After Arafat: Prospects for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

December 8, 2004

Unedited transcript prepared from a tape recording

Proceedings:
MR. MURAVCHIK:  I assume everyone's picked up the packet.  So I will restrict myself to welcoming you all, happy that you're here.  I expect that this will be an interesting discussion.  I'm very grateful to our three speakers for having agreed to give us the benefit of their knowledge and thoughts this morning.

You have their bio information in your packets, so as is our custom, I'm not going to make introductions of them because the time is better used listening to them than listening to me tell you about them, exactly what you can read in the packet about them.  But they're all quite outstanding experts.

We've agreed that Michael Herzog will go first, followed by Said Arikat, and then Rob Satloff, and without further ado, Michael, if you would begin, please.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  Thank you very much.  Good morning.  I'm very pleased to be here and to partake in this panel, and our focus, my talk on the prospects of the post-Arafat era, prospects for Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Is common wisdom that there are new opportunities in the Middle East.  The Palestinians see in Israeli-Palestinian relations, following the departure of Arafat, and with Israel about to pull out of the Gaza strip.  But a big question is how to exploit these opportunities and not waste them.  I think is full of examples of wasted opportunities.

So that's what I'd like to focus on--what should be done in order to exploit those opportunities.

Now strategically, there are several options to be pursued.  Those people who believe that once a new leadership on the Palestinian side is instituted and empowered by elections, both parties should immediately jump directly into permanent status negotiations, or else international community should put forward the blueprint for a permanent state [?] solution.  I've seen this advocated by Secretary Baker, by Mr. Scowcroft, by many Europeans, by some Palestinians.  There are others who believe that once there is a new leadership and Israel implements its disengagement from Gaza, we should jump directly into the second phase of the road map.  My view is different.  I believe we shouldn't, at this early stage, overload both leadership with these kind of decisions, and go about it much more carefully.

 I think we shouldn't waste time but be very careful how we approach this new situation.

I think that over the next year, all parties concerned, and when I say all parties concerned I mean Palestinians, Israelis, the international community, the U.S., should focus on three major issues, and if we are successful in these three, then we can think about introducing other elements into the picture.

And these three are, first of all, I'd say establishment of Palestinian institutions, establishment of a new leadership empowering by elections, building of other institutions, parliament, and so on.

Reforming the Palestinian system, the political, the economic and the security systems.  This is one element.

The second element is the establishment of a stable calm, is the establishment of an environment free of the devastating effect of terrorism, because if you have such an environment, violence heavy, it will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for all parties to proceed, it puts a lot of pressure on decision making on both sides.

I think if you want both democratization on the Palestinian side and a smooth Israeli disengagement from Gaza, you need a stable calm.

And the third element I would focus on is the implement of Israeli disengagement from Gaza and so that'll be as smooth as possible.

I'd also add, and I'll elaborate on it later, that in order for these three elements to be implemented successfully, you need an active international role, much more than you have seen over the last four years.

We already see all those elements in the making.  On the institution building, on the Palestinian side, we're expecting president election January 9th, parliamentary elections in May, Fatah elections in August, and possibly also municipal elections, and I think these are very important.

As far as security station is concerned, there are talks underway to establish a cease-fire between the PA and the Palestinian factions on the one hand, like Hamas, Jihad Islam, and others and PA in Israel, on the other hand.

And as far as disengagement is concerned, I think Israeli government, Israeli prime minister are determined to go ahead.  We are expecting that by the end of this month, the Israeli parliament will pass a bill concerning compensation to those who are settlers, who are removed from Gaza.

The prime minister intends to have a final government decision on this issue by the end of March, to start implementation by the beginning of July, and completed by the end of September 05.

So there's a lot ahead of us, there's a very tight schedule, I'd say, and I think everybody concerned should focus on these three issues.

Now I think we should not underestimate the challenge.  The challenge is huge, the challenge facing the new Palestinian leadership and all the other parties is a very huge one, and I would like to elaborate why I think it's a major challenge.

For one thing, the new Palestinian leadership at its starting point will be a weak leadership.  Assuming we're talking about Abu Mazan, because if Barghouti is elected it's a different ball game, and I'll refer to it later.

But assuming it's going to be Abu Mazan, Abu Allah [ph] and other known faces, I think they will start as a weak leadership, not popular enough, not strong enough to take some major decisions that are needed later on.

So they will have to be empowered by elections, empowered by other elements like international support, like what Israel does, and so on and so forth.  They're inheriting a chaotic situation in the Palestinian Authority.  There's actually chaos and anarchy there, born out of four years of intifada, I think it was Arafat's making, he fostered it and ultimately lost control over it.

But you have today militias in almost every town, sometimes every quarter, sometimes every street.  There's no strong central government that can control the situation and these new guys, new old guys, if you will, will have to reinstitute central authority and it's not going to be easy.

They also have to cope with Arafat's legacy and that's, in my view, a heavy weight on the shoulders of this new leadership.

One element which is going to be very difficult is, in his heritage, is his legitimization of the use of terror as a political tool, to such an extent that it's become a part of the Palestinian system, and it's going to be very difficult for them to get rid of it.

And there's also another element which is down the road, not right now, and that is his position on permanent status with Israel.  On that, I'm not sure that any Palestinian leadership will either want or be able to break away from his legacy, but since we are not going to enter these talks right now, I think that's down the road.

I'm saying I'm not sure they even want to break away because having been at Camp David, my impression is that at least the old guard don't feel differently from Yasser Arafat as concerns what should be the parameters of a permanent solution with Israel.

There's also quite a heavy external involvement in Palestinian affairs.  I'm referring, first and foremost, to Iran, Hezbollah, who's doing their utmost to undermine the prospects of the new situation.

According to Israeli intelligence data, a big percentage of terror attacks in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or emanating from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a big percentage, over 50 percent, there is the hand of Iran, Hezbollah, in one way or another.  In funding, in instructions, in connecting people from various places and so on.

So whereas a new leadership may want to stabilize the situation, there are destabilizing factors working there on the ground and there should be checks as well.

And I think this new leadership is facing the challenge of Hamas, and Hamas wants now a bigger share in power in return for entering a cease-fire.

They also have a big domestic problem with Fatah, because over the last few years Fatah, which is, I'd say, the backbone of mainstream Palestinian politics, was paralyzed, and you have now splinter groups, almost in every time.  Some of them are being paid by Hezbollah, and others, to carry out terrorist activities.  Those Al Aksa Martyr Brigades, and so on.  Now they call themselves Arafat's brigade.

And this new leadership will have to also put order inside Fatah, and I'd say actually engage those young Fatah elements and bring them back to the movement, and out of employing terror.

All in all, I think one shouldn't forget that we are after four years of intifada, and the intifada had an impact on the Palestinian street, and I think the public discourse there is to what extent the use of violence pays off.

So whereas Hamas will say it's our only way and only because of that Israel is pulling out of Gaza, and whereas Abu Mazan is saying I think the militarization of the intifada--that's his term--namely, the use of terror and violence was a mistake because it didn't benefit us, because we are worse off today than we were four years ago, Arafat would say we should use both diplomacy and violence, and much the same says Barghouti.  We should continue; we should use both.

So I think there's a very big challenge facing this new leadership.  However, having said all of that, I think there's room for cautious optimism and I'd like to say why I believe there's room for this kind of optimism.

