American Enterprise Institute
April 24, 2007
[Edited transcript from audio tapes]
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2:45 p.m. |
Registration |
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3:00 |
Introduction: |
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Keynote Speaker: |
Robert Joseph, former under secretary of state for arms control and international security |
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3:30 |
Presenters: |
Bruce E. Bechtol, Marine Corps Command and Staff College |
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Nicholas Eberstadt, AEI |
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Sang-chul Kim, Future Korea Weekly |
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Moderator: |
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5:00 |
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Proceedings:
Danielle Pletka: Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to AEI. I apologize; it is a little warm in here. Gentlemen should feel comfortable to take off their jackets. I certainly did. I’m Danielle Pletka. I’m the vice-president for Foreign Defense and Policy Studies here at AEI, and it is my great pleasure to introduce former Undersecretary of State Bob Joseph here, today.
One of the best things I can say about Bob is that he is a believer in ideas. He is not looking at me right now, so I cannot give him a direct compliment. He is one of the godfathers of the proliferation security initiative -- groundbreaking, and I mean that –- groundbreaking initiative to counterproliferation through ad hoc national cooperation; one of the few effective multilateral institutions around; one without a headquarters, as Ambassador John Bolton often likes to say and perhaps, that is what makes it work. He was one of the strongest supporters in the administration of the defensive measures program that led to a military and financial cordon that was tied - and recently loosened - around North Korea.
Perhaps, though, it is true, as we often say here at AEI, that government is not the right place to nurture ideas. And so, Bob has returned to the research work he did earlier. One of the great liberties of being outside the government is the freedom to be a thoughtful critic. We are not too interested in throwing grenades but there is always room to be a little bit constructive. And six years into the Bush administration, we have a North Korea that continues to menace us; in Iran, well on its way to nuclear weapons; and few real solutions to those threats. Perhaps, it is true that an agreed framework is the right option for an America that is distracted by Iraq. But perhaps, it is time to think out of the box, instead.
Robert Joseph holds the position of senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy. He does retain that position within the administration, but he is here today in his private capacity and speaks not as a representative of the administration in any way. Until March of this year, he served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In that capacity, he was the principal state department officer for nonproliferation and counterproliferation, arms control, arms transfers, regional security and defense relations.
From January 2001 to November 2004, Bob served at the National Security Council as a special assistant to the President and senior director for the nonproliferation, counterproliferation and homeland defense. And from 1992 to 2001, he was professor of National Securities Study and director and a founder of the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University.
Bob, thank you so much for being here. You are away from the seventh floor of the State Department and we are happy to have you thinking some daring thoughts about North Korea. Are we afraid of collapse? Thank you.
Robert Joseph: It is a true honor to be here, so thank you for the invitation. I was thanking Dany for the very kind and generous introduction.
Like many of you, my views on North Korea, my approach to North Korea, is shaped by my own background and my experiences. My academic focus, at least since my year abroad many, many years ago as an undergraduate student, has been on international relations. And it would not surprise those of you who know me the emphasis in that context was always on the realist school of the discipline. And today, as Dani says, I’m here in my capacity as senior scholar of the National Institute for Public Policy.
As for government, before I left last month I had spent approximately the entire previous decade working proliferation issues: How to best prepare the United States for the proliferation threat; how to prevent that threat when we can prevent it; how to protect ourselves, our friends, and allies in the event that prevention is unsuccessful; and how we respond in the case that there is use of a weapon of mass destruction against us. We do need to prepare for the threat from rogue states like Iran, as well as from terrorists who seek nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and who would not hesitate to use these weapons against us causing deaths and devastations, orders of magnitude greater than we experienced on 9/11.
Understandably then, my approach to North Korea is from the perspective of a proliferation threat. And it is from this perspective that Nick has asked that I address the prospects for a negotiated settlement, a negotiated end, to the North Korea’s nuclear program. My starting point is that it is essential to do everything we can to make diplomacy succeed. Let me repeat that: It is absolutely fundamental that we try to ensure through our actions and our policy that negotiations succeed in achieving an end to this program.
But I say this in the context of seeking this outcome and structuring our negotiations in a way that deals with North Korea as it is; in a way that negotiations are conducted with our eyes fully open, and in a way that fashions our policies not on a basis of hope but on a basis of experience. And experience would not suggest a great deal of optimism but rather, deep skepticism.
Just look at four aspects of the record. First, North Korea has been referred to as the world’s number one proliferators, and for good reason; it has a record of selling ballistic missiles and missile technologies to any customer willing to pay. Most disturbingly, North Korean officials have suggested they may be willing to provide nuclear capabilities, presumably, fissile material or even weapons to third parties.
Second, North Korea is a direct threat to us and to our friends and allies. It maintains one of the largest conventional armies and while I’m speculating here, I believe it also maintains one of the largest chemical and biological arsenals in existence. And most disturbingly, it is also is a nuclear threat to the United States and our friends in the region.
Third, North Korea maintains and expands these conventional and WMD capabilities at great cost to its people who, with the exception of a small ruling elite, are, in fact, the first and foremost victims of the regime. I know that I certainly do not have to tell many people in this room about the nature of this regime. In this regard, I have no doubt that I could learn from you of the repression, of the brutality, of the starvation and deprivation.
And fourth, we must remember how the regime operates beyond its borders - its blackmail of neighbors; its abduction of innocent children on the streets and beaches of Japan; its involvement in money laundering, currency counterfeiting and drug smuggling. We must also keep in mind North Korea’s record on nuclear talks. And put simply, North Korea has violated every commitment, legal and political; it has made to forego and abandon its nuclear weapons program. It violated its obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which it joined as a non-nuclear weapon state. It, of course, violated its IAEA safeguards obligation. It violated the North-South agreement and of course, it violated the 1994 agreed framework.
Again, this is not an argument to abandon negotiations but to approach negotiations with North Korea on its nuclear program with a clear understanding that we must make Pyongyang choose between retaining its nuclear program and receiving assistance from the outside. Over the years, the regime very well may have learned that it could draw a different conclusion based on its experiences with the United States and other countries, and that conclusion, put simply, is that it can have it both ways. And it is, perhaps, for this reason that the regime today remains, in my view, more than willing to pretend to give up its nuclear program. [Audio glitch] perhaps, through another freeze of the reactor and the [audio glitch] the reprocessing activities in exchange for massive energy and other assistance.
