American Enterprise Institute

July 24, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

11:00 a.m.	Registration
11:15	Panelists:	Frederick W. Kagan, AEI
		Kimberly Kagan, Institute for the Study of War
		General Jack Keane, U.S. Army (retired)
	Moderator:	Danielle Pletka, AEI
12:30 p.m.	Adjournment

Proceedings:

Danielle Pletka: 

Welcome back to so many of you to another discussion about Iraq and where we are.  This is an especially timely moment for us to be looking at what is happening in Iraq, not just because we have really, in the last months, seen the incredible fruits of the surge and the work of our generals and our soldiers on the ground to deliver an almost miraculous transformation in the country and I think the culmination of what we all hope that Iraq could be.  We are well headed in that direction.

We have today with us three very familiar faces – General Jack Keane – and I'm not going to do the usual introductions.  I hope my friends will forgive me.  You have bios in your folders and it only is going to take time from then.  General Jack Keane, Kim Kagan from the Institute for the Study of War, and our own Fred Kagan to talk about their recent trip to Iraq.  They spent 11 days on the ground all over Iraq.  They have made many trips but I think that they were absolutely stunned by their findings and amazed by the success that they were able to see. 

I hope we will have an opportunity to talk a little bit about another well-reported trip to Iraq – Senator Obama’s trip that just completed his own assessment of the value of the surge, or should I say the lack of value of the surge and ideas about where our troops ought to be placed.  These are all most interesting discussions.  They are going to play a big role in this year’s election and we should turn right to it so I'm going to turn to Jack first.

Jack Keane:  Thanks, Danielle.  Good morning.  I appreciate you all taking the time to come.

We have been on a cycle of visit in Iraq since the President made the decision to change the strategy back in January of 2007, about every three or four months, and we normally stay almost 8, 10, 12, 13, 14 days – something to that effect.  So we just got back a little over a week ago and Fred and Kim had been in Iraq in February and I was there in the end of March as well.  We have found that if you do not take a snapshot in Iraq every three or four months, what can change is pretty dramatic, and those of you who have been there certainly understand that.

I'm going to open by talking about the security and my colleagues will pick up on the other major subject areas and then, we will certainly take your questions.

First of all, from a security perspective and its implications overall, we are definitely winning in Iraq and I think we can say with some degree of certainty, we are achieving our objectives in Iraq.  And to refresh you what those are:  Is a stable Iraq; an elected government by its people and serving its people; a country that is capable of defending itself; it is not a threat to its neighbors; it does not have a radical Islamic sanctuary in it; and it has a long-term relationship with the United States.  All of that is within view and some of those are already there.  I believe the momentum we have in Iraq is not reversible unless we just walked away - or some kind of precipitous withdrawal - would be the only way in my view that that could be reversed.

To make claims like that is a stunning achievement when you remember where we were with the impending disaster with the crisis of 2006 and what that meant not only for Iraq but also for United States’ national security interest in the region.

This has been a major turnaround in about a year and a half - somewhat unprecedented dealing with counterinsurgencies - and probably something that will be studied for years to understand what actually took place and how did that take place.  But why could we make a claim like that?

Well, first of all, if you just looked at indicators - and I know many of you do – all the trends are in the right direction.  They have been in the right direction for some time in terms of civilian casualties, ethno-sectarian violence, certainly U.S. casualties’ level of violence, amount of IEDs, spectacular attacks – all those trends are very, very positive.

The civil war in Iraq has ended, if you actually believe there was one.  I never believed there was one.  I think there was leaning towards something like that but many did; but those who did, believe me, there is no civil war in Iraq and ethno-sectarian violence has not taken place for weeks in Iraq – almost two months – and it is just a fact.

The al Qaeda has been operationally defeated in Iraq.  I believe that at the end of 2007, and, certainly, events that have taken place in 2008 have contributed even more significantly to that.  This is a major strategic defeat for the al Qaeda because they declared this as their central front.  Certainly, with U.S. presence in Iraq, they felt that this was a vulnerability that they could exploit for their own purposes.  They needed the Sunnis to support them to do that and that has failed.  It is well known in the Arab Muslim world that the Sunnis certainly have rejected the al Qaeda in Iraq.  It is a much larger story in the Arab Muslim world than it is in the United States in terms of its significance. 

It should be equally important to United States, particularly for a country that was attacked by these radicals, and when you see that, there are moderates who have rejected them, who are willing to risk their lives to get rid of them as they have done so in the provinces and Sunni neighborhoods in Iraq.  It is a major step forward in the war against radical Islam and encouraging other communities to do the same.  And I’m not suggesting that it was done just because of the Sunnis; the military achievement in dealing with the al Qaeda is rather significant.  The use of not only special operation forces but the degree that conventional forces were used is very different than what had been done in the past.  And certainly, the participation of the Iraqi security forces were all a part of that.

The most recent operation that took place that we were on the heels of, in terms of our visit, was the crushing of the al Qaeda in Mosul which was the last residue of them.  Now there are still some left – I'm not suggesting there is not - and the al Qaeda leadership still wants to try to regenerate if they can.  But in our judgment, it is just not possible.  They need a Sunni infrastructure to do that.

So you understand what is happening - they come across the border.  In the past, they used to be somewhat unimpeded foreign fighters coming in from Syria, all the way to their operational cells with two purposes – one, to be a fighter or two, to be a bomber.  And they normally would survive that entire experience and only in those operational cells will they become vulnerable to us particularly when they started to use telephones or some kind of communication or the more operational they got, the more vulnerable they would become to us.  The facilitation that worked, moving through the Jasir [phonetic] Desert into Mosul has been significantly disrupted, so much so that it is a demotivator if you are a foreign fighter to go to Iraq because you may not even make it to your operational cell to be either a fighter or a bomber.  And those operational cells are so much on the move, their infrastructure and network have been taken apart - that they are very vulnerable when they are in those cells as well.  That is the reality.

Now remember, they are terrorists and they will be capable of a spectacular attack from time to time.  But what they cannot do - and you understand the difference – what they cannot do is sustain a level of violence which could threaten or destabilize the regime and that is what they were doing in 2004, 2005 and dramatically so in 2006 by provoking a Shia response that they wanted.  And that cannot be done today and that is why they are operationally defeated in Iraq.

Also, we should note the resilience of the Iraqi people that reminds me much of the Israeli experience with the Hezbollah and Hamas.  When a spectacular bomb goes off in a marketplace today, that marketplace continues to function except for the street that the bomb went off on and the very next day, that street is functioning again except in the damaged area - many of you who have gone to Iraq recently see this.  And the Iraqis have intuitively concluded that their danger and threat to them by these terrorists because of the infrequency of the attacks - and they live through the crisis and horror of 2006 where hundreds of bodies were laying on the street every week - they believe intuitively that they are not going to be harmed, that the probability is not there for them.  So there are no streets with their families, with children; they are there in the evenings having some kind of social life to break the horrible heat that is certainly in Iraq at this time at the time of the year and it is a dramatic turnaround which has been coming for some time.  We have been reporting on this going all the way back to 2007 in terms of the impact of the security situation on the everyday life experience of Iraqis.