First of all, I think with Arafat gone, there's much room for change in the Palestinian Authority.  I've heard from some people the notion that Arafat may have gone but Arafatism will outlive him.  It will be Arafatism without Arafat.

And I beg to differ on that.  I think, in all cases, you have a dominant leadership leaving the scene.  After many years of domination, there are always changes, and I think that'll be the case as well.  I think the Palestinian public realizes that there's a big difference between Arafat the symbol, the icon, and Arafat the statesman, and they yearn for change, much as the Israeli public yearns for change.

And I think this is a basic element that's very important.

As far as Abu Mazan is concerned, he wants to break away from what he calls the militarization of the intifada.  I'm not sure if he'll be able to do it but at least these are his intentions.

We have less terror on the ground.  We have less terror today than we've had in beginning of 04, in 2003, in 2002.  It is mostly because of the effectiveness of Israeli operational activities, not because there are less people that are willing to commit suicide attacks.

I mean, it's not difficult, even today, to find people who will be willing to go for suicide attacks.  But I think the Israelis, over the years, have managed to cut down the level of successful terrorist attack, and the damage incurred by them, by over 70 percent.  So you have a calmer situation which allows for both leadership, more leeway in their decision making, and that's important.

I also believe that the upcoming elections on Palestinian side, presidential, parliamentary, Fatah, and possibly also municipal elections, are very important, on the positive side, first, because they uphold the spirit of reform, liberalization, and so on.  But also I think they will have a stabilizing effect on the scene, because in my view, no Palestinian faction will want to be perceived in the eyes of the Palestinian public as undermining this process of election, and I think we have many historical examples to show that when these factions believe that this is against the will of a majority of the Palestinian public, they restrain themselves.

So I believe you see, you already see them saying that they are willing to go for a cease-fire and I think these different sets of elections will have a stabilizing effect and that's very positive.

My impression is, and I think recent public opinion polls on the Palestinian side manifest this, is that Hamas was weakened on Palestinian street, if you compare it to Fatah.  We had, the last week, elections in Birzeit University where, for the first time in years, Hamas lost to Fatah.  I think they've been weakened.

They are not unified.  You don't hear one voice, you don't have charismatic leadership, and they've weakened.

Now I believe that also some, the external players understand the importance of the moment and are playing their hands correctly.

I think, on the Israeli side, there is realization that these are new opportunities and that Israel decision makers should rise to the occasion.  In Israel, there's some criticism on the government that they didn't think big enough in 2003, when Abu Mazan was prime minister.

I think currently the thinking in Israel is that this is an opportunity and notwithstanding all the doubts they have about a big change on the Palestinian side, they are willing to give it a chance.

Egypt is now ready to play a much more active role than it was ready to play in the past because, in my view, the Egyptians are afraid that once Israel leaves Gaza, they don't want it to become Hamasastan.  They realize that they need to play an active role, and so some see a honeymoon in Israeli-Egyptian relations, and I think the Egyptians can and should play a very important role in pursuing a cease-fire between Abu Mazan and the factions, and in doing much against the smuggling.

And I believe also even the Syrians will not undermine this process out of other considerations.  They are under tremendous pressure from the international community and unlike the past, they will not undermine the cease-fire.

So I believe, in summing up all these elements, there's room for cautious optimism.  I think all parties should do their utmost to allow for smooth and successful Palestinian elections.

One sentence on this.  Of course if Barghouti is elected, I think it's a totally different gamble, and we're actually in a deadlock.  But my feeling is that he will either withdraw his candidacy, or if he doesn't, that Abu Mazan will nevertheless be elected.

I think the PA should broker cease-fire understandings with the factions on one side and Israel on the other side.  There should be specific demands put forward, what they are up to right now, what they can do in terms of dealing with a terror threat and what should be deferred to later stage after Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and you need this time an active international role, U.S. role in monitoring the security situation, unlike the cease-fire in 2003.

I think disengagement from Gaza should, and is probably going to be coordinated between Israel and the Palestinians.  It's not going to be a unilateral act anymore and I think we are going to see a much more international active role.  The international community, in my view, should support all this process with funding but with proper oversight.  Unlike the past, I would expect a more active Arab role, the envelope of money and they've given nothing.  And one last remark.  I believe if the two state solution is so important to the West, as was proclaimed by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, then they should also do something about the Iranians trying to undermine this process, at least if the West is going to engage Europe, as the Europeans are doing, and A, to engage Iran as the Europeans are doing now, this should also be put on the agenda.

Thank you.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Thank you very much, Michael.  Now Said.

MR. ARIKAT:  Thank you, Josh.  I often wondered what it would feel like on this side of the room, especially for a friendly crowd.  I'm always on the other side.

You know, you really have to give it to Yasser Arafat.  I mean he kept everybody busy while he was alive and imprisoned, talking about him, what will he do next?  Well, he was running the intifada, whether he accepted, you know, an incredible offer at Camp David, and so on.  And it seems that he's keeping everybody busy after his death.

I mean, if we look at the New York Times today, or the Washington Post, there are a couple of articles.  As we speak, there is an event at CIPE that is talking about the very same thing, and so on.  It seems that there's a spirit of peace breaking all over.  Everybody's talking about how, you know, the role of Egypt, for instance, as if it was all of a sudden liberated from the, you know, the shadow of Arafat, and movement has taken place.  Or the role of Syria.

I mean, you know, we see the Palestinian leadership is going everywhere, and so on.  I mean, his absence seems to have created an atmosphere, or maybe in many ways, really, it's sort of an affected atmosphere, it may not be true.  Everybody expected that the Palestinians will fall apart once Arafat is gone; with good reason.  Because he was really the embodiment of the Palestinian for so long, for all their lives, definitely throughout their national struggle or their quest for a national definition and national liberation, and the right to self-determination, and so on.

And for that, you know, you have to acknowledge his role, he played a tremendous role in doing that, and being, and acting as the glue that held the Palestinians together, although the Palestinians are very much like the Israelis.  You have two Palestinians and three opinions.  He was able to hold them together through the, you know, the national council meetings, for instance, you know, the PLO with all its different factions--communist, the popular front, the democrat front, you know, Islamist and others, and so on.

At the end of the day everybody went to him, whether it was George Habash or the communist leadership, or Khalepni [?] from the democratic front, and so on.

So he did play that role, and also, on the other hand, he was really the one person that was powerful enough, and had garnered enough credibility among the Palestinians to actually concede or compromise, or go and deal with the Palestinians, to come out and recognize Israel, which was really a tremendous taboo for the Palestinian.  And he did that time and time and time again.

I mean, unlike what is being said about him, you know, that Yasser Arafat was an obstacle to peace, that Yasser Arafat really went out of his way to reach a settlement, because his dream was to become the first president of the Palestinian people.

He tried to do that.  They first announced that in 1988 during the national council meeting in Algeria.  That he did it time and again after that, and, you know, most recently he did it in a letter that was published in the New York Times, I think if we all recall, he talked about the Palestinian vision for peace.  It was published in February of 2002.  You can look it up.  And he outlined, you know, all these things.  In fact, many of the things that he outlined were perceived by many average Palestinians to be precipitous, really going out of his way to accommodate Israel's demands, and so on.