The result, of course, if that were the endpoint, may mean that Pyongyang has less plutonium than otherwise for its weapons which, of course, undeniably is a positive outcome. But it also means that we are acting to prolong the life of the regime and in fact, prolong the nuclear threat to the United States and our friends and allies. This is a tough choice, at least, for some. It was this logic that led the Bush administration early on to establish the conditions for an acceptable negotiated outcome, which were the complete verifiable and irreversible elimination of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials and programs.
It was also this previous experience that provided the rationale for the defensive measures that the administration has taken with others in the region and outside of the region to protect ourselves from the threat, defensive measures that are at the same time, in my view, reinforce the prospects for the success of diplomacy. It is only by pursuing this comprehensive approach, combining defensive measures with diplomacy, that we have, in my view, any real chance, however small that may be, of achieving the de-nuclearization that North Korea says it is willing to undertake.
So I’ll focus on these two elements, diplomacy and defensive measures, and how they relate to each other. But first, it may be of interest to this audience to say a few words about another proliferator, in this case, Libya, a country that did make a strategic choice to abandon its nuclear weapons program and allowed the complete and irreversible removal of all elements of its program. And as I think back on the Libya experience, I think it is fair to say that at the outset of the secret contacts with the Libyans, my level of skepticism that Tripoli would actually give up its nuclear program was extremely high, almost as high as it is today with regards to North Korea.
But the president wanted to test the proposition that we might succeed; and we did in what most consider a major intelligence and policy success story. I think, all proliferation cases are unique and there are many differences between Libya and North Korea. But there are also some possible parallels. Like North Korea, the Libyan regime was a long-term sponsor of terror. In fact, on this score Libya may actually surpass North Korea in its established record of terrorist killings, including Pan Am 103. As I had reservations to fly on Pan Am 103 the day that it went down, I can tell you that as I dealt with the Libyans across the table in the negotiations before they became public, I never lost sight of the nature of the regime that I was dealing with.
Second, like North Korea, the Libyan regime has a long record of repression at home, denying its citizens the most basic human rights. My counterpart in the discussion was known as the Envoy of Death. But on this score, I think, North Korea clearly comes out ahead as the most repressive, the most totalitarian government on the face of the earth. And like North Korea, the Libyan regime had violated every commitment it had made not to develop nuclear weapons, including its obligations under the NPT, as well as its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In this category, it is pretty much a draw between Libya and North Korea with each scoring a perfect 100 percent. So what were the principal motives of Colonel Khadafy that led him to conclude that he had to give up his nuclear weapons program?
There is a lot of revisionist history on this point. But to answer the question, I think, it is useful to look at the chronology of events. The Libyans came to us in secret intelligence channels through British intelligence in March 2003. And they came to us not with the message that they have a nuclear weapons program and please come take it away; they came to us saying that there were rumors about WMD programs in Libya and they would like to discuss those with us in intelligence channels.
From March 2003 until October 2003, over the course of about six months, there were very brief discussions in a number of European capitals. The discussions always went the same way; we would say - we, the US and UK, and this was all done in intelligence channels - that we needed to have our experts go into Libya in order to assess the nature of the programs and to talk with individuals and to look at suspect facilities. The answer was always the same for those six months: “We understand the rationale, but now is not the time.” Now, that changed in October 2003, and it changed when the United States and UK provided photographic evidence of a shipment, a large shipment, of centrifuge components that had been shipped from an AQCON [phonetic] facility in Malaysia on its way to Libya.
It was interdicted with the help of the Germans and with the help of the Italians. It was a German ship; we took it to an Italian port. Both agreed to do this in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative. But we photographed it, we took it to the Libyans, and in October they said, “You can bring your experts into the country.” And we did that. We did that in October; we had a second visit in late November, early December. And it was in that context, I believe, that the Libyans finally made the strategic decision to give up their nuclear weapons program.
That was not entirely clear as late as the 16th of December, 2003 when we sat across the table for the first time to have a policy discussion. The Libyans started that meeting by saying, “We wanted to talk about lifting sanctions.” Our response was, “That is not what we are here for.” We did not do it in an imperial-type way; we did not confront them in an insulting type of way. We allowed them to make a voluntary decision that they would announce three days later on the 19th of December that they had decided that weapons of mass destruction – both their chemical weapons as well as their nuclear weapons program - no longer contributed to their security, in fact, detracted from that security. And that announcement was quickly followed by a statement from Prime Minister Blair and President Bush.
So, what were the motives? Again, lots of revisionist history, but my read on this from being involved personally was that sanctions, the long-term impact of sanctions, did have an effect. I have been to Tripoli since then; it is dilapidated. It is clear that sanctions were having an effect. Despite having billions and billions of dollars in the bank, the economy was stagnant; it was going nowhere, and it was going nowhere for a long period of time. But that, I’m absolutely convinced, would never have been enough to get the outcome that we did. Remember the outcome being the removal of hundreds of metric tons of nuclear equipment and all of their long-range missiles and infrastructure. We loaded it up on a ship and we brought it back to the United States. So, what else explains it?
Well, I think if you go back to the chronology and you look at when they first approached us, a time when we were flowing hundreds of thousands of forces to Iraq to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraqi WMD, you will have to conclude that there is no accident there. They were concerned and quite frankly, the leadership of Libya, including Colonel Gaddafi and his son [indiscernible], they did now want to become the second Iraq; they were concerned about an attack. I think that was clearly another motive. The interdiction of the BBC China, the German vessel carrying the centrifuge parts, had an immediate impact. As I said, it was that that served as the tipping point for getting our people on the ground. What did that do?
First of all, in the minds of the Libyans they concluded that their program was now susceptible to disruption. They knew that we knew that they had a program and that also added to their concern about being attacked. Then there was a question of legacy, and this was also very clear at the time. The Libyans had tried the Pan-Arab thing; they had tried the Pan-African thing. Nothing seemed to really work. And I think they had made the conclusion by the end of 2003 that they wanted to become more of a normal state. They wanted to become more integrated into the international community.
And finally, a fifth motivation, which was not apparent at the time but became visible very soon thereafter, was the desire of the Libyan government to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism - their perception of their own vulnerability to Islamic fundamentalism. And that also weighed heavily in their decision. So, which of these motivations that are evident in the Libyan case apply to North Korea? I think concern over Islamic fundamentalism clearly does not. It is also clear that the North Korean leadership is not trying to become more normal. This is a leadership that, in a sense, cannot open and still retain its absolute power.
For the same reason, the regime in Pyongyang does not seek to end its isolation or join the international community. To integrate into the community is the last thing that, I think, the leadership would like as it would almost certainly mean its own demise. And well, there are a lot of things. The regime in Pyongyang is not stupid; they survived because of their isolation. And for the same reason, I doubt that Pyongyang is motivated by concern for its legacy. I do not believe that is part of the equation.
