Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to give testimony on the subject of Israel's treatment in the United Nations. I would ask that my prepared statement by accepted for the record, and I will provide a brief summary and, of course, be happy to answer the Committee's questions.
Introduction
Because other witnesses have admirably detailed the discrimination against and mistreatment of Israel at the hands of hostile UN majorities over the years, I will not cover that ground again. I would, however, like to set our briefly why this mistreatment and hostility have been so important to every American Administration over the last fifty years, on a bipartisan basis.
Bluntly stated, many anti-Americans believe that U.S. concern with the adverse treatment of Israel at the United Nations stems from domestic political causes. In their conspiratorial view, "the Jewish lobby" and its much-feared legislative and electoral apparatus have capitalized on an existing skepticism about the UN to distort votes and actions taken in various international fora. In short, "anti-Israeli" sentiment at the UN is often a surrogate for two other predilections: anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism. Of course, if you already believe that the American economy and its foreign policy are beholden to a small, powerful, secretive clique, all of this readily makes sense.
In the real world, however, things are very different. The place of Israel in the United Nations is important to the United States for several reasons, of which domestic politics is only one (and which, in a democracy, it quite properly should be). Most significantly, the UN's consideration of Israel, apart from the earliest days surrounding its creation, has been a continuing case study of political manipulation, mistreatment and dishonesty. What this record tells Americans is that the near-theological rhetoric about the UN's purposes and principles is just rhetoric, pure and simple. By diligently harassing Israel over the years, its opponents have demonstrated conclusively that the UN (and international organizations generally) are entirely political in their makeup and their conduct. As such, it follows inexorably that the UN is simply one among many -- and certainly no better than other -- possible instruments to deal with international problems.
Three Examples of Israel's Mistreatment at the United Nations
Nonetheless, it is hard to understate the troubles Israel has borne at the hands of its fellow UN members. Amidst the flurry of anti-Israeli General Assembly special sessions, and hostile resolutions there and elsewhere, three recent manifestations of Israel's isolated status particularly stand out: the aftermath of the 1991 repeal of the "Zionism is racism" resolution; Israel's exclusion from membership in a regional grouping; and efforts to revive superseded texts like General Assembly Resolution 181, partitioning the Palestinian mandate in 1947. These three are closely related.
First, the General Assembly's December, 1991, decision to invalidate its despicable 1975 Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism marked a clear opportunity to reverse nearly forty years of anti-Israeli behavior. Both the collapse of the Soviet Union and Iraq's crushing defeat in the Persian Gulf War, signaled unmistakably that conditions in the Middle East has changed forever. Farsighted leaders could have capitalized on this opportunity, and the near-simultaneous launching of the Madrid peace process, but unfortunately, at the United Nations, the moment passed.
Moreover, and before memories fade too quickly, we should remember that even the repeal of "Z/r" was no easy task. I have written a very brief description of the repeal efforts from the American perspective, which I have attached to this prepared statement as an Appendix. I did so because even this summary description makes it clear that the repeal effort, which should have been a self-evident proposition, required an extensive diplomatic lobbying campaign by the United States, Israel and a few others. It included the direct, personal participation of President Bush, Vice President Quayle, and Secretary of State Baker; massive efforts by every regional bureau of the Department of State in Washington, American Ambassadors and their staffs in New York and every UN member capital; and lobbying by private groups around the world. The very difficulty of repealing Resolution 3379 showed just how deeply ingrained in the UN system were its venomous precepts, and why, even after repeal, its effects linger.
Nor should we forget that, odious as it was, "Z/r" was only the most visible of a long series (which, unfortunately, continues even to this day) of offensive, anti-Israel, anti-American and anti-Western resolutions. Except for "Z/r" itself, all of this detritus remains on the General Assembly's record.