And it was Yasser Arafat and of course Abu Mazan, who have really launched and worked with the Israelis, and with others as well, to launch the Oslo process, and this is really my--you know, in my case--by the way, I speak on my own behalf, not on behalf of my newspaper or any political organization or anything like this.

So, you know, I feel free to say what I want.  You know, Arafat, for all the good stuff that we talked, or I just described, you know, him being, you know, a leader in that respect, able to hold the Palestinians together, to present their case, to be on the world stage, he had an incredible energy, and, you know, he was moving from place to place, and so on; you know.

So that is a side we also must acknowledge, as Palestinians, and as, you know, observers of what's going on, that Arafat had many, many [inaudible].  You know, he was really a leader in terms of guiding the Palestinians in their quest for self-determination.

He was a leader that worked, by and large, on nepotism.  He encouraged tribalism.  He worked--his loyalty was personal rather than political or factional, if you wish, or party, along party lines, and so on.  He worked on a personal basis.  That's how he garnered loyalties, and so on.  And that is not good, you know, when you are involved in a struggle such as the Palestinian struggle.

He's also the one that, in my opinion, committed a terrible, terrible mistake by signing on to Oslo.  And I will tell you why.  You know, Oslo--what Arafat did in Oslo or what he didn't do in the whole thousand pages of Oslo, he focused mainly on what the Palestinians ought to do to guarantee Israel security.

And I think that was a major, major mistake for the Palestinian leader.  Israel is the stronger party in this thing.  Israel has tanks and armies and support, the support of the superpower in the world.  It has access.  It's a modern state.  It has all these things.  Really, those who need security, as we come to find out in the past four years, were the Palestinians.  That's one.

Second, Arafat, and the major mistake in my opinion, in Oslo, was he accepted the principle of accepting Israeli settlements in the West Bank, something that he should have never done, because when you accept the principle of one settlement, then you leave yourself open, especially with a clever and manipulative Israeli leadership, you leave yourself open to more settlement as we have seen.

As we have seen throughout Oslo, the settlement process grew, it grew out of hand, and Arafat looked the other way.

You know, Arafat was being greeted at the White House time after time, I think he visited four-eight [?] times.  Maybe Rob can correct me.  Something like this under the Oslo--during the Clinton years.  I mean, he was probably more than--he was greeted at the White House more than any other leader at the time, and in fact the price of that was him looking away, you know, while the land grab was going on, while the settlement process was going on, while in fact the two-state solution was little by little becoming more and more a doomed fantasy.

You know, nobody really talked about Arafat as a corrupt leader.  Nobody brought his corruption into focus as we have seen the in the last four years, when he was looking the other way while the land grab was going on, when he as looking the other way, not implementing what is being called by the Oslo process.

I think if you read Dennis Ross's book or if you talk with him, you'll find that the three Netanyahu years were terrible for the peace process, and General Herzog was involved in the negotiations.  The Palestinians in the Wye, at negotiations at the Wye plantation, everything has to be negotiated and renegotiated, and renegotiated again.

So with this background, you know, we come to what is happening after Arafat passing.  First of all, you have an emerging leadership that is really not much different than Arafat.  You know, Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazan is someone who's 69 years old, so he's definitely part of the old guard.  The same thing with, you know, Ahmed Korei Abdallah [ph].  He's part of the old guard.  They are the people that came from the outside, they don't really have a great deal of credibility among the Palestinians, they don't have a great deal of popularity.  I think the last poll before Arafat passing showed that Abu Mazan polled at 3 percent among Palestinians.  And with good reason.  While Arafat was really engaged with the Palestinians, he would go to the refugee camp--and this, by the way, it happened in Jordan, it happened in Lebanon, it happened in many other places, and that was his sort of "ace in the hole," so to speak.

He knew how to connect.  I mean, you know, I remember during their presence in Lebanon, the PLO's presence in Lebanon, the Israelis would attack a refugee camp and within, you know, a few minutes, Arafat would be there talking to people, jumping around, and so on.  So he knew how to create bridges with the public and a couple of others did that, a couple of other Palestinian leaders.

But in fact someone like Abu Mazan has never done that.  So he comes with this handicap.

Another handicap.  Abu Mazan is someone who is, you know, was imposed almost, imposed on the Palestinians back in 2003 to become a prime minister and they accepted that, and then he was brought into Washington and there was a great deal of good will or good feelings, and so on.

He met with the President of the United States, the president promised him all kinds of things.  Then he could not deliver on one thing.  You know, I just want to remind you that I think in the last week or so, the United States government has agreed to release, or to issue $20 million directly to the Palestinian Authority.

Well, this in fact is the same $20 million that was promised to Abu Mazan; you know?  And now when you look at the letters that are issued by the congressman from New York, says Dear Colleague, please support this $20 million because it will go to pay debts owed by the Palestinians to the Israelis.

So we talk about the same $20 million.  The point I'm trying to make, not to talk about money and so on, is that the United States, that has, you know, or the President of the United States that has really sort of initiated and envisioned the road map and the two state solution, and talked about the importance of having a strong prime minister, did not weigh in or did not pressure the Israelis in any way to deliver on their part, on their promises to give Abu Mazan that margin, so he can work with the Palestinians, so he can garner some sort of support among the Palestinians, that can go, or go along the lines that could lead to a peaceful resolution of this thing.  So he comes with difficulty, he has his work cut out for him, if the Americans embrace him too closely, he will be seen by the Palestinians suspiciously, and as a Quisling, and so on.

So, you know, you have three major candidates and you have many other candidates, which is good.  You know, I'm not saying--the election process is going to be very good for the Palestinians, and I think, you know, it's not a moment too soon.

So you have Barghouti, on the other hand, who is in jail, he's sentenced to five life terms in prison, but he enjoys a great deal of popularity, especially among the younger generation, as the general mentioned, or among the young guard as was mentioned the other day at one of the other events.

So he does have a great deal of support and he also believes in the two state solution.  He's, you know, very much along with Arafat.

The thing is with Abu Mazan, where he has to be really careful, is not to depart from, you know, the constant of what the Palestinians want, and not to keep falling into the trap that Arafat fell into.

You know, Arafat's problem, in my opinion, my humble and personal opinion, was the fact that he was able, or was a bit, you know, flexible on the issue of settlement.  I don't think the Palestinians ought to accept 93 percent of the West Bank.  That's nonsense.  The Palestinians should not accept less than 100 percent of West Bank, should not accept less than 100 percent of Gaza.  I mean those are the things.  Should not accept anything that compromises the right of return in principle, because these are U.N. resolutions that the whole world agrees to.  They are not subject to manipulation or movement and so on.

These are principles.  If Abu Mazan says I'm going to accept the presence of 130 settlements or 400,000 settlers in the West Bank, then, you know, in essence he's saying, you know, this two state solution will never work, because that's a reality.  You know, and if he's going to accept that the disengagement from Gaza will keep Gaza as [inaudible], you know, the ports are closed off, the airspace is closed off, the entrances, and so on, closed off, the demolitions go on, closed off, then that is not going to "fly" with the Palestinians either, you know, and the problem will go on forever.

And then the third thing that we must address, you know, we talked about Arafat, we talked about the election--the third thing is this thing is not happening independent or somewhere in orbit.  It's happened under occupation.  So we must bring into question the role of the Israelis in this thing.