The next issue, certainly, is the mainstream Sunni insurgency has capitulated – that is the fact.  They have stopped the violence; they have sought to leverage the United States while we are there at our strongest to influence a Shia-dominated government to address their political grievances in the political process as opposed to using armed violence to achieve those political objectives.  That is what is taking place.  There is no treaty, there is no white flag flying that denotes that surrender but it is what it is and this is the way insurgencies end.  They just sort of fade away.

In this group, what is good about it is they have come into the political process.  Now, the media has a tendency to focus on the Sons of Iraq which they should because it is unprecedented that we now have 103,000, 60 percent of who were fighting us at one time.  But it is a manifestation of a strategic decision that was made to stop the violence, enter the political process and that is what is lost.  And the manifestation of that is the leadership given us their young people to help protect their own people and also work with us to drive out the al Qaeda and they have been influential certainly in all of that.

The other thing I would say is that the Shia extremists and the Iranian influence in the south has been tactically defeated by the recent operations that have taken place led by the prime minister with his commander in chief hat on.  And what that has meant is that the Iranian influence in the south is severely disrupted.

Sadr is politically isolated and militarily defeated in the south.  The Iranian influence has had a major setback.  There is a growing and persistent anti-Iranian feeling in the south and that is certainly encouraging.  The special groups had been tactically defeated as has Brigadier General Suleimani, the Qods force commander who has been in that job 10-plus years.  His Iranian Qods force commander we are talking about here who is cunning and very savvy and certainly very experienced and ruthless, and he has had a political, diplomatic, economic and military strategy to gain influence in the south so that the Maliki government is weak, is aligned with Iran and it is not aligned with the United States – that is not happening.  That is a major setback for them.

We also know Suleimani is still in the job and he reports to one person, the Supreme Leader.  And what does that tell us?  It tells us that they are going to regroup, probably try to learn from the mistakes that they made, which certainly was -- mistake one was their underestimation of the Iraqi security forces and the will and moral courage of the Prime Minister Maliki, for sure.  And what can they do about that is what they are working on right now, in our view, and we will probably see them return to some kind of military action in the next 60 days or so.  And that will probably be focused exclusively on U.S. forces.  But in my view, given the advantages that we have, with troop presence in the south, the resolve of the people themselves who are fed up with the violence, they are not going to succeed.

And the last thing is the Iraqi security forces.  They have made a quantitative and qualitative improvement.  This has been not a revolutionary thing in the last year and a half or last year or six months.  It has been a steady improvement.  They are going back, particularly to the summer of 2004, when we began an all-in approach to put the resources into the Iraqi security forces so we can start to make some dramatic improvement in terms of their quantity and quality.  They are rapidly becoming one of the better militaries in the Middle East, certainly currently focused solely on internal defense and at some point, they will have to be reorganized and retrained to focus as an army on external defense. 

But nonetheless, in terms of the leadership and training and ability to do the tasks that are in front of them, they are becoming a good military force. Make no mistake about it.  And their leadership is part of the story.  Seventy-five percent of their battalions are in the lead in Iraq – something that also is underreported.  Dramatically so in the north, in the west and in the south where their numbers are overwhelming in terms of the operations that they conducted and the fact that we are in a supporting role.

Now how did this happen?  In my view, it started certainly with the presidential decision and the president and the administration deserve some credit for facing the truth.  And the truth was, from 2003 to 2006, we had a failed strategy in Iraq.  And the president faced that truth – it is not difficult to do that.  I mean it is difficult to do that and he did it and two dramatic things came as a result of that.  One was the new strategy and that new strategy was an attempt to use proven counterinsurgency practices for the first time to defeat the insurgency. 

Remember we never had it as a military mission to defeat the insurgency in the past.  We were going to train the Iraqis so they could do it – that was flawed.  The enemy took advantage of that and they increased the level of violence every single year.  We chose not to protect the people and the Iraqis could not protect the people in terms of their capabilities.  They were not ready for that. 

So the strategy was changed, and it required additional forces, which was a true counteroffensive and you all want to call it a surge and it is what it is.  It became this non-military term called the “surge” which focuses on troops but the real issue is a change of strategy.  If you gave the additional troops to the executors of the previous strategy, it would have failed – that is a fact.  So it is the change of strategy with the additional troops that has helped to produce the result.

The second thing, certainly, is the quality of the leadership, and leadership in most campaigns and wars that I'm familiar with makes a decisive difference and it made a decisive difference here.  We are talking about General Petraeus here and we are talking about Ambassador Crocker who made a major turnaround in that embassy with he and his people.  And also, fortunate for the military command, we happen to have, by a virtue of accident of assignment, General Ray Odierno who had just arrived as the operational commander in Iraq for his second tour of duty who understood what needed to be done and truly was the person who put the operational plans together with he and his leaders that unfolded over the next year and a half and are now being very capably executed by General Lloyd Austin from 18th Airborne Corps.

The other thing is the Iraqi people themselves.  They are fed up with the violence and they are willing to take risks to stop it.  You saw that in Anbar Province with the so-called Sunni awakening and in other provinces, as well.  We have seen it in the south with the Shia extremists and special groups and the Sadrist influence.

And finally, the sheer outstanding performance of U.S. forces and coalition forces and, certainly, the Iraqi forces.  All of that, taken together, has made a major difference in achieving such a turnaround in a brief period of time.  And I’ll turn this over to my colleagues and stop right there.

Danielle Pletka:  Thank you very much, Jack.

I would now like to turn to Kim, and I did not say any real words of introduction about Kim.  But I do think it is important to point out we talk a lot about results here, we talk a lot about strategy.  If ever you want to understand exactly what the ingredients were those ended up with the cake that we have now, it is Kim’s work that will lead you there.  She has written a great deal about it in the Standard but in addition, you can find on her web site, which I am hopefully flacking for her, understandingwar.org – a really excellent interactive understanding of a whole variety of operations that you see to get into the guts of just why it is that we are succeeding where we are succeeding on the ground.

So with that short introduction, Kim --.

Kimberly Kagan:  Thank you very much, Dani.

Today, I actually would like to talk about something I do not usually talk about, namely, Iraqi politics.  And it has been a truism in our Washington debate and discussion that although the surge has reduced violence in Iraq, it has not induced political progress and, therefore, it is a failure.  I do not think that that truism is true and I would like to take you through how the surge has affected Iraqi politics, what the Iraqi political situation looks like right now, and where I think it may be headed over the next six to eight months.

First, I think we need to go back to 2006 and remember what was causing the law jam within Iraqi politics.  We have a very weak prime minister, Prime Minister Maliki, who does not control his appointments to cabinet positions and so, if we think to other parliamentary-style governments, for example, to Britain, we think about a prime minister being able to appoint all of his ministers and therefore have them execute the policies that he desires to execute.  Prime Minister Maliki could not do this; that is not how the Iraqi constitution functions and in the face of increasing violence and also in the face of parliamentary opposition, Prime Minister Maliki was extremely weak and not actually able to execute policy.

