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Links and Quotes for July 2, 2015: tech research, Nerdopolis, Uber, jobs, disruptive innovation, and more
View related content: Pethokoukis
Here’s what going on:
The man who coined ‘Internet of Things’ says this is the first tech race America might lose – Kevin Ashton | “Technology investment moves through stages, like gears in a gearbox. Private money is the higher gears, most appropriate once there is momentum, and when the technology is less risky and more mature. Government money provides the low gears and is essential to get things moving, when inertia and risk are high and the final destination — a profitable mass-market product — is far in the distance. In short, high-tech economies need both public and private money in order to thrive. Public money buys a deep foundation of basic science and technology that private money builds on for decades.”
U.S. Tech Funding — What’s Going On? – Morgan Bender, Benedict Evans, Scott Kupor |
This investor has an interesting theory on what Google will do with its self-driving cars – Biz Carson |
Welcome to Nerdopolis: How knowledge workers are reshaping the map of the global economy – Amy Merrick, Natasha Gural | Diamond and other researchers contend that some high-skilled cities could provide even greater economic benefits to workers if local government policies didn’t hold them back. In the US, in particular, the denizens of a few Nerdopolises are effectively barring the gates against others who would like to move there. Rigid local land-use regulations, for example, limit new development in places such as Manhattan and San Francisco, restricting the housing supply and pricing many workers out of the market. That housing squeeze prevents many workers from taking advantage of the productivity gains they would realize in a Nerdopolis, hurting US economic growth as a whole, argues Chang-Tai Hsieh, who is Phyllis and Irwin Winkelried Professor of Economics at Chicago Booth, in a paper co-written with Moretti. Hsieh and Moretti calculate that housing restrictions in certain high-productivity cities such as New York, San Francisco, and San Jose decreased US GDP in 2009 by as much as 13.5 percent—equivalent to more than $2 trillion a year—from what it otherwise would have been. “This is a serious constraint to US growth,”
The Windy City needs cash, and its citizens like to watch movies and develop web apps – Patrick Hogan |
Labor market slack vanishing rapidly – JPMorgan | “The big decline in the unemployment rate occurred in spite of a modest decline in the volatile household measure of employment. The total participation rate tumbled 0.3%-point to a new all-time low of 62.6%. We wouldn’t get too carried away with this move for two reasons. First, much of the decline owes to a big fall in the teen participation rate, which tends to be especially volatile around this time of year. The over-20 group also saw a decline in participation, down two-tenths to 64.7%, but remains within the range seen over the past year. (The over-20 unemployment rate, however, also fell two-tenths to 4.8%, a new cycle-low).
The second reason not to get too bothered by the fall in the participation rate is the composition of the labor market flows. By far the biggest source of the increase in nonparticipants was people transitioning from employment to not in the labor force. Far fewer transitioned from unemployed to not in the labor force. Thus the data are at odds with a story that the decline in participation is due to unemployed workers becoming discouraged and leaving the labor force. Last month 3.2% of employed persons left the labor force, the second highest figure in the 35-year history of the data. Other details of the household survey were also quite favorable. The number employed part-time for economic reasons fell 147,000 last month. The ranks of the long-term unemployed — not a part of the U-6 calculation but often mentioned by the Fed Chair as an indication of incomplete labor market healing — fell 381,000 last month to 2.12 million, the second largest decline on record.”
Why Isn’t the Patent System Nurturing More Innovation? – Chris Jackson |
These startups are trying to beat Alzheimer’s, cure viral diseases, and kill tumors with gold. One common thread: funding from Peter Thiel – Jeff Bercovici |
When The Disrupted Push Back – Ron Miller | When Uber comes into a city, there is usually a significant direct impact on the cabbies and they can feel the results in their pocketbooks immediately. They can see people waiting for their Ubers. It’s in their faces and impossible to ignore. Other industries don’t necessarily feel it as acutely as cabbies have. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, it’s unlikely many newspaper employees understood what was happening to them or why. They might have sensed it was the Internet, but how could they know for sure? It could just as easily have been other economic factors they knew nothing about. They couldn’t point a finger at a disruptive force and definitively say it was the reason. The cabbies can and they have a target they can lash out at.”
