American Enterprise Institute

May 12, 2008

[Edited transcript from audio tapes]

11:45 a.m.	Registration and Luncheon
12:00 p.m.	Speaker:	Edward Pietrzyk, ambassador of Poland to Iraq
12:30	Discussants:	Captain Ann Gildroy, U.S. Marine Corps
		Frederick W. Kagan, AEI
	Moderator:	Gary J. Schmitt, AEI
2:00	Adjournment

Proceedings:

 Gary Schmitt:  Please go ahead and continue eating, but we’re going to start the session right now.  First of all, welcome to AEI.  And on this beautiful spring day, if this goes on for another 35 days then get your arks ready.  Today’s session, address, and panels, is on the topic of Poland’s mission in Iraq.  My name is Gary Schmitt, and I’m a resident scholar here at AEI and Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies. 

Our format will be pretty simple.  We’ll begin today with remarks by our guest of honor, Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk, who will, as the title for today’s session indicates, take us through a review of Poland’s mission in Iraq as its five years of deployment there comes to an end this fall.  The key questions that the Ambassador will be addressing are:  What has the multinational effort in Iraq Central South, which Poland has led since the very beginning, accomplished; what have been the lessons learned from Poland’s perspective about stabilization efforts, about counterinsurgency warfare, about coalition operations, at one time M&D Central South had, I think, more than a dozen militaries and countries involved in that operation; and, of course, what are the lessons learned with working with our always cooperative and deferential U.S. military and State Department?  I’m sure he’ll be, now that he’s a diplomat I’m sure he’ll be diplomatic, but, please, press him on those questions as well. 

These, of course, are not just matters of historical interest.  These questions still matter. The answers to these questions still matter.  Poland will be adding more troops and taking up new responsibilities in Afghanistan in the months ahead, so, again, these answers to these questions, the lessons learned from Iraq, are extremely important not only for Iraq but for events in Afghanistan as we move forward in the years ahead. 

 After the Ambassador’s remarks, we will then have a panel discussion with the Ambassador, Marine Corps Captain Ann Gildroy, who has served in Iraq in precisely that area that Poland’s forces have been in, and our own AEI scholar, Fred Kagan. 

 You have in front of you, of course, or, you should have, the Ambassador’s biographical information.  Before taking up his current post as Ambassador of Iraq, the Ambassador had a distinguished career in Poland’s military, rising to the rank of Lieutenant General, and holding such key posts as Chief of Operations on the Polish General Staff, and Commander of all of Poland’s land forces in the earlier part of this decade.  He also has a distinction of graduating from what I believe might have been one of the last classes at the Academy of the General Staff of the former Soviet Union in 1990, and then our own National War College in 1998.  I won’t embarrass him by asking which of the two academies was the tougher. 

And, finally, I must say, on a personal note, the Ambassador is a man of remarkable courage.  His convoy was attacked last fall in Iraq.  He, himself, was severely wounded, and there was a grave danger of losing him.  He recovered, then insisted on returning to Iraq.  He’s a man of remarkable experience and courage.  Ambassador, the podium is yours!  [Applause]. 

 Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  Good afternoon.  This is an extremely good day for me, because, as you mentioned, I use my five percent opportunity to be still alive.  That’s quite good, quite good to be here, quite good to enjoy the ride.  I tell you this, you know, I am telling this not because to impress you, just, it’s necessarily because this looks so ugly, the bombing is not easy to carry. 

I tell you this, I am always, when I am in United States, I am always stressing that I was reborn twice.  Twice!  This is done with connection you said about my Moscow careers, and, Warsaw pact and Leningrad, by the way, also, after academia, and National Defense University.  After being here in ’97, class of ’98, at the War College National Defense University, always I stress I was really bored because this new world I participate here was totally different.  No one insisted for me to memorize something, just, what do you think about this, what is your personal opinion about this.  It was something new breath for me. 

After graduating from this famous university, I had privilege to work together with the Germans and Danish people to establish Multinational Corps in the Polish soil in Szczecin and, in the meantime, I had a very good and very close cooperation with American commanders in Europe.  It helped me a lot because I came after being trained here at Ft. McNair, and after experience with the Multinational Corps I was sure that it’s necessary to change almost everything in the land forces. 

I got this opportunity in 2000.  I remember the first action was to withdraw and destroy all 1,000 tanks - T-55.  The future Minister of Defense at this time, Jerzy Szmajdziński, he said, being in Wroclow this time, when I will come to Warsaw, and I will become the Minister of Defense, I will kick out General Pietrzyk because of lower [indiscernible] tanks and because of the T-55s he has destroyed. 