By the end of November 2006, the Sadrist Trend had essentially pulled its parliamentarians out of the Council of Representatives making it impossible for legislation to pass and creating what was an insuperable roadblock to any legislative progress whatsoever because it was not possible to get a forum within the Council of Representatives once that group had withdrawn.  And so, as we really turned into the surge itself, we had the Sadrist’s Trend, the party of Muqtada al-Sadr, essentially thwarting whatever desires of Prime Minister Maliki there were and making it impossible for any legislation to get passed in addition to creating a violent environment on the ground in Baghdad. 

And we have to remember that, at that time, the Iraqi security forces were not capable of securing the population of Baghdad and they were challenged by militia groups, by sectarian-minded groups, by al Qaeda in Iraq.  And since Prime Minister Maliki not only did not have control of his security forces but did not have control of a militia, he had no way of affecting the violence on the ground any more than he did the legislation.

I will fast forward a little bit through 2007 to remind you that it was quite quickly after the surge was announced that Muqtada al-Sadr left Baghdad or Najaf or wherever he likes to hang out for Iran and it was at that time also that a number of his closest comrades were arrested by special raids in the dark that really made it less possible for him to function within Iraq and created a sort of competition among a variety of factions within the Sadrist Trend and its variant militias.  That really lasted through the summer of 2007.  Muqtada al-Sadr announced the ceasefire of his militia groups in January/February of 2007 at the beginning of the surge, reiterated that ceasefire again in August of 2007, and then again in February of 2008.

But what happened over the course of the summer of 2007 as the power of Sadr really became diminished?  And as al Qaeda in Iraq became less able to launch its spectacular attacks and thereby, intimidate the government of Iraq, was that a faintly working coalition among the leaders of political parties within Iraq began to take shape, and Prime Minister Maliki along with his Shia and Kurdish colleagues developed a mechanism for discussing legislative issues even without having a legislative process that was well underway.  And these discussions became known as the “three plus one” talks which really involved the three leading figures within Iraqi politics and cross parties, talks that began essentially in August of 2007.

And so, it is really at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, as a result of those talks among party leadership, that we began to see the legislative process in Iraq rekindled, and a variety of parliamentarians return but also a variety of political parties able to work on some of the major benchmark legislation that had been so essential to our Congress’ view of what the next political steps were inside Iraq.  Therefore, we saw the passage of legislation such as the De-Baathification law, the provincial powers law, which enable the Iraqi government to begin to function and to create a certain kind of pattern of reconciliation at the national level that is not really sort of a wonderful “Kumbaya” moment but really a series of bureaucratic obstacles overcome that might allow reconciliation in the future.

Right now in Iraq, we actually see the fruits of this benchmark legislation really generating a new level of vigorous discussion and, indeed, competition among political parties.  On the one hand, we have the rise of some new political parties, in particular, the Sawa or the awakening party that is derived from the Sunni tribal sheiks in Anbar who have essentially opposed al Qaeda within the province and worked side by side with U.S. soldiers and Iraqi security forces in order to defeat al Qaeda within the provinces.  They have formed their own political party, really concentrated in Anbar, but also spread a little bit to the north and east of that.  They are engaged in a competition with the existing Sunni political parties and in particular, the IIP - the Iraqi Islamic Party - whose leading figure right now is Tariq al-hashmi.  And we are seeing a rivalry between these two parties as they compete for different Sunni political interest.  The IIP was a party of exiles; the Sawa is a party of indigenous Iraqis.  The IIP is a party that has been focused on one segment of the Sunni population; Sawa is focused on the tribal segment of the population.

And so we are seeing not only the growth of new political parties within the Sunni movement but a competition between the old political parties and the new political parties that is likely to characterize Iraqi politics over the next year or two years.  In addition, we are seeing competition among Shia parties, particularly among Prime Minister Maliki and his Dawa Party and the party whom we abbreviate severely right now is Iski, the supreme council as it refers to itself within Iraq, and they are competing for the votes of Shia throughout Baghdad and throughout the south. 

The rivalry, I think, has been sharpened by Prime Minister Maliki’s growing strength in the light of the operations he has conducted against the militia groups in Baghdad and in Basra, and that has really paved the way for these two parties to dominate the Shia vote within the upcoming provincial elections.  And the competition is fierce.  We can see Prime Minister Maliki bidding for essentially the ability to provide services to people in Sadr City, in Basra and throughout the south as a way of strengthening his political hand.  We also see almost everywhere we go the posters of Iski and its religious figures competing with Maliki’s so-called secular Dawa Party.

In addition, we have a limited degree of flux and change within the Office of the Martyr Sadr and the Sadrist Trend as their parliamentary leaders essentially split themselves from the militia leaders and really try to find their way to some sort of safe haven so that they can continue to participate in national politics even though the Sadrist’s organization, as a whole, has been so gravely troubled and, quite frankly, almost defeated by the recent operations.  And so we see a little bit of a power struggle within the Sadrist Trend.  Those parliamentarians who now exist are facing up to the fact that they really do not have a place to be in a political infrastructure that supports them fully. 

And so they are in flux in it in a set of interesting debates amongst themselves, generated not least, by the fact that the government of Iraq has determined that parties that have militias are not permitted to run in elections and therefore, really, they have caused a degree of separation among these parties.  The OMS cannot associate itself as closely with the militias nor can the Sadrist Trend parliamentarians associate itself with the militias and we have a competition or struggle within that party.

We have a great deal of friction, as well, generated by the Kurdish parties.  I think we saw that quite clearly yesterday as our good friend, Talabani, decided that he would veto the provincial election’s legislation because it did not contain wording that suited him and the interest of the Kurdish regional government.

And finally, in addition, we see the proliferation of secular political parties and lots of independents so that there are now 502 – yes, that is right –- 502 political parties that will be competing in the upcoming provincial elections.  What does this mean and why does it matter?

First and foremost, it tells you that there is a vibrant Iraqi political life and that there is perhaps not only the political progress that we have seen in the passing of the benchmark legislation, but also a new and vibrant kind of discussion, really quite rambunctious - not neat, completely messy, quite vigorous.  And we do not actually know right now what the parameters of Iraqi politics are going to look like this time next year.

As we talk about Iraqi politics, we have to understand that those politics are in flux.  The terms of the discussion are now being set and all of the politicians in the political parties are finding their space in the political spectrum and the way in which they will function and compete with other political parties.  And so the rhetoric that we hear from Iraq’s political parties is different from what we heard before and is unusual to us, the United States, whether we hear it through the newspapers or whether our general officers or State Department folks or ambassador seize it on the ground and has to wrestle with the fact that suddenly there is a new dynamic. 

