Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the critically important subject of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including current American policy on approving such missions; the relative likelihood of success or failure in several ongoing or proposed peacekeeping operations; and the policy direction in which the UN Secretariat and the present Administration are moving. I have a prepared statement, which I will summarize, and ask that it be inserted in the record. I would, of course, be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee might have.
There is little doubt that, after an explosive growth in UN “peacekeeping” operations in the early and mid-1990s, followed by a decline in new activities, we are again in a period of massive increases. We face potentially enormous and seemingly limitless commitments in both military and civilian deployments in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Many of these operations, like several of their predecessors earlier in the Clinton Administration, are very emphatically not “peacekeeping” as that term has conventionally been understood. Therein lies much, but certainly not all, of the problem that Congress now confronts, in both policy and budget terms.
In this testimony, I would like to review briefly the course of the Clinton Administration’s policy development concerning UN peacekeeping and the recent “experts’ report” to the UN Secretary General, which was largely endorsed both by the Security Council and by the final declaration of the Millennium Summit earlier this month in New York.[1] I believe that it has been consistent Administration policy, from its first day, to expand the size, scope, and mission of UN peacekeeping activities; that it has not been entirely candid with Congress in so doing; and that its support for such policies is at the heart of the Secretary General’s expansive peacekeeping agenda, and the actions of the Millennium Summit. I also provide a brief case study of a pending peacekeeping operation (in the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict) to show how the policy predilections of the Administration and the UN Secretariat are currently being implemented in the field.
I. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S PEACEKEEPING POLICY
From its very first days, the Clinton Administration advocated a policy of “assertive multilateralism,” in contrast to the policies of its predecessors, which were thought to rely insufficiently on the United Nations and other international organizations for the conduct of American foreign policy. The Clinton Administration moved very early in its tenure to translate the rhetoric of “assertive multilateralism” into concrete policy, and its chosen vehicle was Somalia. There was little or no consultation with Congress at any stage of the process. On March 26, 1993, just two months after President Clinton took office, and under intense American lobbying, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814, directing the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Somalia “to assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion, and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.” In addition, Resolution 814 asked that the Secretary General obtain financial support for “the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia.” U.S. Permanent Representative Madeleine K. Albright said unequivocally, “With this Resolution, we will embark on an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations.”[2] Indeed, “peacekeeping” as it was traditionally understood was being replaced in Somalia by the sharply different notion of “peacemaking,” involving the direct use of UN military force to shape the outcome on the ground.
This policy of “nation building” in Somalia continued through the spring, summer, and early fall of 1993 despite increasing levels of violence and instability. On August 27, in a major address, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said “We went there to save a people, and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those people rebuild their nation.” He added “President Clinton has given us clear direction to stay the course with other nations to help Somalia.”[3] On September 22, 1993, again following extensive American diplomatic efforts, the Security Council adopted Resolution 865, which would have locked in a UN “nation building” presence for some time into the future. That Resolution reaffirmed the Council’s support for “the process of national reconciliation and political settlement” begun earlier. Resolution 865 also provided for the UN to assist “in the furtherance of the national reconciliation process and to promote and advance the re-establishment of regional and national institutions and civil administration in the entire country.” Disaster followed in Mogadishu on October 3, less than two weeks later.
Even as the Administration was experimenting with “assertive multilateralism” in Somalia, it was proclaiming and elaborating on the new policy in a variety of forums. President Clinton’s September, 1993 speech to the General Assembly, for example, suggested that the following questions be asked in deciding whether or not to undertake a new “peace operation”:
Is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? From now on, the United Nations should address these and other hard questions for every proposed mission before we vote and before the mission begins. The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in very one of the world’s conflicts.”
While the President and his senior advisors were speaking publicly on the subject, the Administration was also engaged in an intense internal discussion to draft guidelines for US involvement in UN peacekeeping activities, eventually promulgated in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (“PDD-25”) released in unclassified form in May, 1994.