But, he was an intelligent man, after he came to Warsaw I explained him everything, and, why I am talking this?  I am talking this because very soon, after 2000, 2001, 2002, it came 2003, and I cannot imagine Polish armed forces, Polish army, Polish troops to go together with our American friends to Iraq having still 1,000 tanks T-55, almost 1,000 Howitzer, how we say, 122 millimeters and so on, so on.  We were able to say to our superiors, yes, we can do this, we can participate, despite we didn’t have this time, even the modern armored vehicles.  But, we did. 

That means, from this time, I remember, I told that the mission I got from my President, from my Minister of Defense this time, was both a challenge and opportunity as well.  Challenge because lack of equipment, the proper equipment, challenge because I didn’t have an idea, even imagination, how to act in such an environment like in Iraq.  The Poland, Polish troops, we took part in the United Nation mission from ’53-54, but it was never such a serious challenge like this time. 

It was far away from our homeland, 5,000 kilometers.  It was, last time the Polish troops acted 5,000 to, or maybe less, kilometers from their homeland was 16th, 17th century.  It was really a challenge for us.  The most important question I ask my superiors this time, Sir, what does it mean to stabilize a situation in Iraq?  Probably, until now, nobody has the correct answer for this question, but it was really, really challenge.  What to do, how to do, especially if you have received the rules of engagement for your soldiers, for your troops, totally different than you apply for training careers.

But, together with challenge, it was also the great opportunity to act together with Americans.  2003, that means not everyone among commanders, especially young commanders, was able to communicate in English, despite we’re obliged to speak English because of the common NATO language, and so on, common procedures. But, in reality…it was good University, by the way… because, we used our chance, after more than five years, today, I can say, yes, I can confer, yes, but this is my personal opinion, we, the Polish Armed Forces, want our chance.  In terms of equipment we change almost everything. 

You know, I discussed previously with my partners, I ask some time in 2003 my young platoon leaders, company commanders, what do you think, why the brigades are acting during dark time, during night time?  This time, it seemed to me that my young colleagues do not understand me.  Their answers were, like, maybe they are not so correct because it’s better to act during day time, not dark time, and so on.  But, only after being in Iraq one, second, third tour, they recognize what does it mean being able to act successfully during dark time. 

But, you need the proper equipment for this.  That means, in terms of equipment, things are looking up - new armored vehicles.  We got.  We have them.  Probably one of the best now.  It’s proved itself in Afghanistan with its minefields, individual soldier’s equipment.  Traditionally, the legacy from the Soviet system, we neglected, not only young commanders, but also the individual soldier equipment.  Only Iraq proved that it’s necessary to invest exactly young commanders, individual soldier’s equipment, in every parameters. 

You know, tradition was that, I mean, I’m still, I’m talking about 2003, something like this, tradition was that, who is right?  Always senior officer, not the junior officer.  Iraq has changed this.  Now, no one will discuss that in Poland, the platoon commander, section commander, all those leaders on the lowest level, they were extremely important, and the training for individual soldiers extremely important for the success of operation. 

That is reason that mine lessons, after Iraq, will learn, is to make as soon as possible the fully provisional army.  This army is underway, now.  We are going to have this fully provisional army, maybe 2009, 2010, that means quite, quite, quite soon.  It will cost us a lot, no doubt, but we realize it’s necessary to do this way. 

Without having this experience from Iraq, more than five years, by the way, from the very beginning with you, without having this experience it will be impossible for us to say, yes, and to go to Afghanistan to take some primary [sounds like] responsibility. 

Sorry, I am looking how many minutes I have.  From the very beginning of having the new position, new post here, I’m not diplomat, sorry, I’m soldier. 

Gary Schmitt:  I didn’t mean to insult you, sorry. 

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  The very first time in my life, after being in Baghdad with new mission, and during preparatory to this mission I had enough time at the very end of career to think, because, you ask a commander, mostly are acting, because, something could happen you should react and so on and so on.  I realize that sooner or later we should withdraw our troops from Iraq.  It could have happened 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and so on. 

The political decision was made that this will be the end of October this year.  And what after, I ask myself?  What after?  Our soldiers acted there five years, and something.  After they will leave out, maybe one week, maybe two, maybe three, some of them, among local population we will remember, some Poles with the names very impossible to say, they have been here.  Bluanda [phonetic] has been here. 

But, what after?  I suggested to my superiors, and they accepted my idea, just to replace the military activity, military presence there in the Diwaniyah province by economical one.  I started this preparatory work last year, but, for some months I was excluding all these activities, and from the very beginning I started again the mid of December last year I came back from Warsaw, I met several times with local governor, with local businessmen, and I realized they are looking for having really close ties in terms of business.  That means their idea to replace military by economical activities now became possible. 