But other motives may well apply although, perhaps, not in the same way as they did with Libya. North Korea is concerned that the United States working with allies such as in the PSI context or with China in terms of freezing assets or blocking financial transactions can disrupt the North’s proliferation and illicit activities. It now knows from the BDA and other experiences that these illicit activities have been exposed and are vulnerable. It knows from experience that its two-way traffic in WMD and missile programs in and out of North Korea is susceptible to both detection and interdiction.
Pyongyang also respects the military capabilities of the United States and our allies. It has seen the power of the US military in the quick defeat of Iraq’s military force and in other circumstances. It is this capability that, in my view, most likely has deterred the North from using force in the past to achieve its goals. But are these tools sufficient to persuade or compel the North to abandon its nuclear weapons programs? On their own, my answer is likely no. So, we must combine these tools with others that were less apparent in the Libyan case.
Here, I think the role of North Korea’s neighbors becomes key and this was the premise of the six-party approach, which was intended to put pressure on the regime from the other regional states, especially China. On February 13th, the six parties – the United States, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea - agreed on the so-called initial actions to implement their joint statement of September, 2005. And in that joint statement North Korea reaffirmed its commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons and all nuclear programs. In exchange, the other parties would provide it substantial benefits, including economic and energy assistance, normalization of relations, and the prospect of a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War after more than fifty years.
It took seventeen months for the six parties to agree on the initial actions to implement the joint statement. And during that period, North Korea, far from demonstrating its commitment to denuclearization, defied the international community by launching seven ballistic missiles in July and then, most visibly, conducting a nuclear test in October. The February agreement, whose initial sixty-day terms have not been met, is therefore, at best, just the first step in what will be a very long and difficult process.
In my view, if that process is to have any chance of success, the six parties must continue to insist on the full implementation of North Korea’s September 2005 commitments; nothing short of the complete verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of its nuclear-related facilities, activities and holdings should be acceptable. In my view, the other five parties must withhold significant economic and political benefits for North Korea until its denuclearization is complete and verified.
Even more important, we must fully implement the sanctions that the United States and others are imposing in the context of UN Security Resolution 1718, which was passed in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear test. And we must continue this full implementation until North Korea complies by ending all WMD and ballistic missile programs and proliferation. It is this resolution that was supported by China that, I believe, led to North Korea returning to the talks in the first place.
Finally, the United States and others must continue to prevent and defend against North Korean proliferation through other defensive measures, including interdictions of WMD and missile cargos, cutting off financial support to proliferation deploying effective defenses against all ranges of ballistic missiles and rapid creation and operation of a radiation-detection architecture at regional sea ports, air fields, and land border crossings used by North Korea in its trade. We must continue to make very clear to North Korea that it has a choice, the same as we did for Libya. It can denuclearize and gain corresponding economic and political benefits or it can continue its missile and nuclear programs at great cost to the regime with little ability to continue to subsidize its own internal indigenous WMD programs through proliferation-related sales or to gain outside assistance from proliferation networks or other rogue states.
We must avoid the mistakes of the past. In the past, we blurred the message sent to North Korea and every time it took full advantage. In 1993, Pyongyang gave notice of its intent to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and in response the United States negotiated the 1994 agreed framework. In that document North Korea agreed to remain in the MPT, to dismantle its plutonium-producing reactors, and it reaffirmed that it would forego its nuclear weapons enrichment and reprocessing. But in the near term, it would only freeze its nuclear facilities while the United States and its partners provided heavy fuel oil and began the construction of two light water reactors. The United States and our partners decided to end heavy fuel oil deliveries in late 2002 after the covert enrichment effort was revealed.
Over the next few months North Korea expelled the IAEA inspectors, announced its withdrawal from the NPT and the IAEA safeguards, and resumed operations at Yang Byong [phonetic]. In short, the agreed framework cost North Korea very little. It continued clandestine nuclear weapons activities and was able quickly, as we have seen, to resume overt programs. Moreover, the agreed framework made no effort whatsoever to constrain North Korea’s ballistic missiles programs, which now threatens its regional neighbors as well as the United States and through North Korean missile sales to countries like Iran, threaten many other states in another region vital to US interests.
The lessons of the agreed framework are clear. First, denuclearization must be complete and verifiable. That will not be easy but we can never again accept North Korean words as compliance. Second and I think, most fundamental, we must maintain and strengthen our security alliances in the region to leave no doubt about our commitments in the face of North Korean threats. And in that regard, for our own and for our allies’ security we must not forget the importance of defending against North Korea’s ballistic missile programs even as we focus on the nuclear program.
Finally, the United States, our partners in the six-party talks in the Proliferations Security Initiative and in the United Nations Security Council must end any North Korean allusion that its nuclear and missile programs are an issue between the United States and itself. They are, and they must be, treated as an issue between North Korea and the international community. In conclusion, the Bush administration’s strategy for dealing with weapons of mass destruction proliferation, which was announced and published in 2002, remains correct to treat proliferation as a security threat that requires a comprehensive approach, bringing all instruments of national power to bear - intelligence, scientific, economic, military, and diplomatic.
But the national strategy is also very clear that there are no silver bullets and that even if we apply all of the tools for prevention, we will not always be successful. And we must recognize that at the end of the day we may not succeed in dissuading Pyongyang, or, for that matter, Tehran, to give up their nuclear and missile programs. And for that reason, we must work together with others in a multilateral framework to develop the capabilities that are necessary to deter and defend against these threats. Thank you very much.
[Fire drill interruption]
Christopher Griffin: Okay, ladies and gentlemen, I think we are going to go ahead and get started on our post-interlude portion of this event today. The good news is while we were out of the room it may have cooled off by a full degree so I hope that makes it somewhat more comfortable. Thank you very much for coming. Thank you very much for staying.
My name is Chris Griffin. I’m a research fellow here at the American Enterprise Institute. I’m delighted to be chairing this panel with some great experts talking about the question of North Korean collapse, prospects and consequences for it to occur. I would just very quickly introduce our speakers; their full biographies are available in the materials that were handed out at the beginning of the conference.
Bruce Bechtol is an associate professor at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He previously taught at the Air Command and Staff College. Before that, he has had a distinguished career in government, working both with the U.S. Marine Corps -- serving in the United States Marine Corps and working at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has a book coming out - I believe he has some promotional materials on it - called Red Rogue: the Persistent Challenge of North Korea, and he will have some materials up at the front desk after the conference so you can pick those up if you have not already.
