April 2007
Can Post-Conflict Administrations Work? Lessons from the Coalition Provisional Authority
The mixed performance of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq in 2003-04 has been documented in great detail. Do United Nations administrations work better? What is the best possible outcome that can be hoped for in any such stabilization and reconstruction effort? What might the international community do differently in future post-conflict administrations? What lessons can we learn from Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and the more distant past?
At this AEI event, panelists Kimberly Marten, author of Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past; Michael Rubin, author of Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos; and Rory Stewart, author of The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq explored these and other questions. AEI's Mauro De Lorenzo moderated the April 18 event.
Rory Stewart
Turquoise Mountain Foundation
Though many people assume that the problems facing Iraq resulted from the coalition's deployment of its "B-team," intervention was likely to fail from the beginning for structural and institutional reasons. Tactical mistakes notwithstanding, the reconstruction phase has failed because of the makeup of the coalition and Iraqi people--the problem is more ideological than it is strategic.
The CPA arrived in Iraq without a good model. While it had planned for a post-conflict phase, its strategies were unachievable and unrealistic. It was mostly composed of soldiers, development workers, and diplomats--people not equipped to handle the day-to-day job of rebuilding Iraq. Rebuilding required dealing with individual Iraqis on issues such as job allocation.
The fabric of Iraqi society also presented the CPA with a challenge: in rural areas, it was hard to distinguish those individuals who were in charge from those who wanted to be in charge. None of the Iraqi tribal leaders wanted to claim leadership for a particular province and thus assume political responsibility. It was difficult to gain the consent and trust of the local population, as citizens did not give CPA officials the benefit of the doubt. This devolution of power contrasted with the centralization of authority under Saddam Hussein.
Michael Rubin
AEI
Two key Iraq war debates which have not been resolved are the declassification of documents and whether the U.S.-led coalition should have used its leverage before the war to extract concessions or whether it would have had more influence after the invasion if there were more "boots on the ground."
Another key issue was the declaration of occupation, which became a major problem after Baghdad's fall and the establishment CPA. For diplomatic reasons, the United States agreed to define the CPA as an occupying power, but this declaration automatically transformed Iraqi allies into "collaborators."
In an attempt to break out of the bubble, some have suggested the creation of an occupation and reconstruction corps. While this force would be assigned to oversee post-conflict situations, no consensus has emerged over who should lead it. Provincial reconstruction teams should be overhauled so as to find the balance between accountability and quick reactions to developments on the ground. Finally, it is also important how one measures success. To date, using the allocation of funds as the metric for success has failed.
Kimberly Marten
Barnard College, Columbia University
Failure in Iraq was inevitable because liberal democracies do not carry out complex military occupations very well. The United States' goals and techniques in Iraq are not unique; rather, they are quite similar to the United Nations-authorized peacekeeping operations of the 1990s. Liberal democratic states cannot impose political change on others with liberal democratic methods.
U.S. peace operations resemble previous imperialist efforts because they assume that peace comes from tolerance and the presence of liberal democracies. While power-sharing governments are often formed in these operations, they require a military presence for reinforcement. The United States has learned from its experiences in Haiti and East Timor that using a limited number of troops for a short period of time will not work and that liberal democracies lack the political will to stay involved long enough to create a democratic society. Thus, there is an ongoing debate over how to balance national interest with respect for human rights.
There is no overall consistency among the political changes these operations seek to effect. Trying to impose liberal democracy nondemocratically and enforcing tolerance--as attempted in Bosnia and Kosovo--will not work. Post-conflict administrations send a mixed message to occupied countries when such inconsistencies are not reconciled. If these countries are to have ownership of their political systems, it should not be on the international community's terms.
The U.S. government should not engage in regime change without a careful consideration of its unintended consequences. It must reflect on past lessons and use force to provide security when necessary.
AEI intern Jasmin Niku prepared this summary.