I have been, last month, 24 until the 1st of May, with some businessmen from Poland.  They had enough courage to join me, because, you know, if you are looking on our TV, or newspaper, the news from Iraq is always only via bloodshed, via something have happened, if I have received some phones from Warsaw, they distract you, Sir, or not, something like this.  But those guys who came to the Diwaniyah, they realized and they recognized it’s necessary to join with their money, with their abilities, to these problems.  And it really facilitate, I suppose, and cover with terms of security the last moments of our being there, and maybe in future it will be really memory about our being there.

What they need in the Diwaniyah province, this is very poor province, by the way, but, local governor for investment for this year, at least he has informed me, has received from the central government $250 billion.  That’s quite a lot.  This is poor province, but, at this time, this province needs everything in every culture.  They are buying from Iran, tractors, for $75,000, with quality rather like 20-25 years ago, let’s say.  Turkey has provided, to, via our [indiscernible], the tractors for $56,000. 

Why?  Don’t build factory there.  We can do this.  And they are looking forward.  That means, construction, for example.  Everything will just connect with construction, including materials, cement, and so on, so on, we can provide.  They are looking for this.  I hope, I hope, that this mission, with this replacement by the activities different people without weapons will play successful role. 

It’s the first time for me, I didn’t offer some weapons, some new armaments, some new procurement.  No.  I said this is full of civilian people, they have only money, and the experience help to make business.  And, maybe next month, around the 15th of June, the delegation from the province will come to Warsaw, and it will be under umbrella of our Minister of Agriculture, maybe some contracts will be made. 

This is time close, but, one thing I should mention this, because of this, this is, I reborn the second time.  This is the State Department printing, magazine.  This is the group of people I invited to my residence, new residence in Green Zone, 20 people, of January, 17 Blackwater members came to my residence, and among plus to them, General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker as well.  I was so proud that such a simple, very nice people helped me in the proper 15 minutes to have the support needed to be here. 

My Minister of Foreign Affairs offered to every one of them the Letter of Appreciation, and Minister of Defense, some medal of Polish armed forces, which is designated only for the foreign soldiers.  That means that this very evening, 20 people, January, was memorized very well by me, and I hope by them, also, because some of them, until now, they sent, amazed to me, Don Laguna [phonetic], for example, this man who picked me up to his small chopper, and this is my tribute, in this audience, to those guys, without uniforms, without proudness, but with great heart.  Thank you very much.  [Applause].  

Gary Schmitt:  What we’ll do now is, we’ll have two short presentations, responses, from our two other panelists, and then after that we’ll turn towards questions and answers.  First up will be Captain Ann Gildroy, who is a Captain in the Marine Corps Ready Reserve, and Ready Reserve is the right terminology since she has now served three tours in southern Iraq. 

Then, Fred Kagan, our resident scholar here in defense studies will be up next.  He also heads up AEI’s Iraq Planning Group, which has produced any number of reports and monographs on what we should be doing in Iraq.  Then, of course, he’s also the author, most recently, of a book on Napoleon, and also on military transformation, and he’s really aggravating to be a compatriot with AEI because he’s so prolific, he makes the rest of us look like we’re sleeping.  But, anyway, Ann, you’re up first. 

Frederick W. Kagan:  Actually, I’ll speak first, and Ann can finish, which is appropriate.  It’s an honor to be here in the company of heroes.  It’s one of the great experiences, for those of us who have been following this war closely, that we’ve also had the opportunity to become closely involved with some of the very best people in the world who voluntarily put their lives on the line and repeatedly are injured, not usually as badly as Ambassador Pietrzyk, and then insist on returning to duty.  There really is a magnificent commitment by people to succeed in this enterprise, which, those who get involved with rapidly come to see its importance and its value. 

I want to make just a couple of brief remarks.  I want to start by thanking the Ambassador for his service, thanking Poland for its support to our effort.  Unfortunately, in the very toxic political environment that is the United States today, there’s a real tendency for people who want to hit the Bush Administration to aim their fire inappropriately.  One of the things that we’ve been hearing for years is that the U.S. has gone this alone, there’s no coalition, to the extent that there’s a coalition it’s all just a game that the Bush Administration is playing to cover the fact that we have no allies, and by implication that any allies that might happen to be in Iraq aren’t really doing anything. 

The Ambassador is here today as an example of someone who has been doing something, and as we’ve had the opportunity to travel to Diwaniyah and visit with the Polish forces, and, as Ann has had the time to work very closely with them, and she’ll tell us more about that in a moment, they are out there fighting, taking casualties, playing a critical role in a critical province.  I find myself increasingly deeply offended by the people who want to score points off the Bush Administration by casting aspersions on American allies who are risking the lives of their young men and women in combat and taking casualties because they think it’s an important thing to do, and playing a very important role. 