Whereas, last year, there were essentially three moving parts in the Iraqi political system and they did not really move at all.  Now, all of a sudden, we have many moving parts and it is very hard to figure out how to balance their interest with ours and how, we, the United States, should engage in this new highly political discussion within Iraq.

The second thing I will tell you is that this political competition is why Iraq’s provincial elections that one hopes be held some time at the end of this year or the very beginning of next year is so important.  On the one hand, the provincial elections are a way to enfranchise those who did not vote in the elections last time particularly the Sunni population but they are also a way of resolving some of the differences in the competition among all of these different factious groups and, also, paving the way for the national elections that will take place in 2009.

I think we have learned from past experience that our elections in Iraq are not necessarily the end of a political process but rather the beginning.  And so, as we head into these provincial elections, we have to make sure that we do not see them as simply the culmination of the surge and the new Iraqi political process but as the start of whatever Iraqi politics will look like next.  And that is why I think we have started to hear from some of our commanders on the ground that force levels in Iraq really must stay where they are through Iraq’s provincial elections, not simply to secure the elections but also to mitigate the fact that those elections will generate competition among political parties and possibly a great deal of friction when their outcomes are known because I do not actually think that free and fair elections will necessarily determine one party is the winner in the struggle but rather set the conditions for provincial elections coming up again in 2012.

And so, there is a risk that we have in these provincial elections that they will, on the one hand, cause some content among groups that had not been enfranchised before, but also may provoke a violent response from those groups that do not receive what they expect.  Therefore, it is very much in our interest – the interest of the United States and the interest of Iraq - to preserve stability through and possibly beyond the provincial elections.

I will conclude there and turn this over to Fred.

Frederick W. Kagan:  Thank you.

One of the other truisms in this debate that we are often presented with is that those of us who care about Iraq are myopically focused on Iraq and see the need to succeed in Iraq to the exclusion of every other consideration in the world and the brilliant new strategist from the other party has seen for the first time the importance of looking in other theaters in placing Iraq in its proper context.  I do not think that truism is any truer than the one that Kim identified, and I would like, therefore, to make a few points about where Iraq actually fits into the regional picture and why we need to care about this since the purpose of our engagement in Iraq is not to create this beautiful perfect jewel in Mesopotamia that exists in isolation and we can put it under museum glass and look at it.

The purpose of this is to advance our interests.  That is why America fights wars and I think that this conflict has the potential to advance our interests in the region and in the global war on terror very dramatically but only if we actually see it through to its conclusion.

One of the favorite talking points on the other side of the isle and from those who want to denigrate what has been going on in Iraq is that we have not been fighting the right enemy, that the global war on terror began when an al Qaeda group based in Afghanistan attacked us, that the al Qaeda in Iraq was not directly related to that group, and, therefore, we are fighting in the wrong theater.

You know, it is interesting when you actually have a little historical perspective.  This is not the first time in American history that that kind of accusation has been made.  The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Roosevelt got up and made a speech about the day that will live in infamy and then he immediately carried on with a previously declared policy of defeating Germany first which was very controversial at the time, actually.  And it was something that he constantly had to be worried about and he took a lot of flack frankly for the priority that he actually gave to the European theater of war.  The Germans did him a favor.  Hitler did him a favor of actually declaring war in the United States, and Saddam never quite did that although he did do us the favor of clearly violating U.N. ceasefire that have ended the 1991 Gulf War.

But this question of is this actually a distraction or not is no more valid now than it was in World War II.  Roosevelt was right.  Bush has been right to clearly identify Iraq as the theater that matters much more and I think McCain is right to do that and I think that Obama is wrong, frankly, to try to make the other argument.

We, who are concerned about Iraq, are very cognizant that Iraq is part of a larger picture.  We see it as, among other things, part of a larger picture of an Iranian attempt to defeat us and our allies throughout the Middle East and establish Iranian hegemony and it is very clear that the same Iranian leader, Qassem Suleimani, who directs Iranian proxy actions in Iraq also directs Iranian support for Hezbollah and Lebanon, also directs Iranian support for Hamas in Gaza, also directs Iranian support for Syria, also directs Iranian support for Taliban elements that are fighting us in Afghanistan.  There is a larger picture here.

So one of the questions that we have to ask ourselves is: Since no one wants to go to war with Iran, how are we going to deal with this Iranian challenge?  And if you want to start talking about regional implications and you want to start saying that Iraq really is a distraction, then you need to answer the question: How are you going to deal with an Iranian challenge at all if you start by taking what is now a tremendous setback that we have imposed with our Iraqi partners on Iran and turn it into a tremendous victory for Iran?  How does that, in any way, increase our bargaining power with Iran if you want to have negotiations with them if you think that is fruitful? 

I have never heard of a negotiating tactic that says it is a good idea to start by surrendering the thing that your negotiating partner most wants and then beginning to ask for concessions of some variety.  That is a rather strange strategy.  There is no reason to think that it will work, every reason to think that it will not and every reason to think that, in fact, failure in Iraq at this point and Iranian success in Iraq would be devastating for the region which is something that if you actually talk to other regional leaders, they make very clear as well.  They are very cognizant of the fact that about the worst thing we could possibly do right now is pull out and abandon Iraq to Iran’s not-so-tender mercies.

Now, there has been some discussion in the media about comments that Maliki has made and comments that National Security Adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie has made questioning the presence of American forces and so forth.  Most of these comments are taken out of context in the American media debate; neither Maliki nor Rubaie has endorsed the Obama plan of a strict inflexible timeline – both of them have been talking about aspirational goals. 

Now, if you go back to 2006, you would note that Maliki also was talking about getting American forces out by the middle of this year and a variety of other unreasonable goals.  I'm not sure why we should regard him as any more authoritative now than he ever has been particularly when as Kim points out all of a sudden, he is in the middle of a very heated provincial race.  If we are going to apply that principle, then I assume we need to take his ironclad from the hard commitments every single thing that Barack Obama has said in the course of this election campaign, right?  Politicians always tell you exactly what they think when they are trying to get elected.  Or not.

But we had the opportunity to have a lengthy dinner with Rubaie, among others, and we got some version of this line that he was peddling but one of the things that we have discovered when we go to Iraq is that the conversation that you have  the first 10 minutes after you sit down, where you get sort of the party line, and then there is the conversation that you have when you say, “Okay, that is very interesting.  We have the party line, thank you very much. Now, what do we actually think about this?” 

And we managed to stick with Rubaie long enough to get beyond the party line and one of the things that Rubaie said to us was, “Hey, you need to understand.  Iraq is flying west.  There is no question about that.  And Iraq needs to have a partnership with the United States because we need American assistance to maintain our independence from Iran.  We do not want to be an American staging base for war against Iran but we do not think that you want to do that either.  But we do need American assistance and we do, of course we are going to have a security partnership,” he said to us.

