?  Remember that request for a return visit by our defense minister to Washington,” which was like, it was so old hardly anybody remembered anymore.  They said, “Well, we would like to have that happen next month.”  And so, all of a sudden, it all happened.  In fact, if you remember Pham Van Tra, the defense minister who visited Don Rumsfeld in the Pentagon in November of 2003, and the shift as it came the next week; and things have moved rapidly since then. 

I would also point your attention in that period to a very important visit by Vu Khoan the Deputy Prime Minister, to Washington, New York, Texas, San Francisco in December 2003.  I was with him on that trip and what was very important was, in that trip there was the opportunity.  He met with Secretary Powell.  He met with Condi Rice when she was National Security Adviser.  In those conversations, there started to be a discussion of strategic issues, a discussion of strategic concerns; and that was something new in the relationship with Vietnam.  Before, those issues had seemed to be taboo.  There was something that Vietnam did not want to talk about with us; looking over its shoulder toward guess who?  And saw the big guy. 

Now, there was a more -- this refreshing willingness to talk with us about China.  As you have learned, China is a -- when you talk of people, talk about strategic issues in Asia, they are talking about China.  It is just a code word.  And of course, we have had since then this rapid progression of the relationship.  With the visit by the Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to Washington in June 2005, they did now quite regular ship visits.  There were various agreements on military cooperation, on law enforcement and drug cooperation.  Some of these had been just completely stalemated, had gone nowhere for years and years.  And then one, two, three, they have been signed one after another and have been implemented, for the most part. 

Now, getting into some of the things that Fred said, but saying them much more briefly, I would stress that the strategic alignment, which made possible this improvement in relations -- it is very important.  It is critical not to exaggerate it.  Vietnam remains wary of the United States.  Yes, Vietnam values America’s role in balancing power in the region.  But the wariness, the suspicion, about our proselytizing for democracy, human rights, and religious freedom is still quite deep-seated in Vietnam, particularly in certain quarters: particularly in the public security apparatus, and the propaganda department of the party, and to some extent, in the military.  But I think, more important than that even, is the fact that very wisely and understandably, Vietnam is never going to want to be seen as part of the US containment strategy against China.  It is always going to be looking over its shoulder to make sure that the big brother is not unduly provoked. 

The US understands this sensitivity on the part of China.  Containment is not our strategy, so we do not have to worry about that.  I think hedging is a very different strategy than containment, and Vietnam’s role in the hedging strategy has always been seen as a modest one.  It is important but we are not exaggerating how much to expect out of this.  I think that this will allow the relationship with this sort of somewhat modest expectations of each other.  I think it will allow us some good years ahead.  I expect we will continue to have problems with some of the issues that have been discussed already today.  The human rights issues, the religious freedom issues -– they are always going to be a thorn in the relationship.  There will continue to be groups in the United States, particularly in the Vietnamese-American community among some of the protestant and evangelical groups, who will demand focus on some of those human rights issues.  And no administration is going to be able to completely avoid them for that reason. 

But I think from the beginning, there has been a wisdom in dealing with this relationship on the part of both American parties when in power, of not allowing one issue, at any moment, jeopardize the overall relationship -- respecting the fact that there are multiple constituencies, multiple interests. Therefore, no one has the right to hold the entire relationship hostage over his or her favorite issue.  That is probably a pretty wise approach to most bilateral relationships, but we have not always been that wise.  But in this case, I would agree with Fred, in this case somehow miraculously we have managed to get it pretty right, I would say.  Thank you very much.   

Chris Griffin:  Questions, comments, rebuttals?  Yes, please.

Female Voice:  My name [indiscernible].  I'm rather struck by the difference in our policy for Cuba and Vietnam or shall we say our ability to reconcile with Vietnam and our inability to reconcile with Cuba even though we wreck far greater devastation on Vietnam that we did on Cuba.  Could you please tell me why we are doing so well with one when we did so poorly with the other?  They were both -- and Cuba was not even communist when we lost it.