Although PDD-25 purports to establish decision-making criteria that determine when and under what circumstances the United States will vote in the Security Council to support UN peacekeeping, when it will itself participate, and when it will support “peace enforcement” operations, the document is surprisingly unrestrictive. As Michael T. Clark points out, PDD-25 provides
“no assurance . . that the administration will not continue to pursue a particular peace operation should any, or all, of the criteria fail to be met. Indeed, PDD-25 avers that ‘these factors are an aid in decision-making; they do not by themselves constitute a prescriptive device.’ . . . [Thus], it cannot be known with any degree of precision or certainty when, where, or with what degree of support the United States may engage in U.N. peace operations. There is no commitment to vote against a resolution or an operation should it fail to meet PDD-25 conditions.”[4]
Clark also points out that the final version of PDD-25 raises concerns “about the manner in which the president may subordinate U.S. forces to the operational control of a U.N. commander,” because of changes made to an earlier draft, submitted in August, 1993 by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.[5] Finally, Clark also asserts that “much of the language in the unclassified version, widely distributed to members of Congress and the public, is ‘tougher’ than the tentative, vague wording in the full, classified PDD.”[6]
Indeed, in this last point lies much of the problem. Although the Administration has purportedly kept Congress closely informed about UN “peace operations,” there is evident dissatisfaction both with its explanations, and with apparent inconsistencies between the stated policies of the Administration and the votes being cast in the Security Council. Nowhere is this divergence clearer than in the budget implications revealed last week by the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) in its report “Cost of Peacekeeping Is Likely To Exceed Current Estimate.” There, the GAO projects that the annual cost of peacekeeping, due to new and expanded missions, will be approximately $ 600,000,000 (or 28 %) larger than the $ 2,100,000,000 currently budgeted. Moreover, these expenditure projections coincide with other troubling aspects of the peacekeeping missions GAO examined:
-- In the case of Sierra Leone, for example, however distressing are the conditions within that country, it is difficult if not impossible to identify a real threat posed to international peace and security, which is the only jurisdictional basis for action by the Security Council provided in the UN Charter. Recent press reports of dissension within the UNAMSIL force can only increase the level of concern for the coherence and direction of the entire UN operation.[7]
-- In the proposed Congo operation, while a threat to international peace and security is much stronger, the mission is ill-defined, potentially endless in duration, and with long-term financial costs that defy quantification. The persistent inability of the parties to come to a true meeting of the minds in a sustainable peace agreement brings forebodings of Somalia.
-- In Kosovo, the UN’s civilian administrative efforts have been widely criticized, including by the UN’s own Administrator.
-- In the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, considered in more detail below, the UN’s proposed peacekeeping force, endorsed in principle already by the United States, goes well beyond the actual resources needed for a cease-fire observation mission.
These current and proposed new actions form a pattern that is uncomfortably reminiscent of the Administration’s first years in office, when peacekeeping operations seemed to be approved reflexively, and to expand unchecked.
Indeed, it is legitimate to ask now whether PDD-25 in any of its several versions has ever been an effective guide to Administration decisions on UN “peace operations.” To the contrary, faith in the credo of “assertive multilateralism” seems a more reliable explanation of what the Administration has been doing in practice, and enthusiastically so within the last twelve months. Even more troubling, the way forward is already clear, as the next section examines, and that way forward looks, not surprisingly, like “assertive multilateralism” redivivus.
II. THE BRAHIMI REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
Debate in Washington has not yet really begun over the full implications of the experts’ report on United Nations peacekeeping (known as the “Brahimi Report,” after its chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi), but it was clearly commissioned and designed as part of the Secretary General’s efforts to enhance the role of the United Nations in international conflict resolution. Endorsement by the Security Council (in Resolution 1318, September 7, 2000) and the Millennium Summit was ceremonial and perfunctory, as intended, and the real issue now is whether the Report is simply accepted essentially as gospel, or whether it received adequate scrutiny. This hearing is certainly an important step in beginning the necessary attention and debate.
The importance of the Brahimi Report to Secretary General Kofi Annan cannot be underestimated. His transmittal letter to the Security Council and the General Assembly described the group’s recommendations as “far-reaching,” and their “expeditious implementation” was “essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace.”[8] The Clinton Administration’s warm support for the Secretary General, and the Report’s quick endorsement by the Security Council provide clear evidence that its conclusions were entirely predictable and well-briefed in advance to minimize possible objections.