What we are talking about is the details of that and aspirational timelines but there is no question about whether Iraq wants to have, whether the Iraqi government wants to have a strategic partnership with us.  He also made a point that they want that partnership to go beyond a security agreement: that Iraq wants to be able to send its young people to study at American universities; it would like a visa program to support that; it would like American investment in Iraqi reconstruction. 

The notion that it is poisonous to have American companies investing in Iraq is absolutely not, in any way, the case.  It would like to have- he suggested even a sort of a religious partnership.  We should bring members of the Iraqi clerical establishment to meet with American religious leaders and sort of have a crossing the divide kind of meeting.  I cannot really imagine what the Najafi hawsa would make of the meeting with meetings with the Unitarian Church, but it would be - why not?  But the point here is that even somebody like Rubaie, who has been at the lead of making some of the most dramatically picked up comments about getting American troops out, really, in fact, recognizes that the current Iraqi state has no prospect of accomplishing anything that Iraq’s leaders want without a firm strategic partnership with the United States. 

I would like to rollback, by the way, and make one previous point which is, as we have had increasing difficulty in discussions about the status of forces agreement and so forth, it is important to recognize what was actually the starting point for the problem.  The starting point for the problem was that the Bush administration, because of the pressure of the Democratic Party, could not offer Iraq a security guarantee. 

If we had offered Iraq a security guarantee at the beginning of this conversation, I think that the treaty would be signed by now.  The problem is that because that was very much a desideratum of the Iraqi government and because we could not give that at the outset and we made it clear to them at the outset that we could not give that, now we are in the position of having entered this bargaining from a much weaker position simply because of the shortsightedness of war oppositionists who really lost sight of what America’s interest in the region actually are and are just determined to defeat the Bush administration, regardless.

One of the things, of course, that has been prominently discussed is the relative importance of Iraq versus Afghanistan.  In response to that, I would say, to begin with, look at the map.  From a geostrategic perspective, leave aside for a minute the question of where al Qaeda is - although, I’ll come back to that – look at the map and tell me which country is more important. 

Iraq is in the heart of the Middle East.  It is in the heart of the Arab world.  It sits astride the Sunni-Shia divide.  It is the only state that can reasonably serve as a bulwark and a balance against Iranian expansionism.  It has perhaps the world’s largest reserves of oil.  It is also potentially the breadbasket of the Middle East; that is what it usually has been - should be.  When you fly over the Tigris - this is Mesopotamia, this is the cradle of civilization.  We think of it as desert; when you fly over it, it is green.  This is an incredibly important country and it can play an incredibly important role in the international community.

Afghanistan is a pile of rocks.  Its principal export is opium, after that, people.  I do not want to denigrate it, it is certainly something that we need to be concerned about and it matters because we are engaged in war there.  I do not think it is acceptable for the United States to lose any war, frankly; I think we will always pay a terrible price for that.  But from a pure geostrategic perspective, it is insane to imagine that Afghanistan is in some way more important than Iraq.

Now, from the standpoint of al Qaeda, there is also a little truth problem with asserting that Afghanistan is the more important front.  First of all, the al Qaeda bases are not in Afghanistan.  The al Qaeda bases are in Pakistan, and no one has yet convincingly explained how clearing Afghanistan actually takes care of the al Qaeda problem in Pakistan other than vague references to attacking Pakistan, which, frankly, gives me the chills.  I do not feel very good about a half-cocked plan for attacking a country of 160 million people with nuclear weapons.  So that is a little bit problematic as a leap.

But, then, you also have to ignore the fact that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri and many others have long identified Iraq as the central front in al Qaeda’s war against the West.  This is where they put down their chips, and this is where they put down their markers.  And this is where they have suffered, by far, the greatest defeat in that movement’s history.  What we did in Afghanistan in 2001 was a blow to the movement.  What happened in Iraq in 2007 was a catastrophe for the movement.  It was not simply that American forces have defeated al Qaeda, which is what happened in Afghanistan, with the help of Tajiks. 

In Iraq, American forces, allied with a Sunni population that had welcomed al Qaeda, to destroy al Qaeda.  Furthermore, that Sunni population has now indicated a willingness and even a determination to continue the fight against al Qaeda even beyond Iraq’s borders.  Anbari sheiks have apparently put together a span of 32-page memo about how they want to go to Afghanistan and teach the Afghans how to do Sawa - awakening movements - like they did.

Now, let me be clear.  This is an astonishingly bad idea.  The last thing in the world that you would want to do is to have a bunch of Anbari Arabs go into Afghanistan and tell the Afghans how to do their business.  That is not going to work. 

But as a rhetorical and ideological matter in this desperate struggle against al Qaeda ideology, this is the most powerful possible message there can be because you have these Anbari sheiks who are saying, “We did not just do this because we do not want them in our country or in our village.  We did this because we reject their ideology and we want to help other people to reject their ideology because we think their ideology needs to be defeated globally.”

If you talk about a victory on the war on terror and you compare what can be accomplished by having American Special Forces troops put Hellfire missiles into the chests of terrorists in Waziristan versus what can be accomplished by having a Sunni Arab community that had welcomed al Qaeda make it clear to the world that it wants to ally with the United States in the global ideological struggle against al Qaeda, I do not understand how you can even have a conversation about the relative potential importance of those two things.  On another occasion, AEI has studied Afghanistan; we will continue to study Afghanistan as we are also increasingly studying Iran. 

We can have a conversation about what is best to do in Afghanistan; I would say briefly, I think the United States can walk and chew gum at the same time.  I think the dichotomy that people are trying to create - we need to lose in Iraq in order to win in Afghanistan - I actually think we should win both in Iraq and Afghanistan.  I think it would be a much more fruitful conversation if we could, at least, recognize that. 

And I want to just make one last comment about the question of the role that the surge has played in all of this because that has now become a prominent silly talking point.  When we were in Iraq a couple of weeks ago, we had the opportunity to meet with a very, very prominent and important Anbari sheik who was a part of the Sawa movement.  We ran a couple of ideas by him.  We said some people in America are saying that the surge really had nothing to do with the Sawa and that it developed independently and so forth.  The surge really did not matter. 

He said, and I quote, “What idiot said that?”  And we also said, “There are a lot of people who are saying that we need to draw down our forces as rapidly as possible.  We need to get out of Iraq and we need to let the Iraqis stand up on their own.  We really need to turn this over.  The Iraqis do not want us there.”  And he said, paraphrasing slightly for reasons that will appear, “The only people who can say that either belong to the enemy or are jackasses.”  He is a very colorful figure.  He is a very interesting guy; also spoke a truth that we heard a lot from people over there. 

And I think as we have gotten caught up in media swirls about McCain’s grammar, it is more important to look at the larger picture.  It is something that we are frequently accused of not doing.

Thank you for coming.

