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We invite you to join us for this year’s international conference on housing risk — cosponsored by the Collateral Risk Network and AEI International Center on Housing Risk — which will focus on new mortgage and collateral risk measures and their applications.
The notorious Dodd-Frank Act set up the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a committee of regulators, and tasked it with identifying and preventing the ill-defined threat of systemic risk. Join our keynote speakers and expert panelists as they address the fundamental problems created by these political constructs.
In the housing shrivel inevitably following the great 21st century housing bubble, mortgage loans delinquent over 90 days shot up to their dizzying peak in the first quarter of 2010. More than four years have gone by since then; the housing and mortgage markets have recovered. But delinquencies are not back to normal yet.
What can we do to avoid a threatened restoration of the GSE ancien regime? Can the Fannie and Freddie situation be addressed before they arise from their near-death as dominating and pernicious as before? Yes, it can be.
Would it be possible to have a new housing bubble? Yes, of course. And now is definitely not the time for the Fed or politicians to promote further rapid house price inflation.
In the last decade, we have been through multiple international housing bubbles, shrivels, crises, bailouts, and recoveries. But with all the turmoil, and with several alleged new international housing bubbles in process, has anything basic in housing finance changed? No.
The narrative that came out of the financial crisis was that it could have been prevented by better regulation. That misreading of the facts is why we are again on our way to a mortgage financing system that will one day bring on another financial crisis.
The US financial crisis largely stemmed from a failure to understand the build-up of housing risk, combined with a housing finance market dominated by government players and distortionary policies.
Clearly memories as to the causes of the recent housing market collapse are short. Indeed, political pressures are once again increasing on the private sector to degrade sound lending practices.
Our data show that land prices were more volatile than house prices during the recent boom/bust cycle. In areas where land was inexpensive in 2000, the land share of property value jumped during the boom, and this rise in the landshare was a useful predictor of the subsequent crash in house prices. These results highlight the value of focusing on land for assessing house-price risk.
Please join AEI for a conversation among several contributors to the new volume “Teacher Quality 2.0: Toward a New Era in Education Reform” (Harvard Education Press, 2014), edited by Frederick M. Hess and Michael Q. McShane. Panelists will discuss the intersection of teacher-quality policy and innovation, exploring roadblocks and possibilities.