Second, early in 1992, heartened by the repeal of "Z/r," the United States sought membership for Israel in a UN regional group, if not its natural geographic area, then at least temporarily in the Western Group. Opposition to finding a regional "home" for Israel was intense then, and has continued to the present. Exclusion from a regional group at the UN means that Israel is effectively precluded from ever becoming a non-permanent member of the Security Council; it is structurally precluded in many other ways from participating in UN discussions; and it has been and will continue to be seriously under-represented in UN leadership and employment positions.
Some emphasize the importance of membership in a regional group, and argue therefore that Israel's exclusion is a gross and unnecessary injury to a legitimate member government. But consider the alternative perspective: outside of the pretend world at Turtle Bay, the discrimination against Israel actually amounts to very little. But in fact, in this light, it is precisely the triviality of the exclusion that makes it so outrageous. What possible purpose -- other than a purely punitive one -- is served by this violation of comity and statesmanship?
This long-standing segregation of Israel calls into question one of the enduring fallacies offered in support of multilateral organizations, namely that they encourage and facilitate the pursuit of objectives broader than narrow national self-interest. To the contrary, as the Israeli case demonstrates, multilateralism often facilitates precisely the opposite. Indeed, one could argue persuasively that the General Assembly forum has encouraged a "lowest common denominator" approach for anti-Israel governments, as they seek to demonstrate their bona fides to others by escalating the harshness of their attacks against Israel and its friends. This "race for the bottom" mentality unquestionably persists in UN cities around the world.
Third, Palestinians and their supporters are trying to revive General Assembly Resolution 181 as a basis to create a Palestinian state. In a sense, their argument here is a replay of arguments against the repeal of UNGA Resolution 3379. For many years, there was a UN myth that prior resolutions could not be repealed, implicitly or explicitly. While this was never actually true, it gained powerful currency, especially as the number and scope of anti-Western and anti-American resolutions grew. Repealing the operative portions of Resolution 3379 in 1991 shattered this myth, but it lives on in adherence to 181. Ignoring the Security Council's critically important Resolutions 242 and 338 is functionally the same as arguing that 181 has never been modified by subsequent resolutions, much less by events in the real world (which only dimly penetrate UN consideration of the Arab-Israeli peace process). Obviously these events, as reflected in 242 and 338, have overtaken 181; returning to it now as a sacred text is simply illusory.
These examples (and there are countless others) are directly related to clear United States foreign policy interests. By impeding our ability to achieve our international objectives, these problems at the United Nations are neither peripheral nor transitory. Any effective American policy at the United Nations must recognize these issues and deal with them, not simply because this mistreatment of Israel in unconscionable, but because it perceptibly and adversely affects the United States,
Injustice at Geneva
Tomorrow, for the first time ever, the High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions meet to scrutinize the conduct of a particular signatory country. That country -- Israel -- was singled out for this highly dubious distinction after a sustained, highly-politicized campaign waged against it at the United Nations, over the persistent objections of the United States and others. Tomorrow's gathering in Geneva thus marks the worst political abuse of the four Geneva Conventions in their history, and a new low point for "humanitarian law" in the international system.
The treaty at issue -- the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 -- defines what is permissible when one state-party occupies the territory of another during and after armed conflict. Israel stands accused of repeated misconduct since 1967 in its governance of the "occupied territories" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. (The other three Conventions deal with the treatment of sick and wounded combatants, and prisoners of war.)
Legal scholars have debated for years whether the Fourth Geneva Convention even applies to the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, Arab diplomats have boasted that one of their key objectives immediately after the Six-Day War was to make the term "occupied territories" the standard nomenclature to describe these lands; their initial success is in a sense a precursor to tomorrow's meeting in Geneva. Israel has consistently asserted that the Convention does not strictly apply legally, but has de facto followed its humanitarian principles because of their acknowledged moral authority. Indeed, Israel may stand alone in its respect for the Convention; certainly, for example, no one believes the Soviets paid it any attention while they occupied Afghanistan, or the Vietnamese during their occupation of Cambodia.