Danielle Pletka:  I’m going to open up the floor to questions.  I do want to underscore something important here.  There are some who I know, who will suggest that any discussion of who is right and who is wrong and whether or not it was the surge is just petty politicking and beneath us here.  And much as the debate after the end of the Cold War went on in a little bit of a vacuum as to whether the Soviet Union really collapsed on its own or that collapse was brought about by consistent policies of the United States and the West, it is actually rather important to understand why we win and how we win: a) there will be more of these battles ahead and not only in Iraq; but b) should we fail to understand why it is where we are and begin to remove key pieces, there is every possibility that things will reverse themselves.  It will take some efforts as General Keane very eloquently said.  It will take some effort to reverse things; on the other hand, we should not underestimate the eagerness of many inside al Qaeda, inside Iran, and elsewhere to see that reversal take place.

We have rules of the game which I know are familiar to most people here.  Please raise your hand, I will call on you, wait for a microphone, identify yourself, and I’m going to be ruthless today.  I want one question, one question only and I want it to be a question, or I will cut you off and the microphone will be taken away.  I’m sorry; there are a lot of you here.  We do not have a lot of time and I’m very eager to hear from everybody.

John, why do you not -- right in front of me here.  Thank you.

John Wolfstetter:  John Wolfstetter, senior fellow, Discovery Institute.  How vulnerable is the situation in Iraq through destabilization by a stepped-up Iranian action which the Iranians might elect to take or a strike launched at Iranian nuclear facilities?

Kimberly Kagan:  I’ll start.  The situation in Iraq is vulnerable to negative Iranian influence because Iran does not share the United States’ objectives in Iraq.  Iran has consistently behaved to make clear that it would prefer an unstable government within Iraq; one that is not able to govern its own people and one that is not able to act cogently.  It has been trying to accomplish this objective through the armed movement of weapons.  The armed movements called special groups which are latched on militia efforts and which is a group of people who receive training, funding, and weaponry from Iran.  This movement has been going on for some time, really, since 2005.  Its effects were devastating in 2006. 

The Iranians actually have an interest, regardless of what the United States does vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program in destabilizing Iraq.  The Iranians actually have some of that capability.  I would remind you that the press has reported that a number of the leaders of the militia groups and special groups left Iraq after the Sadr City operations and after the Basra operations and went to Iran.  I do not actually think that they are there just to go shopping.  I think we can ask what it is they intend to do.

Iran has also been sponsoring an assassination campaign aimed at some of the political figures who are running for office and destabilizing the provincial situation throughout the south for the purpose of seeing to it that it remains unstable and conducive to Iran’s interest. 

In addition, Iran has been pouring investment into the south to create economic dependency between southern Iraq and Iran.  Finally, and in addition, Iran has been assisting parties and players who advance the separation of Iraq into regions, particularly, a southern region that might cohere better to its political and economic interests, and secondly, those Iraqi politicians who might reject a long-term strategic agreement with the United States.  The reason why these discussions about the long-term strategic agreement really kicked off when they did is that the Iranians engaged in information operation campaign within Iraq to lure Iraqi politicians into a vigorous debate and discussions that they were not already having. 

So I grant the premise of your question that Iran can actually destabilize events in Iraq, but I do not think that it is contingent upon U.S. actions here forward except to say that if the United States were to pull out of Iraq, then the Iranian ability to influence, not only Iraq but also the region, as well as its ability to develop nuclear weapons would actually probably rise.

Jack Keane:  The only thing I would add to that is the fact that Suleimani is still in command after having had such a major setback would tell you that the supreme leader still values his judgment, probably, based on previous successes.  They are going to learn from the experience and the setback that they have had and certainly try again.  But the conditions are not favorable for them to succeed because there have been major changes in Iraq, not the least of which is the political will of the Maliki government.  They have stood up to it, and many thought they would not. 

The second is the anti-Iranian feeling in the south which is palpable when you move around and tt is a growing anti-Iranian feeling that is there among the people.  They do not want to see themselves aligned with Iran and the Persians.  They have seen the mischief that they have been up to, and they do not want to be part of that.

The other is the force levels that are in the south.  They have been increased and they are primarily Iraqi supported by U.S. and they are capable force levels.  And the last is the priority of the command itself.  Well, the al Qaeda was number one and the Sunni insurgency was certainly number two.  Remember, those are the two threats that were threatening the very existence of the state of Iraq.  Iranian influence has never been that, it is to weaken the state of Iraq.  It was not intended to threaten the regime. 

But now the intellectual capital of the command and the resources in Iraq are on this Iranian threat.  It now is a priority that it was never able to enjoy before because of the pre-eminence of the threat of al Qaeda and the pre-eminence of the threat of the Sunni insurgency.  Both were intended to change out the regime, that is, both of those are now gone and certainly the focus is on this.  I think it is going to be very, very difficult for them to get the foothold that they want.

Danielle Pletka:  Paul.

Paul Wolfowitz:  Is this on? 

Danielle Pletka:  Yes.

Paul Wolfowitz:  A small historical point.

Danielle Pletka:  Identify yourself.

Paul Wolfowitz:  Paul Wolfowitz, AEI.  Fred Kagan made the interesting observation that it was not Germany that attacked us in 1941; it was Japan.  I think you also said though, that Hitler did us a favor in declaring war on the United States.  In fact, when GIs were polled during World War II as to why we were fighting Germany when Japan had attacked us, the most common answer was, “Well, Germany declared war on us.”  The fact is, I think, on September 15, Saddam issued an open letter to the American people in which he said that September 11th was what we had coming to us and until the American people had suffered the way they made others suffer in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the way they made the Iraqi people suffer, this would continue.  It is as close as you could find to a declaration of war after September 11 by anyone, any leader of any country.

Frederick W. Kagan:  I think that is right and I think the key point is there have been a number of attempts to try to simplify what is in fact a complicated discussion, just as there were a number of attempts in World War II to try to simplify what was in fact a complicated issue.  There is the question of vengeance for who attacks you and then there is the question of actually pursuing your global geo-strategic interest in the most intelligent possible way.  Again, the issue here is very straightforward. 

Danielle Pletka:  Lost our mic, hang on a second.  Okay, who has it?  There, good work.

Andrew Gray:  I’m Andrew Gray from Reuters.  I wonder if you could address the question of troop levels.  There have been some suggestions that political positions here in Washington and in Iraq could be converging in the sense that security conditions could allow a big reduction which ends up being roughly along the timetable as Senator Obama suggests, which is roughly aligned with the idea of a time horizon now embraced by President Bush as well as Prime Minister Maliki.

Do you see significant differences in the positions remaining?

Jack Keane:  Yes.  I think there are significant issues in force reductions.  First of all, there is far too much emphasis on force reduction.  It always seemed to me the emphasis should be on the goals and objectives that you are trying to achieve in your strategy and measuring it against those.  And based on that, then, the numerator becomes your reductions, but we are where we are. 

In my mind, on the force reduction issue, clearly, I believe if you took what is in Petraeus’s mind - and I’m not suggesting I know - and our political candidates and probably Maliki and you ask them to put something on a piece of paper in terms of timing, I do not think there would be that much difference. 

