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White House/Pete Souza
Editor’s note: This paper originally appeared in the International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 2 in Fall/Winter 2012.
Though it has neglected the region for brief periods over the past two decades, U.S. trade policy, linked to U.S. diplomatic and security policy, has made East Asia a central focus. Secretary of State James Baker’s vow not to allow a line to be drawn the middle of the Pacific with the US on one side and the nations of Asian on the other has held steady. This article traces and analyzes U.S. trade policy toward East Asia since 1990. It describes the development of competing paths to Asian trade integration: a trans-Pacific vision, embodied now in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP); and an intra-Asian vision, embodied most clearly in the ASEAN Plus Three process. The article concludes with a detailed description of the major negotiating issues and challenges that have emerged in the ongoing TPP bargaining sessions.
Key Words: Asian regionalism, U.S. trade policy, APEC, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ASEAN Plus Three
Looking Back: A Selective Historical Overview of U.S. Regionalism
Beginning in the 1940’s, when the postwar multilateral trading system was founded around the truncated provisions of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and continuing to the mid-1980s, the United States steadfastly opposed derogations from most favored national status (MFN) obligations, and, therefore, most regional trading arrangements. (Cold War exigencies account for the exception regarding the formation and growth of the European Community.) Essentially, the U.S. adhered to a two-track trade policy: (1) multilateralism, embodied in its membership in the GATT and in its leadership in eight rounds of trade-liberalizing GATT negotiations; and, (2) unilateralism-bilateralism, dictated by the substantive reality that GATT did not cover key trading sectors, and thus powerful domestic interests demanded that U.S. political leaders pursue independent bilateral negotiations—particularly with Japan and the EC—to achieve trade policy goals beyond multilateral disciplines. Unilateralism was linked directly to bilateral negotiations as the U.S. also reserved the right to act on its own by enforcing its will, should bilateral negotiations fail.1
By the late 1980s, however, forces were coming into play that would induce the United States to introduce bilateral and regional agreements into its portfolio of trade instruments. In response, beginning with the Bush (I) administration, but continuing in more urgent and vocal fashion in the Clinton administration, voices for a greater priority for regional trade policies obtained greater influence within the U.S. executive department. Secretary of State James Baker had stated that while the United States hoped that liberalization would occur in the Uruguay Round, “If not, we might be willing to explore a market-liberalizing club approach through mini-lateral arrangements or a series of bilateral arrangements”2
And in a move that still resonates within the current debate over the correct balance in U.S.-Asian trade and diplomatic policy, it was Baker who challenged (behind the scenes) the first proposal for an intra-East Asian regional institution in form of an East Asian Economic Caucus, advanced by Malaysia in 1991. Baker made clear to U.S. allies in the region that the United States would oppose any plan that “drew a line down the middle of the Pacific” and placed the United States on the other side of that line.3 Baker’s attempt to meld trade policy with broader diplomatic and security goals has echoed throughout all succeeding US administrations.
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