One can agree that, as mere mortals, successive Israeli governments have not been perfect in their application of the Convention to the territories. But the real issue is not what "grade" Israel should receive for its conduct over the last thirty-two years, or the meaning or applicability of specific provisions of the Fourth Convention. Instead, the real issue is the unfairness to and discrimination against a particular signatory, the interference caused in the Middle East peace process, and the potential for abuse of the entire Geneva Convention system.
First, tomorrow's meeting results from a vote by an Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, one of innumerable such steps that the Assembly's anti-Israeli majority has taken since Israel's creation. Its convocation of parties to the Geneva Conventions is one more example of trying to isolate Israel on the world stage, rather than allowing serious bilateral negotiations to proceed. Much, much worse, however, is the precedent that a highly political body like the General Assembly has been able to warp the humanitarian Conventions to its purposes. We will see no end of harm from this distortion.
Second, the United Nations itself is partially to blame both for this result and its consequences. At an informal meeting last Fall to discuss the general applicability of the Conventions, a representative of Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, savaged Israel, and effectively invited the Security Council to impose sanctions. When confronted about this outrageous attack on a UN member by an international civil servant, Mrs. Robinson, former President of Ireland, unequivocally stood by her subordinate's statement. Ironically, Mrs. Robinson is democratically accountable to no one, but she found time to denounce the only fully democratic government in the Middle East. Most significantly, her office's position represents a truly dramatic politicization of the Convention's humanitarian principles, which we have surely not heard the last of.
Third, the United States, on a bipartisan basis, has worked for decades to bring peace to the Middle East. Tomorrow's meeting, and its possible consequences, pose a direct threat to those efforts, and to even larger American interests in the international system. To its credit, the Clinton Administration resisted convening this meeting, and is correctly boycotting it entirely to show our disdain for the perverse and corrupting motives that brought it about. Switzerland, depository state for the Conventions, has also worked diligently to minimize damage from the relentless effort to bend them to political objectives exogenous to their humanitarian purposes. Unfortunately, others in Europe have not been so helpful.
Tomorrow's meeting will not be the end of this story. Although the Swiss hope to confine its scope, realists must plan for the worst. Accordingly, the United States have an alternative strategy, starting with a clear reaffirmation that it rejects tomorrow's's affair as illegitimate, and will resist any further politicization of the Geneva Conventions. We should also make clear to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and all UN officials that they serve member governments, and that their political opinions are best expressed only at the behest of those governments. Finally, the U. S. should insist that the Middle East peace process continue within the 1991 framework established in Madrid: direct negotiations among the parties, and not in side shows in multilateral organizations. By so doing, we can minimize tomorrow's damage to a wide range of American interests.
APPENDIX: Repealing the "Zionism is racism" Resolution
After the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 (XXX) on November 10, 1975, the then-American Permanent Representative, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (later a U.S. Senator from New York), stated:
"The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and before the world, that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act."
The position of the United States at that time, and in all subsequent Administrations, was to seek the repeal of Resolution 3379, or at least of its operative paragraph, which equated "Zionism" with "racism" (known colloquially as "the Zionism/racism resolution"). For a variety of reasons, including the international diplomatic weakness of the United States in the 1970's, little was accomplished.
A major part of the problem was the perception that General Assembly Resolutions could not be repealed. This was, of course, wholly untrue. On November 4, 1950, the General Assembly rescinded Resolution 38 (I) of December 12, 1946, which had barred Spain from UN membership as a former "enemy state," and recommended the withdrawal of diplomatic representation from Madrid. This 1950 Resolution -- 386 (V) -- was not readopted in subsequent decisions to accept other former "enemy states" into membership largely because of Third World government fears about the impact of repealing General Assembly Resolutions. Thus, the General Assembly came to believe that, once adopted, Resolutions lasted forever.
