January 2008
The North Korean Problem: Toward a Diplomatic Solution in 2008?
In the final year of George W. Bush's presidency, Washington finds itself engaged in continued multilateral negotiations with Pyongyang. In striking contrast to its earlier approaches, the Bush administration now emphasizes the desirability of a comprehensive diplomatic solution to the North Korean problem.
Are talks and renegotiated agreements realistic means of mitigating the international community's current concerns about the Kim Jong Il regime? If so, what should the diplomatic agenda be? How should the United States approach the unresolved diplomatic issues, which range from North Korea's nuclear disclosure and the prospective removal of the country from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism to Pyongyang's alleged abduction of foreign nationals and the regime's persistent violation of human rights? On January 17, 2008, key experts and practioners discussed these and other pressing questions looming on this year's policy horizon. Jay P. Lefkowitz, special envoy for North Korean human rights at the State Department, gave the keynote speech.
Jay P. Lefkowitz
U.S. Department of State
North Korea is one of the most difficult foreign policy problems facing the United States. Failure to fully disclose nuclear programs and suspected support of international terrorist and proliferation activities signal that North Korea is not seriously considering giving up its nuclear programs. It is unlikely that North Korea will change its nuclear status during the current administration.
The nuclear issue is of prime importance in the six-party talks, but the United States is also concerned about North Korean human rights violations. These should not be addressed as separate issues. Human rights violations and belligerent international behavior are often linked. The United States should attempt to improve both the nuclear situation and the human rights problems.
The character of the six-party talks is changing from multilateral to bilateral. Neither South Korea nor China has been willing to apply as much pressure on North Korea as the United States hoped. Neither country is interested in a destabilized North Korea on its borders, and both appear happy to maintain the status quo.
The United States should consider some new policy alternatives. It should begin focusing on a longer-term policy, reassessing past assumptions about the six-party talks and linking security issues, human rights, and economic support together in the negotiations. These issues should become part of a policy of open engagement with North Korea, one that encourages dialogue on a whole host of issues while continuing to address the security problem.
Larry Niksch
Congressional Research Service
North Korea is suspected of terrorist and proliferation activities in countries such as Iran, Syria, and Sri Lanka. It is currently classified in the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism and is included in the Trading with the Enemy Act. The United States has recently proposed removing North Korea from these lists. This raises serious questions about the U.S. approach to North Korea. It can be argued that North Korea's activities in support of terrorism in the Middle East pose a greater threat to U.S. security than North Korea's military threat in Northeast Asia.
The United States should consider the following options. First, it could remove North Korea from either the terrorism list or the Trading with the Enemy list in return for complete shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor, emphasizing a something-for-something diplomacy. Second, the United States could link removal from the terrorism list with North Korea's full declaration of nuclear programs, including its activities in the Middle East. The United States should also consider the impact that removing North Korea from the terrorism list will have on its long-term relationship with Japan.
Additionally, the United States has recently focused so strongly on the nuclear issue that other, equally important issues have been ignored. It should bring these issues back into negotiations with North Korea. The United States might also consider opening talks with the North Korean military. Economic and diplomatic incentives alone will not be enough to resolve the problems with North Korea.
L. Gordon Flake
Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
The six-party talks have gone awry and are moving away from their fundamental purpose. The February 13 agreement was a logical set of goals, rewards, and consequences that should have created a dynamic that would lead to more meaningful negotiations. The United States, however, has focused so much on the implementation of the agreement that it has lost sight of this fundamental objective.
Most disturbing is the missed deadline for North Korea's disclosure of its nuclear activities. Washington also insists that North Korea disclose its proliferation activities, a topic not covered in any agreement. This is an issue of such importance in the United States that the negotiations cannot move forward until it is addressed.
Progress in the six-party talks must be measured with the following three yardsticks. First, the nuclear test must be considered. Do U.S. actions in the negotiations constitute a sufficient response to the nuclear test? Second, the impact of U.S. tactics on its regional allies must be considered. Has coordination between the members of the six-party talks improved or declined? Third, the proximity to the strategic goal must be examined. Is North Korea getting closer to abandoning its nuclear program, or is it likely to become accepted as a nuclear state? Along with these concerns, the six-party talks should return to a multilateral negotiation rather than the more bilateral process that it has become.
Michael Auslin
AEI
For Japan, the North Korea problem is not a complex issue. The North Korean abduction of Japanese nationals must be fully resolved before Japan will consider making concessions to North Korea. This is a domestic issue in Japan, and domestic pressure intrudes on every aspect of Japan's participation in the six-party talks. The Japanese would welcome the linkage of human rights to the six-party talks.
The domestic importance of this issue makes it an important topic in politics. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe activated the abductee issue as a tool in his political campaign, promising a hard-line stance on North Korea. Current prime minister Yasuo Fukuda inherited this position, but early in his term he seemed to support a softer approach, even considering normalization with North Korea. Prime Minister Fukuda's rhetoric, however, has recently returned to the hard-line stance, perhaps in response to Japanese frustration with the lack of progress in the six-party talks.
Japan was very supportive of the six-party talks, heralding them as the new mechanism to address all security issues in Northeast Asia. It appreciated the multilateral approach and is frustrated at being left out of current negotiations that have become more bilateral. Japan is particularly concerned about removing North Korea from the terrorism list. Without progress on North Korea's side, Japan remains wary about offering any kind of concession. The United States should consider how its current negotiating tactics might affect its relations with Japan.
AEI research assistant Jennifer Gregg prepared this summary.
