Haiti: The Road Ahead

April 14, 2004

Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording

Proceedings:
MR. FALCOFF:  [In progress]-- And I've had an interest, as many of you have had, in Haiti for a number of years.  I used to teach a course on Latin American history, and the section on the independence of Haiti always was one of the most exciting parts of the course.

But today we're talking not about history but about current events and the future.  And we're privileged to have with us this morning Ambassador Roger Noriega, who, as you know, is the assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, and therefore the person in the administration most responsible for fashioning and implementing the president's policies for countries in the region.

Before he became assistant secretary, he was ambassador to the Organization of American States.  And I can tell you that many of my friends who are ambassadors to that body from different Latin American and Caribbean countries spoke very highly of him as a person who knew how to operate in a multilateral framework very successfully, which, as you know, is not a skill the Americans are very good at.

So with that, I'm sure he'll have a good preparation for the kind of multilateral approach which will have to be taken in Haiti.  I understand that, for example, that a Brazilian general is going to be taking over the peace force soon, and that, breaking with very, very long precedent, Chile is sending some peacekeepers to help the force.  So some kind of a multilateral approach is definitely starting to work in Haiti.  I'm sure we'll hear more about that.  And then we'll have a lot of time for you folks to ask questions, because I know that's why you're here.

With that, I have the pleasure of introducing Roger Noriega.

[Applause.]

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Thank you very much, Mark, for that introduction.  I must say that in the department, in my bureau, there's only so much time in the day, or in a week, and a lot of material to read, that the AEI papers that we get with the little yellow strip across the left-hand column, I believe, that are written by Mark Falcoff are basically required reading for all of us because he manages to say, over a breadth of issues, the essential elements of any crisis that we're confronting.  He manages to sum it up in an effective, cogent, constructive way, and we value his insights and plagiarize at liberty--classifying the documents to ensure that nobody discovers the plagiarism.

When I thought a little bit about what I wanted to say here this morning, I knew that I wanted to stress that Haiti is at an important crossroads yet again, that now, perhaps more than at any time in a decade, there is an opportunity for the Haitian people to make a break with their troubled past and to begin again to make progress on the path to democracy and development.  After waiting for 200 years, Haitians deserve democracy and a government that looks out for their interests.

Some people look at Haitian history, shrug their shoulders, and say, well, it's Haiti, what do you expect?  Or they look at our experiences and our international engagement, the elections that we sponsored over the last decade, and say, well, it's good enough for Haiti.  That's a cynical perspective that overlooks the fact that, many times in the past, the Haitian people have made great efforts to establish true democracy, only to be undermined from within by selfish interests and corrupt leaders and from without by the low expectations of their supposed friends and neighbors.

The Bush administration believes that we will do our part to get it right in Haiti and that Haiti will get the democracy that it deserves.  The international community must be idealistic in approaching the challenges before us in Haiti.

I want to talk to you about the prospects and what the United States will do to help the Haitian people fulfill them, but I realize that articulating how the United States sees the way ahead, we have to explain a little bit about how we found ourselves in the present situation, how the hopes and aspirations of the Haitian people for a truly representative government have been frustrated in the past, including in the not so distant past.  It is a familiar story.  It's a story about a popular leader, who promises radical reform, only becomes what he criticized.  Sadly, this is a story that is not unique to Haiti.  It is, if anything, a cautionary tale for leaders and citizens of democracies everywhere.

Haitians are justifiably proud of their many historic accomplishments.  Haiti's the first nation borne of a slave revolution, a revolt that saw the defeat of Napoleon's army.  Haiti was the second republic established in the western hemisphere, after the United States, and the first black republic in history.  During its first century, Haiti endured isolation and internal strife.

In its second century, a succession of strongmen and failed attempts at implementing democratic rule were followed by the election, in 1957, of Francois Duvalier, a popular leader who promised democratic reform, but quickly resorted to demagoguery and political violence to maintain his self-proclaimed title of president for life.  He was succeeded, as we all know, by his son, Baby Doc, who reined notoriously in Haiti until 1986, when a combination of international pressure and internal antagonism brought on by decades of brutal and corrupt misrule forced him from power.

As you know, the dominant figure in Haiti politics of the last 13 years, more or less, has been Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  Initially, many had high hopes for this charismatic priest, who had worked with the least fortunate in Haitian society and found most of his support there.  His movement, Lavalas--meaning "cleansing flood" in Creole--was a self-styled reform movement that promised to undo the vestiges of the Duvalier regime.  In hindsight, the Aristide regime bore too much resemblance to the Duvalier regime.  Despite his early promise to democracy, the Aristide years were yet another disappointing chapter in Haiti's history.