Raymond Burghardt:  Well, I mean, all these things are two-way streets.  I would say that the government and -- I used to work on Latin American affairs a long, long time ago –- I would say that the government in Vietnam has, for years, been a much more agile, much more clever government that had a deal with the world than the government in Cuba, and therefore has served its own interests a lot better than the government in Cuba.  The other thing I would say is that, in the case of -- in terms of American politics, the Cuban-American lobby in the United States has been able -- has been a sort of a single-voiced lobby and been able to gain political influence in certain key states, particularly Florida and to some extent New Jersey also, in a way that Vietnamese-Americans have never done. 

The Vietnamese-American community for the most part was actually quite opposed to normalization with Vietnam and much of it still is.  I mean, I had the experience of meeting, going out to Arlington -- not too far away from here – and going into a huge crowd of Vietnamese-Americans -- this was just before I went out to Vietnam as ambassador -- and the first person who got up was an old [indiscernible] veteran army of Vietnam, the southern army -- the veteran got up and said, “Before we begin, I want to make clear that nearly all of us in this room do not think we should have an American ambassador in Vietnam.”  And so I laughed; I said, “Thank you very much.  Let's start from there.”  The next thing they said was, “Well, no matter how bad you are, you cannot be as bad as the guy before you.”  So, you have that attitude in the Vietnamese community, but they never organized themselves into a way to exert power on the American political system.  They were not unified enough.  They were not sort of smart enough about how to operate in Washington to be able to have that kind of influence. 

The other thing I would say is Vietnam also is in a dynamic part of the world.  It is a country of 80-plus million people.  Its economy was obviously going to go places.  There was an attraction to doing business with Vietnam and to being involved with Vietnam that never existed in the case of Cuba.  Cuba did not have as much to offer either from a business point of view or from a strategic point of view.  John McAuliff , yes.  He has been helpful at times in the past and sometimes not so helpful.  I’m sorry about that --

John McAuliff:  Well, I have tried both.  Just in passing, you might want to note that part of the problem I aid is congressional limitations.  So it is not a question of what the embassies want to do, but what Congress lets it do in terms of helping.  But my question is, in terms of creating, solving this problem of suspicion in the military creating goodwill, is it not the movement that has begun to happen on Agent orange?  If there is some way of moving that further, if there is some way that the US could find to provide assistance to probable or possible victims of the dioxin contamination in Agent orange, would that not go a long way to helping psychologically with the military people?  And in terms of this, the general humanitarian question of American’s relations with Vietnam.

Raymond Burghardt:  I knew John had to get to his favorite subject in here so -- first of all, I'm not sure that in the year 2007 that it is still as critical an issue in terms of suspicion as maybe you think it is.  But I would also say that, in fact, there has been a lot of movement on the subject.  And it was expressly addressed during President Bush’s visit there.  There is agreement on -- I mean, I'm not totally up-to-date on everything going on there, but I'm pretty up-to-date when I get back there a lot.  I mean, there is -- in fact, I made some notes of things that were agreed during Bush’s visit.  Yes, I mean, there was -- the joint US-SRV statement of November 17th explicitly talked about further joint efforts to address the environmental contamination near former docks and storage sites.  Things are going to happen on that and they have actually started to happen while I was there particularly in the case of the Danang airfield, but it will happen in other places.  The Ford Foundation is very involved and also, I think they are going to put some of their own money into it in addition to money from the US government. 

As far as people and the effect on –- I mean, there are two aspects -- two docks.  One is environment; the other is sort of medical aspect.  Obviously, they are related.  In terms of medical aspect, as you know, there has always been certain amount of debate in terms of the epidemiology as to exactly what caused what and what all the other causes could have been.  The best approach I was [indiscernible] to deal with that is to say they have programs to help people who are disabled and say, we are not going to try to figure out why are they disabled.  We are just going to help people who are disabled.  And to some extent, we did that all along under the [Indiscernible] war victims’ money.  I always fought efforts to cut that money.  There were efforts to cut off Vietnam from that money saying, that war was a long time ago we ought to focus on more recent war.  You do not want to do that because of this Agent Orange.  Because that is the way we deal with this Agent Orange issue. 

So, we need to keep that money going.  We need to expand it, obviously.  I was at the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation where I was in their Board for a while.  Also, it was a very helpful organization dealing with those issues.

Chris Griffin:  Other -- sir?

