May 2007
Civil War and Genocide in Darfur: Chinese and Saharan Dimensions
Despite sustained diplomatic attention from the United States, the African Union, the United Nations, and other actors, the civil war and genocide in Darfur show no sign of abating. While Secretary of State Colin Powell's 2004 diagnosis of genocide has been borne out by subsequent events, the local and regional political aspects of the conflict have received less attention. A successful political solution to the crisis in Darfur will likely have to take rebel movements in Chad and the Central African Republic into account, and address attempts at mutual destabilization by Sudan and Chad. In addition, because China's investments in Sudan and its close political relationship with the Sudanese government have received greater scrutiny, the Darfur conflict has become the clearest test case of whether China is willing to embrace the role of "responsible stakeholder" in the international system.
Alex de Waal, Harvard University and the Social Science Research Council; René Lemarchand, University of Florida; Louisa Lombard, Duke University; and James C. Swan, U.S. Department of State discussed these and other topics at this AEI event. AEI's Mauro De Lorenzo moderated.
Mauro De Lorenzo
AEI
The humanitarian crisis in Darfur continues unabated. Diplomatic and media attention have focused on how to force Khartoum to accept the African Union–United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force. This focus, however, avoids two important questions regarding the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
The first question is: what happens after a peacekeeping force arrives? The history of peacekeeping forces is not good. Deployment of such forces can actually cause damage if civilians expect themselves to be protected but the forces fail to provide protection.
The second question is: how can we facilitate a political solution to the conflict? The crisis in Darfur relates to other wars in Sudan and to historic conflicts over the nature of the Sudanese state. The Darfur conflict is also intricately related to conflicts in surrounding countries, particularly in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).
Darfur has taken on significance beyond Africa, partly because of China's presence in Sudan. China has steadfastly backed the Sudanese government's refusal to accept the peacekeeping force mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706. Although, in the last few weeks, China has indicated some willingness to place pressure on Khartoum to accept the force, it continues to send mixed signals. And while Sudan exports a majority of its oil to China, that oil only accounts for a small percentage of China's total oil imports, indicating that Sudan is more dependant on China than is China on Sudan. Clearly, China's obstruction of international efforts in Sudan is not related to its energy needs.
While China's influence over Sudan may be overstated, its behavior with respect to Darfur remains the clearest indicator as to whether or not China is ready to play the role of a "responsible stakeholder." What we see with China in Sudan is what we might expect to see of China in other parts of the developing world in the coming years.
James C. Swann
U.S. Department of State
The United States approaches the crisis in Darfur as both regional and international problems. As such, it has spent a great deal of time consulting with the neighboring governments in CAR, Chad, and Libya. Both Chad and CAR have a long history of instability and internal wars which stem from domestic and regional factors. Neither country has a record of good governance, stability, rule of law, or democracy, and as a consequence, both Chad and CAR are vulnerable to instability imported from other countries.
The relationship among Chad, CAR, and Sudan is extremely complex. In many cases, national borders matter less than tribal and ethnic loyalties. There is also a tremendous amount of competition among border communities for scarce resources such as land and water. Chadian rebels use Sudan as a base of operations for their attacks into Chad--sometimes with Khartoum's complicity--often crossing through CAR territory en route. In CAR, particularly in the northeast, ethnic and familial ties to Sudan are prevalent, but it is unclear whether the Sudanese government is providing direct support to rebels. There is also relatively little CAR government presence in the region.
The United States. takes a three-pronged approach to the crisis, one which reflects regional dynamics, domestic politics, and economic realities in the region. First, as part of its humanitarian response, the United States continues to be the single largest donor to aid groups working in Sudan. Second, the United States is trying to achieve a political resolution to the conflict, and was the primary instigator of the Darfur Peace Accord signed last year. Finally, the United States advocates the deployment of a robust peacekeeping operation in Darfur. On April 18, President George W. Bush laid out a series of steps--including sanctions--that the United States is prepared to take if Khartoum does not allow for the deployment of UN and African Union troops to the region, does not cease support for the Janjaweed, and does not allow for unimpeded humanitarian aid to Darfur.