The lesson is that democracy is not just an election, a street demonstration, or a dusty legal document.  It is a way of living and working together, and as such, it is contingent on how leaders conduct themselves and how they treat their people.  Leaders can undermine a republic and their own legitimacy by their actions, and that is how people can actually have their democracy taken away from them.

There are many examples of how President Aristide contributed to the collapse of his own government.  However, four key factors stand out.  First, there is the culture of political violence and impunity that characterized his movement and his regime.  Second, the corruption of the institutions of the state that flourished under him.  Third, his polarizing rhetoric and the willful refusal to give any quarter to or to compromise with his political adversaries.  And finally, his flouting of the concerns of his neighbors and friends in the international community.

Early on, as I said, President Aristide was associated with the most egregious transgressions of democratic principles--the use of violence to further political ambition and to intimidate opponents.  It is trademark of demagogues that, from the beginning of their political careers, they are often associated with and inspire violent acts.  President Aristide was a compelling and inflammatory orator, and his followers were known to have necklaced opponents--the fine art of putting gasoline-filled tires around people's necks and setting them ablaze.

Some apologists at the time essentially made moral relativism and ends-justify-the-means argument.  They said, well, in Haiti politics is a contact sport and moving against the Duvalier regime required some extreme measures.  That argument overlooks the fact that murder is simply inconsistent with democracy.  These early incidents were portents of things to come.  Critics and adversaries of President Aristide often wound up dead, while their killers went unpunished.  The murders of journalists Jean Dominique in April 2000 and Brignol Lindor in December 2001 and the former Aristide thug-turned-renegade gang leader, Amiot Metayer, in September 2003 are a couple of notorious examples.

As years passed, Aristide increasingly relied on the Chimere, violent gangs, to maintain his authority, intimidate opponents, and to control the streets.  A notorious example, on December 5th of last year, a day that became known as Black Friday, Chimeres attacked state university students who were gathering for a demonstration in Port-au-Prince.  An estimated 30 students were injured, at least 10 by gunfire, and the university rector suffered two broken kneecaps.  His kneecaps were pulverized by gangs because he dared to move out into the violence; he tried to stop the violence.

In addition to conspiring to generate violence, Aristide also allowed corruption to flourish in the legitimate institutions in the Haitian state.  Teleco, Haiti's national telephone monopoly, was one of the few reliable sources of revenues for the Haitian government.  Aristide packed its staff with his cronies.  Often, after a long day of beating up students and democracy activists, Chimeres were observed marching down to Teleco headquarters is Port-au-Prince, where Aristide's apparatchiks would hand out money to the mobs.  What should have been a national patrimony was used as a piggy bank to fund Aristide's violent ambitions.

The Haitian National Police was also thoroughly corrupted.  It was stood up with international aid after the invention of 1994.  The Haitian National Police was intended to be a national force that, unlike many of its predecessors, would be a credible guardian of the Haitian state and an effective enforcer of the rule of law.  The United States and the international community spent hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure that the HNP would fulfill this role.  Aristide clearly had other ideas in mind from the outset.  He systematically removed professional policemen and replaced them with thugs and criminals loyal to him.  He withheld necessary funds to support, train, and equip the HNP.

More and more, Aristide employed the HNP as an instrument of repression.  As a consequence, by the end of his reign the HNP was a hollow and demoralized force that would not stand up to gangs that rose up against him in February.  There was one notorious example in the very final days of the Aristide regime, where he set the Chimeres loose on his own coast guard because the clear intention was to be able to play the migration card against the United States.

On paper, this force was supposed to be about 5,000 people.  Many good policemen eventually left, out of frustration.  Many dangerous men, men who had no business being any sort of police force to begin with, were left to fight over the graft that was a prerequisite of being an Aristide loyalist on the force.  In the end, the HNP was less about fighting crime than it was about a continually criminal enterprise.

The malfeasance at Teleco and the HNP was part of a pattern.  The Aristide regime operated on patronage politics.  Fanmi Lavalas was aptly named.  It was operated like a family, with Aristide playing the part of an autocratic patriarch.  Aristide inculcated his us-against-them belief among his followers.  His adversaries were not simply political opponents, they were enemies to be driven from the field.  Winning an election was not enough.  Victory had to be absolute.  His handling of the parliamentary elections in May 2000 is an example of a winner-take-all mentality.  Not content with a simple majority won at the polls with the full resources of his political machine, Aristide declared several cronies winners in close elections that should have gone to a second ballot, according to international observers.  His contempt for the democratic process was evident.

For Aristide it seemed to be that winning wasn't everything, it was the only thing.  It was his approach to politics that made him such a polarizing figure and drove so many people away from him.  Even before the split in the Lavalas Party, many allies and adversaries came to regard President Aristide as an ultimately self-interested and untrustworthy partner.