The Bush Administration, in its early days, decided to mount a campaign to repeal U.N.G.A Resolution 3379, recognizing that earlier Administrations had been unsuccessful in their similar efforts. One of President Bush's most important opening initiatives toward repeal was to seek the support of the Soviet Union, which had been a principle force behind the General Assembly's 1975 vote to condemn Zionism as "racism." At that time (the mid-1970's), the United States was in diplomatic retreat around the world (because of Vietnam, the early evidence of OPEC's strength, and a weak American economy), and because of enormous domestic problems (e.g., Watergate). These weaknesses had given the Soviets an opportunity that they were only too happy to exploit. With changed international circumstances, however, the Bush Administration believed that Soviet cooperation on the repeal of the "Zionism/racism" resolution might now be a possibility. Although "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy had been demonstrated in a number of areas, this early Bush Administration initiative was unsuccessful (although there was considerable Soviet interest in backing away from the annual Arab challenge in the General Assembly to Israel's membership credentials, a potentially important first step). Despite several discussions during 1989, the Soviet reaction remained frosty. Nonetheless, the importance of Soviet cooperation in any repeal effort was manifest.
The first public statement about the Bush Administration's intense desire to repeal Resolution 3379 came on Sunday, December 10, 1989, when Vice President Dan Quayle spoke to a Yeshiva University Hannakuh Convocation at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. Senator Moynihan called later that evening to express his appreciation for the remarks, and to offer whatever assistance he could muster in Congress, a clear demonstration of bipartisan support for the Administration's position. The Vice President repeated the strength of the Bush Administration's views the next day in a small meeting with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. As Vice President Quayle was explaining the American view on the repeal of "Zionism/racism," he also handed to Perez de Cuellar a check for $ 65,000,000, a partial payment of the American assessment for the United Nations. This tangible indication of American interest in repealing Resolution 3379 was widely discussed in UN corridors.
During 1990, consultations continued, especially and intensively with the Soviet Union, in Washington, Moscow and New York. There was considerable support, particularly within the American pro-Israel community, to seek repeal of Resolution 3379 at the fall General Assembly session, which would mark the forty-fifth anniversary of the UN, and the fifteenth anniversary of the passage of Resolution 3379 itself. Senator Moynihan scheduled a hearing in late March, 1990, to discuss the repeal question, and it received considerable publicity. Witnesses from the Jewish groups who testified put particular importance on visible involvement by President Bush and Secretary Baker, a sentiment echoed in much of the Jewish press. In Hadassah magazine, for example, one article said that the American campaign to repeal Resolution 3379 would only reach "full force" when the President and the Secretary "take a high profile on the issue of repeal, and do not simply leave it to John Bolton and Dan Quayle to pursue."
Nonetheless, within the Department of State, the Near East and South Asia Bureau ("NEA") resisted making a major effort at repeal because of concerns about the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process. NEA's opposition continued virtually to the actual General Assembly vote in December, 1991, and was symptomatic of State's entrenched institutional bias against taking controversial positions.
Despite these bureaucratic problems, the United States continued to lobby in foreign capitals, making over one hundred demarches in the first half of 1990. An important part of this effort was encouraging governments to support the repeal of Resolution 3379 in their statements in the "general debate" which opens each year's General Assembly. Eastern European governments, by then freed from Soviet domination, were particularly eager to have a vote on repeal, in many respects more eager than the Western Europeans. Perez de Cuellar told the United States that the subject of repealing "Zionism/racism" took up fully half of his summertime meeting with Czech President Vaclev Havel. Many Latin American governments were also supportive, but the Africans were largely silent during consultations, not indicating an opinion one way or the other. Very little lobbying was done among the Arab countries (except Egypt) for obvious reasons. The Asian countries largely saw the issue as having little relevance to their concerns.
Although the General Assembly does not open until the end of September each year, preparations in capitals begin in the late spring and early summer. To influence the thinking and ultimately the positions of member governments, therefore, diplomatic lobbying, especially on potentially difficult issues, must begin early, before positions become firm. Moreover, when American Ambassadors returned to Washington for routine consultations, the importance of the effort to repeal the "Zionism/racism" resolution was stressed to them, so that when the decision to seek repeal was made, they would understand the high priority attached to the issue.