This year is shaping up to be yet another one where real GDP growth doesn’t even hit 3% (roughly the four-decade average before the Great Recession). Since the 1990s boom, there have been only two years of 3% or higher growth. And no 4% years. As economist Paul Ashworth of Capital Economics puts it in a new research note, “As things stand now, GDP is on track for a 2.3% increase this year, which would be very similar to the growth rates achieved in 2012, 2013 and 2014. It appears that GDP growth is stuck in a rut.”
And Ashworth is skeptical whether the economy can escape that rut and even hit 3% growth on a sustained basis, much less that 4% growth some Republican candidates think should be a national growth target:
1.) Admittedly, there are periods, notably the 1800s, when the economy has sustained a GDP growth rate of more than 4%. [See above chart]. Aside from the rebound after World War II, however, it has been more than a century since GDP growth averaged 4% or higher. But those faster rates of GDP growth in the 1800s were only possible because of the rapid growth in the population, which averaged close to 3%. The latest projections indicate that over the next few decades, population growth will gradually fall even further below 1% per year
2.) As others have pointed out, achieving 4% GDP growth would either require a massive increase in annual immigration or a massive increase in the labour market participation rate of the existing population. There is scope for some increase in immigration: many talented foreign students already attend US universities, it is still a desirable destination for many in developing countries and America has more space to settle immigrants than any European country. But immigration on that scale would never be politically feasible, even if the unemployment rate was unusually low.
3.) We’re also not confident that trend GDP growth could be raised by boosting productivity growth. The latter has been unusually weak since the IT related surge ended around 2004. If anything, trend productivity growth is getting even worse.
4.) Finally, conservative economists have suggested that supply-side reforms could provide a big enough boost to the participation rate and productivity, if only politicians were willing to make the radical changes needed. As Chart 6 shows, however, the correlation between tax rates and GDP growth is pretty weak. GDP growth boomed during the 1990s, when average tax rates were rising, and then slowed in the 2000s, when tax rates fell sharply. The bottom line is that even 3% economic growth is likely to be a is likely to be a rare event in the future. 4% growth will be about as common as unicorns.
My take: Slower population growth plus slower productivity growth is the black magic formula for perpetually sluggish GDP growth. But policy can help — tax policy, too — as I recently wrote in The Week:
First, you need to boost labor force growth. One way is by keeping older people in the workforce longer by eliminating the payroll tax for workers 62 and older. Increasing immigration would also help. Despite America’s immigrant friendly reputation, our immigration rate is only half that of some other advanced economies, including Australia, Canada, and Germany.
Second, you need to boost productivity. Sorry, Republicans, but tax cuts are not enough. Making America more innovative requires everything from more startups to better infrastructure to more science funding.
Third, we need to measure GDP better. A recent Goldman Sachs report argues that metrics designed for an industrial economy are poorly suited for one driven by information technology. Productivity and GDP growth might be higher than we think: “So confident pronouncements that the standard of living is growing much more slowly than in the past should be taken with a grain of salt.”
I think 4% is a fine (very) aspirational target, but if the US economy could just grow over the next generation or two as fast it has over the past generation or two, it would be quite an accomplishment.
Nothing in the June jobs report to suggest any approaching US economic acceleration or surging inflation — or reason for the Fed to raise interest rates. The top line numbers were decent: 223,000 net new jobs, the unemployment rate fell to 5.3% from 5.5%. Also a big drop in the U-6 unemployment-underemployment rate.
The internals were less decent: The participation rate fell, the employment rate fell, the labor force fell by 432,000, April and May jobs were revised lower by 60,000, nominal wage growth was flat. What’s more, 2015 job growth of 208,000 a month is markedly lower than the 260,000 monthly average for all of last year. And if the participation rate had merely held steady from last month, that big jobless rate drop would have turned into a jump to 5.7%. Maybe this chart best sums up where we are six years into economic recovery (June was the anniversary month):
The employment rate for Americans in what should be the prime of their working life looks stalled at a depressed level. Sure looks like there is plenty of slack in the US labor market. As economist Justin Wolfers tweeted, “Every month that we learn that we can get more people back to work without stoking inflation, is fantastic.” Or to put it another way, via AEI’s Mike Strain:
The US labor force participation rate has fallen by about three percentage points since the Great Recession. Of that decline, Barclays thinks two points are due to population aging. The rest it blames on less participation within various age groups. Now overall, the US still has participation rates higher than Germany, Japan, and UK — the other large, advanced economies Barclays examines in a new report. But US participation dropped a lot more than those nations between 2005 and 2014. And it has particularly dropped a lot for working-age Americans versus that age group in other nations. Barclays:
The most striking aspect of the first question is the decline in US participation by men and women in their prime working years. In Japan, Germany, and the UK, changes in participation within these population groups added at least a percentage point to the overall rate of participation from 2005 to 2014 (Figure 2), led mainly by a trend increase in female labor force participation.