The United States also supports the deployment of a peacekeeping operation to Chad and northeastern CAR, which would be tasked with protecting citizens and deterring cross-border attacks. Because the root of instability in Chad and CAR is poor governance, the United States is working with European partners to promote democratic reform, dialogue, and transparency in both countries. The United States also supports the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which is tasked with promoting reconciliation and dialogue in CAR.
As Chad's immediate neighbor to the north, Libya has a vested interest in the stability of the region. As such, it is determined to play a role in the resolution of the conflict and has been instrumental in brokering recent peace agreements between Chadian rebels and the government, as well as between CAR and the rebels.
As the former colonial power in the region, France continues to wield a great deal of influence in Chad and CAR. In Chad, the French have provided support to the government, and in CAR they have directly engaged some rebel groups in the northeast. As a result of its economic investments, China also has considerable leverage in Sudan and must be part of any solution to the conflict.
René Lemarchand
University of Florida
Looking at the complicated Sudan-Chad relationship, two points become clear. First, Although Chadian president Idriss Déby and Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir are sworn enemies, they share a number of traits: both are dictators dependant on a party-dominant state; both target specific regional and ethnic communities to maintain control; both pocket large amounts of oil revenue to build up their armed forces; and both are involved in a proxy war, manipulating client factions.
Second, as the French are well aware, it becomes clear that if you remove support for Déby you may very well be left with a much worse situation that would pave the way for a radical pro-Khartoum faction. If you support Déby, you are criticized by both the domestic and international communities and are, indeed, complicit in a dictatorship.
Chad is, in many ways, characterized by a constantly changing factionalism, and while the crises in Chad, CAR, and Sudan are interlinked, their roots are indigenous to each state. For example, Libya suffered a devastating military defeat in northern Chad in 1987. As a result, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi believed that he had no choice but to use Darfur as an alternative theater of operations to propagate Arab supremacist ideology. He did so by using the Arab legion, which is, today, one of the main providers of men to the Janjaweed. Likewise in Chad, Gaddafi recruited a large number of al-Failaka al-Islamiya (Islamic Legion) members who now comprise to 50 percent of the Janjaweed.
While interactions between Chad and Darfur are a two-way phenomenon, the current crisis is in many ways indigenous to Chad. In Chad, though, it does not fall along ethnic lines, as much of the fighting is intra-Zaghawa. A large part of the problem is that there are 20,000 demobilized soldiers in Chad who have nowhere to go: they have been used by both Déby and CAR president François Bozizé, but neither has been able to reliably pay them. As a result, these soldiers have been forced to join one faction or another. The three major rebel factions in Chad now are the United Front for Democratic Change, the Rally for Democratic Forces, and the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD), all of which are to some extent supported by Khartoum, though the UFDD receives most of that support. While ideology used to be the driving force of each of these groups, they are now largely opportunistic and focused on increasing their own power.
There has been a lot of moral posturing in Paris about the situation in Chad and Darfur, but there has been very little action. The French, however, are ideally situated to make a difference and should do the following four things: First, they should increase their force in the region to at least 5,000 men and redefine the force's mandate with an eye to protecting human lives in the camps. Second, they should develop a contingency plan under the European Security and Defense Policy to set in motion an intervention force on fairly short notice, if needed, to counter attacks from rebel factions. Third, they should pressure their own firms to divest or suspend their activities in Sudan. Finally, they should reach out diplomatically to China, Russia, and the Arab League.
Louisa Lombard
Duke University
The international community engages with CAR half-heartedly for several reasons. One reason is that it is very difficult to find out information about this part of the world, and it is easy to spread disinformation about such an isolated area. As a result, Sudanese actors have become accustomed to using Central African territory as they wish. For example, in the 1980s, Sudan launched attacks against Sudan People's Liberation Army rebels from positions in CAR. Likewise, Khartoum supported Chadian rebels who crossed CAR territory to launch attacks on their own country. Today's conflict is a continuation of a longstanding pattern.