The United States agreed with Israel that we would make a joint decision in mid- to late-August of 1990 about whether to seek a vote in the fall. This time period was chosen because virtually all pre-General Assembly consultations would have been concluded by then, and the two governments would have time to assess the results. By the end of August, we concluded that the likely outcome of a vote was still too close to call, and we deferred a final decision until the actual opening of the Forty-Fifth General Assembly. Obviously, from early August on, the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait was the dominant world issue, and hung over all discussions not only of repealing Resolution 3379, but virtually everything else.
The Israeli position all along had been that they did not want to proceed with a vote on repeal without what they called a "clear indication of success." The United States had argued that pushing for a vote was the only way to obtain such an indication, but the Israelis were very concerned about the consequences of a defeat. Ultimately, on September 24, 1990, the Israelis informed the United States that Prime Minister Shamir himself had decided that there was no "clear indication of success," and that there should be no vote that year. Obviously, the United States could not proceed further, when the main beneficiary of the repeal of "Zionism/racism" did not itself wish to do so. President Bush did not mention repeal in his speech to the General Assembly, and the issue largely died away for the rest of the year, especially because of the intense diplomatic efforts being put into successfully forging an international coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. One piece of news that was encouraging was that, for the first time in many years, the Arab nations did not challenge Israel's credentials at the Forty-Fifth General Assembly.
After the coalition forces' massive military victory over Iraq, and particularly because of renewed hopes for reinvigorating the Middle East peace process, there was increased interest in early 1991 to press ahead with repeal. Israel informed the United States in late March that they were now prepared to proceed with a vote.
Unfortunately, within the American government, those involved in the peace process -- specifically NEA and the Policy Planning staff -- argued that a vigorous effort to repeal the "Zionism/racism" resolution could complicate their efforts. Others argued that the opposite was true: repeal of Resolution 3379 could encourage Israel that the United Nations was not hopelessly biased against it, and might therefore have a useful role in implementing a comprehensive settlement. There was no final decision at the Department of State, but soundings on repeal were made in the course of pre-General Assembly consultations, as in 1990. Private citizens from the pro-Israel community and from Jewish organizations in other countries also continued lobbying around the world.
As a result, Secretary Baker agreed with Israel in August, 1991, that we should make a "serious effort" at repeal in the Forty-Sixth General Assembly. Accordingly, we increased the already high level of US-Israeli bilateral consultations on the issue, to be ready in case a decision were made to seek a vote. I arranged to go to Israel in mid-September, stopping first for consultations in London and Paris (capitals of two Permanent Members of the Security Council) and The Hague (because the Netherlands then held the Presidency of the European Community). The Europeans were all opposed to any major repeal effort in 1991. I conveyed this information on to the Israelis, who had heard essentially the same thing.
Israeli-American relations were at a low ebb at this point because of a controversy over United States housing loan guarantees to Israel, but the consultations were nonetheless productive. Most importantly, the text of the repeal resolution was agreed upon. It would have no preambular paragraphs, and only one operative paragraph, which would repeal the sole operative paragraph of Resolution 3379. This approach seemed to be the simplest, and would avoid potential controversy about a lengthy resolution. Another drafting approach -- which was rejected -- was to resubmit a draft resolution with exactly the same language as Resolution 3379, and then defeat it, thus nullifying the effect of the 1975 vote. Although innovative, this approach was deemed to be too risky. The two sides also agreed to make immediate demarches in twelve capitals to seek co-sponsors for a repeal resolution. Co-sponsorship is important, because agreement to co-sponsor signifies not only support for the resolution, but also opposition to all amendments opposed by the principle sponsors.
President Bush raised the repeal issue in his speech to the General Assembly on September 23, 1991. Simultaneously, the Department of State sent out a worldwide cable stressing what the President had said, and instructing all embassies to inform their respective host governments that the repeal campaign was now effectively under way. Because so many high-level officials were present for the opening of the General Assembly, we used the week following the President's speech very intensively to spread the word about our serious efforts to repeal Resolution 3379. Many nations agreed in principle to co-sponsor the repeal resolution, especially from Eastern and Western Europe (ranging from Norway to Albania) and Latin America (including Brazil, an important breakthrough), confirming the results of earlier consultations.