Nicholas Eberstadt is the Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute. He has written and published extensively on the North Korean political economy, South Korean economy, a variety of questions. His most recent book is The North Korean Economy: between Crisis and Catastrophe, which was published earlier this year through Transaction Publishers.
And finally, Kim Sang-chul is the chairman of the National Crisis Council of Korea. They just had a publication out; I’ll see if we can get an electronic copy of it. We can post it on the website later on. He has an amazing career in voluntary groups in government and in the private sector as a former mayor of Seoul. He is CEO and publisher of the Future Korea Journal. What struck me as most impressive -- as president of the Commission to Help North Korean Refugees, he assembled almost 12 million signatures on a petition for the United Nations to grant refugee status to the hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees living in China.
Without further ado, we will have Dr. Kim speak first and then Prof. Bechtol followed by Nick Eberstadt. Dr. Kim, thank you.
Kim Sang-chul: It is an honor to be here, and thank you to my colleague [sounds like] organizer Dr. Eberstadt. I have a prepared text so you could receive some copies. If you raise your hand then you could receive; there are several copies.
Since 1995, when North Korea suffered from massive starvation, its industry and social system actually collapsed. North Korea was and is under the control of a rogue regime and does not function as a normal country. For example, North Korea received assistance worth a total of $8.5 billion, mostly from the South Korean government, from 1995 to 2006. But more than three million North Korean residents were dying from hunger. If the regime had spent about $200 million buying food, it could have stopped such starvation. This rogue regime, however, preferred to leave three million people to starve to death by pouring the money into building up military power and developing nuclear weapons.
So I must raise this issue for reasoning that North Korea’s dictator Kim Jong Il is not the same as Libyan dictator. The Libyan dictator has not killed his people, but Kim Jong Il has killed his people with the number of more than three million by pouring the money and goods from abroad into building up its military power and developing nuclear weapons. Korean Peninsula may be the only one in East Asia to see its borders changing in the near future.
The chances are three. First, North Korea, which has already collapsed economically, will be gradually subordinated into China since it cannot exist without supplies from China. Even if North Korea receives massive economic assistance, it will reject fundamental reform, which makes it impossible to expect its economic revival as long as the Stalinist system does not collapse. The life of slavery for North Koreans under the rule of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il has lasted for 60 years.
South Koreans under this scenario will continue to develop and proceed toward the US and a favorable attitude toward the Chinese so the South Koreans’ economic power will weaken and its national fortune will head toward a decline under the strong influence of those who follow the Kim Jong Il regime and the delusion of socialism, like as the [indiscernible] government nowadays. The result will be [indiscernible]. China will gain the upper hand in East Asia and U.S. influence will shrink. But democratization will slow down in China and the risk of instability within the Chinese system will grow during the dictatorship of the Communist Party.
Second, most South Korean peace system either go to possibly communization ¬of South Korea. The concept of a Korea confederation will be implemented after the North to South peace system between Stalinist North and democratic South is built through peace summit. South Korea can be communized soon after the withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. As a result, the Korean Peninsula will become a land of mayhem and decline. South Korea will become a brutal killing field and industry in South Korea will grind to a halt. No one will laugh on the streets or at home and all churches will be destroyed. Consequently, the Korean Peninsula will collapse while most of the Asian region will be a darker land than in the past. And even the safety of Japan will be at risk.
Third, ending North Korean tyranny and making unified free Korea. If the Korean Peninsula emerges as a unified free democracy, [indiscernible] Asia will flourish as a new world never seen before. The life of slavery of North Koreans under the Kim Jong Il regime and atheistic idolatry of Kim, the father, and Kim, the son, will come to an end while commerce and industry will revive. The deception and demagoguery of the campaign for overthrowing South Korea will cease and the real inter-Korean reconciliation will take hold as overcoming the disorder and hardship in the process of unification, people will realize their ultimate limits as humans. As their devotion gains strength, as South Korea is already the world’s eleventh largest economy, the high-level of intellect, passion, persistence, and devotion of all Koreans will catapult the unified Korean Peninsula into the position of the world’s leading economy soon.
As a result, China’s Northeast districts near and bordering Korea will see its economy grow in prosperity. The vibrant economy and free democracy of all the Korean Peninsula will have a positive impact to China, contributing to China’s economic power, as well as, progress towards democratization. Last, China will enter a new age of true international cooperation beyond the Sino centrism that often seems to guide the Chinese policy.
When will South Korea and the world begin to care about our enslaved North Korean people? When will South Korea stop cooperating with the violent regime of Kim Jong Il and cease to seek confederating our democracy with his dictatorship? South Koreans sometimes ask which country we want to see --the unification of the Korean Peninsula. But what do South Koreans want to do? Do they want to promote unification or an endless delay of unification? If Koreans think that China will not tolerate the free unification of South Korea and gives up the efforts at free unification, then do they want North Korea to be subordinated to China or a foreign nation forever?
Such sad endings are not right. Koreans should wish for free unification. Tyrant Kim Jong Il has no way to survive. Now, the North Korean regime barely exists with the sympathy of China and the submission of those who follow Kim Jong Il’s regime in South Korea. It is not easy to survive from extortion and begging. North Korea’s tactic of dragging out Six Party Talks has reached its limits already. The termination of Kim Jong Il regime is crucial to the stability of East Asia and world peace, as well as, the survival and well-being of all Koreans.
I would like to say about steps to bring down the regime. When it comes to the North Korean policy, the [indiscernible] government nowadays presumes coalition with the Kim Jong Il regime and the opposition Grand National Party makes co-existence with Kim Jong Il regime its precondition. But co-existence with the Kim Jong Il regime that oppresses its residents goes against human justice and conscience. At the Korean Peninsula, he bargained for more than 60 years. We should save our brethren by freeing North Korea from the tyranny of Kim Jong Il and dedicate ourselves to the destruction of his regime.
Some fear the subsequent confusion from the collapse of Kim Jong Il regime but we should be willing to accept some sacrifices and side effects from saving about 20 million captives of this tyranny. The scenario of the Kim Jong Il regime collapsing will begin with attack and sanctions from outside, uprising by the North Korean people and revolt within the regime. But, in the end, we will witness a regime heading toward self-destruction. There should be international sanctions, a blockade, an immediate halt to all forms of various economic assistance and finally, international resistance in order to save North Korea and its persecuted people.