If Israel continues with its policy of reoccupying, policy of assassination, policy of home demolition and so on, I mean, yesterday there was an incursion into the West Bank--I mean, I'm sorry, into Gaza--then again, that is not going to create the good will that the general spoke about and the need for a cease-fire.

So it's not always the Palestinians that must deliver, and this is, to me, you know, with all due respect to the President of the United States, who I think, you know, is really quite committed to what he says.  So it's, the problem is with implementing and makes his statement a bit spurious, in fact, is the following.

You know, when he spoke in Canada the other day, and he said that the issue is Palestinian democracy and reform, he's absolving the Israelis.

I mean that is really, that is not going to resolve, or that is not going to bring about the realization of his vision for a two state solution, because if you want a two state solution, and as he said, viable and contiguous, then you cannot qualify that by saying what he said on April 14, 2004, you know, when he was with Sharon.  He says, you know, there are realities on the ground.

Well, there are also other realities on the ground.  There's, you know, the millions of Palestinian refugees, the refugees that are in Gaza, Palestinian refugees that are in the West Bank.

Indeed, there are 250,000 Palestinian refugees in Israel, you know, who were, you know, removed and uprooted from their home.  So these issues cannot be dismissed under the, you know, the cliche of realities on the ground.

And you have to talk about borders.  The road map is wonderful in comparison to Oslo because it does speak about ending occupation, but it does not speak about borders, it does not speak about water, it does not speak about, you know, the roads that go around, and so on, and all these things.

You can't keep changing position.  I mean, the U.S. government, on one point, back I think a year ago or so, whether it was Condoleezza Rice or the president himself indeed, said that the wall is a problem.  But then the wall became, "is okay."  You know, the wall gobbled up half of the Palestinian territory.  That's what it does.  It gobbles up the territory.

Unless that wall is built exactly on the borders of the 1967, it will continue to disenfranchise Palestinians, it will continue to dissect their communities, it will continue to create the absence of contiguity for a viable state.

And I can tell you, you know, I, for one, am not very optimistic, you know, because I think the conditions for creating a Palestinian state, which is really the linch pin of peace and the future of peace in the Middle East, are almost not there.  You know, I'll finish very quickly.

So we have to look at this reality, and if I could suggest to the Palestinian leadership, the emerging leadership, whether it's Abu Mazan and others, what they should do, what their priorities ought to be in the near future, it ought to be the following.

It ought to be that they have to look after their own community that have fallen into disrepair.  The chaos that really permeates across all areas.  The armed factions.  There must be a stop to the armed factions.

There must be a stop to the suicide bombings because it's ugly and it's horrible, and it's not a communicative [?], and it does not serve the Palestinian people cause, and it vitiates Palestinian life.  So these things must stop.  The disrepair that is happening within the social fabric of the Palestinians, these are the priorities.  They must focus on these things, they must organize the communities, and I think whether, you know, this election can go to serve the creation of a Palestinian state or not, it can be a good thing towards reenergizing a political process for the Palestinians, where they can go on and create the element and the [inaudible] so as not to lose more land, and so on.  Thank you.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Thank you, Said.  Well, we've heard the voice of optimism, a voice of pessimism, and I'm on the edge of my seat to find out where you're going to come down, Rob.

MR. SATLOFF:  Thank you for setting me up as the voice of realism.

Josh, thank you very much, it's a real pleasure to speak at AEI.  I have a lot of friends here, a lot of colleagues.  AEI does excellent work, especially on the Middle East, and I can give a plug here for a study that we commissioned Josh to do at my institute, to look at how the American elite media reported the intifada, which is a very interesting topic, and Josh did this with great dedication and disinterest, and came up with a fascinating study that I urge you all to take a look at.

Well, I'm going to speak principally about U.S. policy in this issue, but just a few introductory words.  I'm not going to speak much about the history.  But for the record, as a historian, I have to say that I disagree with almost all of what Said just said about the historical legacy of Arafat.  I was reminded of--you know, it made you think of what Mark Anthony said about Caesar which is, you know, the evil men do gets interred with their bones.  Evidently, all the evil got interred and only the good lives after Arafat, because that was a historical revisionist look at Arafat, and we can get into that in questions, if you would like.

It is I think more appropriate to view today's discussion, not just in the terms of "after Arafat," but I think a more accurate headline as a context for looking at the next period is, "Bush is in, Arafat is out.  So what?"  What are the implications?  There's two factors.  Because I really think the changes in the regional environment that have been triggered or certainly nurtured by the administration's policy, combined with the opportunities that occasioned themselves by the death of Arafat, are themselves the trigger for the moment of opportunity that Mike Herzog accurately spoke about.

You know, it's a bit ironic that we're even speaking of a moment of opportunity right now.

A month ago, when Arafat was between that, lying between life and death in Paris, there was a, this image of amateurish racing to his bedside, competition between the wife and the nephew, the leadership of the PA, would have given you the imagery that life after Arafat would be a life of hilarity, a life of chaos, a life in which Palestinians would be bickering amongst themselves, in which we wouldn't be talking about a moment of opportunity but we'd be covering our hands, and a friend of mine gave me this, suggested this image of, you know, Suha leaning over Arafat--it should have been a cartoon--Suha leaning over Arafat, shaking him, shaking him, saying, you know, "What's the PIN number?  What's the PIN number?"

But that didn't happen, and I think one of the reasons why we have a moment of opportunity now is because of the speed with which the Arafat moment has passed.  This is not to say that the iconic image of Arafat has disappeared from Palestinian political life.  Now way.  That is not going to pass for quite some time.

But the Arafat moment, a moment which lasted regrettably, 40 years, I think that moment is passing quite quickly.

You know, I have a paper trail on this a mile long, so I'm not going to shed any crocodile tears over the passing of Arafat, and I think that it is, the implications are only between good and very good, about what his passing means for Palestinians, Israelis, and all those who are interested in peace and stability in this part of the world.

Now the question really is what we do to take advantage of this moment, as Mike accurately said.  There are others who are already beginning to take advantage of this moment, who see in this composite of Bush in, Arafat out, the requirements and the opportunities of changed behavior.

Mike mentioned three different actors that have all either begun to take new, begun to make new changes in behavior, or are accelerating changes in behavior.  Egypt, Syria and Iran, each in three different ways, are taking new measures in this moment of "Bush in, Arafat out."

The Iranians want to fill the vacuum, in a very negative sense.  We already know that up until Arafat's death, the Iranians have made a huge play for asserting control by Hezbollah and their agents in the West Bank.  We already know that they played a major role in weapons infiltration.  They play a major role in terrorist activities.

I think that the Iranians are likely to try to increase their influence considerably in the period ahead, all for the negative.  We see that the Syrians are probably going to now reach an armistice of sorts with the Palestinian leadership.

That they are probably going to opt out of trying to undermine the next phase of Israeli-Palestinian relations.  There are a lot of reasons for this.  Some of this have to do with U.S.-Syrian relations, with the growing crisis in those relations.

[Start side 1B.]

MR. SATLOFF:  [continuing] --be a serious crisis between the United States and Syria, based principally on what the Syrians are doing in Iraq, but there will be other feeder factors for this, including what the Syrians do, or in this case, don't do to try to undermine the emerging process between Israelis and Palestinians.