Eventually, many of President Aristide's neighbors and members of the international community began to see him in this same light as well.  The OAS passed resolutions out of concern for the increasing number of politically motivated acts of violence and the collapse of the political process in Haiti.  Resolution 822 called on the Haitian government to ensure a climate of security and confidence with a view to establishing the conditions necessary for free and fair elections in 2003.  It established November 4th of that year as the date by which an autonomous, credible, and neutral provisional electoral council should be formed.

The United States and other interested nations worked diligently to broker an agreement between opposition opponents and the Aristide government, throughout the fall of 2003, that would satisfy the opposition's reasonable concerns over security, given the violence that they had endured at the hands of the HNP and the Chimeres.  President Aristide refused to guarantee their safety, and no agreement was reached.  He refused to take tangible, concrete steps that would ensure basic security under which a democratic process might flourish.  Despite his public protestations, President Aristide was never really negotiating in good faith, because he had a pattern of violating his words and failing to deliver on his promises.

Months passed, the deadline for elections approached and tensions grew.  As violence began to break out in the capital and outlying cities, many Haitians took to the seas.  Naturally, this was a concern for all of Haiti's neighbors, including the United States, for humanitarian and security reasons.  In his final days, Aristide issued numerous statements on immigration that most observers, informed observers, agree were intentionally ambiguous and intended to put his neighbors on notice that they faced the prospect of a major migration crisis if they did not come to his aid.  It was attempted blackmail, and the real victims were the Haitian people themselves.

I'm convinced that President Aristide himself is to blame for his own political demise.  Had he not encouraged and condoned political violence, he would have had much greater moral authority and political sympathy.  Had he not corrupted the state and the police force, his government could have withstood the challenge brought on by a handful of rebels.  Had he not alienated so many of his former allies and adversaries by grabbing power with both hands, he would likely have been able to continue his success at the polls.  Had he not turned his back on his neighbors and friends in the international community, especially when they were trying to help him resolve political crisis by constitutional electoral and peaceful means, he probably would be in office today.  Aristide is, as I said before, a disappointing chapter in the Haitian history and a cautionary tale for demagogues and despots.

Fortunately for the people of Haiti, that chapter is over and they now have an opportunity to write a new one.  As Secretary Powell observed during his recent visit to Haiti, the government of President Alexandre and Prime Minister Latortue is off to a good start.  The cabinet that the prime minister and the president have named is comprised of many experts in their fields, and it is as professional nonpartisan a group as has ever existed in the history of Haiti's government.

Earlier this month, the government brokered an agreement with the political parties that calls for elections in 2005.  That time frame will allow for the restoration of government services and the necessary preparations for national elections supervised by the international community.  The multinational interim force has established security in the capital and many outlying cities and is moving into other cities as we speak.

I think it's important to acknowledge the contributions of France, Canada, and Chile, which they've made already by deploying forces to Haiti within hours and days of President Aristide's departure.  Their soldiers, and U.S. forces working beside them, have performed very, very well under difficult circumstances.

We are also engaged in discussions with the United Nations and other member states as to the nature and composition of a follow-on peacekeeping force, and those talks are proceeding very well.  As Mark has indicated, Brazil has signaled its interest in playing a leadership role in that follow-on peacekeeping force.

At the beginning of my comments, I said that we in the international community must do our part to give Haiti the shot at genuine democracy that it deserves.  To achieve that goal, the Bush administration believes that our engagement with Haiti needs to be guided by certain principles.

And we should note that, first and foremost, the international community itself has to recover credibility with the Haitian people.  Throughout the 1990s, the international community stood by as elections were stolen, as political opponents were harassed, some killed, as human rights were violated systematically, and we, for various reasons, said, well, that's all part of being in Haiti.  And that's not good enough.  It never was, and it isn't, by all means, now.  And we have to commit to the Haitian people that the international community is genuinely interested in building democracy in Haiti.

First of all, the norms established by the Inter-American Democratic Charter and other international conventions regarding human rights must be adhered to in Haiti.  Political power must not be turned over to people who have participated in political violence, including irregular armed groups.   Moreover, the political process should encourage the participation of all nonviolent, peaceful political movements, including successors of the Lavalas movement.

Second, if Haiti is to break with its dark past, no form of political violence or corruption can be tolerated.  It is vital to restore security and impose the rule of law to duly authorized forces, including the MIF, the Multinational Interim Force, PKO, and a renovated, independent, apolitical, independent, and professional Haitian National Police Force.  All Haitians, without regard to political affiliation, must be held accountable for their past crimes through a system of justice, not revenge.

Third, to begin to fulfill Haiti's economic potential and provide opportunity for the Haitian people, we will engage the government of Haiti, the Haitian private sector, and the Haiti diaspora.  We will help jump-start private-sector job creation, trade, and investment.  We will help the government of Haiti ensure accountability in public finances, including the effective and timely use of development resources.  We will provide technical and legal aid to update Haiti's commercial code, which dates from the 19th century, in order to help create the right environment for growth and wealth creation.