Paul:  Paul [indiscernible] of Reuters News Agency.  Frederick Brown mentioned briefly the IMET program and I understand that there was a presidential directive making Vietnam eligible for non-lethal sales of military type equipment, I'm just wondering if he brings us up-to-date on that a little bit.  And what you might see as the constraints as to how far this would go; whether they would come from Vietnamese caution or congressional oversight.

Raymond Burghardt:  That is getting a little down the weeds in terms of the stuff I will have specific information on.

Male Voice:  I just learned -- [cross-talking].  It was a [indiscernible].  Yes, that is correct.  There was a PDF.  What is it called?  PD --?

Raymond Burghardt:  Presidential Directive [indiscernible].

Male Voice:  Yes.  On that issue, just a few days ago, the State Department informed me of that.  Yes, that is correct although it is up to $100,000 IMET.

Raymond Burghardt:  Well, the IMET is for training.  IMET involves training activities.  Agreement to sell non-lethal military equipment would be a non-IMET issue.

Male Voice:  That was in the PD. [cross-talking]

Raymond Burghardt:  Sorry, we cannot help you much on that.  That is pretty obscure stuff.  Do you want me to direct them questions?  Okay, back there Commerce Department.  Yes.

Male Voice:  Thank you, Ambassador.  My question is maybe a little bit out of the box thinking toward the future.  There was a lot of discussion about corruption.  Corruption is, in some way, unequal, unfair distribution of wealth.  If the relationship, especially with Vietnam entering the WTO, is going to be much more successful, we can predict that there will be a lot more wealth to go around.  The rule for dividing that wealth, however, has not been very clear. 

My concern is with US investments.  As companies invest more and more, we might find ourselves in a position whereby the interest of the companies and the interest of those in power coincide against the interest of people who might think that they are not getting fair share of the pie.  What can we do to immunize ourselves against a future where we might have to be in a position of trying to arbitrate in the interest of American companies?

Raymond Burghardt:  Are you still working for the Commerce Department?

Male Voice:  Yes.

Raymond Burghardt:  Okay.  All right.  I have a couple of observations on corruption.  First of all, as I said to somebody else here, I think it is very difficult to deal with the fundamental problem of corruption in a political system like Vietnam has.  Maybe this is an overly ideological remark, but I based it on practical observation.  I think most countries around the world have found that three most effective measures in dealing with corruption are:  A free press, a non-politicized free judiciary system, and a competitive political system in which candidates wants to expose the corrupt action of their political opponents.  There is obviously no tendency in Vietnam, no trend to adopt any of those three measures.  Without any of them, I do not think you can make a lot of progress against corruption either in Vietnam or in China or in a lot of other countries in the world.  There is simply no way to expose it.  There is no way to ensure.  It is always going to be forced out into the open and exposed.  It is going to be in too many people’s interest to cover it up all the time. 

Fortunately countervailing that, of course, is the Party’s fear, which we have in China also, that corruption is undermining its control.  So, you have this a really rather as a kind of a wonderful paradox for the Party which is that the corruption undermines the Party’s control.  But the only proven measures to deal with corruption would destroy the Party’s monopoly on power.  So, it is the perfect Leninist dilemma and will be fun to watch.  I would say that I’m encouraged actually in Vietnam by the fact that during the last Party Congress, there was firing of key officials of the transportation minister and of various vice ministers and other people because of corruption in dealing with large infrastructure projects, particularly projects funded by foreign aid.  That is really where the worst corruption is in Vietnam -- is in dealing with these big infrastructure projects. 

I know that from trying to help American engineering companies get contracts for projects like that.  It is a pretty uphill battle if you have something like called the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and you are dealing with competitors who do not have Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts.  I think it will help also the more we can expose the corrupt practices of companies like Siemens.  I can mention it by name since it is now all over the news -- their corrupt practices.  I can think of certain French, Japanese, and Korean companies over the years that I have tried to help American companies compete with.  This is what creates corruption also. 

It is not just the system in countries like Vietnam.  It is the willingness of the big companies to spread money, to use money in order to get contracts, and to clear the way for themselves.  The only way to deal with that is you go back to my three points again.  The only way you deal with that is through exposure and it is probably having that exposure in their own societies or in neighboring countries.

Chris Griffin:  Are there -- I do not know how much longer people want to stay here for these questions, but five more minutes.  Okay, we are running.  We start a little late, so we run a little late.  Please.