But in the US, participation of prime working men and women fell over this period, dragging the overall rate of participation down by a full percentage point. The movement of female participation is particularly striking; in the US, this peaked in the mid-1990s and has been drifting downward since. In the other three countries, female labor force participation has continued to climb.
The uniquely American decline in the participation by working-age men and women puts the US in a long-standing contrast to Japan, Germany, and the UK, and is hard to explain on cyclical grounds, because it long predates the 2008-09 recession to which, anyway, the other countries were also exposed. And it leaves the US with a 2014 participation rate that is quite low by international comparison.
Barlcays find this all “counterproductive” since the US has a higher overall participation rate. But, as the bank explains, “this turns out to be entirely due to the more favourable US demographic structure. For example, the US rate of labor force participation is lower than Japan’s for every demographic group that we consider, except the young (15-24) population some of whom might be more productively occupied in school for advanced training than in paid employment. … After adjustment for demographic composition, the US has the lowest, not the highest rate of participation.”
“Puzzling” is what Barclays call it. But I wonder if the the depth of the recession in the US isn’t a factor. After all, US participation crawled higher from mid-2004 through the start of 2007, then whammy. Also, maybe more of our potential younger workers — mid-to-late 20s — went to school or stayed there. I dunno.
“History in the age of fracture,” a recent report by the University of Oklahoma’s Wilfred McClay, addresses history’s decline as an academic discipline and challenges readers to rediscover history’s importance to civic life.
According to McClay, civilization cannot survive without collective memory. A nation’s awareness of its history creates a common consciousness, cultural vocabulary, and ethical framework for its citizens. A group of people with a shared past can move together from its common starting point toward definite goals. By contrast, lack of interest and confidence in history divides people. Insulated from one another, they march to “the incessant drumbeat of daily events.”
McClay attributes history’s decline to our growing inability to see its value. This inability stems from: (a) hyper-specialization among historians and their resultant incomprehensibility to the public; (b) the misconception that only objective, scientific disciplines are useful; and (b) the combination of collective guilt and fear of dogmatism.
New techniques of data analysis allow historians to delve into deeper subspecialties, but emerging subdisciplines have trouble communicating with each other and with the public. Today, journalists – not historians – feed the public’s hunger for history. Although historians rightfully fear that writing for general audiences might lead to their work’s politicization and oversimplification, historians’ unwillingness to cultivate public collective memory leaves people to question whether “history” in its current form has any purpose at all.
According to McClay, instead of pretending that history is a science we must see its value as a study of human nature’s ever-changing complexity. Science calls for empirical inquiry, testable hypotheses, and reproducible results. History is humankind’s self-conscious exploration of humankind. It can never be a science, and any attempt to turn it into one only siphons away what makes it truly valuable – its humanity.
McClay writes that history is to a society as memory is to an individual. Like memory, history connects isolated events and draws overarching conclusions to create an identity. But this sort of history makes us nervous. We are reluctant to pass subjective judgement on objective occurrences because we fear we might distort the past. McClay writes that while a desire to debunk false self-conceptions is necessary, it does more harm than good when carried too far. History conceived as a catalog of transgressions builds walls between nations, religions, and races. As a social weapon, it destroys civilization instead of binding it together.
McClay concludes that history should be for the public “in the sense of being addressed to them, as one people with a common past and common future.” History for the public should be both accessible and intellectually challenging, conscientious in its subjectivity, and honest in its celebration of past triumphs. According to McClay, if our society can reclaim history for civic life, it may help save us from the “age of fracture” in which we live.
There is some evidence of what those policy changes could be. The economy could withstand far higher tax rates on the wealthiest, and a 90 percent rate would both reduce inequality and also boost government tax revenue. Government policies that help redistribute income through the safety net also won’t harm economic growth but will address inequality.