The real issue is how you control reductions.  Remember, we had a failed strategy in the past that was driven by two primary variables.  One is our underestimating the enemy for three years who was able to increase the level of violence every single year.  And the second was overestimating the Iraqis’ capability to deal with that level of violence.  Those two variables were at play.  Ambassador Crocker, General Petraeus, and now General Alston, are very much aware of that and they certainly do not want to make the mistake that had been made in the past.  So they will argue and I believe, quite persuasively, that force reductions should not be arbitrary in terms of timetables, but force reductions should be subjective based on the variables of what is the enemy’s capability and also what are the Iraqis’ capabilities to mitigate our reduction.

Given the dynamic that is in Iraq, and given what changes in 90 days or 120 days or certainly in six months - it is very dramatic - it makes timetables themselves somewhat foolish to deal with in terms of the arbitrary nature of it.  So I think it is perfectly reasonable to have a discussion with the prime minister - a private one - about what we believe our realistic goals would be.  Then continue to move towards those goals, given the enemy and, also, the progress of the Iraqi security forces. 

So timetables and timelines for me in a public arena still do not make much sense, but certainly force reduction makes considerable sense given the success that we have achieved in Iraq.  We are going to reduce our forces, probably rather considerably in 2009 and also in 2010.  And we will transition the mission from one of where we are in the lead to one to where the Iraqis are in the lead and they are doing most of the counterinsurgency, and we are doing the most of the support.  That is right in front of us and we can see it.

Danielle Pletka:  If I can just grab the mic for a second, I do find it a little bit ironic.  In all these discussions about Iraqi views on our troop presence in their country, I wonder what would happen if they suggested that we should stay forever.  How would we feel about that?  Is it really up to them to decide how long and where we deploy or is it something we should decide in negotiations with them, always understanding what our national security interests are rather than what their political interests are at that particular moment?

This gentleman here had a question.

Derek Harvey:  Derek Harvey, I’m from the Pentagon.  Given your description of the impact on al Qaeda and on the Sunni insurgency and on the militias, [audio glitch] travels and observations could you [audio glitch] probably very important [audio glitch] could you address that please because I think it is key to the way forward and I appreciate your insights.

Jack Keane:  Thank you.  Colonel, retired, now Mr. Derek Harvey, the United States’ foremost intelligence analyst on the war in Iraq had it right from 2004 to the present when he was a minority of one in the early years.  It is great to see you here, Colonel Harvey.  Of course he knows the answer he has asked.  I’ll try to do justice to the answer that you know. 

But the fact of the matter is, as we all know in counterinsurgency, the use of military force is a part of that strategy but there are also a nonkinetic and nonmilitary part of that strategy that has a political and economic side to it.  Mostly what we are really talking about is helping people and that is going on rather dramatically in Iraq as the security situation improves. 

So we find our military leaders very much involved in councils at various levels, at the district and provincial levels, attending those meetings on a regular basis with their PRTs, provincial reconstruction teams, to assist in providing essential services to the Iraqis which is happening, not on any level that anybody in Iraq is satisfied with, but six months is better than what it was the previous six months.  So that consumes a lot of their energy and time in facilitating that.  And certainly, the military forces touch on the entire social fabric of life in Iraq by providing security but also facilitating the ministries’ capacity to provide services to its people.  That is in general sense what has taken place and my colleagues may have something more specific.

Frederick W. Kagan:  I would like to start by pointing out, obviously, I agree with the premise of the question and with what Jack said.  You might also ask: Why are there still forces in Bosnia; why are there still forces in Kosovo?  Why do we still have - believe it or not - a mission in the Sinai?  Why do you do that?

Part of the answer is because one of the key things that our forces do by their mere presence is to deter hostile actors who wish to re-engage the civil war, wish to re-ignite sectarian violence.  We deter them by being there.  We assure - and this is probably even more important, goes to Kim’s  point - we provide an assurance to local populations that they can participate in the political process and that it will not revert quickly to the law of the jungle.  If you ask most Iraqis on the street, what are the forces that you trust most to be there, to be nonpartisan, to be objective, to protect you, the answer increasingly that you get now is the U.S., number one - not the coalition by the way.  This is another point that is lost on our friends who want to talk about the failures of multilateralism. 

The Iraqis are not interested in partnership with NATO.  The Iraqis are not interested in U.N. presence or sanctions.  The Iraqis are not interested in having Brits or Poles or Romanians or Japanese or anyone else there.  The Iraqis trust us and that is something else that has been very much lost in this discussion.  And they very much want a bilateral relationship with us and this is on the ground too.  Local Iraqis will say we trust the American Army; number two, is we trust the Iraqi army. 

And one of the reasons for that is because one of the things that our forces do is to provide essential support, not just training, but support to the Iraqi army.  There again, we play multiple roles.  We play a role also as role models.  It has gotten almost comical sometimes.  You will see Iraqi soldiers wearing every piece of equipment that American troops might ever have even when it is not appropriate.  They will go into meetings with the knee pads and the elbow pads and the night vision goggles and say, “Okay guys, at ease.” 

But they want to be like Mike; in this case, they want to be like Joe.  They want to be like our American soldiers and we set role models.  One of the most important ways in which we do that is ethically.  You do not see Iraqi units committing atrocities in the presence of American forces because they - and this has long been true - because they understand that we will not tolerate it.  And that kind of mentorship and presence is also important and helps build trust in locals in that.  And I could go on and on and on.

If we could get out of the trope of the mission in Iraq is to get American forces out as rapidly as possible and recognize that the mission is to pursue our interest which include traditional peacekeeping, which is one of the roles we have shifted into.  And then you say, “How long do you that and do you pull out the peacekeepers the minute the last bullet has landed,” then it becomes more intelligible too.

Kimberly Kagan:  I would like to make a comment on that subject too.  For those of us who have travelled in Iraq and been able to go places as diverse as West Baghdad and East Baghdad, West Mosul and East Mosul, and down into Basra, we can see that where the surge forces actually were and acting in conjunctions with the Iraqi forces in the ring right around Baghdad out to Anbar and just to the south.  In that area of central Iraq where our troops were, we have a great deal of economic development, political prosperity, a great deal of economic and social fabric being developed where there was none. 

As you go further out towards Mosul in the north or down south to Basra where the number of American troops got fewer and fewer, you will see a greater degree of poverty, a greater degree of conflict among parties, among ethnicities, among sects, and you see a greater degree of need for reconstruction, not simply in order to alleviate the economic problems of the Iraqi people but actually to ensure that neither al Qaeda in Iraq nor Sunni insurgents, nor former Baathist elements, nor Shia militia groups actually have the ability to regain their influence over the population. 

Right now, there is a race between the government of Iraq and the militia groups, in particular in the south, to provide services to the Iraqi people and the United States has, for now, taken the position, “That is an Iraqi problem and it has an Iraqi solution.”  That is to say, the government of Iraq must provide the funds, the troops, the wherewithal to reconstruct Basra, to reconstruct al-Hamra and to reconstruct Mosul in order to see to it that the militias do not return or that the Sunni insurgents do not return.