One of the things that we’ve seen is that as Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been defeated, and as the Sunni insurgency has been falling apart, the center of gravity of the problem is shifting into the Shia community, and shifting into the south.  If you read the media, which hasn’t been, or talked to people who haven’t been paying close attention, this will be presented to you as, oh, you see Iraq as hopeless, as soon as you solve one problem another problem emerges. 

The truth is, this isn’t a new problem, this is a problem that we’ve known about for a very long time, and it’s coming to the fore, first of all, because we’ve solved a few problems, and, second of all, because this is the remaining obstacle in front of real success.  Real success, defined as the transformation of Iraqi society by the upcoming provincial elections and by the Council of Representatives election scheduled for the end of next year.  Being on the ground there,

I’ve only been there very briefly, Ann has spent a lot of time there, the Ambassador has spent a lot of time there, much more than I have, but, being on the ground there one of the things that becomes very clear is that the Iraqi people are very hungry for change, if that sounds familiar to any Americans, and, in little polls we’ve taken, by the way, Obama polls pretty well in Iraq not because they think he’ll be good for Iraq but because they like change.  Change is good.  That slogan goes over pretty well. 

I don’t remember if the governor of Diwaniyah was an Obama fan, I don’t remember, we asked him.  The Babel province governor was, he was a Hillary, that’s right, the Diwaniyah guy was a Hillary man, I think.  But, they are hungry for it, and, by change, they mean democracy, they mean elections.  There’s a lot of mythology also that is put about by people who just want to turn their backs on this effort that democracy is inappropriate for Iraq, that we shouldn’t be trying to establish western standards, that they have to find their own way, and the implication is that we’re engaged in a fool’s errand, and they really don’t want this anyway, and we’re foisting this system on them, and so forth. 

The truth of the matter is that that viewpoint does not survive contact with the Iraqi on the street because what the Iraqi on the street wants to do is vote.  I predict that there will be elections by the end of this year, for the very simple reason that anybody who tries to stop there from being elections will raise a huge howl from every part of the country and every aspect of Iraqi society.  They want to vote, and the Shia want to vote. 

We also have a number of very silly discussions about how the Iraqi Shia, or, Shia like the Iranian Shia, and they like the Iranians, and we’re just throwing Iraq into the hands of the Iranians, and, like this.  And one of the other interesting things that we noted while we were traveling briefly through the area, and perhaps Ann can talk about this a little bit more based on her more, much more serious study, is, the growth of anti-Iranianism within the Shia community.  And this was something that we were very taken aback by on a recent trip when we, you talk to people on the street and they talk about those God damn Persians in Baghdad, which is really amusing, when you’re talking to a bunch of Shia in the Shia heartland, and they’re talking about the Persians in Baghdad, it tells you that something is going on. 

One of the things that is going on is that in the Shia areas of Iraq there’s a very large growth of Iraqi nationalism, which, in Iraq means anti-Persianism, among other things, and a general revulsion against the idea of clerical rule, and a growing, there’s a strong and growing desire for secular democratic, if not anti-Iranian at least independent of Iran, western oriented government among Iraq Shia has been, in many respects, one of the most profound developments of the last year. 

If we do our job correctly, which means seeing this effort through and not bailing prematurely, I think we have a very good chance of seeing these movements crystallized in the upcoming elections and in this transformative period. 

There are challenges ahead, there are no guarantees in war, the enemy gets a vote and the Iraqi people will also get a vote, hopefully, and we’ll have to do our best to make sure that that vote is free, fair, transparent, and not unduly influenced.  And we have to be very careful not to fall into the trap of saying, well, it’s an Iraqi solution and we’ll just have to let the Iraqis work this out, because the truth is, we care how it comes out, we have an interest in this, and it matters to us that the voice of the majority of the Iraqi people is freely heard, and that parties that happen to be in power at the moment do not find ways of ensuring that they continue to be in power even though they don’t have popular support. 

So, this is something that we have to help guide the Iraqis through, and I think that we can, I think that the Iraqi people want us to, and I think that we play a very important role here.  Most of all, I think that we have a very real chance of success, and, in this area, that chance of success depended very heavily on the skill and sacrifices of our Polish allies who stepped up and have fought very bravely to make this possible.  We’re very grateful for that. 

Captain Ann Gildroy:  Good afternoon.  My name is Ann Gildroy.  I was just released from active duty and I’m now part of the IRR.  First of all, Ambassador, I’d like to thank you for your service and the participation of Poland.  I understand that some Americans picked you up off the street and saved your life, but your men also saved the life of our combat cameraman when he was shot through the neck and none of us thought at the time he was going to make it, 20 years old.  So, your forces have done great things for us as well. 

I have done three tours, and all in the south of Iraq.  I’ve spent time from the Province of Najaf all the way to the Wasit province, which lies on the Iranian border.  I’ve been exclusive to the central southern region, so those five provinces.  I’ve never traveled south of those five provinces, and I’ve never been north of Baghdad. 