The Peoples Republic of China, which had voted for Resolution 3379 in 1975 (but without making an explanation of vote) told the United States that the subject of repeal was a critical matter for Beijing's relations with Arab countries. Accordingly, the PRC would hold back diplomatically until the general reaction to President Bush's speech was clearer. Similarly, the Soviets virtually pleaded that the repeal resolution not be put to a vote, since they were concerned about the domestic and international effects of whatever position they adopted. Unfortunately, the Egyptians -- the only Arab nation at that time to have diplomatic relations with Israel -- were actively opposing the repeal effort. Their position was somewhat weakened, however, by their continuing efforts to secure United States support for the candidacy of Boutros Boutros-Ghali to become Secretary General of the United Nations.
By October, we had decided to seek to have a majority of the entire General Assembly (84 out of the then-membership of 166) become co-sponsors of the repeal resolution. There were two reasons. First, having a clear majority of the Assembly as co-sponsors would demonstrate that there was no way that the issue of repeal could be made an "important question" under Article 18 of the UN Charter. Article 18 lists a number of issues (such as the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council) which must be deemed as "important questions," and thereby requires a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting to be adopted. Article 18 also provides that additional questions can be considered as "important" by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Thus, having a majority of member-governments as co-sponsors would make it impossible to have the repeal resolution so designated, and thereby removed a potentially troubling procedural tactic which the opponents of repeal were considering using.
Second, obtaining 84 or more co-sponsors would also indicate that any attempts to weaken the repeal resolution with unhelpful amendments were similarly doomed to fail. Such amendments could have included harsh criticisms of Israel that, if adopted, would have largely undermined the impact of repeal. Having a majority of members as co-sponsors likewise eliminated this procedural option. There were, nonetheless, still many other procedural tactics which the opponents of repeal could employ (such as seeking to postpone the vote until the next General Assembly, or a motion to take no action), but all could be defeated with a majority of the members as co-sponsors.
For tactical reasons, the United States and Israel had agreed to hold the repeal vote as late in the General Assembly as possible. They had also agreed to take the repeal resolution directly to the floor of the General Assembly, rather than having it considered first in one of the Assembly's committees. Both of these decisions were intended to minimize the number of potentially troubling tactics which opponents of repeal could employ. Nonetheless, by waiting until mid-December, we were risking running out of time, and being engulfed by the flood of end-of-General Assembly business.
Starting on December 3, 1991, the State Department's main focus for two weeks was on the repeal of Resolution 3379. At that point, despite the earlier indications of support in principle, there were still only sixteen co-sponsors, and time was exceedingly short. Using not just the staff of the IO Bureau, but staffs from all of the regional bureaus as well, cables and telephone calls were made on a continuous basis to obtain additional co-sponsors and indications of support. Demarches were made personally by American and Israeli Ambassadors to heads of governments and foreign ministers, and often made several times. Foreign ambassadors in Washington were called in frequently to meet with senior State Department officials (at the level of Assistant Secretary or higher), and urged to become co-sponsors. At the end of each day, a worldwide cable was sent to every American embassy summarizing the new developments in the last twenty-four hours. This cable also let every Ambassador know that his or her performance was being closely watched, and compared to the successes of other American Ambassadors in the respective regions.
Significantly, numerous letters from President Bush to his counterparts, and from Secretary Baker to his counterparts, were also delivered, nearly fifty by the end of the campaign. They, along with Vice President Quayle, also made personal telephone calls to particular capitals when lower-level lobbying had failed to produce adequate results. Several influential Members of Congress also sent letters to governments where they had strong ties. By December 7, there were 39 co-sponsors.