Evan:  Evan [indiscernible], US-Asia Institute.  What effects --?

Raymond Burghardt:  US?

Evan:  US-Asia Institute.

Raymond Burghardt:  Okay.

Evan:  What effects do you see of Vietnam joining the WTO?

Raymond Burghardt:  I think for Vietnam joining the WTO was -- I think Vietnam [indiscernible] the authorities, the government saw joining WTO from two points of view.  One was it was the final step in joining the world club and being seen as a fully respected, fully integrated member of the world club.  But on a more practical and local level, I think Vietnam -- and this is very similar to China.  It was also Jurong Ji’s vision for China joining the WTO.  I think the Vietnamese leaders see it as a way to force Vietnam’s own economy to make the kinds of adjustments and the kinds of openings and the liberalizations, which are essential in order to compete in the age of globalization. 

And so, it was a bit of tough medicine for Vietnam’s own economy and was seen that way by the leadership in Vietnam, which is a very –- frankly, a rather visionary approach.  I think everyone knows it will certainly hurt certain noncompetitive industries, but it will help others.  It will mean that Vietnam can use the WTO mechanisms when it gets into trade disputes.  That can be more effective than bilateral battles with people like United States or the EU.  It is a somewhat fair system for small countries to be able to go to the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms.  I think you have already seen that just in the lead up to Vietnam joining the WTO. Because it was known that they will be required to open certain markets in the financial sector, in telecoms, and other areas of the services, you have seen a huge amount of investment going into Vietnam.  Just the anticipation of getting in the WTO has drawn in a tremendous amount of investment and I think you will see that continue. 

It will be important, of course, to Vietnam to continue to live up to those WTO commitments.  It will be important also for it to make the adjustments it needs to make improving the infrastructure.  For example, just two days ago, I saw an announcement about plans for huge investment in improving the railroad system, that is long overdue, and the kind of thing that needs to be done.  The ports also keep falling behind the rate of growth of trade.  That needs to be kept up.  So, joining the WTO and allowing your economy to be more open and allowing more investment to come in means that the challenges never stop.  Last question?  Most provocative question?  Yes, sir.

Michael Anderson:  Not very provocative, I'm afraid.  I'm Michael Anderson from SEIS and I think Professor Brown will give me extra credit if I ask something.  So, I want to get it inputted.  We are taking the Indo-China class and we just finished a very good book by Mr. Chando on Vietnam, Just Getting Out of Cambodia.

Raymond Burghradt:  That is a great book.

Michael Anderson:  Where is the relationship going since then?  Is Vietnam still -- is there any fear of imperialism there? Or is there any significant relationship [indiscernible]?

Raymond Burghradt:  I'm sorry.  Are you talking about Cambodia?

Michael Anderson:  Between Cambodia and Vietnam.

Raymond Burghradt:  I think one of the things that has been interesting in Cambodia has been how - and as I alluded to before -- Vietnam has watched this with some concern is that Hun Sen and his government in Cambodia has seen China as an important partner.  The Chinese investment in Cambodia, the Chinese presence, Chinese influence has grown markedly in the last few years.  I mean you see that in many ways and you see it in sort of the way you wanted to see in this kind of country, intimate relationship between certain Chinese businessmen and certain people in the Cambodian government sort of helping each other in more ways than one. 

You also have seen it in a very particularly hostile approach toward Taiwan.  The Taiwan representative was expelled from Cambodia.  It is one of the few countries in Southeast Asia that does not even have a Taiwan trade office.  I would note that the Taiwan office in Vietnam is one of the biggest in Southeast Asia and one of the strongest than [indiscernible].  And likewise, Vietnam’s office in Taiwan is very large and sophisticated operation.  But there is nothing like that between Cambodia and Taiwan, whereas Taiwan investment might in fact be very useful for Cambodia.  But they have very much followed Beijing’s direction on those kind of issues and I think that is the kind of thing that I have had Vietnamese cite to me as examples of things that worry them. 

Chris Griffin:  And with that, I would like to thank Ambassador Burghardt very much for his remarks today.  Also thank you, of course, to Alex Vuving and Fred Brown for speaking.  And thank you all for coming and please have a good day.  Thank you.

[End of Panel II]

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