It's an important note that you can't pay anyone in the western hemisphere as little as you can pay a Haitian for an honest day's work.  But you do not see investment flooding there over the last five years because of the absolute lack of the rule of law.  So that's an essential element to rebuilding Haiti's economy.  We will also encourage the government of Haiti to move forward at the appropriate time with the restructuring and privatization of some of its public-sector enterprises through a transparent process.

We have already begun to put these principles into action.  Secretary Powell announced during his visit to Haiti last Monday, we're deploying a team of security experts who will advise the Haitian government on the development and renovation of the Haitian National Police.  We are looking to put advisors into all of Haiti's government ministries.  The U.S. Department of Treasury, for example, will send a team to Haiti to determine the technical assistance needed by the Ministry of Finance, as we are prepared to assist Haitian in their recovery of assets that may have been illegally diverted over the last decade.

In addition to an ongoing $52 million economic development and humanitarian assistance program, the United States will begin an urgent three-year job creation program, which will provide tens of thousands of jobs to improve the municipal infrastructure and to create opportunity in Port-au-Prince, Cap Hatien, and Gonaives, as well as other locations as needed.  The project will rehabilitate schools and public buildings destroyed by rioting and burning, and people will begin to see that Haiti is being returned to normal and building for the future.

Prospectively, the U.S. government will seek to expand our humanitarian development programs to ensure that medical and nutritional needs of Haiti's most disadvantaged people are being met.  On the political side, we've already located resources for the holding of elections and building democratic institutions, including strengthening independent political parties.  This money is in addition to the contributions we've already made through the OAS Special Mission.  Other efforts include training assistance, as I said, of the Haitian National Police, as well as support for a commission on truth, justice, and national reconciliation, which has been created by the interim government.

In conclusion, I should say the Haitian people face a real challenge, it's very, very true.  But I'm confident that they are up to it.  Haiti has an opportunity to make a break with that past that I described.  At previous critical junctures, the hard work and aspirations of the Haitian people were subverted from within by bad leaders and from without by indifference and cynicism in the international community.  But we have to learn from those mistakes and not repeat them.  If we move forward and abide by the principles of democracy as opposed to expediency, I'm sure that we will succeed at getting Haiti and Haitians the shot they deserve.

Thank you very much.

[Applause.]

MR. FALCOFF:  We have a little over 25 minutes for questions.  When I recognize you, please wait for the microphone to get to you, and please identify yourself.

QUESTION:  Eric Farnsworth with the Council of the Americas.

Roger, thank you for those good comments and the comprehensive nature of them.  You made an interesting comparison of the Aristide government with the predecessors in terms of the Baby Doc and Papa Doc Duvalier regimes.  There's an interesting role of the U.S. Congress in both of the, shall we say--I don't know if you want to say removal of those regimes or changes of those regimes, in 1986 versus today.  And I wonder if you had any comments or thoughts about how the U.S. Congress is playing its role, certainly, with the transition in Haiti and how you are working with the Congress.  Thanks.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, I think we're moving forward.  I note that Senator Nelson and Representative Kendrick Meek were just in Haiti, and the reports of their visit are very positive, constructive, and they're looking forward.  I note a terrific reservoir of goodwill in Congress to help the Haitian people.  Part of this is just a compelling humanitarian story.  The fact is we have fed anywhere from 700,000 to 1 million Haitians for the last 30 years.  So that's a compelling story.  So there is an interest in helping Haiti move forward.  We see a couple of trade measures that will give Haiti some trade breaks in an effort to jump-start economic development.  There's a willingness to consider the new aid levels for Haiti.  Right now, we're doing an internal review to identify money, to see what's available in appropriated funds in 2004 to give us the essential resources that we need to carry out critical missions--security, jump-starting the economy, those essential areas, putting the financial institutions back on their feet.

And I think Congress supports all of that.  I have had good meetings, good consultations with members of Congress.  And we need to continue that in a bipartisan, constructive way.  I think it's important to start looking forward and recognize that there are 8 million Haitians whose interests ought to be at least as important as one former president.

QUESTION:  Quill Lawrence from the BBC.

I don't want this question to sound flippant.  It might at first, but it's actually a serious question.  Marcos got Hawaii, Baby Doc got France, even Idi Amin ended up in Saudi Arabia, at least.  Why take Aristide to the CAR?  You take someone there, I would think they aren't going to want to stay long.  Is it a concern that he's back in the region?  And why not take him to a place where he'd more likely to stay away?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, I've never been to the Central African Republic, but they seem like very nice people.  The reality is that in that early morning, when the plane took off with President Aristide, he had chosen the location.  It was one of the first inquiries the night before--do I have a choice where I go?  And we said, sure.  And he said South Africa.  And he was sure they would take him.  And he said that he hadn't spoken with them, but he was sure that they would take him.  And so when the plane took off, it was on its way to South Africa.  During the course of the flight, fairly early on in the flight, we discovered that South Africans were not comfortable with making a decision, they hadn't talked to Aristide directly and so were concerned.  And I can understand that in retrospect.  And so they said they couldn't take him.