And then there's what the Egyptians are doing.  I'm very glad that Ambassador Fahmy is here.  I know that he's played a very useful and important role in trying to promote a constructive Egyptian approach to a whole range of issues.

What we're seeing with what the Egyptians are doing is very positive.  I'm not just referring to the release of Azam Azam [ph].  I'm not just referring to the agreement to send 750 soldiers or whatever the technical term of the "souped up" policemen, border guards, whatever they are, that are being sent to Rafah for the Philadelphia road.  I think it is--it's the music as much as the fact.  It is the idea that the Egyptians are sending the signal throughout the region, that this Israeli government is a government one needs to work with because there's an opportunity here to make significant progress, and the new benchmark is being sent by [inaudible] that one should be constructive, one should be helpful, one should try to take advantage of the moment of opportunity.

Now there are perhaps other factors that factor into this in terms of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, in terms of the Bush administration's wider efforts in the region.  From where I sit, those don't at all derogate from what the Egyptians are doing.  So we should recognize it as a net plus.

Now if others are seeing this as a moment of opportunity, it's right for the United States to see this as a moment of opportunity too.

The greatest critique, the most serious critique of the administration's policy in the Middle East is the level of activism.  Why doesn't the president get more active?  Why doesn't he have a higher level of engagement?

It seems to me this is a "bum rap."  A far more important issue than the level of engagement is the direction of engagement.  Direction is what matters.  Whether or not there's a Middle East envoy, whether or not there are signing ceremonies, whether or not there's shuttle diplomacy, is much less important than whether the direction is heading in the right way.

Now I would argue that the direction is heading very much in the right way.  The administration had essentially three innovations in its policy on Arab-Israeli matters over the last term.

Innovation one was to recognize that the Israelis are facing a significant terrorist threat and that they should have the wherewithal to respond.

Innovation two was, for the first time, a president enunciating the objective of Palestinian statehood.

And innovation three is Arafat lied to us, not just to Israelis, which he'd been doing for years, but he lied to the President of the United States about the Karine A missile boat, something that the president took very personally, and therefore I'm just not going to deal with him.

There were a lot of other reasons why i shouldn't have dealt with him; but now he crossed the line.

If you remember, that the administration did deal with Arafat in the beginning.  Colin Powell saw him, there were conversations.  This is not something that he came into office saying, "I'm not going to deal with Arafat."  This is a decision that was made after the Karine A, that Arafat is just out of bounds.

Now each of these innovations had a policy implication.  The terrorism innovation led to the United States adopting an approach at the United Nations which says no Security Council resolutions that are imbalanced, that only focus on Israeli military actions and not on the threat of terrorism.

The Palestinian state innovation led to the road map, which was an operational document, although not a self-implementing document, which is part of the problem with the road map, we can get into questions, if you want.  But it was an operational document for how you go from the concept of statehood to making statehood possible.

And the principle about Arafat led to the policy of Palestinian reform and democracy first.  It's not just Arafat but Arafat actually reflects something larger than just himself, and that we are going to have to have significant change in reform within the Palestinian political community, if, indeed, we're not going to repeat the mistakes of the past.

So that it is not just Arafat and not Arafatism, but a complete change.

Now I think that we're poised to reap the benefits of these three innovations.  Now of course the key factor that makes this possible is Arafat's disappearance.  But it's not only Arafat's disappearance because the administration's approach led to two other innovations in the region.

It led to the Israeli policy of disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank.

This is a huge event.  People should consider the magnitude of this event.  This is Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israeli settlements, the man who went through Gaza on the way to cross the Suez Canal in '73, the man who's responsible for the building of these settlements and who once said that Gaza is as important as Tel Aviv.

Think about that for a moment.  That Gaza is as important as Tel Aviv.  Who is now saying that we are going to get out of Gaza completely, and I am quite convinced that he will overrule the generals eventually on the Philadelphia route, and that he will overrule the security agencies, after a period of time, on the other aspects of the international access to Gaza, and that it is in Israel's national security to be out of Gaza, and that it is in Israel's best interests to close down settlements, to actually dismantle them.

This is a huge event.  I think it's as  important in the history of this conflict as the signing of the Oslo accords, because of what it does in transforming the mindset inside Israel, and legitimizing certain things that were heretofore illegitimate among a large portion of the Israeli population.

The second innovation that was produced because of the change in American policy is what's going on among Palestinians.  Who would have thought that in the wake of Arafat, Palestinians, in the year 2005, as Mike just outlined, are going to busy themselves with four sets of elections.  Who would have thunk it? as my kid would say.  Presidential, legislative, Fatah elections, first in 16 years, and then local elections.

Now it may not happen to the standards of the Carter Center, or actually I should--it probably will happen to the standards of the Carter Center.  But it may not happen to the standards of everybody in this room.

But this is what politics among Palestinians is going to occupy themselves with in 05.

Now if these two very important and positive trends are going to take place, then we have a choice to make, and there are only two paths in front of us.

Now the advocates of each path are going to blur the distinctions but we should not succumb to this blurring.  And the paths are really very clear.

Path one is diplomacy now, and path one has a certain intellectual logic to it.  It says Arafat was the problem.  Arafat is gone, ergo, the problem is gone.  So therefore we should be able to resolve this conflict.

And therefore let's get back to a fairly high level of negotiations as soon as possible.

This is, I would say, the European approach.  Actually it's even, I think, more the European approach than many of the approaches adopted by many Arab leaders, who I think in some respects have a more realistic view of the situation.

This would be the completely wrong approach.  It would be the wrong approach because it would break the back of these two positive trends.  It would break Gaza disengagement and it would break Palestinian reform, because it would focus the attentions of the Palestinian political leadership on the negotiations instead of focusing their attentions on getting their internal house in order.

Now the other path says do those things first--Gaza disengagement and get the Palestinian house in order, and then you're in a much better position to reengage in the right way in high-level negotiations.

Not only that.  But if you do it the other way, you're sure to fail, because if Gaza fails there will not be a single Israeli constituency for a significant negotiation over the West Bank.  The Palestinian test is in Gaza.  If the Palestinians can have a reasonably well-ordered, reasonably well-functioning, reasonably peaceful administration of Gaza, that is the single most important factor in my view to ensuring the success of the negotiations over the West Bank.

If, however, Gaza becomes Somalia, or if Gaza becomes Bosnia, or fill in the metaphor, then forget it.  The quartet, the diplomacy, road map, Phase I, Phase II.  There will not be an Israeli constituency.  There won't be an American president.  But there won't be an Israeli constituency to promote a significant negotiation over the West Bank.

So if you're serious about peace making, you have to be serious about making Gaza work, both on the Israeli side, in terms of achieving an orderly withdrawal and, on the Palestinian side, helping Palestinians create an administration that is worthy of the next phase of negotiations and worthy of the receipt of sovereignty.

Now what does that mean for the American policy? and I will wrap up with just a couple of sentences.

What this means is we don't want a Middle East peace envoy in 2005.  What we would rather have, I would suggest, is a special representative for Palestinians reconstruction and development, somebody with the power and the authority of the president to martial the forces around the world to help make this happen.