Some aspects of the Brahimi Report are clearly correct, although these seem awkwardly out of place when compared to other aspects of its work. The Report properly stresses the importance of “clear, credible and achievable mandates” when the Security Council creates peacekeeping forces. Noting the important but often overlooked fact that the Council is “a political body,” the Report observes that the need for political compromise can create ambiguities and compromises in its mandates that can spell serious trouble in implementing that mandate. It then concludes:
“While it acknowledges the utility of political compromise in many cases, the Panel comes down in this case on the side of clarity, especially for operations that will deploy into dangerous circumstances. Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions, the Panel urges that the Council refrain from mandating such a mission.”[9]
This is precisely what the Security Council should be doing, but which too often it has failed to do in the recent past, including in currently proposed operations such as the Congo.
The Report itself admits that recent peacekeeping operations have often been combined with “peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict,” and that such complex and risky mandates have been the rule rather than the exception.”[10] There no attempt to justify this radical departure from the requirements of the UN Charter, which limit Security Council jurisdiction to threats to and breaches of “international peace and security.” It is, in fact, the promiscuous resort to UN peacekeeping over the recent past that has inserted the UN into situations it was not intended to handle, and, in fact, is not competent to handle. This is the real place to begin the debate on American policy about United Nations peacekeeping. Congress has repeatedly made its skepticism on this point known. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has repeatedly ignored not only Congress, but also its own publicly stated limitations to U.S. support for “peace operations.”
There are many recommendations aspects of the Brahimi Report that are wrong-headed, inadequately considered or simply confused, several aspects of which are discussed below. In fact, most of its conclusions are foreordained given the eleven “premises”[11] from which the Report begins, many of which simply assume a conclusion that other knowledgeable observers would argue is at least subject to reasonable debate or qualification. The report is woefully insufficient in even considering alternative analyses to the problems within its purview. What follows in this prepared testimony is only a limited overview of the Brahimi Report, which deserves careful attention and review by Congress.
1. Peacekeeping Doctrine and Strategy
For present purposes, however, we should focus first on the most egregiously mistaken section, “Implications for peacekeeping doctrine and strategy.”[12] In these few paragraphs are concentrated the real agenda behind the Secretary General’s request for this Report, and the most intractable unwillingness to learn from past UN mistakes.
Although the Brahimi Report’s doctrinal section begins by reaffirming the traditional preconditions for successful peacekeeping -- “consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self defense” -- it quickly moves to jettison all three of them. First, the Report lists examples where “consent may be manipulated” by “the local parties” and where the UN has been “unable to respond effectively to such challenges.” Second, the Report defines “impartiality” to mean “adherence to the principles of the Charter” and to UN mandates rooted in those principles. Third, the Report rejects the “symbolic and non-threatening” force structures of traditional peacekeeping in favor of “bigger forces, better equipped and more costly” that will “pose a credible deterrent effect,” and which will have “a robust force posture” and “robust rules of engagement.”
In the first two instances of rejecting traditional peacekeeping criteria, the Brahimi report is intellectually muddled. The examples of “manipulating” consent are in fact instances where one or all of the parties to a conflict have not in fact truly given consent. They are not problems of peacekeeping military operations or doctrine, but of fundamental political failure to reach actual agreement on ending conflict. As such, they are circumstances where the United Nations should not deploy a peacekeeping force at all, not one where more “robust” rules of engagement will make a perceptible difference.
Equally muddled is the Brahimi Report’s concept of “impartiality,” which would make the UN forces “morally compelled” to use force where the local parties are not “moral equals.” Calling this approach “peacekeeping” is actually more than muddled: it is intellectually dishonest. The UN has had success in restoring international peace and security between parties of varying morality, and that is why it has been a useful instrument of international policy. If the Brahimi Report truly contemplates that the UN will be picking white hats and black hats, its failure to so explicitly, relying instead on distorting the “impartiality” principle, will not pass unnoticed.
Even more intellectually dishonest is the third point, dealing with UN peacekeepers and the use of force. “Robust” is the often-used word of choice for the new look, which has a fine rhetorical tone, but very little military substance. Despite all of the muscular rhetoric, however, the Report modestly observes “the United Nations does not wage war.” Earlier, however, the Report had said precisely that: “when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them.”[13] What this really says, however, is that the UN now wants the capacity to wage small wars (small, “moral” wars, of course). One cannot talk about the use of force, even for “moral” purposes without being prepared for retaliation, either against the UN or against other parties to the conflict. This involves combat, and it most assuredly will involve casualties. This is war, not peacekeeping.