If Kim Jong Il regime collapses, the top priority should be on maintaining North Korean public order in the country and supplying the necessities of life. This is not so difficult to do, given the capacity of international society and of Korea. For example, when North Koreans can be allowed to freely engage in farming and Korea, the U.S. and Japan each provide 500,000 tons of food stuffs over the next couple of years, hunger can be easily reduced. In this case, there would be no massive flight of North Koreans across their borders. Next, industry should be built and jobs should be created. Again, this chore [sounds like] is not so difficult, considering the record of entrepreneurship of the Korean people.
Finally, we should hold a free election and determine the national polity of North Korea. I mean, the North Korean people should hold a free election and determine themselves the future of North Korea. Some fear North Korea’s subordination to China and some are in favor of promoting a form of democratization in North Korea that differs from that in South Korea. But most North Korean residents, however, do not admire China under the Communist Party dictatorship. Rather, they aspire to the same level of freedom and prosperity as in South Korea. Therefore, they ultimately yearn for free unification, joining this South Korean system. A program for enlightening North Korean residents on freedom and democracy in South Korea will be clearly necessary at this stage in the lives of North Korean refugees in South Korea would do for that.
We should overcome Chinese opposition to free unification and we will need assistance from Asian and European nations as well as close cooperation and alliance with the United States, Japan, and eventually China. In order to do so, proper timing will be essential. The best timing would be in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, an event on which China is counting to show off its great accomplishment. China in the period before such an occasion cannot afford to disregard international opinion and dispatch troops to North Korea to deter the free unification of the Korean Peninsula.
What is the vision of a unified Korea? A free and unified Korea can be a global superpower. More than 70 million Koreans live on the Korean Peninsula, and another seven million live abroad. They display a high passion for education, leading the world in such industries such as ship-building, semi-conductors, petrochemicals, iron and steel, motor vehicles, machinery, IT, and BT. Given such high accomplishments, no one can prevent Republic of Korea from developing into one of the world’s leading countries after the collapse of the North Korean dictatorship, the source of the trouble on the Korean Peninsula.
If unified Republic of Korea tries to assist and encourage under-developed nations across the world with patience and humility learned through hardship, the Republic of Korea will stand as a symbol of true hope and solace for the world. Korea can make an epic contribution to global welfare by transforming itself into one of the world’s advanced countries without invading or plundering a foreign country. As the people of Korea has a long history of hardship, Koreans can appreciate the problems of oppressed people everywhere and support them as shown in Vietnam War, now showing in Iraq by Korean troops’ civil service projects.
And as the Korean way sweeps Asia, Korean music and culture can also play a vital in building the pacification community together with Korean industry, commerce and example of Korean democracy. Thank you very much.
Christopher Griffin: Thank you, Dr. Kim. Just noticed [audio glitch] enough for a conference on North Korea supply outstrip demand on the paper copies of his remarks. We will have those posted online later on this evening. But Bruce, please help yourself.
Bruce E. Bechtol: I would like to thank AEI for inviting me here today, particularly Nick Eberstadt and Chris. And I would also like to thank Chris for helping to put out the word on my book. Thanks, Chris. I'm going to have to take off my glasses because I'm getting old and these are bifocals and I'm still not used to them. So, my apologies.
I have been asked to speak today about succession issues in North Korea and a possible instability in Pyongyang that surrounds these issues, particularly as they deal with the military, which is kind of my specialty. So, that is what I'm going to address today in my remarks. Kim Jong-Il has a vested interest in ensuring he can successfully hand over the regime to his hand-picked successor; as the evidence suggests, he has made carrying on his father’s legacy a high priority. A smooth transition to Kim’s successor is not just important to whoever the power goes to, but also to the stability of North Korea and the stability of Northeast Asia.
If Kim fails to successfully implement a successor process, this will likely lead to instability that will have a negative impact not only on North Korea but every nation-state with an interest in the region both militarily, economically, and politically. Most importantly, consequences of a North Korean failed state would quite literally rewrite the security strategies of every state that has an interest in the region. Now, this is not to say that the continued existence of the Kim Regime is a stabilizing factor, because there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. But the succession system -- its success or failure –- is one datum point we can refer to for the purpose of predicting changes in North Korean stability.
What I'm going to talk about for a while is unusual issues relating to the stability of Kim Jong Il’s succession process that began to occur in 2004. And as many of you in this room know, it was about that time that Chang Song Taek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, one of his most trusted confidants, and a highly-placed official within the North Korean government, was reportedly purged some time during 2004, perhaps, because of succession issues in the government over which he and the Dear Leader disagreed.
During 2004, Kim also reportedly purged several of his relatives and up to 80 other officials and their families, reportedly, for trying to seize power, but perhaps over succession issues, as with Chang. In an even more intriguing turn of events, Chang’s wife, Kim’s sister, Kim Kyung Hee was reportedly injured in an auto accident during 2004 in an event that is assumed to have been a possible attempt on her life.
Finally, Kim’s eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, whose nickname in South Korea is a “the fat bear” -- and anyone who has seen a picture of him knows why -- reportedly narrowly avoided an assassination attempt while on a trip to Austria. There has also been speculation that this was because of infighting within the inner circle over succession and power issues involving who will wield the reigns of power once Kim Jong Il is gone.
During 2005, rumors began to circulate that Kim had picked his second son, Kim Jong Chul, as his successor. Couple of signs of this: Kim Jong Chul dined with Hu Jintao and Kim Jong Il in the fall of 2005 and his portrait was reportedly hung in the Central Community building in Pyongyang. Now, despite these rumors, there are also other rumors and these are coming from one place, at least -- well, several places. The Korean Institute for National Unification, one of their scholars indicated that Kim Jong Chul may have a fatal disease that results in him suffering from excessive female hormones. In fact, Kim Jong Il’s former Japanese chef wrote in his memoirs that the elder Kim considered his second son “too girly” to transfer his power to.
Nevertheless, according to South Korean reports some North Korean officials were seen wearing lapel pins bearing the image of Kim’s second son during the spring of 2006, which, for all of us who follow North Korean issues know, is a very important possible indicator that he is the heir apparent. The oldest son of the family, Kim Jong Nam, the previously mentioned “fat bear,” would ordinarily be considered the heir apparent in a Confucianist society, but he is widely known for his drunken binges in Pyongyang hotels and elsewhere, and for blowing wads of cash on shopping trips to China and elsewhere, as well as trying to sneak into Japan on a fake passport to visit Tokyo Disneyland. Little is known regarding the status of Kim Jong Un, the youngest of the three sons -- and by the way, his name is the same as my wife’s, which I remind her of as often as possible -- though according to recent Japanese press reports –- I hope I'm coming to the microphone okay. According to recent Japanese press reports, some party members were seeing wearing his picture on lapel pins in the summer of 2006.