Is this now a common center-left tax policy preference, that the top tax rate should be 90%? The Center for American Progress is usually thought of as a center-left think tank (with strong ties to Team Clinton) and ThinkProgress is a “a project of the Center for American Progress Action Fund,” which is the sister organization of CAP. (I hope I’ve gotten the family tree correct.) If so, it is certainly an interesting development, though not surprising given the growing number of liberal economists who’ve been pushing the idea of sharply higher tax rates. [Update: Bernie Sanders is also talking 90% or bust.] Have to keep an eye on this.
That said, I do not think it a good idea:
View related content: Pethokoukis
I am concerned about climate change and think the risk of dangerous climate change is high enough to warrant precautionary action. That being said, the contentious debate over this issue shows the value of Hayekian humility when it comes to policymaking. In the new EconTalk podcast, host Russ Roberts has a great chat with journalist Matt Ridley about climate change and the issue of consensus and “settled science.” Here is a key portion of their talk:
Ridley: And of course, you know, the whole point of science is that, as Richard Feynman famously said, “Science is in the business of proving that experts are wrong.” And you know, until very recently, 97% of medics agreed that cholesterol was the cause of heart disease. Now, that’s gone. That theory is wrong. Pretty well everybody–well, not pretty well everybody, but gradually, most people are realizing that that just ain’t true. Dietary cholesterol, I should say. Cholesterol is involved in heart disease. But it’s not because you are eating it in your diet. And that was based on very dodgy science in the 1950s. Which was enforced by a pretty ruthless consensus-building exercise that was pretty brutal to people who disagreed with it.
… And we see this again and again in science. The whole point of science is challenge, and so on; and I can see why in climate science this has happened. And that’s because the IPCC process has kind of made a single church out of it, whereas science is often a very geographically enterprise with people in different universities all over the country and all over the world challenging each other. Which is actually quite helpful. The fact that there are rival groups prepared to say Professor Jones has got this wrong is what has kept science honest all these years.
But actually if you look back at other episodes in science, there is a surprisingly strong tendency for this to happen. I refer again to cholesterol; I refer to Lysenko-ism–well, that was in a totalitarian regime where one biologist, Trofim Lysenko, was able to insist on his version of genetics and even got some of his opponents imprisoned.
But you know, even things like continental drift and the age of the earth–it’s often been very hard. Or you mentioned stomach ulcers. The two Australians who, 20 years ago, said “I don’t think stomach ulcers are caused by what we think they are. We think they are caused by a bacterium which is easily cured by antibiotics”–they were hounded and ridiculed and vilified for this absurd heresy, until they–well, they ended up with a Nobel Prize and we now realize that they were 100% right and the others were wrong.
But it’s not at all unusual for science to do this, to start championing one cause and making one church out of things. And by the way–there’s an element of confirmation bias, and confirmation bias is an important aspect of what happens. In other words, if I champion, if I come up with a theory, then I’m not going to go out and look for ways in which this theory is wrong. I’m going to go out and look for ways in which this theory is right. … And we all act like the prosecuting attorney who is trying to prove his case, rather than being–and sometimes will often claim we’re the only person that challenges our own ideas. It’s not really true, actually. Most of them actually look for confirmatory evidence. And by the way: I don’t think we should stop them. I don’t think it’s possible to expect, you know, Professor Jones at such-and-such university has come up with a new idea to suddenly be his own worst enemy. It’s just unrealistic, that. But what I do think we should expect is that Professor Smith should be Professor Jones’s worst enemy. That’s what’s kept science honest over the years.
Roberts: That’s right. And I’ve been writing recently about how hard it is for economists to change each others’ minds with data; and that suggests that maybe economics is not so scientific. … I’m thinking about Semmelweis and puerperal fever, when women were dying in childbirth. … Semmelweis went out and he did a number of quick small experiments that confirmed his theory, which was people needed to wash their hands when they left the morgue when they left to deliver children, babies, in the maternity ward. And he was laughed at. And it wasn’t open and shut, to the other people; in fact what was the opposite–his theories were obviously a crank and crazy.
Ridley: Worse than laughed at. He was driven out. … He went mad in the end, and all that.
