We should remember how agonizing the post-Cold War period was in its uncertainty. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the fall of Saddam's statues in 2003, a pall of ambiguity and indecision hung over the international political order. Yes, the United States was the world's sole remaining superpower, blessed with unprecedented wealth, military power, and a set of political principles based upon universal, individual political rights. It also had a uniquely intoxicating mix of "soft power"--spanning from the low culture of popular music to the high culture of the world's best research universities, and including seemingly everything in between as well. Yet translating this "hyperpower," as the French called it, into policies with a consistent purpose was not something American political leaders could easily manage nor something that American public opinion seemed to care that much about.

Until September 11, 2001.

But though the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon galvanized Americans and the Bush administration to action, the scope of that action--beyond the first-order goal of bringing the terrorists themselves "to justice," as President Bush put it--was still to be defined, and indeed it is still a work in progress.

The invasion, occupation, and reconstruction of Iraq carries the United States across a fateful threshold, one that we cannot easily go back across without suffering a tremendous defeat. The decision to step into Iraq reflects the character of President Bush himself--this is surely a case where an individual makes a great difference to history--as well as that of his advisers and, very profoundly, the nature of America, its power, and its principles. As we look for "lessons learned" from the war in Iraq and predictions as to what the immediate future might hold, it is best to begin with a careful reading of recent history.

The Road to War

The Bush Doctrine came to full flower in September 2002 with the release of the National Security Strategy, which originates in the observation that "the United States possesses unprecedented--and unequalled--strength and influence in the world." The Bush administration intended to keep it that way, to extend "the unipolar moment" as far as possible: "We will work to translate this moment of influence into decades of peace, prosperity, and liberty."[1]

One purpose for the continued exercise of American global power, the NSS stated, is to defend against the world's new threats.

But the strategy statement also foresaw an opportunity to exercise "a distinctly American internationalism"--a phrase first used in November 1999 by then-Governor George W. Bush in a speech at the Reagan Library. Most remarkably, the NSS argued that this "American internationalism" reflects "the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better."[2] In other words, the Bush administration's drive to extend the Pax Americana can be found in a nexus of moral and strategic imperatives.

As attention--particularly congressional attention--turned toward Iraq, pressure began to mount on the administration to speak directly about its intentions toward the regime of Saddam Hussein. The anniversary of the September 11 attacks provided the president with the opportunity the moment demanded, and he seized it in speeches on September 11, 2002, at Ellis Island and the next day in an address to the UN General Assembly. Taken together, these two speeches mark the beginning of the march to war.

Quite naturally but with a clear purpose, the president began his Ellis Island speech by summoning and shaping the memory of the previous year's attacks: "September 11, 2001 will always be a fixed point in the life of America," he said. "The loss of so many lives left us to examine our own. Each of us was reminded that we are here only for a time, and these counted days should be filled with things that last and matter." For Bush, the "mission and moment" that began in the aftermath of 9/11 had not ended in Afghanistan, but continued; indeed, he now defined it as a lifetime commitment and perhaps an eternal one for the United States. The life of the nation, he seemed to suggest, should be filled with great things.

This was also perhaps the point where the Bush Doctrine parted ways with the Clinton past. Both presidents were animated by the vision of a liberal international order in which the United States played a central role. But Bush called for something like Theodore Roosevelt's version of "the strenuous life," a conscious striving to achieve a larger and more secure liberal order; Clinton, with his emphasis on economic forces and international organizations, acted as though the Pax Americana would somehow expand itself, requiring only modest efforts--in particular, modest military efforts--wise guidance, and constant consultation with others, whether democratic or autocratic. Bush's rhetoric also revealed a faith in what Abraham Lincoln might have called "providence." Said the president: "I believe there is a reason that history has matched this nation with this time." He explained,

There is a line in our time, and in every time, between those who believe all men are created equal, and those who believe some men and women and children are expendable in the pursuit of power. There is a line in our time, and in every time, between the defenders of human liberty and those who seek to master the minds and souls of others. Our generation has heard history's call, and we will answer it. . . .

 

This nation has defeated tyrants and liberated death camps, raised this lamp of liberty to every captive land. We have no intention of ignoring or appeasing history's latest gang of fanatics trying to murder their way into power. They are discovering, as others before them, the resolve of a great country and a great democracy. In the ruins of two towers, under a flag unfurled at the Pentagon, at the funerals of the lost, we have made a sacred promise to ourselves and to the world: we will not relent until justice is done and our nation is secure. What our enemies have begun, we will finish.[3]

The speech was more than a moving oration at a solemn moment. It introduced, forcefully, new elements into the policy debate over Iraq and the "war on terrorism." No longer was this simply measuring justice for the September 11 attacks or a strategic decision to respond to the threat of rogue regimes and weapons proliferation. The president strove to place this larger war within the broadest context of American history, quoting the Declaration of Independence, recalling World War II in his references to "death camps" and "appeasement," and evoking the resolve of Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address--another funeral oration intended not simply to commemorate the dead but to dedicate the nation to a future, unfinished task.