So, the situation surrounding the Kim Family remains very confusing, as are the questions of who the most powerful in Kim’s circle is. During January of 2006, Brent Choi, who as many of you know writes for the JoongAng Ilbo and has misquoted me many times [indiscernible], wrote -- and I'm quoting: “Most of the reports on North Korea’s successor are 99 percent wrong. Kim Jong Il’s sons might not even make it to the list of candidates. In order to become a successor the prospective leader will have to prove himself in enhancing both economy and ideology.” This conjecture was further supported later in 2006 when the German press quoted a University of Vienna professor as saying a military junta could replace Kim instead of one of his sons, and that Kim does not necessarily need to stay alive to remain ruler.
The confusing picture surrounding Kim’s power circle became all the more mysterious during January of 2006 when, of course, Chang Sung Taek was un-purged. While there is a great deal of debate surrounding why this occurred, it may have something to do with succession issues, particularly if Chang has anything to do with helping Kim pick who his successor will be. In any case, any discussion of the succession issue is taboo in North Korea, as is any discussion of Kim’s sons, their names, ages, and whereabouts.
And by the way, as many of you know, though Chang is married to Kim Kyung Hee, Kim’s sister, she reportedly lives with another guy, a cello player, named Kim Sung Ho. They have a daughter who also reportedly committed suicide in Europe last year, as most of you know. The prospect of a leader succeeding Kim Jong Il who is not one of his sons obviously rates some discussion. First of all, if one is to follow historical examples of how succession has occurred in North Korea, the only example we have is Kim Il Song to Kim Jong Il. A grooming process would have to begin several years before the new leader would actually emerge, and this began with Kim Jong Il in 1974.
The Kim succession in 1994 is important as a case study because most analysts considered it a fait accompli that Kim Jong Il would succeed his father in 1994. There is no such evidence –- at least not yet -– that any such individual exists today that everyone would consider the heir apparent. More to the point, Kim has not anointed any of his military officers or one of his other relatives as a person who might succeed him yet.
Based on the evidence, it appears that there should be no clear successor to Kim Jong Il when he dies, thus, several scenarios are possible. The first is that there is a violent struggle for power among those in the current power circle in North Korea. Each side would seek to gain the support of the military, as this would appear to be the power base most important to maintaining power in the country. In this case, it would be anyone’s guess as to who would emerge as the leader of the country.
Another scenario would be that the military itself would seize power. In this case, again, there is no clear indication -- now, we have seen a lot of conjecture –- as to what individual or a group of individuals who would seek to gain
dominance in the government -- the absolute power that Kim currently wields and the Byzantine web of reporting, counter-reporting, and resultant fear makes it extremely difficult for factions to form within the military, at least that are apparent to those of us who are analyzing contemporary North Korean issues.
Still, another scenario, number three, would be that members of the military would seize power following Kim’s death and then sue for peace and unification with the South. This
scenario is not as far-fetched as it may seem. It is a rather well-known secret that many of the generals in North Korea are rather corrupt, and that there are even rumors that many of
these generals are actually on the payroll of NIS or other agencies in South Korea. This may be a scenario where the ball will truly be in Seoul’s court should the South Korean government choose to aggressively pursue reunification and dialogue during what would likely be a confusing time frame.
Finally, a scenario that has very real possibilities for occurring is that no leadership figure would emerge, the army becomes factionalized, and the country falls into civil war. Again, this may be an opportunity for the government in Seoul, as this would be a significant opportunity, depending on the circumstances, for the ROK to step in and take control of the North, perhaps even with minimal use of force.
One thing is for sure: There is no clear evidence that any potential future leader has yet emerged who can step into Kim’s shoes should he die. Furthermore, based on the length of time it took Kim Il Song to prepare the way for Kim Jong Il, we should expect that it would take considerable time to prepare the way for his next successor. Thus, it appears fairly obvious that should something happen to him in the near future, the potential for widespread anarchy in North Korea is very real. And there is no reason to believe that Kim does not want the legacy of himself and his father to continue. In fact, the evidence suggests that he places this as a high priority.
The rather interesting and confusing evidence that I presented thus far points to three challenges for the Kim Jong Il regime. First, it will be necessary to prevent political turbulence within the regime caused by division of loyalty between Kim Jong Il and his successor, whoever that successor turns out to be and whenever he is formally announced, if ever. Secondly, the goal is to ensure that the propaganda and political mythology process adequately indoctrinates the North Korean populace. Finally, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the competition between Kim family members does not impact regime security and it may have been this competition that was at least partially responsible for Chang’s two-year purge.
In order to prevent turbulence within the regime caused by a division between Kim Jong Il and his successor, whoever that may be, Kim will have to continue to engage in purges as this division occurs, or as he perceives that they are beginning to occur; and as you all know, he has never been hesitant to engage in purges. Based on the evidence I presented thus far, one would think that the succession issue in North Korea is still up in the air. While there is anecdotal evidence that suggest Kim may already be planning to choose and more importantly, anoint his successor, many issues still remain unanswered.
Should Kim’s death occur before a clear successor has been anointed and is clearly set in the minds of the army, the party, and the people, the clear possibility exists that a vicious fight for power will ensue. This is because of the current situation that exists today where everybody is compelled to compete with everybody else for power with few natural allies. Thus, if Kim’s death occurs with no clear and credible successor in the wings, what could easily ensue would be a no-holds barred grab for power between the military, the party, and the security agencies, a rather disturbing situation.
Looking at nations in the region or/and nations that have an interest in the region have utmost importance to Beijing, a collapsed North Korea might lead to early reunification, and this would remove the current strategic and operational depth from the Americans that currently exists. Of course, Russia, now a much weaker nation, has no interest in seeing North Korea collapse as that would remove the last vestiges of influence they have on the peninsula.
South Korea’s government, at least the one in power right now, simply sees itself as not being able to afford a collapse of North Korea, and the prospect of rebuilding a devastated economy. Indeed, in an alternative scenario where semi-anarchy or complete anarchy is occurring, Seoul would be very concerned with an exploding or imploding North Korea whose instability would be likely to seep across the border. Japan would be faced with two very unsavory implications, an exploding North Korea, or eventually, a unified Korea that has the potential to be a major economic and military challenge years down the road after recovery from the debilitating effects of sudden unification.