Three things are of particular interest in CAR's political context: First is the scope of the militarized regional economy which stretches from Cameroon to Chad, CAR, and Sudan. Second, the state is extremely fragile: no Central African government has ever been able to exert control over the northeast territory. It therefore takes very little for rebel groups to take over towns in CAR. Third, civilian-military tensions are a major source of the conflict, necessitating real reform in the security sector.
Support from both Chad and France is important to the relative stability of CAR. In addition to the 150 Chadian soldiers who are located on the northwest border under the framework of a joint border protection agreement, the strongest contingent of foreign soldiers in CAR is Chadian. While there are joint missions to turn back rebels in CAR, French support has been decisive both on the ground and through air support. In reality, the French would like to reduce their forces in the region, but given their historical ties it is unlikely they will completely abandon the region.
The idea that the crisis in Darfur is spreading into CAR is not necessarily historically accurate. The situation in CAR is rather the result of internal and regional dynamics related to the militarized economy, civilian-military tensions, and a very fragile central state.
Alex de Waal
Harvard University
Social Science Research Council
The Darfur crisis began as a spillover from Chad, and many believe that it will only end if the situation in Chad is rectified. It is important to note, however, that although the governments in Chad and CAR are authoritarian, their authority does not extend beyond the major metropolitan areas. Where they do have power, they have gained it through negotiation, not command. As has been the case in similar situations, Chad, CAR, and Sudan are attempting to conduct wars by mobilizing their armies, which are not up to the task. As a result, they mobilize proxies to go to war in their stead, but because they do not control these proxies, they spend years cleaning up the mess the proxies created. Proxies often defect and the countries are faced with a situation of anarchy in which the proxies are a threat to the army itself. The UN Security Council made a critical mistake when it demanded that Khartoum disarm the Janjaweed: the Janjaweed are more powerful than the government and therefore cannot be disarmed by them. Add to this the intense fractionalization of the rebel forces in the region and the constant shifting of sides and positions, and you begin to realize just how difficult it will be to solve this problem.
There are two camps of thought as to why U.S. policy has not worked: some believe we simply have not tried hard enough, while others believe we have not been smart enough. Unfortunately, the latter argument is more convincing.
But if we have not been smart enough, why was there a successful North-South peace accord in Sudan? First, in 2001. U.S. leverage was at the height of its international power. Second, there was consensus on the issue between the United States, Europe, the Arab countries, and the countries in the region--Ethiopian tanks have much more leverage in Sudan than the UN does. Third, China did not play a significant role in Sudan at the time, and therefore was not able to almost single-handedly block international decisions on the issue. Finally, and most importantly, there was clarity in the North-South conflict: there was a single policy objective that was clearly explained to the Sudanese government and acceptable to Khartoum. The objective, of course, was peace, for which the United States would reward Khartoum with recognition and support for its policy of democratization and national unity.
It is also important to note that Sudan took ownership of the North-South conflict and negotiated a peace agreement. The solution to the Darfur crisis cannot be imposed from outside, no matter how much we may desire it. Peace will only last if it is negotiated and achieved by Sudan itself.
Because the United States has focused so much energy on shifting responsibility from the African Union (AU) to the UN, the expectation of what UN troops can do has inflated. In reality, the UN will not be able to do much more than the AU troops have already done. There has been a conflation of what a military intervention force would do and what a UN force would do. Unfortunately, the UN would not serve as a police force. Sudanese generals, for the most part, do not have a problem with the UN being active in Darfur: it is Bashir who overruled them because of his domestic constituency, mostly militant Islamists who strongly oppose UN intervention. Bashir also realized that standing up to the UN--and in particular to the United States--in this way was an easy win in the Arab world.
What is important now is a face-saving measure for both the United States and Bashir. This would allow both sides to refocus on the real issues of stability, governance, democracy, and the overall future of Sudan. For those who advocate regime change, elections are guaranteed to accomplish that goal. We must also work toward the creation of government--or rather governance--in Darfur, Chad, and northwest CAR. The complete absence of government in Sudan or the region would be a far worse disaster.
AEI intern Charlie Murray prepared this summary.