I first got to Iraq in 2004, and I got home three weeks ago from my last tour.  It’s been interesting to watch the south evolve.  There is some very positive fundamentals about the south, but, also, certainly, something we need to, I think, refocus on and ensure that we do not have a hands-off policy towards the south as Mr. Kagan suggested, and make sure that we don’t leave it to the Shia or the Iraqis to figure out. 

I worked this tour quite a bit with the Polish.  We entered the city of Diwaniyah in August, it was largely controlled by the militia, I would say probably 85 percent of the territory was controlled by the militia.  My team, called Team Phoenix, we are an attachment to the Green Berets, and we work directly for General Petraeus from the field.  Our job was really to work in conjunction with the 8th Iraqi Army division, and the Polish forces there, to insure that counterinsurgency tactics were being employed and effectively executed. 

It was my great pleasure to work with a man named General Bouck [phonetic], who, again, saw odds, took a very small infantry force into the city, and used a con-op based on the oil spot theory to regain control of the city, which he did in about five weeks.  He inspired the Iraqis to do a follow-on operation in Diwaniyah, called Operation Lions Pounce, where they set up combat outposts across the city and literally regained the entire city from the militia. 

We went from indirect fire attacks approximately four times a day from May to July to several times a week to zero attacks from, sort of, November to January timeframe.  So it was a dramatic difference in security, and largely credited to the ambition and initiative of those Polish forces to be the front in those operations. 

I won’t talk for too long.  There’s so much to touch on in the south.  There’s so much we do not know about the south.  There’s a lot of answers to Iran in the south.  I think if we better understand it, we might find some ways to gain leverage over Iran.  The greatest difference I saw this year in returning to the south was the presence of Iran.  It certainly has always been there, but, I feel it’s an incredibly strong force now.  When you’re pounded with 240-millimeter rockets you clearly understand there’s another player in this game.  So it is a very real threat. 

I understand among my peers that there’s a lot of distrust now towards the U.S. government in actually believing allegations or accusations of Iranian influence and presence.  And, so, I would say, just from my own personal experience, I’ve seen it in many different ways, I’m deeply worried about Iran’s influence in Iraq, but I am extremely encouraged by how moderate the Shia are in the central southern region. 

I think that’s very confused in American society.  The average Iraqi in central south desperately does not want us to leave.  They trust the American and multi-national uniform, and, in some regards, feel that this is their hope right now, and they would like us to stay very present, especially through the elections in October.  In fact, many have told me they want Americans or Polish to stand on top of the ballot boxes.  So, I think that we have to sort of put the myth off the table that the Iraqis no longer want Americans there, or coalition. 

So, I leave any question open.  As far as political or security, I think our greatest challenge in the south will be the political situation.  We very much need to be careful about picking sides and sort of back off of picking sides with ISQI [phonetic].  So, hopefully we can have an interesting discussion about that.  Thank you. 

Gary Schmitt:  Thanks, Ann.  We’ll take questions now from the floor, and, please just wait for a microphone, and, identify yourself, and ask a question.  Yes, you’re the embarrassing first question.  [Laughter]. 

Rebecca Sundan:  Rebecca Sundan [phonetic] from Georgetown University.  Actually, my question is for Ambassador Pietrzyk, and, in talking a little bit about your military, drawing on your military expertise, could you tell us how this contribution of Poland in Iraq will play upon Poland’s future roles, specifically, not just Poland’s significant contribution to the stability of Iraq? 

But I’m also talking about the current missile defense negotiations to upgrade Poland’s air defense capabilities.  It seems to me that it’s all preparing Poland for a unique role of being a global ally of the U.S. in safeguarding international security.  It seems that all the pieces are falling in place, not just Poland’s historic prominence of the Polish hussars in defending Europe, but, the current modern day war experience in Iraq, the increasing, even, economic performance of the U.S., and the strengthening ties with the U.S., particularly over military defense. 

So my question is to you, how do you see Poland stepping up to this new role, stepping up to this new role as a U.S. global ally?  You said that 2010 that was the expected timeline for the modernization of Polish forces, do you feel this is a significant timeline to see Poland taking a more active role, not just in Iraq, but in other international peacekeeping and stability alliance.  Thank you. 

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  Thank you very much for talking about the Polish hussars [sounds like] in Vienna.  It was really last time we were out of our country, but after that, it was really tragedy for my country because we disappeared from the map of Europe.  This time, for sure, situation is totally different. 

This is really extremely great feeling for Poles like me, to be called a U.S. global ally, which, is really, for me, something, with coming from my heart, for sure.  But, I suppose it’s very clear that we are going to play the really active role because of this modernization of our armed forces and professionalization [sounds like] of our armed forces.  We got a lot of troubles I didn’t mention because a lack of time, how to select people to send them to Iraq. 