So we had a plane in the air heading over the Atlantic Ocean.  And we immediately worked with some of our friends, and the Central African Republic was one of the countries that said they would be willing to take him--we felt that was at least on his way to his eventual destination--so that's where the plane landed.  Obviously, he was not a prisoner, because he left, chose to leave, came back to Jamaica.  The Jamaicans have done, I think, a credible job of mitigating the impact of his presence in the region by limiting his profile, frankly.  And I suspect that he will eventually move on to South Africa and find a final spot there.

QUESTION:  [inaudible] France-Presse.

I wanted to know if you think that Aristide should be allowed to present himself as a candidate in the next elections, in 2005; and also, what do you think of the position of the new government to include in the Haitian National Police the rebels?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, the decision on who would be eligible to run for office in Haiti is a decision that Haitians have to make.  And they haven't pronounced on that issue, as far as I know.

The Haitian authorities also have not decided to put these rebels into the police force.  They quite explicitly have not done that.  We have said that any security forces in Haiti should be the product of a very close vetting of individuals for past criminality or human rights violations.  Participating in a rebel group, for example, would not necessarily disqualify a person, but it wouldn't automatically move them into the security force.  That is not the acceptable formula.  By that I mean the United States and the international community, I'm convinced, will not support financially or technically that kind of a security force.

That was a mistake that we made in the not-too-distant past, when we let President Aristide put about 1,200 of his partisan thugs into a force that we had created.  And we didn't complain about it.  We let him do it.  And it corrupted the force from within.  We won't allow groups of people to be moved in that have a partisan political agenda.  There are a terrific number of bright, young Haitians who want to participate in the security force.  We discovered that in '94 and '95, four or five thousand young people who were willing to come in, who had clean backgrounds in terms of criminality and human rights.  And that's the same thing we would want to try to create in Haiti in the future.

So there is no decision, as I am aware, of the Haitian authorities to move these people as a group into the security forces, and certainly we wouldn't and the international community wouldn't accept that.

MR. FALCOFF:  Let's have a couple of questions from people from NGOs.  Yes, sir.

QUESTION:  I'm Mike Degan [ph] with ACDI/VOCA.  We haven't worked in Haiti, but I've been down a couple of times.

The first question I want to ask is the Lavalas Party is very powerful here with the diaspora.  Is the State Department working to bring this party and this diaspora back into the fold to help build the future in Haiti?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  I should note that several prominent Lavalas figures played an important role in the democratic succession that took place.  Yvon Neptune agreed to stay on as interim prime minister, and Leslie Voltaire participated as the Lavalas representative of the president and the prime minister in this tripartite council that in turn chose the Council of Eminent Persons, which nominated people for the cabinet.  So there are some Lavalas leaders who are immediately looking to the future and looking at building a legitimate democratic institution.  So that is a promising development.

There is a political movement there, and they have every right, I think, and we're convinced, to participate in Haiti's future.  They have some--I see the diaspora as sort of divided.  Some are anti-Aristide, some are pro-Aristide.  Some are Lavalas who are anti-Aristide.  And we want to work with them all.  I don't know why the previous administration, in the very important programs that we had in the '90s, didn't bring the diaspora more into the process of developing programs.  Perhaps it was because they were worried about this politics--and that is an issue, diaspora politics, that you have to contend with.  But we think it is value added.  These folks, as you know, and this is why I'm so hopeful about Haiti, is Haitians who come here do very, very well.  They flourish.  And it shows what these talented and creative people can accomplish if you don't strangle them with violence and corruption.

So we definitely and systematically will engage the diaspora community.  We have three conferences in mind already--one in Miami, one in New York, and one in Montreal.  And we've been talking to the Canadians about doing that.  Get them involved, get their ideas about development.  As you know, some of them have very well developed ideas about development plans and schemes, about what Haiti really needs.  And I think that may be the secret weapon that we have in mind, is engaging these talented people, getting them back in and giving them a shot.

MR. FALCOFF:  Let's have another question from an NGO.