2. The Limitations of “Preventive Diplomacy”
“Preventive diplomacy” rapidly became a contemporary buzz phrase for several obvious reasons. It is virtually impossible to argue with the abstract proposition that preventing conflicts is superior to resolving them after they have erupted into military violence. The costs in human life, property, and lost political and economic opportunities will almost certainly be higher once conflict breaks out, both for the parties directly involved and for interested outsiders. Successful preventative efforts, moreover, may lessen the inclination to resort to force in the future by building trust and confidence, and by actually helping to solve underlying disagreements.
Moreover, as the Brahimi Report concedes, UN peacekeeping “addressed no more than one third of the conflict situations of the 1990s.”[14] Like so much of the rest of the Report, however, the section on “Implications for preventive action”[15] is really little more than an ill-disguised call for more financial and other resources, to close “the gap between verbal postures and financial and political support for prevention.”[16] Of course, another way to close the gap is to reduce the level of verbal posturing, which I consider below.
If preventive diplomacy is so attractive, why is it so infrequently successful? In particular, why has the United Nations not achieved a better record at prevention? First, hard as it is for many people to believe, war is often an entirely rational calculation, and preventive diplomacy can no more stop it than it can reverse the power of gravity. Second, the UN is (and is likely to remain) only a collection of governments, the sum of whose efforts will not be greater than their individual exertions. Third, governments should understand that the UN Secretariat, especially the Secretary General, does not operate on a higher plane than mere mortal national officials, and that the Secretariat’s contribution is more likely to be at the molecular rather than the molar level. Let us consider each point in turn.
First, Clausewitz correctly noted that war is a combination of “hate and enmity,” “the play of probabilities and chance,” and “the province of pure intelligence.”[17] Advocates of UN preventative diplomacy typically assume that only “hate and enmity” are at work, and, therefore, that “good offices,” mediation, and conventional diplomacy will frequently be successful in preventing the resort to force. Unfortunately, this is both naïve and often dangerous. Where UN efforts have played a role in preventing conflict, such as the efforts of played by former Mauritanian Foreign Minister Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah in Burundi in 1993-95, it often has more to do with the abilities and personality of the individual involved than it does with the UN as an institution.[18] This is because the UN’s capabilities and resources, although often cited as inadequate, as in the Brahimi Report, are rarely the real issue. The real issue is the balance of calculations between the potentially warring sides, which may be susceptible to political resolution or may not be.
Second, UN member states do not put aside their national interests when they enter the General Assembly or the Security Council chambers, a point the Brahimi Report essentially ignores. Indeed, obtaining two-year, non-permanent seats on the Council is often a national policy objective precisely so that the new Council member can take care of national business during a particularly critical or sensitive time. Even where direct national interests are not at stake, broader political alignments and the potential precedential importance of Council decisions, among other factors, will play an important role in decision making. In short, the Council is not composed of Platonic guardians, but states pursuing interests, often seemingly far removed from the subject under debate. Thus, Ecuador abstained on Resolution 687, the post-Persian Gulf War cease-fire text, because it contained provision for demarcating the Iraq-Kuwaiti border, which might turn out later to have an impact on the long-standing Ecuadorian-Peruvian border dispute. To be sure, such behavior may say more about human nature than the UN institutionally, but it is unmistakably pervasive. For that very reason, moreover, the oft-mentioned alternative to the UN -- reliance on regional security organizations as such -- is also not really likely to provide measurably different results.[19]
Third, the “Dag Hammarskjold myth” has unusual persistence in UN circles, but it is nonetheless still just a myth. The Secretary General is only the UN’s “chief administrative officer,”[20] and has neither the political legitimacy nor the authority to exceed the wishes of member governments. Thus, the Soviet Union would surely have vetoed Hammarskjold, the poetry-writing idealist, for a third term as Secretary General had he not died during a 1961 mission to the Congo. In precisely the same vein, the Clinton Administration savaged Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he became inconvenient to its objectives in the 1990’s. Any Secretary General who ignores this reality will suffer the same fate. On the other hand, when a Secretary General is serving the interests of a Security Council majority, he can typically expect ample support as a useful surrogate. Ironically, where the Secretariat can be most effective -- on the ground in specific crisis and pre-crisis situations -- it is often the most cautious and bureaucratic. Thus, where a Special Representative acts decisively and even boldly (as did Martti Ahtisaari during the 1989 Namibian elections), the UN’s chances of success are higher, but these cases are unfortunately rare.
While conflict prevention by the United Nations is attractive in the abstract, its desirability should not obscure either international political reality. In all likelihood, therefore, the United Nations will continue to play only a highly limited, if occasionally useful, role well into the foreseeable future. The Brahimi Report, however, flatly rejects this analysis, and proposed instead a substantial strengthening of the independent capacity of the UN Secretariat to act in advance of the wishes of Member States. Such a capacity would give the Secretariat an autonomy that is both illegitimate under the UN Charter, and quite likely contrary to the broader interests of the United States in pursuing its national interests on a world-wide basis.
3. The Unrealistic Objectives of “Peace Building”
One of the more remarkable aspects of the Brahimi Report is its virtually unrestrained confidence in the ability of the United Nations of what the Clinton Administration used to refer to, back in 1993, as “nation building.” Although “nation building disappeared from the Administration’s record after the debacle in Somalia, the policy has continued -- unsuccessfully to be sure -- in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and east Timor. The Brahimi Report, for example, quotes approvingly from a 1998 statement by the President of the Security Council in support of the UN “establishing post-conflict peace-building structures,” and actually cites Haiti as one example.[21]
In a breathtaking series of recommendations, the Report asserts that: (1) “all peace operations should be given the capacity to make a demonstrable difference in the lives of the people in their mission areas”; (2) the UN should support “a broader process of democratization and civil society building”: and (3) “a doctrinal shift is required in how the [UN] Organization conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations.”[22] The Report even suggests that prior “missions’ tasks would have been much easier if a common United Nations justice package had allowed them to apply an interim legal code. . . .”[23] In short, UN peace missions “must also try to rebuild civil society,”[24] as blatant a statement of the philosophy of social engineering as we are likely to hear in the foreseeable future.
These and other related proposals are surely “nation building” with a vengeance, culminating in the Brahimi Report’s conclusion that “the United Nations should be considered the focal point for peace-building activities by the donor community.”[25] Once this point finally emerges, of course, all of the Report’s earlier suggestions fall into place, in what is manifestly a brief for expanding the UN’s turf. There are strong reasons and considerable empirical evidence underlying our conclusion in U.S. domestic policy that it is not within the Federal government’s competence to build civil society. In light of that experience, why should any of us believe that the UN possesses that competence internationally?
4. The Trouble with Increased UN Funding and Personnel
The largest part of the Brahimi Report is dense bureaucratic prose on suggested changes in the UN Secretariat, virtually every single one of which, without exception as far as I can discern, calls for increased funding, personnel, and responsibilities for the UN Secretariat.[26] Here, the agenda is not hidden at all, because the report acknowledges that increased resources will enable the Secretariat “to prepare well and be asked to undertake [peacekeeping missions] more often because it is well prepared.”[27] Although the Brahimi report does not repeat the call for a UN “rapid deployment force” -- undoubtedly in part because of the forceful opposition to such a force so widely expressed in the United States -- it comes as close as one can imagine without actually using the phrase itself. Indeed the report acknowledges that it is precisely this American opposition that much change to make implementing its recommendations possible.[28]
All of the these doctrinal changes in peacekeeping, and all of the proposals for increased financial, personnel and other resources for the Secretary General have the same consequences: strengthening the independent capacity of the UN Secretariat and the personnel assigned to it at the expense of the Security Council collectively, the Five Permanent Members in particular, and all of the UN’s member governments individually. Curiously, however, the report nowhere involves the mechanism contemplated by the UN Charter: the Military Staff Committee (“the Committee” or “MSC”). If any of the Brahimi report’s recommendations on UN military structures are to be implemented, it should be the position of the United States that they take place through the MSC, not just in the Secretariat.
No one seriously believes that the Security Council itself can direct military operations. Indeed, the Charter explicitly provides in Chapter VII for a Military Staff Committee -- comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the Council’s Five Permanent Members, or their representatives -- to oversee the UN’s military activities. It is no accident that the MSC reports to the Security Council, and effectively, therefore, to the Perm Five -- not to the Secretary General.