Believe me, it was not easy because if you have professional soldiers, if you have the company or platoon or battalion which is fully the same soldiers, the same, I don’t ask them, would you like to go to Iraq?  No, I just ordered him to go to Iraq as a battalion, and so on, so on.  But, we, at the very beginning, we completed one battalion from ten garrisons.  That’s true.  Successfully we stopped this year by year. 

Now, there is division after division.  All our four division they have been deployed in Iraq, and I suppose this is the normal way, if, traditionally, you know for Pols, what does it mean to defend our country, for Pols?  And average Poles will answer you, to stay along Bug River, for example, or, other river, because we always were from the west or from the east attacked.  That means, traditional approach, how to defend your country, means, go to the river Bug, stay, and be ready. 

And now we are proposing our people something different.  My old theory was always, it’s better to defend your country 5,000 kilometers abroad from Warsaw.  Do you think it’s not very popular among Pols?  No.  We should try to do everything to have this understanding that it’s much better to send small professional contingent in order to prevent the huge danger, which could approach our border.  This way.  Okay! 

Thomas Ridd:  Hello, my name is Thomas Ridd [phonetic] from the Rand Corporation.  I also have a question to Ambassador Pietrzyk.  Poland’s armed forces, I believe, at the moment, are in the process of acquiring 48 F-16s and beefing up their conventional air defense, vis-à-vis the east, not so much the southeast, but more the northeast.  And, at the same time, the army is beefing up its expeditionary capabilities to be a better ally in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly with military police units, as I understand.  My question is, do you see something, like a conflict of interests, between being ready for preparing mid-term, long-term, for a more conventional confrontation that could, you know, is not completely off the, outside of imagination, and, on the other hand, preparing for an expeditionary force?  Thank you.

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  Three years ago I will always tell you that I am against F-16.  Why?  Because I was land forces commander.  [Laughter].  That means, this time, for me, as the commander of the land forces, responsible for 90,000 troops, was to provide to them the best equipment, the best means of transportation, [indiscernible], and so on, so on, so on.  It was not secret if my particular master has decided to buy F-16s, that means it will be a land forces pouch will pay for this, for sure. 

You’re right that this army, why are starting to build now, this is expeditionary army, probably no one among Europeans now thinking about possibilities for Europe to be really attacked from the east or from the different direction.  No.  No.  Europe is thinking about common European army, I hope, only not against the NATO, the NATO links, and there have been less last week in such a conference in Berlin.  It was very interesting.  But this is future European army.  But, for sure, the European armies also, is also promoting such an idea to go far away from the Europe, or, sometimes to go to Kosovo, for example. 

About possibilities to use F-16 for such operation, in reality when it, some years ahead, to be fully operational with F-16, that means, for time being I suppose mostly land forces, maybe partial navy, they will take part in this expeditionary operations. 

Ed Ronnie:  I’m Ed Ronnie [phonetic], former Ambassador, retired Lieutenant General, and, like the Ambassador, I want to be blunt and ask an undiplomatic question.  I was very proud when Poland came in so quickly right after 9/11, announced they’d go into Poland, and proud of their record there and thought that they gained a lot of world prestige, not only stronger U.S. friendship, and, so, I was, I would say, disappointed to learn that the Poles would take out all their forces.  I’m happy they’re going to Afghanistan.  But, my question is, what were the factors there in Poland?  Was this the press?  Was it the political parties?  Was it European allies?  What caused the Polish government to decide to pull out their forces in advance of the U.S.? 

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  In reality, we completed the mission in Iraq, and the last election, the future prime minister, has promised the public opinion in Poland that after the election he will do everything to withdraw as soon as possible our contingent from Iraq because, because, for Poland it’s impossible to be parallely [sounds like] involved in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Because Iraq, from his point of view, from his opinion, was stable, and our goals were achieved.  He decided to go to Afghanistan to one province to take one province,  [indiscernible] responsibility for, by Pols.  That’s the simply answer. 

Why the public opinion has changed, this is interesting, my very shortest answer is because of media.  This is the CNN effect in Poland, because, for the very beginning, I remember 2003, even the first half 2004, more than 80, 80 percent of Poles has supported the mission to Iraq.  80 percent of public opinion is quite a lot.  And, after that, month-by-month, year-by-year, this percent was lower, lower, and now this is 23 percent for presence in Iraq.  That means mostly, I suppose, the way the media has presented our effort here was maybe, maybe, was supported by, for my prime minister to make such a decision. 

Female Audience Member:  Mr. Kagan and Captain Gildroy, if that’s permitted.  I’d like to know what we can do about Iran, and when should we do it?  And, for Captain Gildroy, in the interest of the [inaudible, audio glitch] problem, which is causing tremendous [inaudible, audio glitch] in America as well, as we know, with campaigns of disinformation, how soon can you get on Fox News, and, are you available?  Thank you. 

