September 2007

"No Middle Way": Two Reports on Iraq

Prior to General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker providing an assessment of President George W. Bush’s strategy in Iraq, AEI held a conference to analyze the implications of their forthcoming reports.

Special remarks were delivered by Lindsey Graham, Republican senator from South Carolina, who recently returned from a trip to Iraq. His comments were followed by two panels which discussed the state of Iraq and the political climate in Washington.

On the first panel, AEI resident scholar Frederick W. Kagan was joined by former acting Army chief of staff General Jack Keane and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution. They outlined impressions of Iraq gained from recent visits, and commented on the likelihood of future developments.

The second panel featured the release of No Middle Way, a new AEI report authored by Kagan. It evaluated the feasibility of a proposal from the Center for a New American Security’s (CNAS) June 2007 report entitled Phased Transition: A Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq. James Miller, a defense analyst and coauthor of the CNAS report, provided a response. 

Special Remarks

The Honorable Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.)
U.S. Senate

By engaging the enemy on new terms, morale among U.S. forces is sky high, but this trend is not immediately visible to those viewing events from afar. By creating a new military model, the United States had seized the moment at a time when al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had overplayed its hand. Having turned a corner in Iraq, any political intervention by Washington to undermine the new strategy.

The situation in Iraq is the first test of wills in a global struggle, and the U.S. presence is not responsible for attracting al Qaeda to Iraq. Instead, it was the steps the Iraqi people were taking to free themselves of repressive elements that made them targets of aggression. Police recruitment of Sunnis in Anbar province is growing, rising from 1,000 in 2006 to over 12,000 in 2007. Political reconciliation will continue in coming weeks and months, due to the success of the surge strategy. The recommendations of General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker need to be heeded.

Panel I

General Jack Keane
U.S. Army (retired)

The logic behind the surge strategy responds to the violence of 2006. The counteroffensive had been designed to last for twelve to eighteen months, but remarkable progress has been made in just a few months. Much greater security has been achieved, with violence down by 75 percent in some areas. While U.S. troops have suffered higher casualties, this is reflective of past counteroffensives such as those at Normandy and Incheon, and the rate at which American troops are being killed or injured is starting to decline. The results of better security include thriving markets, open schools, and working hospitals. However, the lack of essential services ensures that more needed to be done.

Insurgents are being defeated in Anbar and Diyala provinces, where local tribes are supporting American efforts. This is essential, given the need for moderate support in the fight against radical Islam and al Qaeda around the world. AQI has been unable to provoke Shia attacks in the way that it had throughout 2006, and the incorporation of 30,000 formerly hostile Sunnis into a constructive effort to root out insurgents has been positive. Sunni Iraqis are abandoning the unrealistic hope of reasserting dominance in Iraq and and now seeking to play a role in a national government. It is essential that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki win Sunni support through the distribution of government funds and through including Sunnis in increasingly effective security forces.

But more work needs to be done, including dissolving a broken police force. Moqtada al-Sadr’s new ceasefire is tenuous, and the likelihood of rapid political reconciliation is not high. U.S. forces must stay in Iraq to allow political leaders more time to achieve reconciliation.

Michael O’Hanlon
Brookings Institution

One must allow the legitimacy of questioning whether the success of the surge has been sufficient to maintain an American presence, but there has been military progress. The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) recent report should have focused on progress towards benchmark aims rather than their attainment. The GAO has not made a good enough effort to document sectarian violence, which have fallen to 2004 levels.

There is currently flexibility in the Iraqi political system. A greater degree of regional autonomy could help ease political reconciliation, as could international mediation of Iraq’s factional politics. U.S. troops are needed beyond the Green Zone, and it is impossible to withdraw them rapidly due to logistical difficulties.

Frederick W. Kagan
AEI

One simply cannot deny that progress has been made in Iraq. An influx of more troops and a new strategy are responsible for providing security in Anbar and Diyala. The stabilization of all of central Iraq is now a genuine possibility, and Sunni groups have finally accepted that they would have a reduced role in postwar Iraqi politics.

Criticism of the Bush administration for moving the goalposts of reporting on the success of the surge is misplaced. Continuous reevaluation of tactical priorities is natural in warfare. The GAO benchmarks were drafted in 2006, making them less relevant than has been widely reported. Many of the political benchmarks are being met in practice, with only the authorizing legislation lagging behind. Yet the security gains made in Iraq are tentative. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are unable to maintain them without U.S. support. For that reason, America’s strategic options are stark, with no middle way possible between full withdrawal and perseverance with the present strategy.

Panel II

Frederick W. Kagan
AEI

AEI prepared a detailed response to the CNAS report, Phased Transition, because CNAS had made a thorough attempt to chart a new course for American policy in Iraq The AEI report (No Middle Way) is aimed at providing an objective military analysis.

It is simply impossible for the United States to draw down to a troop presence 60,000 as the CNAS report suggests, for Iraqi forces rely on American logistical support. Although built for fighting, the ISF do not yet have the independent logistical backbone necessary to fight on their own. Arbitrary timelines would limit the flexibility of military commanders to pursue objectives. "Soft" timelines and targets, too, are not helpful, as these often become thought of as more stringent timelines. The ISF will be able to take control of security matters eventually, but they are not able to do so now.

James Miller
CNAS

The purpose of the strategy recommended in Phased Transition is to withdraw as many troops as possible while leaving sufficient forces to prevent an al Qaeda stronghold in Iraq, a regional war, or genocide. Sixty thousand troops is merely an estimate; the transition strategy can accommodate variations should circumstances demand them. A rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is not in America’s interest. There are, however, insufficient resources to maintain the surge. If the surge is indeed working as claimed, it makes sense to begin withdrawal. While President Bush seems dedicated to continuing the surge, it would be a mistake not to focus more heavily on training Iraqi forces. The Bush administration does not having a detailed long-term plan.

AEI intern Timothy J. Stafford prepared this summary.