Is this good news, bad news, or a bit of both? From the Associated Press and CNBC:
Incomes for the bottom 99 percent of American families rose 3.3 percent last year to $47,213, the biggest annual gain in the past 15 years, according to data compiled by economist Emmanuel Saez and released Monday by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth. “For the bottom 99 percent of income earners, this marks the first year of real recovery from the income losses sparked by the Great Recession,” Saez, a professor at the University of California-Berkeley, said in a summary of his findings. … Still, income inequality worsened in 2014. The richest 1 percent of Americans posted a much bigger increase in pay: their incomes soared an average of 10.8 percent to $1.3 million. The wealthiest 1 percent also captured 21.2 percent of all income in 2014, up from 20.1 percent the previous year.
Saez is that other French economist and inequality researcher (though he works with Thomas Piketty, author of “Capital on the Twenty-First Century). A few thoughts here:
1.) It’s always worth pointing out what Saez means by “income.” It’s basically income from the private economy, but not including the safety net or employer benefits such health insurance or retirement contributions.
Now that’s a lot, but it obviously isn’t everything. For example, using a more inclusive, after-tax income measure finds median incomes up about 40% over the past three decades versus flattish “market income” gains. The point here is that when you factor in total compensation plus the safety net, middle class incomes and consumption power are doing much better than Saez’s data would suggest. As the Manhattan Institute’s Scott Winship noted back in late 2013, “By 2011, the safety net had returned middle-class and poor households’ incomes to the highest levels ever seen. Since then, the situation has likely improved. Disposable income among the poor and middle class is probably at an all-time high.” Yay, safety net.
2.) Of course, I would prefer more of those income gains come from “market income” than the government or healthcare benefits. As Saez notes, “By 2014, bottom 99% families have recovered slightly less than 40% of the 2007- 2009 Great Recession losses.” (Again, not counting all that other stuff.) Faster growth would help a lot, though there are also reasons to worry a “rising tide” isn’t lifting and won’t lift all boats as in the past without (a) more economic dynamism and innovation, (b) more capable workers, and (c) expanded income supports.
3.) But when prosperity is broadly shared and upward mobility is robust, there is less reason to fret about rising inequality — especially if it comes from market capitalism rather than crony capitalism. See the below chart from Saez:
Hey, incomes rose a lot during the much-revered Clinton expansion. And income growth for the 1% was five time as great as for the 99%. Overall, income going to the top 1% rose to 21.5% in 2000 from 14.2% in 1993. (And for the richest of the rich, the top 0.01%, the top income share rose to 5.1% in 2000 from 2.3% in 1993.) A rising tide wasn’t lifting all boats equally, but they were all getting a pretty good lift nonetheless. During the Obama expansion, however, top incomes are again rising about five times as fast as for everyone else, but people seem to care a lot more since their income growth is tepid at best.
4.) Is high-end inequality just going to get more and more extreme? Here is a chart showing what it’s done each year since 1993 through 2014.
At AEI’s recent event, “The American dream in crisis,” Robert Putnam, Charles Murray, and William Julius Wilson discussed problems brought to light in Putnam’s new book, “Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis.” The book expounds upon several alarming trends – the widening income gap, growing class segregation, and the disappearance of working-class communities – and investigates their implications for America’s children.
Putnam’s presentation highlighted several startling class-based disparities in children’s upbringings, cited historical trends in income inequality and other potentially-related variables, and suggested ways to revitalize the American dream.
“Increasingly the most important decision a child will make is choosing their parents, and that is fundamentally un-American,” Putnam observed. Class disparities in children’s environments, communities, and opportunities are present at birth and take effect during childhood. Possibly the most dire consequence of these disparities, according to Putnam, is the fact that poor children have no safety nets. By contrast, potentially life-shattering blunders become harmless learning experiences for wealthy kids, thanks to their highly-invested support networks.
In Putnam’s view, America is in a second Gilded Age, and today’s upper class, like that of the 1890s, must experience a “civic reawakening.” To illustrate this point, he presented a chart showing that after the first Gilded Age, social capital, philanthropy, economic equality, and political consensus increased until the mid-1960s. According to Putnam, the establishment of public high schools sparked these upward trends by diminishing educational inequalities and jumpstarting economic productivity.
In hopes of reviving those positive trends, Putnam proposed what he calls “purple policies,” which combine conservative and liberal ideas. With the goal of reviving equal opportunity, Putnam advocates for the careful development and reform of programs such as early childhood education, apprenticeships, tutoring, community colleges, and parent coaching.