QUESTION:  Dan Erikson with Inter-American Dialogue.  I had a question about disarmament and what the U.S. policy is toward disarming the rebel groups, the Chimere.  Clearly, there are a lot of guns traveling through Haiti at the moment.  And my understanding is that many of the rebels, certainly outside of Port-au-Prince, are slowly becoming part of the informal power structure of the countryside.  And the U.S. position on disarmament seems to have shifted a little bit.  Initially, I think, General Helz [ph] said that this was an important element of the U.S. force.  Then, I believe, there was another commander in Haiti that said our mission is stabilization but not disarmament.  And also, I think that Brazil, as I understand it, ultimately offered leadership for the U.N. mission.  They in fact don't necessarily want to have to confront people and take away their guns.  And so I was curious to know what your thoughts are on this and how--clearly there's a lot that needs to be done in terms of the judicial institutions, the police, but it seems that taking the guns away from the rebels and administering some sort of justice to the violence of last February is an important element.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  With your final point, I agree.  There has to be some accountability for political violence.  There has to be some accountability before a judicial system.  The trouble with that is there is no judicial system that exists.  And the first part of your question, there also isn't a Haitian force that can impose its will, impose the rule of law, to work along with our international forces to begin to collect weapons.  But that is--every day the situation is improving.  And there are different ways you can address that--developing specialized units within the HNP and trust people that can go with the multinational force and go get weapons where we know they're cached.

So you'll see that evolve.  But the objective we're leading to is one where people are disarmed, people do not have a right to carry weapons.  They canceled all weapons permits, one of the first things the government did, so the multinational force will seize a weapon if they see it on the street.  They are now, I believe, going to offer incentives for people to turn in the weapons caches, so we can go after--instead of monetizing a gun, you pay for information about who's got guns stashed, and we go get them.  Also, we are giving special attention to groups that might be intending to do harm to the international force.

So it's evolving.  And as the HNP is able to impose its influence in the rule of law with the multinational force, you'll see more and more of collecting weapons.  Sometimes when you hear we're not doing disarmament, demobilization, and resettlement or reintegration, it is that they're not taking on this mission of doing that to thousands of people in a systematic way.  But it doesn't mean that we wouldn't take arms away from people who don't have the right to have them.  But it's being done gradually.

Let me give you an example, an anecdote.  In Port-au-Prince, you don't see guys carrying guns.  Up north, you see these so-called rebels carrying weapons, you know, over their shoulders.  They clearly aren't supposed to have them.  And the  multinational force's approach is as long as they don't--in Port-au-Prince, the force would take that gun away.  Up north, they are saying, for the time being, that as long as he doesn't point it at me, he can keep it.  If he points it at me, we take the gun away, or do more.  But the other thing they say is that when the Haitian government says take those guns away from people whether they point them at you or not, they'll do that too.

But, you know, you have to take it a step at a time.  So it's a complicated thing, but we are moving toward the objective where you'd have real justice and accountability.  Let me cite a specific example of this.

Louis Jodel Chamblain, for example.  He's a guy who has a criminal conviction on the record.  He is, under Haitian law, entitled to a trial.  So I think as soon as the Haitian government authorities can arrange his detention and arrange his trial, the better.  But it has to be a genuine trial.  It can't be something that just--you know, a kangaroo court that lets him go.  That's where I'm concerned, is not that they lock him up and throw away the key, but I'm concerned that in the current context he might be just popular enough because of his role in denouncing Aristide that they let him go.  And that wouldn't be acceptable.  It has to be a credible process.

But in the meantime, I think he ought to be--in my view, the sooner they put notorious figures like that under detention, the better.

QUESTION:  Ev Bauman, El Universal of Venezuela.

Mr. Secretary, I think there's quite a striking similarity between the history of Mr. Aristide and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.  And as you know, Mr. Chavez, who's offered refuge to Aristide, identified with him.  I don't know whether you have any information on that process.  But my question is, you felt that there was a mistake made in not applying the principles of the Inter-American Charter to Aristide.  And I wonder what you think the prospects are for invoking them against Mr. Chavez, especially now that he has fully shown his hand and refused to hold a referendum.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, Ev, as you know, the process is still under way in Venezuela.  And the OAS is there watching the process very, very closely.  We believe that the international community has to be rigorous in assessing whether the Chavez government has respected the constitutional norms, respected the independence of other institutions of government, respected basic human rights.  I must say that the negative examples seem to be mounting in Venezuela.  We believe that a referendum would provide one constitutional means for overcoming the deep and dangerous polarization that exists in Venezuela today.  That is the view of the international community and the OAS, and we're pleased that the OAS has demonstrated real leadership by being on the ground and supporting this democratic process.

QUESTION:  Ernie Preeg, currently with Manufacturers Alliance, which--we're not a lobbyist, we're an NGO, incidentally, representing the U.S. private sector, which leads to my question.  First, I want to commend the secretary on an excellent statement, and comprehensive.  I hope it gets wide distribution not only here in Haiti but elsewhere, including CARIBCOM countries, who've had a very, I think, misguided assessment of Haiti.

