American Enterprise Institute

January 31, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

8:30 a.m.	Registration
8:45 a.m.	Introduction:	Christopher DeMuth, AEI
	Speaker:	Radek Sikorski, foreign minister of Poland
9:45 a.m.	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Christopher DeMuth:  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning and welcome to this talk by Radek Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, on Poland and the future of transatlantic relations.  The diplomatic community is filled with people of great sophistication and intellect, but once in awhile, even in this company, there emerges an individual of truly surpassing perspicacity and force of character, and Radek Sikorski is one of those brilliant phenomena. 

 He was deeply involved in the student wing of the solidarity movement in Poland as a teenager in the late 1970s.  In 1981, he found himself stranded in England when martial law was declared in Poland and what turned out to be the last gasp of communist repression began.  Making the best of his circumstances, he enrolled at Pembroke College, Oxford, where he studied politics, philosophy, and economics and received bachelors and masters degrees.

 In the 1980s he worked as a freelance journalist, a roving correspondent for National Review--a war correspondent in Afghanistan and Angola.  For a photograph taken in Afghanistan, he won the World Press photo prize in 1988.  Following the triumph of Solidarity over the communists in 1990, he returned to his homeland and in the 1990s, served in early post-communist governments as Deputy Minister for Defense and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and wrote several notable books, including Dust of the Saints: a Journey to Harat in Time of War, Full Circle: a Homecoming to Free Poland, and many articles during that period. 

 From 2002 to 2005, he was right here at the American Enterprise Institute where he was a resident fellow and most importantly, the executive director of AEI’s New Atlantic Initiative.  In 2005, he returned home once again, ran for the senate from his hometown, and won a smashing victory.  In the government that was then formed, he served until early last year as Minister of Defense.  And following his election to the Lower House--the people’s house--in the elections of last fall, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by the new prime minister, Donald Tusk, last November.  We are very proud to have back to AEI our friend and this great Polish patriot.  Please give a warm welcome to Minister of Foreign Affairs Radek Sikorski.

 Radek Sikorski:  Thank you, Chris.  My mother wouldn’t even believe all of this.  I am always grateful to someone who is ready to perjure himself on my behalf.  It’s great to be back at AEI and it’s wonderful to see so many familiar faces, so many friends.  AEI is a great institution, I thoroughly enjoyed being here and I know how important it is to the country, to the forming of opinions in the sole remaining superpower.  So it’s a great privilege and an honor to talk to you.  And therefore where else but at AEI would a new Polish foreign minister like to talk about the relationship between Poland the United States?

 Poland has good historical reasons to feel comfortable with U.S. leadership.  President Woodrow Wilson helped resurrect Poland after World War I.  After World War II, as a result of the Yalta Agreement, Poland did not become free, it became a part of the Soviet bloc.  We lost 6 million people in that war, half of them Jews, half Catholic.  But against our will, we were imprisoned in the Soviet empire.

 But great American presidents, from Harry Truman to George Herbert Bush, kept freedom of the captive nations in Europe high on their political agenda.  Many of them supported dissident movements behind the Iron Curtain.  Ronald Reagan, above all, undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet domination over Central Europe and challenged its political and military power. 

 We are still grateful for the United States, to the United States, for your insistence on the permanence of borders in the Europe that became free in 1989 at the time of the unification of Germany.  It was also American support and determination that opened the doors to NATO for Poland and other countries in the region.  The United States consistently advocated the inclusion of Central European states in the union and making Europe whole, free and at peace.  This legacy laid down a foundation for strong bonds between us and the United States.

 Poland has supported America inside Western structures and in other ventures.  The first Polish non-communist government after our liberation in 1989 hosted Jewish people fleeing the then still existing Soviet Union on their way to the free world.  During Gulf War I, Polish secret services helped rescue their American colleagues trapped in Iraq.  And then the Polish government represented for thirteen years U.S. interests in Baghdad, with some risk to our diplomats.  Polish troops also served hand in hand with their American comrades in difficult missions such as the one in Haiti.

 This relationship matured and consolidated in the following years.  With the full determination, Poland has fulfilled its obligation towards NATO.  Our troops have participated in practically all operations conducted by the alliance.  We are still a part of KFOR in Kosovo and we have twice increased our NATO sponsored mission in Afghanistan.

 In Afghanistan, we are in the south and the east.  We used to have 1200 troops; we are now increasing that by 400, sending eight extra helicopters, four gun ships, four transports.  And we have not imposed any caveats on our troops.  In other words, Polish troops in Afghanistan can truly be used according to military logic.  Our special forces are, perhaps, in the toughest place in Afghanistan, in Kandahar. 

 We have also at NATO urged other countries not to impose caveats.  If others did what we have done, if there were no national caveats on the use of troops inside Afghanistan, commanders there could use them more freely and we would probably have enough forces there. 

 Poland has done all of this because we believe deeply in the necessity to preserve NATO’s central role in providing security for the transatlantic community.  Poland and other new members strived passionately for the membership because they wanted to be a part of the most successful alliance ever formed.  We not only sought the best guarantees for security of borders, but were also driven by the desire to widen the area of stability and peace in Europe.  Our countries expected NATO would remain the main platform for the transatlantic dialogue on security matters and these convictions still hold today.  Therefore, we cannot stop investing our good faith, our political capital, and resources into NATO, so that our next generations can reap the fruits of its success and build an ever-better alliance. 

I have already said that Poland has been comfortable with American leadership.  In fact, it is hard to imagine a successful NATO without the strong engagement of the United States.  Poland has always advocated a greater American presence in Europe, regarding the United States as a de facto European power, and our position on this has not altered.

Poland, unlike some other European countries, supported the United States in Iraq, something that was contested elsewhere in Europe.  Polish troops were on the ground in Iraq from day one and we have in total sent 18,000 Polish troops to Iraq, 22 of whom died.  Now it is time to move on.  In our view, most of our objectives set for the Polish mission in Iraq have been fulfilled.  We intend to move Polish troops out of Iraq sometime at the end of this year.

In November the new Polish government gave the United States a year’s notice before actually saying that the mission was accomplished.  By the end of that mission, we will have been in Iraq longer than the length of the Second World War.  We will continue to train Iraqi forces within the framework of the NATO mission there, so there will still remain some Polish troops for some time in Iraq. 

In Poland we like to define our relations with the United States as a strategic partnership and we hope that the relationship is strategic not just on our side.  We think that’s the best way to describe relations between nations which share the same democratic values, often act hand in hand to combat global terrorism or the proliferation of WMDs.  Poland, as a country that loves liberty and knows how to export it, is also with the United States in promoting democracy and freedom, not just in Europe, but in the world.

Now I would like to say a couple of words about the project which I am told is the largest foreign defense investment project that the U.S. is proposing during the current administration, namely the missile defense base, which is a subject of important discussions between Poland and the United States.

Contrary to some European and American observers, the core issue here is not a big hole in the earth and a large fence around it, but a strategic vision of what we can do together, a vision that was originated by the great Ronald Reagan and whose purpose is the prevention against growing threats that have materialized towards our alliance and our partnership.

Let me now explain the importance of the MD project from the Polish perspective.  The possible location of the American interceptor base in Poland offers a unique opportunity to advance our joint partnership.  Indeed, in my country, the MD cooperation has been seen in a wider context.  It has been viewed as a project aimed at improving defense for the United States and its allies.  In other words, it is not only about the MD base alone; it should also be about Poland to be better prepared to defend itself and to help defend our allies – it is a unique undertaking.

Yet it corresponds with what we have done before.  Hand in hand with the United States – in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Iraq.  It is about strengthening NATO through joint efforts.  It is also about better regional defense cooperation in Central Europe, because this initiative pulls together Poland and the Czech Republic--together for the benefit of the whole of NATO.

It creates a platform for a dialogue and possible cooperation with Russia, so we can try to ease current tensions and eliminate harsh language.  Last but not least, it is about a bigger American engagement in European security and defense, for it provides for more U.S. military presence on our continent, something that we value highly. 

For Poland, the MD project, with its far-reaching security implications, is the most important security issue after our entry into NATO.  Thus nobody should be surprised that there is so much attention devoted to it and so many expectations built around it.  We have already been consulting with the US administration on MD for several years.  Exactly a year ago, we received an offer and regular negotiations began. 

I have closely followed the process from the beginning.  We have discussed many aspects of this initiative, including changes in Poland’s security environment that will result from it.  And I have to admit that for all of this time, our assessment of challenges and means to confront them have not yet jelled fully with those of the U.S.  Let us get back to the basics.

In general terms, we share the American threat assessment, though Poland does not feel directly threatened by Iran or any other Middle Eastern states.  However, we recognize that the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missile technology are important challenges in the years to come.  There are countries that perceive WMD as a tool of international politics and a potentially effective instrument of blackmail.

There are what we used to call rather coyly rogue regimes that--I think the politically correct way is to say states of concern now--that do not comply with the international law and do not cooperate in good faith with the international community.  And we must not preclude a situation in which the WMD and means for its delivery could become available for violent non-state actors.

In such a dark scenario, economic incentives, diplomacy, or traditional non-proliferation and control regimes will not be sufficient.  Therefore the MD project adds to our options a much needed element of force and thus contributes to our deterrence capability.  We are glad that there are signs of understanding within NATO on these issues.  The possibility of inter-operability of the American project with the anti-missile defense programs developed by the alliance will make NATO militarily stronger in case of potential threats.  It will also enhance a genuine visibility of security for the entire alliance.

There are ideas that both parties in this negotiation keep close to their hearts.  There are, however, issues that have not so far been shared by our American partners.  The first important factor in this regard is that the potential U.S.-Polish MD cooperation will make our security mutually dependent for decades to come.  It will affect our security in military terms and all other aspects of our security.  Therefore it is crucial that we establish a new and solid legal foundation that will make this concept stable and resistant to political disturbances, or rather, turbulences.

The second factor is that the missile defense project does not exist in a vacuum.  The missile threat does not constitute the only challenge to the alliance and to both of our countries.  There are other risks that require the development of new capabilities and a sufficient political effort to collectively address them.  I have already pointed out the fight against terrorism, reconstruction, and stabilization.  One can add also energy security, cyber defense and other issues. 

But last but not least, it is because of our geography within NATO, and the obligations that we have towards Polish citizens, that make us think about MD slightly differently from our American allies.  I am personally engaged in the dialogue with our neighbors and I’m fully convinced that if well managed, the MD project may serve the security of all.

On the other hand, as many of you know, Poland has come under political pressure and has even been blackmailed by some of our neighbors who fiercely oppose this project.  It is a little bit like living in an apartment block in which a friendly neighbor says to you – look, I’m planning to get myself a satellite receiver, I need to put up a dish, and I will get a much better angle for reception from your balcony because of its direction.  Could you possibly let me have your balcony to put up my dish?  And you say sure, we are friends and allies, why not? 

But there is another neighbor who says that the proposed dish on my balcony will be bad for his health, literally will make him sick.  And you and I know that a dish doesn’t make you sick.  But he says no, I am convinced that it will make me sick and if you put up this dish, I will smash your windows.  And so the question is what can we do together to address an unreasonable neighbor?

Thus in the negotiations that we have, we aim at a comprehensive, political, military agreement that will comprise initiatives to enhance NATO, to deepen our bilateral cooperation and to support the modernization of our armed forces.  Our aim is to make a more secure--is to contribute to the security of the United States, of NATO, but also to make Warsaw more secure.

The adherence to shared values has led us to Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the first case, it has been keeping us there for some five years, it has cost Poland a number of dead, as I mentioned, wounded, and half a billion dollars in expenditure.  In the times of the Afghanistan ISAF operation, growing demands and limited response from other allies–-as I mentioned before, Poland has twice increased its military presence there with no caveats on the activities of our soldiers. 

What we expect from the United States is solidarity--solidarity, a word that we in Poland treat particularly seriously.  And that the cooperation that we have enhances the security of both of our countries.  In NATO, we would like to see the US more concerned about NATO’s traditional mission, namely collective defense.

Article V of the Washington Treaty should not be moved into some kind of back pocket.  Its validity has been reconfirmed in the aftermath of September 11.  The classic role of the alliance should be protected by any current or operational needs, because it constitutes the foundation of transatlantic relations.  And as a country that is on the border of the alliance, between the area of democracy and security on the one hand, and an area where democracy and human rights and the rule of law are far from guaranteed, we feel this particularly keenly. 

We have been a member of NATO since 1999 now, but we still do not have on our territory any hard NATO military installations.  We are a flat country, which NATO planners used to joke, God created for tank warfare.  While transforming the military face of the alliance currently so occupied in Afghanistan, we also expect the US to remain vigilant about developments in the East and South of Europe. 

In this context, Georgia and Ukraine offer us the prospect for democratic development and successful integration with NATO.  Their voice should be better heard in Washington and their aspirations properly addressed during the forthcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.  The last twenty years have witnessed an unprecedented change in Europe.  The fall of communism released a huge wave of energy for nations.  Poland is a true believer in transatlantic cooperation. Our engagement in NATO and our engagement in the EU’s foreign and defense policy confirm this.

We are also convinced that the world today needs more than ever a strong partnership between America and Europe.  With their political and economic resources, the United States and the European Union, if they act together, can almost always succeed, and Poland is ready to make its contribution to make that happen.  Thank you.

Christopher DeMuth:  Thank you very much.  Minister Sikorski will take questions and comments.  I will call on you, he will deal with what you have to say.  Before asking your brief question if you could please identify yourself and wait for the roving microphone, which should be roving around – it is right now.

Donald Sajikowski:  I am Donald Sajikowski from Headquarters, Marine Corps. Minister Sikorski, welcome back to Washington, sir, it’s good to see a familiar face and an old friend once again.  Sir, I wanted to ask you a question that harkens back to your previous portfolio as defense minister under the Kaczynski government.  And it was alleged that you had left that position just about a year ago now over your concerns for adequate intelligence support for the Polish troops that were then headed to Afghanistan following restructuring of Poland’s military intelligence services. 

I am just wondering, sir, how will such reforms continue on the Tusk government and how will they improve intelligence cooperation between our countries and within the coalition?  And if you could comment, sir, on the overall striking of a balance between vetting and lustration for safe and secure intelligence service versus keeping and retaining experience and professional personnel?

Radek Sikorski:  This is a very in subject, reform of the Polish intelligence.  Particularly, I think you mean the military intelligence service.  And you are quite right that the way that this process was done was part of the reason why I parted ways with Prime Minister Kaczynski. 

I was in favor of reforming the old intelligence organization WSI.  How could it be otherwise?   They bugged me in my previous position as Deputy Defense Minister.  They ran a file on me.  I think I was their biggest victim or at least the best documented victim.  And the file that they gathered on me, you can take a look at on my web page.  I have made it available.

So clearly that intelligence organization, and this was supposed to be a military intelligence service, was used by politicians for political ends and therefore something radical needed to be done.  But I simply disagreed with my prime minister over who should do it.  He appointed a fellow who, in my judgment, was simply unfit for the job. 

I tolerated it for awhile because he was seen as someone who might yet be useful in smashing the old organization, which had some people from the past that needed to be gotten rid of.  But by this time last year, I knew that I was going to war in Afghanistan.  We were going from 100 guys in Afghanistan to 1200.  In other words, a serious operation.

I was going to the south, to Kandahar, to Ghazni, to Paktika--and I know a thing or two about Afghanistan. You have to be serious when you operate in Afghanistan.  So part of the conversation which led to my departure was look, if you are telling me to go to war, I need the instruments to win.  I need the commanders that I trust and I need intelligence chiefs and intelligence officers that I think are capable, rather than being, if you like, enthusiasts, revolutionary enthusiasts.  It was about that.  And from a year’s perspective, I can only say that I feel vindicated by events. 

Petr Kolar:  Good morning, I am Petr Kolar, Czech Ambassador to the United States.  Minister, my question is about your neighbor’s satellite on your balcony.  Could you share with us a bit your views and ideas of how to convince your unreasonable neighbor that it is not something against his health or against his interests?  Thank you very much.

Radek Sikorski:  Well, you are, of course, more advanced in your negotiations with the United States than we are.  But you are also in a different position, you have different neighbors.  All of your neighbors are in the EU.  You don’t have, for example, Mr. Lukashenka for a neighbor and some others. 

So it’s a more vivid issue for us.  And when talk about this third site started some years ago, the United States engaged in a dialogue with Russia and told us don’t worry, we will square Russian concerns.  We will take it upon ourselves to explain to them the technical aspects of it and to reassure them that it’s not aimed at Russia and they will see reason and they will lift their objections. 

But as you know, that hasn’t happened.  We are trying to do our best and I have actually, on assuming office, I have opened the dialogue with Russia.  Mr. Kislyak, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for this issue, came to us and gave us a technical presentation.  I have seen Mr. Lavrov.  And whereas they have calmed, to some extent, the rhetorical aspect of the opposition, the opposition is still very much there. 

And not just verbally, but Russia tells us very frankly what it will do in the military sphere if we agree to this installation.  And I think it’s credible that they will do what they say.  And so either the United States has to try some more to persuade them, or the United States and we have to find some other way to address the full situation in its entirety, namely that the U.S. will have a base that will contribute to the security of the United States and NATO.  But we will face some additional risks and that has to be addressed.

Ed Rowney:  I am Ed Rowney, President Reagan’s arms controller.  Does the fact that NATO is now planning for an active defense of all of Europe--ballistic missile defense for all of Europe including plans for Southeast Europe--does that help sway public opinion in Poland to more active cooperation with the United States?

Radek Sikorski:  Yes, NATO-izing the project in political terms or even operational terms, we perceive as a good thing.  Entering NATO was seen as a great national success, as something that contributes to our security.  But more than that, there is a symbol of our return to the family of free nations.  And if the proposed base could be part of a NATO architecture at different levels--strategic theater and short-range--that’s all to the good.

But as you know, these plans are still quite vague, at quite an early stage.  By the way, General Rowney, you will be pleased to know that at my direction, we will soon have, in the Polish Foreign Ministry, telephones and Polish Embassy telephones, the music by Ignacy Paderewski that I know you care so much about.

Joe Fitchett:  Joe Fitchett from the European Institute.  I wonder what we see in prospect, which is better relations between your government and the other governments of the EU in the months and years to come.  I wonder if that change in tone, if it does materialize, as we expect, will improve the chances that Poland and the United States will get more perhaps smarter and more useful support from all of the other EU member states in the debate about missile defense that concern the neighbor who worries about satellite dishes nearby. 

Radek Sikorski:  Well hopefully, because it all goes into a mix of this very complicated decision.  This is an unusually complicated equation because in addition, there are some uncertainties about what the next US administration might do.  There are also some people in Europe who say well, why should Poland do this bilaterally with the US? Europe’s security is at stake, too.

But the bottom line for the government is that whatever we agree, in the end I will have to take to parliament, I will have to take the podium and persuade members of parliament that what we have negotiated increases the security of the alliance, but also increases the security of this country.  I will have to persuade them and they will have to vote on it.  And so the European aspect plays into this, too.

Jacek Marczynski:  My name is Jacek Marczynski and I have a practical question for Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski.  The American consulate in Poland, the embassy, has a special fee to make an appointment with a U.S. consular officer.  And this rule doesn’t exist in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and many other countries.  Are you going to raise this issue with the U.S. State Department, that this is kind of a discrimination and unfair policy towards Poland by the State Department, since Poland is such a great ally of the United States?  Thank you.

Radek Sikorski:  I think you are factually wrong in saying that the visa application fee does not apply in other countries.  I think it does.  I think it does.  But yes, it is a problem.  In 1991, we had an agreement.  Poland dropped the visa requirement for US citizens and in return, the U.S. said that it would issue visas for free. 

Visas are free, but you pay $120, I think, for the application, which is not refunded if the visa is refused.  It’s less and less of a problem because, the zloty is stronger and stronger, the dollar is weaker and actually Poles can now travel all over Europe and work legally with social security at higher wages.  And the US has also raised the limit below which–-it’s a complicated issue.  But anyway, there has been a positive movement and the problem is less severe than it used to be.

Jacek Marczynski:  The appointment at the consulate office – that is what I am addressing, this issue.

Radek Sikorski:  I will check, but what really rankles people is the visa – we will look into it.

Christopher DeMuth:  We have time for just one more question. 

John Czop:  My name is John Czop and I am a correspondent for the Post Eagle weekly newspaper.  In November of 2005 in a speech at Columbia University, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski mentioned that the road to Warsaw is open to invasion from the east.  Do you think that Poland’s defense today is better off or worse off than it was when Professor Brzezinski made that comment back in November of 2005? 

Radek Sikorski:  I don’t think he was announcing or fearing or indicating any imminent military threat.  I don’t think our estimates, NATO estimates, expect anything like that in any future that can be predicted.  But you are right, there is half a millennium of history over a plain with no significant geographical barriers. 

And yes, it’s true that after the 1990s the Russian military suffered from serious shortages, and the Russian defense budget is now growing very dynamically.  I wished when I was defense minister, that I would have those kinds of increases in the proportion of GDP devoted to defense, and increases of GDP.  But that’s why we have armies is to be there for those occasions that are least expected.  I don’t think that has changed at all.

Artur Orkisz:  Artur Orkisz – I have a quick question with regard to the current political climate in Washington.  I am wondering whether or not, from your perspective, as the presidential race unfolds, if there is one particular horse that you favor as a partner going forward in negotiations.  Thank you.

Radek Sikorski:  I wouldn’t dare interfere in the internal affairs of a superpower.  But of course, we follow--the whole world follows--the greatest race on the planet.  Of the current contenders I can tell you I have met Senator McCain.  When I worked for Chris, I was very impressed that Senator McCain would come to a conference that I organized here in this room in 2003 on Belarus.  Not exactly a sexy subject, Belarus.  And there were no cameras present, and there was no political gain for Senator McCain to come and make a brilliant speech on human rights and on the violation of democracy in Belarus.

And he came and did that to a full room.  And it helped to create the intellectual climate for the passing of the Belarus Democracy Act by Congress, which is now helping the victims of the Lukashenka regime.  So what I am saying to you is that I greatly admire John McCain.  Not only did he spend time in a communist jail--so we feel among former captive nations that he probably feels our pain, if you know what I mean--but I think in his support for liberty abroad, because of what he did here, I think he is genuine. 

Then I have an American wife who sees another candidate as someone who would change America’s image abroad, someone who would give the world a pause and would shift the paradigm in terms of America’s standing in the world, but I won’t dare say who that is. 

Christopher DeMuth:  One last question.

Male Speaker:  Mr. Minister, again on missile defense, is February still a target to conclude your negotiations with the U.S. government on missile defense, and who are you meeting with in the Bush Administration while in DC?

Radek Sikorski:  I am here as the foreign minister of a new government in Poland.  My defense ministry colleague was here two weeks ago and the Prime Minister is also invited.  So this is a fairly routine exercise.  Most countries when they constitute a government want to touch base with Washington.  So I am being received by the Vice President, I saw Mr. Hadley yesterday, I am seeing the Secretary of State.  I expect missile defense to be raised by the U.S. side, but we are talking about a variety of issues between our countries.

Male Speaker:  This February is a target to conclude your negotiations?

Radek Sikorski:  The outcome of negotiations is determined by their content.  You can always conclude negotiations quickly by agreeing to the other side’s concerns. 

Christopher DeMuth:  Minister Sikorski, thank you for your excellent talk and presentation.

[End Conference]