The language of the UN Charter on these points is unequivocal. The MSC’s function is to “advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament.”[29] In addition, the MSC “shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.”[30] To be sure these provisions originally contemplated a very different relationship of national forces to the United Nations than now exists in any peacekeeping mission. Rendered impotent by the Cold War, the Committee has never fulfilled the Charter’s expectations, but that does not mean, if major improvements of the military capabilities of the UN were to be made, as the Brahimi Report suggests, that the MSC should simply be ignored. So doing would dramatically undercut the role of the Perm Five, and strengthen the role of the Secretariat.
Significantly, the Brahimi report proposes no new role whatever for the MSC. None of its recommendations even mention the Military Staff Committee. All of the bureaucratic and structural changes proposed are in the existing civilian bureaus (such as the Department of Peace Keeping Operations, or DPKO) of the Secretariat. How obvious can one make the total exclusion of the MSC -- and hence the Perm Five -- from the central reforms proposed by the Report? This exclusion is a direct, unambiguous effort to shift power from the Perm Five to the Secretary General, amounting virtually to amending the UN Charter itself. It should be flatly unacceptable to the United States, and indeed to all of the Security Council’s Permanent Members. If the Clinton Administration is unable to understand why this should be unacceptable to the United States, perhaps Congress can assist it.
5. The Unacceptability of the Brahimi Report
In short, the Brahimi Report is badly flawed. In virtually every respect, its recommendations for the Secretariat and the UN as an institution can be boiled down to one word: “more.” It is not an exaggeration, in response, to say that the appropriate answer is almost equally simply: “no” or “not now.” The central point is that inadequate policies or the reluctance of member governments to adopt more interventionists policies -- for reasons good bad or indifferent -- will not be corrected by increasing the resources available to the Secretariat or otherwise strengthening its capacities. Only if one’s objective is to strengthen the independence and capabilities of the Secretariat vis-a-vis member governments per se -- and particularly as against the United States -- will such policies as those recommended in the Brahimi Report make sense. I do not believe that it serves American foreign policy interests generally to cede such capabilities to any international organization.
The Report states that without increased capacity “the Secretariat will remain a reactive institution, unable to get ahead of daily events.” But the United Nations should be a reactive institution, reactive to the desires of the member states. It is not in the interests of the United States for the United Nations to develop an autonomous capacity to act without our knowledge and without our express prior approval. When it is in the interests of the United States to bring the UN in on a problem early, we will do so. When it is not, it is flatly contrary to our interests to have the UN off operating essentially on its own.
III. A CURRENT CASE STUDY -- THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (“UNMEE”)
The pending Security Council decision on a peacekeeping force in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is an excellent contemporary case study of the dangerous shift underway in UN peacekeeping policy. The UN’s significant involvement in that conflict began after Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a cease-fire agreement on June 18, after a year of armed conflict, and a bloody struggle for Eritrean independence before that. In Resolution 1312 (adopted on July 31, 2000), the Security Council authorized deployment of 100 military observers, which is currently in preparation. The Council also requested further planning for the UN’s role. Secretary General Kofi Annan supplied a report on August 10, recommending, inter alia, an additional 120 military observers, plus three infantry battalions, landmine clearance units and accompanying logistical support, for a total strength of 4,200 personnel. The Council is now considering the report.
The central philosophical and policy issue is posed by the proposal for three infantry battalions. What exactly are they supposed to do? Monitoring compliance with a cease-fire and the disengagement of combatant forces are tasks eminently suited to military observers, a classic peacekeeping task. If 220 military observers are insufficient, then no one would quarrel with an appropriate increase. But by recommending three infantry battalions and their attendant logistical support, the Secretary general has added an entirely new and unnecessary dimension to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (“UNMEE”). This is not simply a budgeteer’s bean-counting quarrel over personnel levels, but a fundamental disagreement about the most appropriate and feasible role for the UN in international conflicts.
Peacekeeping, as noted above, historically has relied upon the consent of and cooperation by parties to a conflict. Where that is absent, not only does peacekeeping fail, but so too will “peace” itself. Many UN advocates are dissatisfied with the limited UN role such hard-headed assessments imply, and the Brahimi Report is an express attempt to transform their analysis into accepted doctrine. Annan, for one, has been very explicit about his preference for transforming “peacekeeping” into something else: “to go prepared for all eventualities, including full combat.”