I also commend your attempts to get the Congress in a bipartisan way back into Haiti.  I was, I should say, a former ambassador to Haiti in the first Reagan administration.  When we did have a, believe it or not, during the '80s, a firm bipartisan Haiti policy.  Reagan administration, Congressional Black Caucus, the Florida delegation under a very active governor, Bob Graham, in Florida.

So this leads to the question of the point you raised about private-sector job creation, trade, investment--which was flourishing in Haiti, actually, in the '80s, despite political problems.  The assembly industry was way out ahead of Central America, other countries; full employment in Port-au-Prince.  People forget some of these things.  So could you elaborate a little bit--

The other thing I found is the short-term, immediate priorities have to be law and order on the streets, resume the election process, humanitarian needs.  But the longer-term job creation tends to get shunted aside.  So could you elaborate a little bit how you're organizing that part within the administration, support for private-sector job creation?  Is there a particular person?  Because I'm a little bit--I'm also on the Haiti Democracy Project Board now, in this area.  Is there somebody I can talk to in the administration about your strategy for getting early job creation, investment, trade, maybe even the beginning of a free trade agreement with Haiti?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Sure.  Well, I would say the AID mission director, David Adams, and Karen Harburt [ph].  And I say AID--they know that development is not just aid, it is also economic--jump-starting economic activity in the private sector, and it's a high priority for us to get that in there.

It's going to take some doing to convince people to go back in to Haiti, but there are some incentives being considered by Congress--for example, the HERO Act sponsored by Senator Mike DeWine of Ohio.  Secretary Powell has expressed our general support for the goals of that piece of legislation, but for us to support it in a formal way, we're going to have to ensure that there's interagency support for it.  And I think that would send an important signal.  The FTA that we're doing with the Dominican Republic has a particular side letter that has a cut-out for the Dominican-Haitian activities, and that should be a positive signal to the private sector that we have very much in mind jump-starting the private sector.

It's going to take the rule of law, attacking corruption, providing some sort of security, and I think one of the highest priorities, privatizing the port facility.

QUESTION:  Re-privatizing it.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, re-privatizing it and getting it operating so that people, honest people can do business in Haiti, too.  And that will generate, I think, interest in people going back.  They are good workers, and the assembly sector folks there, particularly from the United States, were good employers.  Kept many of them on the payroll long after factories shut down--for months.  Some of them went broke doing that.  But we need to have folks that are committed not to exploiting people in Haiti, who have had such a hellish experience in recent years.  We need to have some people that are really committed to Haiti and developing Haiti giving these people an honest break.

[Tape change.]
 AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  --the AID folks would be two folks [inaudible] work, but it is an important part, a priority of our plan for Haiti right now.

MR. FALCOFF:  I think we have time for two more questions.  So what I'm going to ask is I'll recognize two people, give your questions, and then I'll just give you a chance to incorporate your answer.

The lady all the way in the back.

QUESTION:  Thank you.  Chandry Navarro [ph], with Greenberg Triad.  We represent the Haitian Association of Industry.  We applaud Secretary Powell's general support for the HERO-- Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity--Act.  And Haiti's private sector group definitely believes that this bill is one that can create jobs quickly and efficiently and hope that the administration will begin to work on its support, as you mentioned, more formal support, very quickly in light of the fact that the apparel trade benefits are needed right now and with the global elimination of quotas at the end of the year and hope that we can see that coming to the administration soon.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Okay.

MR. FALCOFF:  One other?

QUESTION:  Frank Davies, Miami Herald.

Let me ask you a little bit about the multinational force that is going to be coming on.  How long do you envision it will be necessary to have a force like that in Haiti, will it have adequate numbers, and will part of its job be to basically protect the political process?

As you said, you want to see a political process open to all who are nonviolent.  Is that force there going to enforce that through elections, for example, in 2005?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Well, the terms of reference for the force are yet to be determined.  I must say that we have started to consult, almost immediately we started to consult with countries in the world that would be interested in putting forces there, and I, for one, was surprised by the eagerness by some governments and a willingness by a good many others to put people on the ground in Haiti.

So I don't think we're going to have a problem getting the troop presence that we need, you know, anywhere from--well, I should be careful because this has to be determined by the U.N., and it's a Security Council Resolution, but the experts are looking at this, and the Secretary General's initial report is expected soon.  It will determine what's required and what the terms of reference will be.

There will be an initial period, we will be authorized for an initial period, again, yet to be determined, which conceivably would be renewable.  But I think there's a recognition that we need to maintain a presence for a period of time until the Haitian National Police is stood up, and that process will take at least, I would think, 9 to 12 months to get people identified, and then there has to be a process of shadowing them.

A civilian police force will also be part of this PKO-CIVPOL component, which will go out and actually do patrolling, as well as mentoring of the new force,  but a key priority will be security.  And then the international presence can be reduced as the HNP is stood up.  And that means you have to have adequate revenue to sustain the force, equip the force, and you have to have mentoring over a period of time.  So the number of people on the ground and the character of their mission will change as the HNP is stood up.

