October 2007
"Demographic Divergence" between America and Europe
According to most projections, Western Europe and the United States are poised to undergo an unprecedented "demographic divergence." Over the next generation, Europe's demographic profile will age markedly; its working-age population will begin to contract in size; deaths will regularly exceed births; and the population as a whole will begin to shrink, possibly indefinitely. The United States, by contrast, is expected to see steady and continuing population growth for all age groups, and America is likely to remain the most "youthful" of any major developed society.
What does this impending "demographic drift" portend for transatlantic relations? Will a more elderly Europe be more cautious about international security cooperation? Will a demographically strong United States find its partnership with a demographically stagnant Europe to be of declining international value? As Western Europe ages and its workforce shrinks, will that make it more risk-averse, with too small a tax base to fund missions abroad? And do the sharply different demographic patterns in store for America and Europe reflect underlying differences in popular values and attitudes that may complicate the relationship between these historical allies?
Nicholas Eberstadt
AEI
Demography is not destiny, but it can alter the realm of the possible. Europe and the United States are moving in two different demographic directions. Europe's total fertility rate is below the replacement rate, whereas that of the United States hovers at around two children per woman. Within the next few decades, the European population will begin to shrink, while the United States will remain the only country in the developed world with a growing population. These demographic changes will challenge the transatlantic relationship in new ways. For example, the aging in Europe may complicate European cooperation in dealing with Islamic extremism. An older Europe may also face an innovation stagnation.
It would be simple to say that immigration and policy play key roles in this phenomenon. In reality, even when comparing Anglo-Americans to Western Europeans, the white Americans' total fertility rate is higher than the the European average. Europeans have friendlier, government-enforced maternity policies; more free time; a virtually equal standard of living; and enough living space. If the traditional economic material explanations do not work well, then what does? We need to look at the ambiguous realm of values, attitudes and beliefs.
The importance of religion in Europe has been decreasing over several decades. The United States is not following the secularization trend. Twice as many Americans say religion plays an important role in their lives than Europeans do. Although fertility rates of religious Americans and religious Europeans are nearly the same, the United States has a higher percentage of self-identified religious people. Furthermore, religion plays an important role in overall attitudes of the people. For example, religious people on both sides are more willing to fight for their country and support a strong defense force.
The "demographic divergence" is important in several ways. In the future, Europe will be older, smaller, and less likely to engage in military operations. It may not support assertive U.S. policies, which may strain the alliance.
Barbara Boyle Torrey
Population Reference Bureau
In America, no one wants to retire, and in Italy, thirty-year-old men still live with their mothers. When making predictions, we need to take into consideration that this data is "before behavioral changes." In the decades to come, personal and policy changes will likely shrink the effects that a widening demographic divergence suggests.
The European Union (EU) has a lot of policy space in which to work. It has a high proportion of part-time workers, long vacations, and early retirement age. If the governments adjust policies, it could adequately address economic divergence. In addition, Turkey's entrance into the EU will boost the total population by a substantial 12 percent.
Although religion plays a role, the current fertility data may be incomplete. Secular couples may reproduce at an older age, and therefore may be excluded from fertility calculations. It is curious to see that religiosity produces different effects in Europe and the United States. Political inclinations in the United States vary more widely based on religion than in Europe. Even though religious people in Europe have many children, their attitudes toward NATO and other transatlantic issues remain similar to their non-religious counterparts with fewer kids.
Demography is not destiny. It could be overridden by short-term goals, and the divergence is not something to worry about.
Tod Lindberg
Hoover Institution
We should not be pessimistic about the transatlantic relationship. Compared to other parts of the world, Europe and the United States are getting along well, and the divergence is not critical. Forty-six percent of Europeans and 37 percent of Americans think the U.S.-European relationship will stay the same after the U.S. presidential elections. We should not fear the status quo, because Americans and Europeans like each other more than it seems. For the past several years, tourism has been increasing on both ends. We should also note that 42 percent of Americans and 35 percent of Europeans believe the transatlantic relationship will improve, which shows good will on both sides of the Atlantic.
Finally, when we look at the liabilities side of the ledger, we usually see political disagreements. We should not forget the economic part of the matter. Foreign investment from Europe to the United States and vice versa does not paint a picture of divergence. At least in the economic realm, both sides of the Atlantic still follow the "each unto the other" principle.
AEI intern Alexandra Prokhorova prepared this summary.