Co-sponsors were themselves urged to make demarches in countries where there was reason to believe that approaches from governments other than the United States and Israel might be helpful. The United Kingdom, for example, lobbied in a number of Commonwealth countries, as did Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The French demarched in Francophone Africa, and Argentina held consultations with several other Latin American governments. Other countries, such as Finland, lobbied in capitals where they had developed substantial foreign aid programs or projects.
One pattern that rapidly emerged was that nations frequently expressed a reluctance to co-sponsor unless either their neighbors or other significant nations also co-sponsored. This pattern was particularly pronounced in Latin America and Africa. Panama, for example, was initially reluctant to be a co-sponsor, but came on board when it learned that Costa Rica and Honduras had agreed. Columbia was persuaded to become a co-sponsor only after learning that Mexico and Venezuela were part of the coalition. There were many similar situations.
Another pattern which emerged was that a commitment to join as a co-sponsor -- even from a head of government or foreign minister -- was often hard to translate into a country's Mission in New York signing the co-sponsor list with USUN or the Secretariat. Frequently, there had to be numerous telephone calls and meetings to persuade or direct recalcitrant Permanent Representatives in New York to follow their instructions. This phenomenon was part of a larger pattern that has emerged only in the last few years, namely that more and more voting decisions are actually being made in capitals, where the "UN culture" is absent, and where direct appeals can be made to national interests. Several Permanent Representatives in New York, many accustomed to operating for years without specific instructions, were fighting a losing battle against this historic change. The effort to repeal Resolution 3379 was a vivid example in this shift in the conduct of United Nations diplomacy.
By Monday, December 9, there were 42 confirmed co-sponsors and 81 definite votes in favor of repealing Resolution 3379. The Organization of the Islamic Conference, which had been meeting in Senegal, then proposed a "compromise," in which repeal of the "Zionism/racism" resolution would proceed, but there would then follow a second resolution condemning Israel's practices in the Occupied Territories. The United States and Israel rejected the "compromise," believing that they would soon have the votes necessary to block any obstacles to repeal. Moreover, there were continued diplomatic efforts to persuade Islamic countries simply not to participate in the final vote on repeal. The fewer members present and voting meant that the list of co-sponsors was coming closer and closer to being an actual majority on the General Assembly floor.
The Soviet Union, the moving force behind the adoption of Resolution 3379 in 1975, finally confirmed on December 10 that it would vote for repeal, but it had not yet agreed to be a co-sponsor. At the very moment we were lobbying in Moscow, Washington and New York, the Soviet Union was in the process of breaking apart (the USSR. formally ceased to exist on December 31), and the foreign ministry was in disarray. Nonetheless, the U.S. continued to press for co-sponsorship, and obtained it on December 13, in one of the last official acts of the Soviet Union before it disappeared. Moscow's decision made it easier to obtain co-sponsorship from Ukraine and Belarus, which were original members of the UN.
After further difficult negotiations, the vote was scheduled for the afternoon of Monday, December 16. By Friday, December 13, we had 73 co-sponsors and 94 confirmed votes for repeal. We had also decided that Acting Secretary Eagleburger would lead the US delegation, and give the American statement to the General Assembly (Secretary Baker being out of the country). Secretary Baker also agreed to an op ed piece that I wrote, and which appeared in the Monday New York Times, called "Zionism Is Not Racism." All of these tactics were intended to highlight the importance the United States attached to repeal. Cabling, telephoning and meetings continued unabated over the weekend.
When Acting Secretary Eagleburger and his party left for New York on December 16, there were 81 co-sponsors and 106 committed votes for repeal. By the time the General Assembly session convened shortly after 3:00 P.M., there were 86 co-sponsors, two more than an absolute majority of all UN members. As expected, the opponents of repeal tried to have the issue declared an "important question," but their motion to do so failed by a vote of 39 in favor; 96 opposed; 13 abstaining; and the remaining nations not participating.
The repeal resolution (Resolution 46-86) was then adopted by a vote of 111 in favor; 25 opposed; 13 abstaining; and the remainder not participating.
John R. Bolton is senior vice president at AEI.