You had another question about--

QUESTION:  As far as protecting the political process and keeping violence out.

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  Clearly, that's, you know, the very fact that there are U.S. Marines on the grounds of the Haitian national palace is an important sign that one of the missions is to preserve basic constitutional institutions.  That was the first site that they secured, incidently, within about 12 hours of Aristide's departure.

And, incidently, let's be very clear.  The decision to help Aristide leave Haiti averted a blood bath, saved lives, and probably even his own, and prevented a genuine coup, where these rebel forces would have occupied the national palace.

Go back to the scene in Port-au-Prince with the rebel gangs, with mobs of people singing their praises and demonstrating on their behalf outside the gates of the Haitian national palace.  There's no doubt if there were not U.S. Marines on the ground, those rebel leaders would have walked into the palace and killed anybody that got in the way.  So that is what--that's the essence of the genuine story is that we prevented a coup.  We prevented the smashing of the democratic constitutional institutions in Haiti.

We have empowered not a rebel leader, but the former president of the Haitian Supreme Court, as is dictated by the Constitution.  And the people who are running the ministries today are not rebel leaders.  They're not even politicians, which has caused some griping among the political party leaders because they are not even party leaders. They're technocrats.  And so the international community also didn't turn power over to political parties.

And the smart political party leaders are saying: Okay, let's let these guys run the government.  Let's go organize a party.  Because when they give us honest elections in '05, we have to be competitive.  Let these guys run the government.  Let them be accountable for the mess, cleaning up the mess.

So that's the real story in Haiti, not that there was a coup d'etat, but that there was not a coup d'etat.

MR. FALCOFF:  We have about 5 more minutes.

QUESTION:  Hi.  My name is Robert Rizzo [ph] with Voice of America TV.

I wanted to ask you, Mr. Secretary, about the health situation in Haiti, particularly the health care crisis, with UNICEF saying there's about 1.2 million children at risk between HIV, malnutrition, et cetera.  What do you see as the critical element needed from an international community and from the Bush administration toward helping HAITI reverse that trend?

And also I wanted to ask you a question about NGOs doing work down there, charitable organizations.  I heard several allegations from one woman running orphanages down there of all sorts of threats of bribes, kickbacks, et cetera, things, all sorts of corruption going on among the social services agencies that deal with these charitable organizations.

What is the Bush administration trying to do to temper that corruption or stop that corruption and what sort of help from the international community do you want to see to sort of quell any future corruption within the Haitian government?

AMBASSADOR NORIEGA:  First off, we have said to this government, and I should say that Prime Minister Latortue is eager to say this, eager to make this commitment of zero tolerance on corruption.  It may sound, in practice, impractical or unrealistic, but if you're really going to break the cycle of destruction in Haiti, you have to take very precise, draw clear lines.

And on corruption, we said no corruption.  We're not going to avert our gaze on corruption, in particular.  And we've gone in and made this very clear to the ministers. And they have to understand, and the private sector needs to hear, that we mean business on that, so that they can do business and create jobs in Haiti.  So corruption is an extraordinarily important subject.

We also know that millions of Haitians are at risk every day.  They live on the knife's edge of existence.  They've had a pretty good rice crop.  There's an awful lot of aid on the ground in Haiti--food aid--and a key challenge in the last several weeks has been making sure that you're able to distribute it without bandits interrupting or grabbing the cargo.  So that's a key challenge.

You have to have fuel there to maintain the coal chain on medicines, continue nutrition, continue the anti-retroviral programs that are important, and we have to keep that chain vital.  Secretary Powell visited one of these sites where the United States is a prime contributor on Monday--last Monday.

So we treat the humanitarian challenge is a high priority as well.  There are just too many people that are vulnerable because of lack of nutrition, and we need to maintain our vigilance over that.  The international community is working together in a very concerted effort to monitor the situation on the ground and to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to delivery of medicines and food.

Ambassador Preeg will tell you that there are dozens of nongovernmental organizations that have operated in Haiti for 40 years, doing extraordinary work, and we want them to continue to be engaged.  We want to strengthen our commitment to them.  Most of them do this business without any help from the United States government, and they're not particularly interested in having it, other than getting their passports renewed every 10 years, and God bless them for that.

But we do want to work with them and support that and support their good work because they have a lot of credibility in the community.   And it's important for, again, for us to recover our credibility with that community as well, and tell them that we're genuinely committed to giving a good start at a new future.

MR. FALCOFF:  I want to thank you very much.

[Applause.]

MR. FALCOFF:  And thank all of you.  We really appreciate it.  You've been terrific.
   [Whereupon, the proceedings were adjourned.]