The three infantry battalions proposed for UNMEE are admittedly but a small step toward “full combat” preparedness, but it is in any case the wrong step in the wrong direction. If the Ethiopian-Eritrean cease-fire breaks down, military observers will be able to detect and report it for appropriate political or diplomatic action. Moreover, if such a breakdown occurs, signaling a true political disagreement, the three infantry battalions will neither resolve the dispute nor be numerous enough to deter combat. They certainly will not be able to “enforce” the parties’ compliance with a disintegrating peace agreement. In the end, if Ethiopians and Eritreans are not willing to uphold their own peace, what other nationality is willing to kill and die for it?
So what is the point of the Secretary General’s proposal to deploy the three battalions? Perhaps it is simply idealism about the UN role, but more likely it reflects a determination (fully supported by the Clinton Administration, and abundantly reflected in the Brahimi report) to make the UN Secretariat a more active player in international disputes. But introducing a substantial outside presence into such a conflict is no guarantee of increased security -- for the parties or the UN observers -- and it may contribute to greater animosities if one side (or both) sees the UN assuming an openly partisan role. Abandoning the UN’s historical peacekeeping role is a prescription for higher UN expenses, more failures and less support in Washington. Sending observers to the Horn of Africa is sensible, but the infantry battalions should stay home.
* * * * * *
Mr. Chairman, I have not attempted here a comprehensive assessment here of either the entire Clinton Administration policy on UN peacekeeping or of the full scope of the Brahimi report. Nonetheless, I think even this brief analysis shows the consistency of the Administration’s pursuit of “assertive multilateralism” from its very first days right through to its closing moments. The risks and pitfalls for the United States, and indeed for the United Nations itself, in pursuing these flawed and potentially dangerous policies have rightly attracted extensive Congressional attention during the Clinton Administration. The need for that scrutiny has not declined, and indeed has increased substantially in light of recent developments. I would be pleased to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have.
Notes
[1] The Secretary General transmitted the formal document, known as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, by identical letters dated August 21, 2000 to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. UN Docs. A/55/305 and S/2000/809 [hereinafter, the “Brahimi Report”].
[2] See generally, my “Wrong Turn in Somalia,” 73 Foreign Affairs Number 1, p. 56, at p. 62 (1994).
[3] Id. at p. 64.
[4] Michael T. Clark, “The Trouble with Collective Security,” Orbis, Spring, 1995, at pp. 249-50.
[5] Id. at pp. 250-51.
[6] Id. at p. 251.
[7] See, e.g., Douglas Farah, “Internal Disputes Mar U.N. Mission,” Washington Post, September 10, 2000, p. A1, column 6.
[8] Brahimi Report, supra, n. 1, at page i.
[9] Id. at paragraph 56, p. 10 (emphasis added).
[10] Id. at paragraphs 18-19, p. 3.
[11] Id. at paragraph 6, pp. 1-2.
[12] Id. at paragraphs 48-55, pp. 9-10.
[13] Id.at paragraph 1, p. 1.
[14] Id. at paragraph 29, p. 5.
[15] Id. at paragraphs 29-34, pp. 5-6.
[16] Id. at paragraph 33, p. 6.
[17] Karl von Clausewitz, War, Politics, and Power, edited by Edward F. Collins (Gateway, Washington, 1997). The phrases quoted are from On War at p. 55.
[18] See Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Burundi on the Brink 1993-95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy, (U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, 2000).
[19] The Brahimi Report does recognize this particular inhibition. See Brahimi Report, supra, n. 1, at paragraph 32, p. 6.
[20] United Nations Charter, Article 97.
[21] Brahimi report, supra, n. 1 at paragraph 35, p. 6.
[22] Id. at paragraphs 37-39, p. 7.
[23] Id. at paragraph 81, p. 14.
[24] Id. at paragraph 77, p. 13.
[25] Id. at paragraph 44, p. 8.
[26] Id. at paragraphs 84-264, pp. 14-44.
[27] Id. at paragraph 78, p. 14.
[28] Id. at paragraph 90, pp. 15-16.
[29] UN Charter, Article 47(1).
[30] Id. Article 47(3).
John R. Bolton is senior vice president at AEI.