What we want is a major American push, first, to get Arab states and others who have made significant financial commitments to pay up, and I would suggest that not one American dollar be spent unless it is also matched by fulfillment of outstanding commitments, let along the making of new commitments.

The fulfillment of outstanding commitments by various Arab parties.

I would suggest that the United States lead an effort to buy out UNRA in Gaza.  Double the funding for refugee resettlement in Gaza nd by out UNRA, so that it is the Palestinians themselves who are responsible for the resettlement, the housing, the construction, the education and not an international agency.

All of us have an interest in trying to create in Gaza as much of a Palestinian address, as much of a Palestinian administration as possible.

We should invest in it, we should nurture it, because this, in my view, is the clearest and surest way to make sure that the next phase of the peace process, later in 05, early 06, whenever it happens, that the next phase is successful.  We don't just want to have a process.  We want to have one that works. Thank you.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Rob, thank you very much.  I'd like to thank all three of the speakers.  I feel that our goal, as AEI's goal in this program, has been quite well achieved in giving us a chance to hear three quite distinct views.

We're honored here by the presence with us of the ambassador of Egypt, Mr. Fahmy.  I'm going to open the floor to questions now, but Mr. Ambassador, if you would like to say a word or two, we'd be very interested to hear it.  We'll get you a microphone.

AMBASSADOR FAHMY:  Thank you.  Thanks for recognizing me.  I'm very glad to be here and I didn't to make any comments.  I actually came here to listen and learn from my colleagues and friends here on the podium, some of whom I agree with, some of whom I disagree with, but that's part of the debate.

My only comment, and I will give them back the floor--we have three different views.  I don't think one can say that they are three exclusive views.  They all have to fit in together.  And if I can just take from Rob and then move across the table.

I think it's quite logical that the issue of Palestinian reform will be an ongoing issue and has to be ongoing issue.  First of all, for Palestinians.  It is in the national interest of Palestinians to pursue this issue of reform, to make their own institutions viable ones, and therefore become a better society as such.

So I agree with Rob that this issue has to continue. 

Now I agree with General Herzog, that there has to be practical measures on the ground and the ability to work together, and I agree with him that the Gaza withdrawal will now become a coordinative process rather than a unilateral process, and that's the only way it would have worked anyway, by the way.  If it had been attempted to be done in that way, it wouldn't have worked.

Said's comment that while it's not all only obligations on the side of the Palestinians, there are obligations on the side of Israelis, there are also points I agree with.

This never works if one side is signing the music sheet and there's nobody else there singing with them.

Let me simply conclude by saying reform is important but no Palestinian establishment will succeed if there's not a political dividend that will actually give it credibility as it reforms itself.  So I would argue that one, pursue reform, but there has to be a peace process that goes hand in hand with that.

I would argue that we need to make the Gaza withdrawal a success but that really is contingent on it being a cooperative process, not on one side, and I would say to Said that my opinion on Oslo is a bit different.  That being said, it is a process which we've all gone through and learned from, and I do agree with him that there are obligations on the Israeli side that have to be met in this year to come.  I'm not going to describe it as an opportunity, or I'm neither optimistic or pessimistic.  Whether this is an opportunity or not will be determined one year from now, not just because of what happened over the last couple of months, whether it's the election or the death of a leader.  Thank you.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

The floor is yours.  The only ground rules are please wait for the microphone and introduce yourself.  You may either ask a question or make a comment as long as if you choose to make a comment it's not at great length.

MR.      :  Thank you.  I think a good starting point will be to--Cy Frenkel [ph]--with the agreements between Said, Rob, and the ambassador.  There's one thing that the three of you agree upon, and that is that the Palestinian people, starting in Gaza, have to change the image that they have, not only in Israel but in the rest of the world, from people that are involved in the murder of women and children, blowing up buses, involved in enormous corruption, to a people that can govern themselves following the laws.

I don't think that anyone else can do it for them.  Obviously they can be helped.  They can be helped by Egypt; they can be helped by the United States.  But this is a prerequisite.  As Robert Stovall [?] said, there will not be Israelis that will go along with establishing a Palestinian state, unless they see the Palestinians as being able to govern the state, rather than establishing a state of chaos, which exists now.  That's the first thing. 

The second thing is I think the absence of Arafat has lifted an enormous burden from the Palestinians and from the rest of the world.  He detached himselves from reality.  He thought that he can fool the whole world.  And he was at Oslo to do it.  Financially very successfully, and you can argue whether it's $3 billion or $8 billion, that exists somewhere in different banks in the world.

But as far as the standard of living of the Palestinian people, they are much, much worse off now than they were before the Oslo process.  They are because the people that are governing them are people that have had experience in arms smuggling, in terrorism, and not in government, and they continue this process.

And Said's comment that Israel will be willing to give them a 100 percent, allow all the refugees, give them--evacuate all the settlement, is terribly unrealistic.  That's a nonstarter.  The first thing--

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Okay.

MR.      :  --is recognize reality.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  My ground rule was you can make a comment but the comment must be brief, and it was almost brief. 

Do any of us want to respond to that?

MR. ARIKAT:  Very quickly.  His last thing on the issue of the West Bank and the settlement and so on.  Well, I tell you, the Palestinians have already made their historical compromise.  They have agreed to have a state on 22 percent of their homeland.  I think this is the historical compromise.

I don't think any Palestinian would agree that the Palestinians must lie [?] with the Palestinian refugees forever, in the diaspora, and their miserable conditions.  I'm not suggesting that all Palestinian refugees would come back, but this is an obligatory thing, this is something that the U.N. recognized, and this is something that Israel must recognize its responsibility for. 

So it is a principle.  You know, Palestinian refugees may not go back to Palestine, this can be worked out, but the principle cannot be departed from.

MR.      :  Just one word.  That's inaccurate.

MR. KASS:  Leon Kass, AEI.  This is a question about the relation between the political struggles on the Palestinian side and the plan for disengagement from Gaza, the two planks, really, of Mr. Satloff's comments, and mentioned also by the others.

What would you say to those critics of the disengagement, who suggest that in fact this will be interpreted really as the withdrawal from Lebanon was interpreted, namely, as in a way a victory for the intifada, and that if Abu Mazan is in fact a weak leader, that over the next few months, or even year, one would see the emergence, really, of the triumph of Hamas and the other leaders, in other words, that the disengagement might in fact weaken exactly what you think is necessary on the other side.  And this is a question really for General Herzog as well as--in fact for all three, if you really, if you have comments.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  Indeed, there are those in Israel who criticize disengagement, and tend that it might be perceived as a second Lebanon, withdrawing from Lebanon, or a price to terrorism.  My answer to that is that it could happen but I think we could avoid that if now, with the new realities on the ground, disengagement will be coordinated between both parties, there'll be another [inaudible] Palestinian side to assume responsibility already, and capable to assume responsibility.

And the most important is that it is done in such a way that it'll be perceived and actuated [?] as an asset being handed over to the Palestinians side, not as a liability, not as something that Israel is doing on its own because it was pressurized to do.  And I think it could be done that way.

In my view, especially now, with Arafat gone, I'd say that my impression is that the bulk of the public opinion on the Palestinian side would like to change the situation, they're yearning for a change, and I think they, apart from what Israel might do, could pressurize those factions who want to continue what they call their own struggle, not to do it.