Speaking to the United Nations the next day, the president shifted his emphasis to the threat posed by Iraq. Global security, he declared, is "challenged by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of morality and have no limit to their violent ambitions." Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a perfect example of this new threat: "In one place--in one regime--we find all these dangers, in their most lethal and aggressive forms, exactly the kind of threat the United Nations was born to confront."4

But as he reviewed the history of Iraqi actions since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the president expanded the "threat theme" to demonstrate that Saddam's intentions and arsenal were dangerous not only in themselves but also to the authority of the United Nations itself. "Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a decade of defiance," he said. "All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?"5

Bush went on to lay out six tests to measure whether Iraq intended to come into compliance with UN resolutions. Yet the president also made it clear that the removal of Saddam's regime was an inevitable outcome. Either the Iraqis would accept UN resolutions--"the just demands of peace and security"--or "action will be unavoidable," and the United States would go to war. "The purposes of the United States," said President Bush, "should not be doubted." And even if the regime complied, the Iraqi people would rid themselves of the tyrant. Saddam could not survive, either way, for "a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power."[6]

Importantly in an international forum, Bush began to make the larger case for political reform in the Islamic world. "If we meet our responsibilities, if we overcome this danger, we can arrive at a very different future," he said.

The people of Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim world. These nations can show by their example that honest government, and respect for women, and the great Islamic tradition of learning can triumph in the Middle East and beyond. And we will show that the promise of the United Nations can be fulfilled in our time.7

In the event, however, the United Nations collectively demonstrated it had no interest in fulfilling this promise. Indeed, the Bush administration's decision to seek UN support proved a setback to the policy of regime change in Iraq. Although enjoying initial success in winning a unanimous vote in the Security Council for Resolution 1441, which found Iraq in "material breach" of previous UN resolutions and promised "serious consequences" for Iraq if it did not quickly come into compliance, the diplomatic process became a referendum on weapons inspections. As in the 1999 Kosovo crisis, the United Nations revealed that it inherently favored sovereignty over liberty; perhaps the very structure of the organization--it is, after all, a collection of states--made it unfit to accomplish the purposes the president intended. And as one report of inspectors followed another, and as France led an opposition movement both in the United Nations and in the larger court of world opinion, the main question became one of American "unilateralism." The accelerating deployment of U.S. military forces to the region seemed to underscore Bush's "rush to war."

Thus, by the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush found himself very much on the defensive. To regain the initiative, he again argued that the Iraq crisis was a test of the United Nations and that his patience with diplomacy was limited: "America's purpose is more than to follow a process--it is to achieve a result," he said. "[T]he course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people." He continued:

Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and for the opinion of the world. The 108 UN inspectors were not sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of California. The job of inspectors is to verify that Iraq's regime is disarming. It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened.[8]

He also stressed his commitment to a free Iraq. "Tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: your enemy is not surrounding your country-your enemy is ruling your country. The day [Saddam Hussein] and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation." And, as before at crucial moments, the president upped the political ante. Addressing another "message" to the U.S. armed forces, he left little doubt that war was imminent:

Many of you are assembling in or near the Middle East and some crucial hours may lie ahead. In those hours, the success of our cause will depend on you. Your training has prepared you. Your honor will guide you. . . . Sending Americans into battle is the most profound decision a president can make. The technologies of war have changed; the risks and suffering of war have not. For the brave Americans who bear the risk, no victory is free from sorrow. This nation fights reluctantly, because we know the cost and we dread the days of mourning that always come.[9]

With the die so obviously cast, the one issue left to discuss was the real purpose of the war. Trapped in a dead-end debate about weapons inspections, the administration sent Secretary of State Colin Powell before the UN Security Council to try to preserve any hope of a wartime coalition of traditional Western allies. His presentation on February 5 was a dramatic show of satellite photographs, intercepts of Iraqi military radio communications, and information provided by Iraqi defectors. Not only did Powell make the case that Iraq had not disarmed, he also suggested that Saddam's links to terrorist organizations were substantial and increasing. "My colleagues," Powell beseeched in conclusion, "we have an obligation to our citizens--we have an obligation to this body--to see that our resolutions are complied with." Iraq had been given a last chance and spurned it, Powell said. "We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility for the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body."[10]

Yet for all its drama, the effort was an immediate failure. The echoes of Powell's presentation had barely died within the UN building when other members of the Security Council voiced skepticism about the facts of the case and continued opposition to the policy. Powell "failed in front of the world to prove that [Saddam] is a threat to the world," declared Jacques Myard, a member of the French parliament. "The U.S. really lost a great opportunity today."[11] For others, evidence of weapons was simply a reason for more intense inspections. Over the following weekend, at the Wehrkunde conference in Munich-traditionally an expression of NATO and particularly German-American solidarity-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer spat at U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, "Excuse me, I'm not convinced!"[12]

The Bush Doctrine in Iraq

With the disarmament debate lost beyond saving, despite the steadfastness of British prime minister Tony Blair and indeed most European governments outside France and Germany, the Bush administration braced itself and the American people for the inevitability of a "unilateral" war. True, Great Britain could be relied upon to provide genuine support, and Kuwait, Qatar, and other small Persian Gulf states would permit U.S. forces a minimum of access and support, but Operation Iraqi Freedom had become Bush's War. Having failed to convince the rest of the world of any imminent threat from Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the president chose to cut his losses--to turn his back on the traditional diplomatic approach of Powell--and stress those arguments that appealed to fundamental American political principles. It was, in the president's reckoning, the despotic nature of the Iraqi regime that was the source of the danger. President Bush's February 26 speech to the American Enterprise Institute is worth quoting at length:

The safety of the American people depends upon ending this direct and growing threat. Acting against danger will also contribute greatly to the long-term safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security and America's belief in liberty both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq. . . .