Frederick W. Kagan:  Well, what we can do about Iran to begin with is win in Iraq, and, that means that, I think, we need to make it very, very clear to the Iraqis, the increasing number of Iraqis, particularly Iraqi Shia, who have indicated that they want to stand with us against improper Iranian interference, that we will be there for them, and that we will not walk away from them. 

I think that’s a very, very important issue because we’ve had a large number, a growing number, of Iraqi Shia leaders, particularly over the past few weeks, really show that they want to side with us, and want our help against the Iranians.  Ann has had the opportunity to work with a real Iraqi hero in General Farhood Othman, the Commander of the 8th Iraqi Army Division, who has put his life, and the lives of his family members on the line for years now, combating Iranian influence within his region and creating an incredibly professional military force, probably the best unit in the Iraqi army at this point. 

And that’s actually saying something, because the Iraqi army is becoming an increasingly professional and capable force.  He has been fighting Iranian militias hammer and tongs for years, and we’ve been helping him, although, frankly, not with very much.  The Poles have been down there fighting, and, for a while, for a long time they’ve been down there pretty much by themselves with the assistance of a few extremely talented Americans like Ann, but, not a very large team and not a very large presence. 

I think that what we need to do now is recognize that as we’ve gotten Al-Qaeda in Iraq under control it’s not time to declare victory and withdrawal, it’s time now to redouble our efforts to support those Iraqis who are asking for our help to fight against Iran.  Ann can tell you exactly who they are and what we should do about them, and I would like to see her on Fox, but, I think what we need to take away primarily is that we need to stand with the people who have chosen to stand with us. 

Captain Ann Gildroy:  Well, in response to disinformation, I do want to make sure I’m as balanced as possible, because as Marines we’re just trying to win the war over there, I think we also take a lot of blame for disinformation to the American public in the beginning of the war.  We really like to have these bubble charts that started with red and ended with green by the time we would leave an area. 

So, I think we, as a military, have started to finally really embrace the media and bring them in, a lot of that has changed with General Petraeus.  I think what’s disheartening is that I feel like the American public is tired of this now, and, so, we’ve lost a lot of energy to say, wait a minute, there’s a lot of good momentum over here.  So I think there’s faults on both sides as far as information, and I also feel that the communication to the American public from our Congress and our Administration and our media has not been fair and honest. 

When I travel across the country I really sense that a lot of Americans don’t really understand what’s going on, but when I watch General Petraeus come and conduct testimony I also realize a lot of senators don’t really know what’s going on.  So I think it’s not just a problem of the media, it’s really, are we just too tired to figure it out at this point, and I think that’s a real danger, especially when you have young men and women over there on the front lines. 

So, I talk to anyone, I’ve been on al-Jazeera, and I am open to any media outlet and I try to keep an open mind with regard to their intentions.  So, communication is key, and I think as a nation we really need to start to be a little more open and honest about this. 

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  May I have a few words about the Polish media.  From the very beginning, we ask representatives from different companies, from TV companies, newspapers, and so on, to go together with us to our camp.  It was a serious mistake because those guys, from the beginning, the set was interesting, but, after that, nothing to do.  We are not going to take them to action, and so on.  The life became boring for them. 

You know what they did?  Several times I went to TV stations and I tried to explain, what they did, they asked the soldier, always you can find, if you have 2,000 soldiers together, you can find one who is disappointed with something, with his boots, with something else, and they put him, not the face to the camera, but the back to the camera.  He was looking to the desert, and the journalists were behind him, they made some repertoires to [indiscernible], and he started to regret that this is too hard, because, 50 degree of Celsius, because his boots are not good, and so on, so on, because his commander is, and, you know, this is only small example, they created. 

In addition to this, some irresponsible people started to explain to the public opinion, have a look, with the interest of the oil refinery, with the interest of the access to the oil.  Who promised you to have access to the oil?  But, we didn’t.  And, one plus another and another and it kept happening similarly to your opinion.  Thank you. 

Gary Schmitt:  Just let me add one thing to it.  I think one of the problems is that we don’t actually use our most effective spokespeople on these, both Afghanistan and Iraq, and what I mean by that, when I talk to friends involved in transatlantic relations in Europe, they are constantly commenting that the most bang for the buck that we get on this side of the information warfare is when we bring Iraqis in Afghanistan, or people from Afghanistan to the countries of Europe, and let them make testimonies.  Because, it’s their words about the help that Poland or the United States is giving that seems to carry the most weight as opposed to our own politicians or military, unfortunately.  So, I think, in fact, NATO and our allies have not done as good a job as they could have in that respect by not involving Iraqis in Afghanistan in the cause of selling what we’re doing in both places. 