I tell you, it is in the United States’ national interest to prevent those militias and those insurgents from returning and providing services that will in some way wean the Iraqi people away from the government.  We have spent a year and a half now working hard to see to it that the people of Iraq supported the government and we have created that in the center, but it is at risk in the peripheries.  And so I think that we have to remember that U.S. forces serve not only to secure an area, but also to ensure that it remains secure over time by this kind of political and economic development.  And as our forces move further and further out of Baghdad into these areas, they really bring with them the ability for the United States to achieve its long-term objectives - not just reduce violence.

Danielle Pletka:  We are going to move into the cliff notes version of our event because we are going over time.  I do not want to cut everybody off.  Although, if people do need to leave, please obviously feel free to go out by the back. 

I have a number of hands up, I am not blind, I promise.  This gentleman, then I have one gentleman at the back and then we are going to go back there. 

John Mulligan:  I’m John Mulligan from the Providence Journal.  In as much as some political leaders prescribe troop reductions or mission change as a method of pressure on the Iraqi government to bring reconciliation, how do you reconcile your picture of political progress with the lack so far of a deal on the future of Kirkuk, a deal on oil, a deal to run the elections, and so forth?

Danielle Pletka:  And Fred, could you also tell us why we have no appropriations bills in the Congress when you answer that question?

Frederick W. Kagan:  Yes.  No, that is exactly where I was going to go with that.  I mean if your standard is perfection, I guarantee you it will not be met in Iraq, but I also guarantee you it will not be met in Washington either. 

It would be curious to put the legislative achievements of the Iraqi Council of Representatives over the past 18 months against the legislative achievements of the American Congress.  Actually, I think I am sure about where that comes out, at least if you look at number of laws of significance and significant controversy that actually passed either one of these things.  The Iraqis did pass an amnesty law in the midst of an insurgency and it is being implemented.  Fitfully granted.  But it is being implemented.  The Iraqis did pass a law reversing part of the de-Baathification process which was incredibly controversial.  Think about it, the government passed a law letting former Baathists into the government in greater numbers even as it was continuing to fight an active Baathist insurgency. 

I do not see the American Congress doing anything remotely like that.  I noticed that we were able to take care of immigration reform without any problem.  I noticed that we have also got Social Security and Welfare and Medicare all taken care off.  I mean there is this mean that anything that the Iraqis do not actually accomplish is evidence that nothing is happening.  But I have to say I think we have to shutdown Capitol Hill if that was going to be our standard here.

Thom Shanker:  Thom Shanker from the New York Times.  I want to return to the troop level question.  Putting aside timetables and horizons, General Keane, you briefly described a concept for what the legacy of American forces would look like.  What is your best military assessment about what the enduring American troop levels should be - the breakdown for kinetic counterterrorism versus combat support, service support and training?  Thank you.

Jack Keane:  Yes.  I’m not going to discuss numbers because I’m not competent to discuss the numbers but in terms of the numbers required for the various functions.  I think it is easy to conceptually see the framework that is there.  Currently, we have a heavy combat support presence.  We share a role with Iraqis in administering to that combat role and that role has begun its transition in 2008 and will continue dramatically in 2009 for sure.  Somewhere between 2009 or 2010, it will dramatically shift to where that mission I think will be subordinate to the Iraqis being responsible for that mission, and we will be in a support role with some combat forces and we will continue the training role and we will also continue the enablers and logistics. 

I think as one of the things the Iraqis want to do, the level of violence will come down rather dramatically over that period of time, in my view, where casualties are no longer an issue.  Then the role of the U.S. forces are more akin to the role that we have had in other countries where there is more of a permissive environment, and we will see that role manifest where the premier role will be one of training the Iraqis.  As I mentioned before, the Iraqis want us to transition them from a force that is capable of internal defense to one that is capable of defending the nation state against its neighbors.

There have been two external threats here, obviously, one from al Qaeda and one from Iran in terms of a kind of terrorist insurgency plot, but they know they need a conventional military and they do not have it.  They want us to assist in the training of that, and I think that is a long-term relationship with them which would not require a lot of forces to do.  It certainly would require some support troops for us to do that and then obviously the trainers themselves.

That probably does not answer your question, Tom, because I do not want to get at the numbers.  I’m not capable of talking about what those numbers would be represented by those functions.  And all of that is rheostat [sounds like]. It is, as I said before, based on the conditions and those conditions being driven by the enemy and also by the Iraqis’ capability to absorb our reduction.

Danielle Pletka:  I’m only going to take one more question because you are going to hear my stomach growling otherwise.  So selfishly, this gentleman in the far back and then let me encourage people to come forward and try and ask whatever else remains privately.

Frederick A. Peterson, III:  Frederick Peterson, from the U.S. Freedom Foundation.  I would like to ask the panel a question near and dear to all of our wallets right now and that is your assessment of the current state of the oil development infrastructure in Iraq and its ability to sustain in terms of production and refinement that economy and assist us in helping to afford our very worthwhile enterprise, I believe, there.  Thank you. 

Frederick W. Kagan:  If by that you mean should we get the Iraqis to pay us for the occupation - no.  That idea was floated by Democrats on the Hill and it is an amazingly bad one.  If you mean if we stay with the success in Iraq, will we reap the economic benefits of a greater Iraqi oil production put into the international market?  The answer is yes -- hell, yes. 

We already are seeing some of that, frankly.  The Iraqis are not stupid people.  They know that they are sitting on a vast pool of oil and lots of bubbles of natural gas.  Now that they are not hindered by the lunatic dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, which really did not care very much about how much oil money he got as long as he got enough to take care of himself in the style to which he had become accustomed, they are very vigorously drilling, building, looking for investment to refurbish the infrastructure that Saddam had let collapse.  It was tremendously unfortunate in this regard that a number of American congressmen, for reasons that surpass understanding, intervened in short-term maintenance contracts that the Iraqis were about to sign with Exxon Mobile and a number of American companies, thereby, setting this process back by about a year and delaying the timeframe in which we could have more Iraqi oil come on line. 

Depending on who you talk to in Iraq, estimates are that Iraq might actually have the largest oil reserves in the world, larger than Saudi Arabia.  Other experts question that; I do not know.  What is unquestionable is that they have phenomenal reserves and they have the ability and the willingness to put a lot more oil in the market which would absolutely benefit us.  They have the desire to do that. 

Now the question is, first of all they cannot do that unless security is maintained.  That is one thing that we need to factor in here.  They also cannot do that if we are going to continue to get into this business of just trying to defeat anything that the Bush administration does or anything that we do to help them just for the purpose of defeating it.  I think you might want to recognize that we actually have a national interest in helping the Iraqis do this.  We should give them the assistance they asked for and that might move us along here.

Danielle Pletka:  Let me thank our panel and our audience for a wonderful discussion and a lively one at that.  We will see you next time.  Thank you.

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