We invite you to join us for this year’s international conference on housing risk — cosponsored by the Collateral Risk Network and AEI International Center on Housing Risk — which will focus on new mortgage and collateral risk measures and their applications.
The Dodd-Frank Act has failed to achieve its stated goals. Instead, evidence suggests that Dodd-Frank has reinforced investor’s perceptions that the largest financial institutions enjoy an extended government safety net. Rather than ending too-big-to-fail, Dodd-Frank’s provisions create new uncertainties around the resolution process for large financial institutions.
As implementation continues, it is increasingly clear that Dodd-Frank's unbalanced mix of new regulatory powers and vague goals are causing over-regulation and reducing economic growth.
As the great economist Joseph Schumpeter rightly said, “Capitalism not only never is, but never can be, stationary.” Of the ten largest banks in 1981, only two still exist as independent companies.
Four years after it took effect, Dodd-Frank's pernicious effects have shown that the law's critics were, if anything, too kind. Dodd-Frank has already overwhelmed the regulatory system, stifled the financial industry and impaired economic growth.
The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) uses the phrase “systemic risk” 39 times without defining it. Because the term is ambiguous, the law allows the regulatory agencies wide discretion. The DFA directs agencies to draft and implement rules to control and minimize “systemic risk” without requiring the agencies to identify specifically what they are attempting to control or minimize.
The notorious Dodd-Frank Act set up the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a committee of regulators, and tasked it with identifying and preventing the ill-defined threat of systemic risk. Join our keynote speakers and expert panelists as they address the fundamental problems created by these political constructs.
In the housing shrivel inevitably following the great 21st century housing bubble, mortgage loans delinquent over 90 days shot up to their dizzying peak in the first quarter of 2010. More than four years have gone by since then; the housing and mortgage markets have recovered. But delinquencies are not back to normal yet.
While there is reason to be concerned that Basel III gives banks too much latitude, allowing capital regulation to be guided solely by stress tests is a mistake for a number of reasons.
What can we do to avoid a threatened restoration of the GSE ancien regime? Can the Fannie and Freddie situation be addressed before they arise from their near-death as dominating and pernicious as before? Yes, it can be.
Please join AEI as the chief actuary for Medicare summarizes the report’s results, followed by a panel discussion of what those spending trends are likely to mean for seniors, taxpayers, the health industry, and federal policy.
Please join us as four of Washington’s most distinguished political observers will revisit the Watergate hearings and discuss reforms that followed.