So I think it's not doministic, that it'll perceived that way.  It depends how all parties play their hand, and to what extent this will be coordinated, and to what extent Palestinian leadership will be able to assume, willing and able to assume responsibility.

MR. SATLOFF:  I think it's a very real fear.  I think it's quite legitimate for people to suggest this fear.  However, I think that the differences between Lebanon and Gaza are profound.  The greatest threat that many Palestinians felt about the Israeli action, the proposed action in Gaza, is that it was going to be unilateral.

I mean, think about this for a minute.  Thirty-seven years after the Six Day War, the Israelis are going to get up and leave Gaza, and most Palestinian leaders say "Please don't."  We need to negotiate it, we need to coordinate it, we need to do it together.  It's a very different approach than what happened in Lebanon, where everybody was quite keen for the Israelis to just get out.

Secondly, it's the manner in which I think the--both the imagery and the manner in which the Israelis will be leaving, I think is quite different.  I think it's regrettable, in retrospect, the actual tactics of the way the Israelis left Lebanon.  I think that there'll be a lot greater effort to ensure that the Israelis don't leave Gaza under fire.  I mean, Sharon has made this quite clear.  We saw him with a group.  He's said this to many other groups.

I saw him a couple months ago, in which he was as adamant about saying that Palestinians will suffer far disproportionately if we are leaving under fire, than Israelis will suffer, and I think the message is very clear.

Thirdly is the point that I was making before.  For many Palestinians, the big game is about the West Bank, and so here, I think the Israeli consensus is not to give the sort of massive withdrawal that they're doing in Gaza without clear evidence, up front, of what the outcome will be like, because it's in the heart of Israel.  It's right in the stomach of Israel as opposed to Gaza.

And so the test will be how they perform in Gaza.  And so if it is a Hamasastan, you know, the Israelis aren't going to be making a similar move in the West Bank as they're making in Gaza.

So I think the circumstances, for at least three different reasons, are quite different.

MR. ARIKAT:  Very quickly on this point.  I don't think that the Palestinians or the people in Gaza are under any illusion that they can really elevate their struggle against occupation, much like Hezbollah did.  After all, Hezbollah was able to create a paramilitary force that was aided and armed and so on, that was able to train, and so on.

In fact the Palestinians are always reacting to Israeli incursions.  So there is no illusion that we have defeated them by the power of the gun.

The issue with Gaza is the following: if it's going to be Gaza first and Gaza last.  If Gaza is part of the road map, then that will be fine.  But if it happens that the expansion--you know, if we take the settlers from Gaza, and then we expand the settlements on the West Bank, then it's not going to work.

MR.       :  Thank you very much.  My name is Alivan [?] from the Palestinian Mission.

Just a quick point, the gentleman just raised the issue before, is that leave the Palestinians alone, then they will be able to govern themselves.

The greatest, really, contribution to the Palestinian Authority, and to Arafat himself, was the great power transition that took place just in the past couple of months, that nobody has talked about, and I think that is a remarkable achievement by the Palestinians.

And concerning Sharon's disengagement plan, I believe the circumstances that that plan that came out was not really an indicator that Sharon is a man of peace.  Rather, there was an internal and international pressure on him to do something while everybody--the Geneva initiative came out, the people's peace initiative came out, and also because he wants everybody to draw a blind eye on the wall in the West Bank.

The word "test" that Robert has just mentioned, I really feel that this is racist.  I mean, you cannot tell me that you are depriving the entire Palestinian of their freedom.  They should go through tests first, to be able to live free and dignity in their own land?  This is racist itself and I do not accept it, and as long as the Israeli have this mentality of being the executor and the judge at the same time, of having security before freedom and peace, this is the wrong approach.  Unless you address the concern of both people, Palestinians and Israelis.  Palestinians suffer tremendously.

They are deprived of their most basic rights for the past 30 years and they deserve their freedom, and once you address these issues, you can have your security [inaudible].

My question, which I really want to ask most of the panelists here, is about Henry Sigmund's [ph] article that appears in the New Yorker, November 4th, about international conference and the new approach to the Middle East peace process, which is the interventionalist approach rather than the facilitation approach by the international community, that international community, including the U.S., should invite all parties to go to international conference--this is the deal, this is how you should--both parties accepted it.  What do you think of that?  Thank you very much.

MR. SATLOFF:  Well, first, if anybody thinks that Ariel Sharon is getting out of Gaza because there was the Geneva accord, or Ami Ayalon [ph] and Sayan Usaba [ph] get a couple hundred thousand signatures on a petition, that's crazy.

Second, it's not my test.  It's the practical situation in the world.  If Palestinians are going to achieve Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, and they're going to achieve negotiated statehood, then they're going to have to satisfy Israeli expectations about what this state is going to look like.  I mean, this is a negotiation that will eventually happen.  This is not my test.  It's the political test.  It's the fact that, you know, Israelis are going to make their judgments about what and where to withdraw from based upon their expectations of the future, and if they see the Palestinians are successfully implementing the opportunity of Gaza, that will affect their negotiation.

If they see that Gaza turns into Somalia, that will affect their negotiation.  It's not my test.  It's just reality.

Henry Sigmund?  I have no regard for Henry's analysis of the Middle East.  The idea of international intervention, I think that history has shown that trying to impose a solution on this conflict is precisely the wrong way to go.  We're actually at a moment in which the parties are moving in their right directions, internally, so as to enable them to move in the right directions together, and one of the best ways to subvert this moment of opportunity is to try to internationalize it and have an imposition of a solution from the outside.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  First of all, I also don't believe in imposed solutions.  It just won't work.  If the parties themselves are not up to it, no imposed solution will work on the ground.

But I'd like to take issue with what you said about the disengagement.  I hear many Palestinians just sort of downgrading the disengagement from Gaza, and I think this is a big mistake.

I think you should not underestimate the fact that Israel, for the first time since 1967, is going to remove settlement.  You should not underestimate the fact that under the road map it happened after the third phase, namely as a result of Israeli-Palestinian permanent state negotiations.  Now Israel is doing it now, before we even completed the first phase of the road map.   You are underestimating the fact that in the West Bank Israel's going to withdraw four [?] settlements and several camps [?], but is going to create a contiguous Palestinian area which is over twice the size of the West Bank.

And if you are concerned about Gaza first being Gaza last, my answer to this, if you don't want it to happen, make sure that disengagement from Gaza will be a success story, because I believe in dynamics more than any stated intention of anybody.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  We have a lot of hands here and I'm going to try to get to everyone if we can, but I'm going to ask both the questioners and the answerers to be as concise as possible.  Right here.  Please.

MR. SIEDEN [ph]:  I'm Nat Sieden with the U.S. Navy.  I have two quick questions for General Herzog.  Number one, everybody has mentioned that Abu Mazan is 69 years old, and I think Abu Allah's probably in his early 70's.  So therefore, there will--sixty-eight.  There'll be a new generation of leaders very shortly.

And is that generation of leaders politically oriented, that you can negotiate with, or do they have Said's view of principles, where, you know, like religion, where you can't negotiate at all?

And a second quick question.  Do you think the international community will be successful to get Syria to remove themselves from Lebanon, which would change the whole dynamic in the north?

