Why would the United Statesrecognize and support India's nuclear technology program,thus making a seemingly large concession on nonproliferation rules?
The following article appears as a chapter in Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2007), edited by Henry Sokolski.
The Joint Declaration signed on July 18, 2005, by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been heralded in some quarters as the equivalent of President Richard Nixon’s opening to China. America agreed to recognize India as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" and pledged to support its civilian nuclear program and urge others to do the same. This agreement caught observers in the strategic community and Congress by surprise. Even supporters of closer relations with India had a difficult time understanding why the United States made a seemingly large concession on nonproliferation rules in exchange for a vague exchange of Indian support to help the United States combat HIV/AIDS, support those countries that seek a "U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative," and otherwise support India’s economic development in a number of areas--there simply seemed to be too little Indian quid for the American quo. . . .
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Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at AEI.
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