February 2008
In February 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates traveled to India to discuss a bilateral defense relationship that has undergone much change in recent years. Since 2002, U.S.-Indian military exercises have expanded rapidly, resulting in unprecedented military cooperation and an increased ability to carry out joint operations. Moreover, India recently decided to purchase six C-130J military transport aircraft from the United States, an indication that Delhi may be looking to supply its forces with equipment that is more interoperable with the American military. How can Washington and Delhi capitalize on this rapidly expanding defense relationship? Will the United States and India ever develop a serious defense-industrial partnership? Can U.S.-Indian defense relations continue to flourish, even if a 2005 agreement to allow civilian nuclear cooperation falls through? These and other issues pertaining to the new U.S.-Indian defense relationship were discussed by Lisa Curtis, senior research fellow at the Asia Center of the Heritage Foundation; Timothy D. Hoyt, professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College; and Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. AEI research fellow Christopher Griffin moderated the panel, which was held on February 26, 2008.
Ashley J. Tellis
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Before 2001, and especially after India's nuclear tests in 1998, the U.S.-Indian defense relationship was fraught with uncertainty. By 2004, largely because of the Bush administration, the relationship had much improved. The Bush administration now seeks a consolidation of these improvements and normalization of the bilateral relationship.
There are five distinct aspects to the U.S.-Indian defense relationship: military-to-military ties, defense trade, defense-industrial cooperation, technological development, and joint operations. There has been improvement in all five areas, but it has not been uniform. The most impressive gains have come in the area of military-to-military ties, in which India does not hesitate to cooperate with the United States. This is in stark contrast to India's relationship with the former Soviet Union, which was geographically close but shared no direct military-to-military ties with India.
India is still in the midst of taking its first steps toward greater defense-industrial cooperation with the United States, but the future is bright in this area, as evidenced by its recent purchase of American C-130J aircraft. India has turned to the United States for assistance in technological development and has signaled that it wishes to be a provider of high technology to others. There have also been small but significant advances in joint operations with the United States, such as successful deployment of emergency personnel during the 2004 tsunami.
Impediments to consolidating the U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship on the Indian side include coalition politics, the unwieldy Indian bureaucracy, and lack of personnel dealing with the most important foreign policy issues within the Indian government. On the U.S. side, obsolete regulations with respect to how technologies are transferred and a begrudging willingness to move towards a full partnership with India can stall a quick agreement on the terms of the new relationship. However, the future of U.S.-Indian relations is promising.
Lisa Curtis
Heritage Foundation
Secretary Gates's visit to India is practically and symbolically important. Symbolically, it reflects a change in perceptions of the United States in South Asia. Practically, it can help solidify trade and military relations. Relations with India started to improve in the 1990s, but it was under the Bush administration that a substantive shift occurred. While there is still debate within Indian strategic and defense circles over U.S. engagement, new, influential thinkers are emerging who support greater ties with America.
Without a strong military-to-military relationship and healthy defense trade, the U.S.-Indian relationship will lack substance and depth. The Indian military market is one of the fastest growing in the world. India has long relied on Russia for its needs, but the United States has a comparative advantage in this field. While the 2005 Civil-Nuclear Agreement helped boost confidence, we still have far to go.
U.S. support of Indian missile defense signifies confidence in the military relationship. It is now seen as a pillar of the strategic relationship. Leftist pressures have slowed negotiations with the United States over the Civil-Nuclear Deal, but top levels of the Indian government have remained committed to it. Rejection of the deal would be a setback for India's reputation as a world player, as well as for the bilateral relationship.
Timothy D. Hoyt
Naval War College
India sees its defense environment as littered with threats: an emerging China, a hostile Pakistan, internal security concerns, underdeveloped maritime capabilities, and nuclear proliferation dangers. However, important opportunities have emerged within this environment, including rapid economic growth (which has allowed for greater real defense spending); the end of Cold War strategic dilemmas; and a transformed relationship with America characterized by greater domestic interaction, growing economic links, and a new strategic partnership.
Trends in India's defense budget show that it is increasingly interested in power projection capabilities and high technology. These new priorities conflict with historic ones such as acquiring technology from multiple sources, fostering state-run domestic production, promoting indigenous research, development and production, and weakening the private sector. Indian reform is necessary for significant improvement. The 2007 Raksha Udyog Ratnas (defense-industry status) program hints at the beginning of this reform.
India's new security environment places great emphasis on soft power. It wants new international partnerships and greater domestic security. Economic improvements have made India more receptive to private industry and foreign investment. These developments bode well for the U.S.-Indian relationship. Elements of Indian leadership and society, however, still distrust the United States because of its support of Pakistan and its nuclear sanctions. India is likely to continue to assert its sovereignty in matters of technology acquisition. A complicated budget process, underdeveloped relationships between the military and private firms, and limited Indian capacity to engage with the United States mean that transformation of the U.S.-Indian bilateral relationship will take place on Indian terms, not on our own.
AEI intern John O'Trakoun prepared this summary.