When it comes to the United States, there can be no doubt that the biggest concern is control of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. There are no benign scenarios in an imploding country with a million-man army and nuclear weapons and missiles whose control are unknown. So, given the ramification that I have discussed thus far, the successor process in North Korea will likely continue to be an important issue as long as the current regime exists in North Korea for all of those with a strategic interest in the region. Thanks.
Nicholas Eberdstadt: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm happy to be able to address our hardcore conferees. You have survived the arduous march down to the street; now, you have made it back to the top of the mountain here. I want to make sure that we have some time left for discussion despite the surprise events that have befallen our conference this afternoon. Any discussion of -- question of who is afraid of regime collapse in the DPRK has to at least address the economic question, and that is what I'm going to try to do the next few minutes.
It was Charles de Gaulle from France who is accredited with the aphorism that, “Brazil has a great future. Brazil has always had a great future. Brazil always will have a great future.” I would like to paraphrase that to say that the economic implications of the regime collapse look scary today. They have always looked scary today. They always will look scary today. What do I mean by that?
I took the liberty of including in your folder an article that I have written called, “A Reminder for Seoul: Reunification Will Benefit Koreans.” You do not need to take a look at this now. I will mention a couple of points I make in this piece. I criticize the ROK Ministry of Finance and also the Korea Development Institute for some long-term thinking they offer showing a gradual reform and eventual lowering costs of the future reunification between North and South, and my crack is that this vision may be pleasing, but it is a fantasy, a dream palace built on a mountain of dubious assumptions. The real North Korean government that exists in Pyongyang today is engaged in a furious race to develop nuclear weaponry and the objective of this quest is hardly to improve their living standards and competitiveness. I argue further in this piece that the key to reducing costs of unification is the rate of return on investments in post-Kim Jong Il or post-DPRK in Northern Korea.
Now, what I also say in this article when I argue is that if peaceful separation of the two Koreas is maintained for another decade or so, the odds are that the economic gap between North and South will grow even greater than it is today. Thus, the problems and costs for reintegration are likely only to be postponed and magnified under such a scenario.
Now, the reason that I have quoted this at excess length is because I did not write this article today. I wrote this article in 1993. That was 14 years ago, okay? And what has happened in the meanwhile? Back in 1993, people in the Northeast Asian region in general and in South Korea in particular, we are becoming terrified by the prospect of the enormous cost of prospective reunification between the two sides of the divided Korea.
Are those prospective costs seemingly lower today than they were 14 years ago? I think not. If we look at what has happened over almost this decade-and-a-half, we can see the ROK has increased its per capita output by something like 75 percent. The Bank of Korea, which makes estimates for North Korean GNI and GNP and let’s say is always alert to the positive comes at best to the hopeful guess that there has been zero growth in North Korea in the per capita basis over this [indiscernible]. There are other signs that might suggest that the absolute and relative gap has been even greater than these soundings might suggest.
Take a look at North Korea’s ability to compete economically in the international world of trade. Back in 1993, if one takes a look at mirror statistics on North Korean exports and real statistics on the rest of the world’s exports, North Korea was not exactly a world leader. About three-tenths of one percent of total world exports in legitimate civilian merchandise emanated from the DPRK - three hundredths of one percent. Today, as best we can tell, that fraction is 1/100 of one percent of world exports. Although it might not seem possible for the DPRK to fall further behind than it was in 1993 with respect to the rest of the world trade economy, it has.
And there is real -- although, people have some hopeful thoughts and wishes about Kaesong Industrial Complex and possible new signs of reform, that hardy perennial for North Korea, there is very little reason to expect that the real existing Kim Jong Il regime as we know it will not fall further and further behind the world economy in general, and the ROK in particular. Thus, the gap will only be larger if the system continues as it is with the divided peninsula.
With more time, I could make some arguments about the German example of reunification, which concentrated attention in the ROK and terrified many people. I think many lessons had been mis-learned from the German example; that is maybe a discussion for another time. I think the key, however, is rates of return and I want to get back to a point that I made 14 years ago because I think it is just as valid today. If the framework in the North -- friendly to direct foreign investment and conducive to high rates of return on investment -- can be established, foreign investors may well fight each other to assume the so-called cost of Korean unification.
Indeed, the key to the economics of unification will be rates of return. If a climate conducive to high rates of return can be established in a reunited Korea, the costs of the project will take care of themselves. For this reason, people in South Korea today should be doing all they can to eliminate inefficiencies, structural impediments, barriers to increased growth in the ROK and they should also be thinking about the contingency of the reintegration of Northern Korea because sometimes that day of judgment turns out to be closer than you think. Thank you very much.
Christopher Griffin: Okay, thank you, Nick. The good news, ladies and gentlemen, is that we will wrap this up by 5:00. We respect your time. The bad news is I'm [indiscernible] about 15 minutes for questions and answers. Three very basic ground rules we appreciate your following: We have mics going around the room; please wait till you get a mic before you ask a question. When you get a mic, please state your name and your organization or affiliation. Then, of course, lastly, please ask your question at the end of your statement. Any questions, please? Sir?
Mario Loyola: Mario Loyola, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. I read a really fascinating paper, I think, two year ago by an Australian professor now at University –- in Seoul teaching at university who had traveled to North Korea over a period over a decade-and-a-half. And he described how there had developed an astonishingly prolific contraband economy in North Korea, things he had not seen when he first started traveling. There are video cassettes; contraband South Korea soap opera video cassettes and video cassette recorders were all over the place. And he noted that this was very interesting because the regime -- in 1990, if a North Korean was caught with an illegal cassette recorder, you would wind up in a concentration camp or dead or something. But by the time –- by a couple of year ago, the police were no longer enforcing a lot of these laws and his perception was that the authority of the regime was being sort of eaten away from the ground up. What indications have you all seen along these lines and sort of what is happening beneath the spectacle of North Korea’s -- of Pyongyang’s absolute power?
Bruce E. Bechtol: That is an interesting assessment on his part. Another anecdotal story that I heard recently was many of you hear know Marcus Noland whose book with Stephen Haggard just came out. Marcus was telling me the last time he was in China, he went way down to the border with Shin Wei Ju [phonetic] where they were looking across the border at North Koreans; and the Chinese had set up those telescopes like you see at the den at Las Vegas so that Chinese tourists could look out through these telescopes at North Koreans farming by hand in the farms right across the border, which to me sounds very tragic.
Now, that is one anecdotal datum point and that is important, as is what you said. I do not think the government has lost control of the people. It simply does not – the signs are not there from others who have been there. So I mean, it may have been slightly exaggerated with the author who wrote from Australia. This is the guy who has the website, right?