Alex Bujon:  Hello, my name is Alex Bujon [phonetic].  I want to say from a perspective, I am not a politician, I am not a lobbyist or a part of some military company which does the contracts in Iraq.  I want to go back to the statement, which the Ambassador say about the perception of the average Pol in Poland, why the support dropped from 80 percent to about maybe 60 percent now.  The Polish people, and the United States, we have a great history going back to the American war of independence, [indiscernible], and America was always the symbol of ultimate democracy and freedom. 

But, when Poland put the commitment not only to Iraq, but also Afghanistan, Kosovo, Golan Heights, we have a Panama, not also Chad in Africa, Poland and the Polish taxpayers, we absorb tremendous costs, going into the billions of dollars, and as official estimates, Poland only gets about $28 million, only, a year, and now the Bush Administration wants to offer only $20 million to agree with the missile defense. 

So this must be a little bit of a joke when U.S. is giving so much money to country like Turkey, in billions of dollars, to Pakistan, to Egypt, to Israel, in many billions of dollars, and Poland is only getting $28 million a year.  Our taxpayers, we have to spend so much money.  So where is the fairness?  And that’s why the Polish people look different way. 

And also was the question of reconstruction.  A lot of allied countries that came to help after September 11, from, pretty much all over the world, was 28 country coalition, but we didn’t get any contracts, all the contracts went to Hollywood and Blackwater, ExxonMobil, to all the companies for reconstruction.  Poland was excluded now for possibility to participate to rebuild the oil infrastructure in Iraq, when, before the first Gulf war we used to have about 30,000 engineers working in Iraq, and then after the first Gulf war Polish intelligence rescued American [indiscernible] left behind enemy lines, was not, all the country in the world was able to rescue Americans.  Then, beginning of the war, [cross-talking]. 

Gary Schmitt:  We’ve got your point, Sir. 

Alex Bujon:  [Cross-talking], you know, when the Polish Special Forces secured the oil platform.  So we pretty much feel like we were not [cross-talking]. 

Gary Schmitt:  I appreciate, are you going to ask a question? 

Alex Bujon:  That’s the question, why we only get $28 million a year from United States?  We want billions of dollars.  Thanks a lot. 

Gary Schmitt:  I understand that.  If I was in your position, I would too.  Kim?

Kim:  I’d like to follow-up on the question, or the issue that Fred raised a little bit earlier.  Of course, as our Polish allies are leaving Diwaniyah sometime this fall the 8th Iraqi Army Division and other Iraqi security forces will be falling in on the successes that they’ve built over the course of the past five years.  I’d like to ask the Ambassador, and also Ann Gildroy, what is your assessment of the 8th Iraqi Army Division, how has it changed, or its capacity changed over the past four or five years, and what is it capable of doing as a more independent force as we move into the fall of 2008? 

Captain Ann Gildroy:  I’ll be brief here so you can hear from the Ambassador.  I started working with the 8th Iraqi Army Division, which was just a brigade, in 2004.  I’ve watched it evolve in a very positive direction.  It remains an independent force, and one of the bright lights in the south of Iraq.  They are now able to conduct independent operations.  We saw an example of this in Karbala [phonetic] in the fall of 2007, where General Othman, without U.S. or multinational support, went in and stabilized the situation in Karbala. 

My deep concern about the 8th Iraqi Army Division is the influences that the government of Iraq and the politicians will have on that institution.  As you know, in Iraq institutions are still very much dependent on the personalities who are running them, far less on the actual structure of the institution, and, so, therein lies the danger and vulnerability. 

So, I worry about the ISQI party potentially infiltrating that unit and removing some of our key leaders who are very independent.  I think we need to watch very carefully the political influences on the Iraqi army in the south, particularly post elections. 

Ambassador Edward Pietrzyk:  May I add something.  General Farhood Othman, who is the Commander of the 8th Division, I am familiar with him from 2003, and, believe me, this is a general who openly always is stressing up the influence of Iran to the south part of Iraq, which is totally wrong.  He is criticizing it.  Maybe this is the reason that the governor doesn’t like him, and vice-versa.  That’s for sure.  But, having such commanders like he, or the support, from time being, from the Minister of Defense, and General Petraeus as well, this is some guarantee that this division will continue in the right direction. 

The very beginning for this division in 2003-2004, they started really from zero.  Now, even if you are observing the behavior of soldiers, behavior of officers, they are looking like soldiers, they are looking like officers, commanders.  They acted together with us.  They served a lot.  Even the last event, you know very well that General Farhood, by himself, took one battalion, went to Al Kut in order to make some effort to clear the city, and he succeeded.  It’s really, this division, I’m pretty, pretty sure is reliable. 

[End of Transcript]