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  Concerning the young politician on the Palestinian side, I don't cite names, but there are people there whom I also personally know some of them, I think with whom Israelis can talk and negotiate, and I don't know if permanent state solution will be possible in the near, foreseeable future, but there are people there with whom such a deal could be negotiated, and by the way, they don't hold Said's view.  I've talked to some of them.

On the issue of Syria, I don't see the Syrians going out of Lebanon again in the foreseeable future.  I think they're under pressure but they don't feel they have to make a choice right now.  So I don't see it happening in the near future at least.

MR. LOYOLA:  Hi.  Mario Loyola.  There's something, just speaking as a Latin American, I guess, more than anything, there's something that I have trouble understanding.  I have a lot of Palestinian friends and I've heard a lot of Palestinians speak about the problem with Israeli security measures, and is there anybody on the Palestinian side that understands that the repressive security measures are, first of all, the fault of extremists on their side?  Because there doesn't seem to be, and without coming to that realization I don't, I'm not very hopeful that the extremists can be defeated in the popular culture, which is where they have to be defeated, first of all.  Thank you.

MR. ARIKAT:  Well, first of all, you have to understand that the most extreme form of violence is the military occupation that has gone on for 37 years.  I mean, you know--well, let me just finish.  I heard you quite well.  I mean, if you say that the Israeli measures are in reaction to Palestinian violence, that is not true.

For 20 years, from '67 to '87, there was an occupation, there was hardly any Palestinian violence, yet the Israeli violence went on day after day, the building settlements went on day after day.  Imprisonment.  Every Palestinian--almost every Palestinian family had a member in prison.  Some people spent 20 years, 15 years, 17 years.

Jabril Orjub [ph], who was the head of the Palestinian security, spent 18 years in prison.  He was imprisoned way before the intifada, and so on.  So that is a fallacy.  The occupation is the most violent form that you could possibly apply to an occupied people.

MR.       :  That's preposterous.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  I'm going to take one last question here, and then I'm going to give each of the speakers a chance for a last word.

MR.       :  Good morning.  I'm Meredith Buel from Voice of America, former Jerusalem bureau chief.  I wanted to ask about Mr. Barghouti's candidacy, briefly mentioned by the panelists, but not really gone into depth.

What impact is that possibly going to have on what, as the Palestinian representative said, it's been a relatively smooth transition from Mr. Arafat to the old new, or the new old leadership.  If he wins, what impact does that have on what you gentlemen have discussed this morning, and if he loses, what impact might that have in the support from the younger Palestinians who have been active in the intifada for this new old or old new leadership that may or may not win?  Thank you.

MR. ARIKAT:  Well, you know, I think it's very interesting.  I think the more the merrier because it will bring many people into the political process, of many different schools of thought.  I don't really expect Mr. Barghouti to win.  If he wins, I think we will have more of the same, because, you know, in many ways Arafat was in prison for the last three years, so we will just continue to have the same thing.  Barghouti is sentenced to five life terms in prison, so the Israelis will feel, look, you know, they elected a guy who is indicted and in prison, we will not have to deal with him.

Now if he really gets a good percentage, I think there will be tremendous pressure on the leadership, on Abu Mazan, and others, to reform quickly, because definitely the generation that Barghouti represents is the generation that wants reform, wants political changes, they want sharing, they definitely want to get rid of the corruption, and this, you know, sort of apparatchik strata that is up there.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  I think there are three scenarios.  One is that Barghouti withdraw his candidacy, and in this case everything I've said is valid.

The second scenario is that he will not withdraw, he will run, and he will be defeated by Abu Mazan.  I think in this case, even though Abu Mazan will win, he'll be weakened because he'll probably win by a small margin as public opinion polls indicate right now, and this will also divide the Fatah movement which is, I've said is the backbone of mainstream Palestinian politics, and any leader will have to rely on Fatah.

If he wins, a big, big problem, a deadlock.  I don't think he'll be able to function, to do anything as a leader from an Israeli jail.  But beyond that, I think the Israeli public will perceive this, interpret it as a message from the Palestinian public, because Barghouti from his jail continues to preach the continuation of the armed struggle.  So that is a problem.

MR. SATLOFF:  Just one sentence on this.  You can imagine the reaction in the White House.

Here, you know, we isolated Arafat for two years as a terrorist, and someone with whom one could not do business.  Palestinians get a chance to, a clear choice between, you know, a person opposed to the violence and the terrorism, and willing to make, you know, a principled peace with Israel without being a Quisling, versus someone who is committed to, like Arafat in the U.N. in '74, pistol in one hand and olive branch in the other, and if Palestinians choose the latter, you can, you know, bet your bottom dollar what the reaction would be in the White House, which is they're going to get what they deserve, which is I'm not going to focus on this five minutes during the rest of my term.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  Okay.  I'd like to ask our speakers if you'd each like one minute of last comment.  We'll do it in the reverse order in which you spoke, starting with Rob, ending with Michael.  That point, that path that you wanted to get in--

MR. SATLOFF:  One point would be January 10th is the next key date.  January 9th is the election.  If you assume that Abu Mazan wins, for a moment, January 10th, there's going to be a deluge of European phone calls to the White House saying, well now they have democracy, we promised you that we would support your approach of democracy first, now they have it, let's get down to real negotiations, let's hold conferences and send envoys.

And the real test for the administration is not before the election of Abu Mazan.  It's what happens on January 10th and how they massage the Europeans and how we especially massage Tony Blair.

MR. ARIKAT:  A couple points.  I think that if we [inaudible] forward, and the New York Sun, last week, they all talked about how Condoleezza Rice met with the major, the president of major Jewish organizations, and assured them that there will no special envoy, there will be no international conference, and so I think that really foretells [?], because everybody looked at this administration as perhaps now it feels that has mandated enough to actually go ahead and lean a little bit on Sharon, and make him really adhere to the principle that he agreed to, you know, in the Akaba conference, when they agreed to the road map.  That's one.

The second point that I want to make, when I said that more and more with every passing day, that a two state solution is becoming a doomed fantasy, I'm not speaking ideologically, I'm speaking practically, because when the land is taken away, and then when these realities on the ground as, you know, pronounced by the president and others, and as being pronounced by Israelis, day in and day out, and so on.

These realities on the ground make the Palestinian state not feasible.  So those are the points that I wanted to make.  It is not ideological but it is practical.

BRIGADIER GENERAL HERZOG:  The one point I want to make is that we should all change our mindset.  That's the most important thing, the mindset.  We should not focus on the empty half of the glass but, rather, on the full half of the glass, which I try to do.  Unfortunately, I think Said concentrated on the empty half of the glass, not look around and see where are the threats but look around and say here is a big opportunity, let's seize the opportunity, because if we don't, then the two state solution will become a fantasy.

MR. MURAVCHIK:  And I get the last word which is a warm thank you to our three speakers who I thought were all extremely interesting.

Also a warm thank you to the three women who put on this program, Suzanne Gershowitz, Kara Nichols Barrett, and Unid Golub [ph], and before I thank you for coming, one advertisement.

If you'd like to speak the whole day with us at AEI, there's a very interesting program about hearts and minds, midday, and then we're going to have a session back here and I get to resume the chair in the afternoon about oil for food.  If you haven't already signed up for these, there's probably at least standing room available, and thanks very much for coming.

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