 

There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken. The nation of Iraq--with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated people--is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.

 

The world has an interest in spreading democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the "freedom gap" so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab character that champions internal reform, greater political participation, economic openness and free trade. And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward political reform. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.

 

It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world--the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim--is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be vastly different. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better life, we are the same. For these fundamental reasons, freedom and democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the slogans of hatred and tactics of terror. . . .

 

Much is asked of America in this year 2003. The work ahead is demanding. It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions and war. It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have met great tests in other times and we will meet the tests of our time.[13]

This is a speech that Bill Clinton, or indeed almost any American president, might have made; it is imbued with liberal political principles that the founders would recognize as essentially the same as their own. Yet, coming from Clinton's mouth, these words would elaborate what he would regard as very good reasons for avoiding a war. For George W. Bush, these were fighting words.

And soon after the president spoke them, Operation Iraqi Freedom did indeed drive Saddam Hussein's regime from power--opening an opportunity for what is the harder task of remaking Iraqi society and politics. The combination of American power and principles forged under the Bush Doctrine has transformed U.S. strategy in Iraq and the greater Middle East; we are no longer content to "contain" petty tyrants or "absorb" terrorist attacks from radical Islamists such as Osama bin Laden. To use Cold War terminology, America's purpose is now to "roll back" these forces.

This larger project is now also the defining trend of international politics. The Bush administration insists, rightly, that each crisis--including confrontations with the remaining "axis of evil" states, Iran and North Korea--will demand a unique approach. The Bush Doctrine does not free the United States or its presidents, diplomats, and soldiers from the practice of practical statecraft. But if the means may change (and the military preeminence of the United States, now shown in the Iraq war to be still greater than almost anyone imagined, suggests that Bush's view of the utility of force will endure), the ends--regime change and the promotion of democracy and individual political liberty--may not.

The aftermath of the war is also making clear the lasting rationale for the operation: the liberation of Iraq. The search for weapons of mass destruction has proved frustrating, even bungled. The anticipated humanitarian crisis, mercifully, did not materialize. And the war-for-oil myth has perhaps suffered most: Iraq's oil infrastructure

is in a miserable condition and will require many years and billions of dollars of investment to return to past levels of production; Western companies are, for the immediate moment, taking a wait-and-see approach until greater security, rule of law, and a stable and self-governing Iraq emerges. Conversely, the full dimensions of Ba'ath repression--the mass graves, torture chambers, "disappearances"--are stunning in scope and still make for daily headlines. The Shiite pilgrimage to Kerbala was a genuine expression of religious sentiment by millions and frustrated what were almost certainly Iranian-aided attempts to politicize the event as an expression of anti-Americanism. And the number of small political parties that survived the terror and are coming out of the Iraqi woodwork is a challenge to catalogue.

The Bush administration has raised the stakes with the war in Iraq--both for itself and its successors. Already, the Bush Doctrine has freed us from the ingrained balance-of-power thinking of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. In its rejection of containment and deterrence, it has likewise restored to prominence the historic characteristics of American national security policy: a proactive defense and the aggressive expansion of freedom. In its explicit focus not only on tearing down Saddam Hussein's terror state, but on raising up the lives of the long-suffering Iraqi people, it has pledged the United States to an ambitious, far-reaching course. It is a course from which we cannot, and should not, turn back.

Notes

1. George W. Bush, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," September 2002. Accessed on May 14, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

2. Ibid.

3. George W. Bush, "Remarks to the Nation on the First Anniversary of September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks," September 11, 2002. Accessed on May 14, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020911-3.html.

4. George W. Bush, "Remarks by the President in his Address to the United Nations General Assembly," September 12, 2002. Accessed on May 14, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. George W. Bush, "State of the Union Address," January 28, 2003. Accessed on May 14, 2003 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

9. Ibid.

10. Steven R. Weisman, "Powell, in UN Speech, Presents Case to Show Iraq Has Not Disarmed," New York Times, February 6, 2003, p. A1.

11. Richard Bernstein, "Speech Praised by Europe's Politicians, but Public Is Still Unpersuaded," New York Times, February 6, 2003, p. A21.

12. Richard Bernstein, "German Demonstrators Oppose War, Not U.S." New York Times, February 9, 2003, p. A14.

13. George W. Bush, "Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute's Annual Dinner," February 26, 2003. Accessed on May 14, 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2003/02/20030226-11.html.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.