Mario Loyola: [Indiscernible]
Bruce E. Bechtol: Yes. But, I mean, there are a lot more tapes out there than there used to be in 1990, certainly. That may be what it is attributed to. Certainly, they are struggling with the economy and that is why they have allowed the illegal markets to exist from time to time; then when they had stronger economic conditions, they clamped down on them. Again, as Marcus Noland would tell you and Nick will probably comment on that as well.
Nicholas Eberstadt: Just one sentence about Andrei Lankov’s essay. I'm an Andrei Lankov fan. I think he is wonderful. He points to, in particular, the virulent spread of corruption in the bureaucracy of the DPRK as a force that may be hollowing out the structure, and he may be right. I mean, the history of dictatorship is that after they fall, we do these autopsies and after they fall we see how weak they were at various points during their tenure. The nature of the observation problem is just very difficult to do that today for DPRK.
Sang-chul Kim: The video cassette is not hard to find in the North Korea, actually. But there is also -- actually, there are lots of political concentration camps. So, we can say the fundamental of the system has not changed at all. But the control of power, the efficiency of the control has barely weakened. So, there are, overall, many merchandisers and small businessman also in North Korea, but it is not witnessing any fundamental reform and change of North Korean regime. Thank you.
Peter Kang: I'm Peter Kang. I have questions for Kim. You have stated that the way for North Korea to collapse is tensions and uprising in North Korea, and so on. But the tensions have failed so far. So, my question first is how realistic it is that we can succeed in toppling the King Jong Il regime through tensions, et cetera. That is my one question. And then the other is that the Bush administration appears to be trading human rights for nuclear condition. In other words, you give up nuclear weapons and we do not care about human rights. So, do you agree with what Bush administration together with the South Korean government are doing? For example, the February 13 agreement -- do you agree or do you oppose? You have [indiscernible] solution then. This is not the way to go and you have different solutions?
Sang-chul Kim: Thank you. I have said that, eventually, we will witness a regime heading toward a self-destruction. For example, North Korea, I believe, has no real will to abandon nuclear weapon. My opinion is that it has already been revealed and when they think -- so Kim Jong Il think that their -- his deception tactics is failed, then he will go to another action, especially the possibility of evocation [sounds like] in South Korea. May I explain a little about the politics in South Korea? Roh Moo Hyun government has sympathies for North Korea and his party members and his colleagues have not yet found any possible presidential candidate. In contrary, the opposition party has a very good rate of support. And if the government changes in this presidential election in South Korea, then it means to Kim Jong Il that he loses his power upon South Korea.
So, nowadays, South Korean government is doing everything good for North Korean regime and doing nothing bad to North Korean regime. But if the regime –- the South Korean government will be changed in the next election, then Kim Jong Il will not have any hope to be supported massively by South Korea. So, if I were Kim Jong Il then I would make some effort to influence South Korean election, or if it is impossible then he will do some very, very effective evocation [sounds like] on South Korea. But such kind of evocation will meet directly the reaction from outside, I think. So, it is a way to a collapse of North Korean Kim Jong Il regime also. And for the second question, yes, it is a very important issue for South Korean people also if as to whether George W. Bush has changed fundamentally his policy toward the North Korea.
I have myself attended a private reception by George W. Bush on –- so, at the beginning of this month in California. And that time, George W. Bush imposed upon his task [indiscernible] of the history, and he has said he will never compromise in principle. He has said about North Korea and South Korea almost one-third of all his speech. It is very extraordinary. And my analysis is that George W. Bush has not changed his principle policy towards the North Korea. He is trying nowadays only for a democratic solution because he could not find any other good ways to solve the North Korean nuclear. And but if Kim Jong Il will not abandon the nuclear weapon, then I think United States and George W. Bush will not permit it.
So, there must be a time of crash and it is already the time of crash, I already believe. So, George W. Bush has made every possible thing to solve North Korean nuclear a program by democracy, but it is nearly the end of its effort. And so, I trust George W. Bush’s policy toward the North Korea. That is not a compromised policy at all. It is not appeasement policy, I think. If we keep the correct principle and we try to solve by the tool of diplomacy and we will do everything and we wait, then it is not yet appeasement policy, I think. But I think it is nearly the end of the effort, nearly the end. Today, it is more than two weeks after the North Korea’s delay of fulfillment of their promise. Nothing has been made so I think it is very crucial now. Thank you.
Bruce E. Bechtol: Do you like me to comment?
Christopher Griffin: Sure, sure.
Bruce E. Bechtol: I have a lot of questions about the latest results of the Six Party Talks myself. And many of my questions revolve around the highly-enriched uranium program of North Korea. I mean, the American press and the South Korean press have debated this. Let's be clear about this: North Korea has an ATU program. It is probably at least [indiscernible] as Libya’s ATU program was when we got them to take it down. And to ignore the ATU program means we are not solving the nuclear problem.
So, my concerns are largely that not only should we be solving the plutonium program, but this is a dual-track nuclear program that North Korea has and we need to get them to a) admit that they have the program again, since they already did it in 2002; and b) we need to get them to transparently dismantle it. And that is going to be very, very difficult. So, I mean, I'm hopeful as I'm sure everyone in this panel is. But I still have a lot of questions about the feasibility of being able to get them to dismantle their ATU program.
Nicholas Eberstadt: I want to get one little comment in about the question of sanctions because I think that is a terribly important question. If you talk to any specialists who have followed the history of economic sanctions, either through international relations or economic historians, the consensus is that coercive economic diplomacy is a miserable instrument and almost always fails. Its batting average is very, very, very low. However, North Korea is not an average typical economy, right?
The DPRK is the most distorted economy on the face of the planet and it can only continue to survive as we know and love it the way that it is today through constant unremitting inflows of transfers from abroad because it is so inefficient that without these continuing transfers from abroad, business ceases. When the net transfer of funds from abroad was only half-a-billion dollars a year, only half-a-billion dollars a year, the DPRK was plunged into famine. That was the situation in the mid and late-1990s. Now, the net transfer of funds from abroad seems to be three or maybe even four times as great as during that period and the famine has temporarily ceased. What I think this means, or at least what I take this to mean, is that the continuation of the Kim Jong Il regime as we know it today is very largely in the hands of the government abroad that are continuing to finance its survival.
Christopher Griffin: To add just one concluding observation on your question, it does not seem that we have traded human rights for non-proliferation. It seems we have traded away human rights and we have not even gotten non-proliferation in exchange. But thank you all very much for coming. A couple of us will be sticking around now, but it is 5:00 and we should wrap up. And thank you again very much. Please have a good day.
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