While Murray agreed with Putnam’s observations, he questioned the efficacy of “purple policies.” Citing a study in Nature, Murray said that factors such as family income, parenting style, and education account for a limited amount of variance in outcomes like cognitive ability. Genes predict these outcomes more accurately.
According to Murray, declines in inter-class marriage are creating an ability gap that exacerbates the opportunity gap. Children’s emotional intelligence, IQ, and overall success, Murray said, are highly correlated with each other and with parental IQ. The complication of “assorted mating” suggests that Putnam’s solutions may not suffice. “I hope for a better outcome,” said Murray. “I do not expect it.”
Wilson drew attention to another complication: race. According to his 1980 book, “The Declining Significance of Race,” economic class predicts life trajectory with greater accuracy than race. This statement is even truer today, said Wilson, and according to a study that compared intra-racial income gaps, the divide between rich and poor is widest among African Americans.
Putnam concluded, “There’s a core of things we could all agree on that would make things better.” We may not know what caused the American dream’s malaise. We may disagree as to the proper cure. But we can agree that an alive-and-well American dream guarantees our kids an equal chance at success.
View related content: Pethokoukis
Democrats do better electorally where it’s crowded, Republicans where it’s less so. The greater the population density, the bluer a state, region, or city. And that’s too bad, argue Michael Hendrix and Andrew Evans in National Affairs, because “the result of this electoral reality is that Republicans rarely control the levers of power in some of the areas with the most people and greatest economic vitality.”
A more important result is that one-party, Democratic dominance means these cities are often closed to disruptive forces that could help them more fully unleash their economic potential:
As a result of decades of Democratic governance and misplaced priorities, however, American cities do not offer the opportunities for success and growth that they should, especially for those looking to climb the socio-economic ladder. In many cases, city governments are utterly dysfunctional. And the reason for this dysfunction is that our cities are too often closed — closed to businesses and closed to outsiders. For the middle class and those striving to make it up the ladder, the taxes, housing, and other costs leave cities simply too expensive to afford — especially with a family. Excessive regulation makes it difficult, if not downright impossible, to get the permits necessary to start a business. Cronyism and a lack of transparency make it difficult to know whether anyone is trying to fix the situation. The reality is that American cities — with their insufficient affordability and poor governance — suffer from a profound lack of opportunity and a surplus of problems.
Cities are important, both for the millions who live in them and the economic growth they generate for the nation as a whole. “Cities,” says Richard Florida, “spur the mixing and mingling of talented people that lead to technological inventions and the formation of entrepreneurial enterprises.” And when that mixing process is working right, everyone benefits. Research from Enrico Moretti has found that for each new innovation-job in a city, five additional jobs are created. “For each new software designer hired at Twitter in San Francisco, there are five new job openings for baristas, personal trainers, therapists and taxi drivers, ” Moretti wrote in the Wall Street Journal back in 2013.
Hendrix and Evans wants to deregulate cities to open them up to new workers, to new entrepreneurs big and small, and to more transparency and accountability. They want to make it easier to build housing, get a business permit, see online what your city government is up to. “Since cities are closed, conservatives should seek to make them open,” Hendrix and Evans write. That word, “open,” is an important one, argues Scott Beyer of the Market Urbanism blog in post about the the Hendrix and Evans essay, because it inverts political stereotypes. Beyer:
At the national level, Democrats are portrayed as the open and tolerant ones, and Republicans as the reactionary ones trying to uphold the status quo. These distinctions have been established largely because of the parties’ differing approach to social issues. But this is hardly applicable to cities, where issues are rooted more in economics and quality-of-life. A large number of urbanites—whether they want to call themselves liberals, progressives, or Democrats—are in fact quite reactionary themselves, a point emphasized by the authors. Housing regulations have been used by the urban left to restrict new construction, as if city neighborhoods are gated country clubs that should never allow change or new people. The liberal business elite have fortified the business permitting process so much that, in many cities, it is nearly-impossible for competing entrepreneurs to enter basic professions like hair-styling. And to carve out a voting bloc, the left has defended unionized public monopolies that deliver services at far higher cost, and less efficiency, than is necessary.
Some some possible elements of an urban agenda that come to mind: housing deregulation, charter schools, prison reform, occupational licensing reform, expanded income supports …
By the way, a few other posts on the housing issue: