May 2003
Castro's Crackdown: Why and What Now?

After the recent massive crackdown on human rights activists and political dissidents in Cuba, it is time to take another look at U.S. policy toward the island. Three specialists provided different perspectives and exchanged views at a May 14 event.

The Cuban puzzle is a difficult one to piece together, as there are always surprises. The crackdown was a surprise to me because Fidel Castro has lived happily for a long time with the growing civic opposition and was in no danger of being overthrown. The Cuban regime is one of the more stable governments in the region due to its coercive power and the role of the United States in helping to keep Castro in power by allowing the flow of money in and refugees out. The wave of arrests began the day after the fifty-ninth session of the UN Commission on Human Rights commenced in Geneva, Switzerland. The reaction of the Western European countries, even more so than the Latin American nations, was one of shock and dismay. In fact, it is surprising that the Cuban government incarcerated the dissidents rather than just expelling U.S. Interests Section head James Cason on charges of undiplomatic behavior. Cason had met with opposition members around the island and in the week before the mass arrests, allowed a group of dissident journalists to use his official residence for a meeting, which lead to sharp criticism from Fidel Castro.

Castro likes these complex and tumultuous situations. He is at his best when creating crises. This panel will deal with what happened in Cuba recently and with what might be the appropriate U.S. response.

The recent crackdown is part of a longstanding reactionary pattern in Cuba and was, therefore, not a surprise. There are a number of contributing factors to look at when examining the possible causes for this crackdown.

First, Marxist economies cannot sustain themselves, and thus need outside assistance. In order to replace dwindling European and Canadian support, the Cuban plan has been to charm and entice the United States through agriculture sales. Over the last two years, this plan has been failing. In fact, over the last three to four years, the economic program as a whole has fallen short. Bolstering tourism and upping foreign investment has not been successful, and the island-wide closing of sugar mills is indicative of a seriously ailing economy.

Second, the growth of the dissident movement within Cuba was significant and upon closer examination, Fidel Castro saw that the island was teeming with people and organizations not loyal to him. This posed a real threat because Castro’s power is dependent on a complete monopoly of information and organizations. One such organized movement is the Varela Project, led by Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas, which is focused on a formal petition for referendum on legal reform seeking greater personal, political, and economic freedoms, as well as amnesty for political prisoners. The Varela group, composed of journalists, leaders of independent labor unions, and pro-democracy activists of illegal opposition political parties, was hit the hardest, with forty-two activists arrested and given harsh penalties. Independent journalists were second on Castro’s list of targets.

Third, it is likely that the situation in Iraq heavily influenced Castro’s response. Countries have reacted in many different ways. For instance, Syria is being more progressive, while North Korea and Cuba have chosen to react negatively.

The fourth item is both a result of the failing economy and the growth of the dissident movement. Cubans are entrepreneurial by nature, and the black market, which might be considered a shining example of entrepreneurship in other places, is illegal. Towards the beginning of this year, Castro’s efforts to crackdown on small independent businessmen were conducted under the guise of anti-narcotics. It was driven underground successfully, as fear was instilled in most Cubans, not of receiving a fine, but of the confiscation of houses, vehicles, and other personal property.

Lastly, there are undoubtedly succession concerns that could have played a part in the recent crackdown. Castro is getting older and lately has been less directly involved in policymaking. Those around Fidel and his brother Raul may have been trying to assert power and influence in an effort to discourage competition when succession finally does take place.

In terms of a U.S. response, this is not a U.S.-Cuba problem and therefore, we should be talking about an international response. We should also work actively with our allies inside Cuba to promote democratic principles. I am in favor of remittances because they fund dissidents and break the cycle of Castro’s forced dependence upon him. Castro’s information monopoly needs to be attacked aggressively. The American-funded and Miami-based TV Martí is banned in Cuba and if it comes back, in any form, the myth of Castro will break down.

Fidel Castro, like Saddam Hussein, measures success by survival. We should figure out how to break Castro’s reign and put Cuba’s destiny back into the hands of the Cubans.

The crackdown came as a surprise to me in that it was not politically rational, and I would like to express my admiration for the dissidents now in jail. In examining why this crackdown occurred, it is useful to look at the Castro regime’s perspective of America’s Cuba policy. What Castro’s regime sees is a near total trade embargo, the Helms-Burton law, and the fact that the United States both actively discourages others from trading with Cuba and punishes foreign investors who do business there. Castro notes the laws passed in 1992 and 1996 that tightened American sanctions to bring down the government. Today’s policy of promoting the rapid and peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba undoubtedly sounds to Castro like regime change, which is inherently threatening. In current events, Bush’s unilateral actions in Iraq are both hostile and troubling. With respect to James Cason, it most likely appeared to Castro that the United States was not only supporting, but also organizing the dissident movement in Cuba on top of an already overt program to provide resources to it. Although not rational, it is conceivable that these factors, singly and as a whole, acted as a force that required a reaction from Havana in an effort to mask any signals of weakness.

U.S. policy towards Cuba faces a design problem. The ends of the policy, the means employed, and the conditions in Cuba through which the means are supposed to work, are not connected. There are no measures in place to attain a rapid and peaceful transition and none could achieve that end. Furthermore, the United States does not have the stomach for such a policy.

There are five final points to mention regarding how to proceed. First, we should maintain direct flights and remittances. Banning travel and withholding remittances would punish the Cuban people, leave Castro unscathed, and undermine and taint American policy and image respectively. The misery of the Cuban people is not the solution to the American policy problem. Second, organizing international support for U.S. sanctions is a dead end because European outrage at the crackdown in no way translates into agreement with U.S. economic sanctions. Third, the issue with Radio and TV Martí is not money; it is quality. It should be put under the supervision of Voice of America, have tough editors, superior news and commentary, and a diversity of opinions and programming that does not mirror what Cubans already have. Fourth, the United States should rethink its posture toward the dissidents in terms of what would best serve their needs, considering the very difficult situation in which they live. Finally, a policy of encouraging more contact, rather than limiting it, between Cubans and Americans would serve both long-term American influence and the future interests of a post-Castro Cuba. The way to deal with a post-Castro Cuba is to do it now by connecting with the next generation of Cubans, who do not feel threatened by capitalism and openness.

AEI staff assistant Lauren Di Cecio prepared this summary.