Having just returned from China after an eight-year absence, I have seen again the almost miraculous progress achieved and the daunting economic problems China faces. While a U.S. role is both inevitable and critical, the American tendency to impose strategic frameworks on China and Taiwan is unfortunately pervasive. These have been based on China's and Taiwan's various "principled and rhetorical agendas," i.e. One China, no use of force, Taiwan independence, sovereignty and unity, and so on.
All this is important but it misses the essential point: namely, that the driving force in the China-Taiwan relationship today is largely economic. Taiwan's investment and trade are a major part of China's growth, which sustains stability and prosperity in China. China's market has been essential for Taiwan's exports, manufacturing efficiency, and resources. Together they are a successful part of the global supply chain.
The deep suspicions of both sides are real. China fears that an independent Taiwan could undermine its place in the world, its honor and its dynastic survival. Taiwan resents and fears mainland China deeply because mainlanders have for centuries colonized, occupied and brutalized Taiwan. In more recent years, China's disastrous Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen tragedy have inoculated Taiwan against wanting to join politically with China.
So there is an ongoing debate--China on its side stressing unity and sovereignty, while Taiwan emphasizes democracy and self-determination. The U.S., whether we or the Chinese or the Taiwanese like it or not, is an essential part of the resolution of these contradictions. But the resolution should build on the solid economic base, not on solutions imposed from above.
Our experience tells us that Americans usually are not smart enough to master the intricacies of Chinese history. Our principles for shaping a framework have thus evolved from circumstances at the time: We supported One China because both Chinese sides wanted it in the 1970s when we first opened to China. Then, when China seemed to emphasize armed intervention if its demands were not met, we adopted the concept of peaceful resolution and we had the wherewithal to back this up. Later in the 1980s, we supported both sides working together to expand trade and exchanges. All of this has led to formidable progress in cross-Strait relations. In the 1950s, military action dominated; but by the 1990s millions of Chinese were crossing the Strait, investment was at an all-time high, and Chinese and Taiwan leaders were meeting and talking at the highest levels, both unofficially and through a formal arrangement worked out by them.
The implicit American premise was that a secure and stable Taiwan would be a more willing and successful partner in dealing with China. Judicious arms sales to Taiwan were part of this formula and in the past it has worked. The large arms sales package and President Reagan's personal support contributed to the breakthrough in 1987, when President Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan lifted martial law and agreed to the China opening. Our large arms sale to Taiwan in 1992 was followed quickly by the two sides agreeing to disagree on a One-China formula and then agreeing to meet in Singapore formally in April 1993--for the first time since the Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949.
If elements of this broader formula are disregarded by the current Taiwan authorities, however, then the successful historic pattern has been broken. U.S. military support and arms sales cannot be used by Taiwan to move away from China--they were meant to make Taiwan feel secure enough to move toward accommodation with China. Our support should be conditional on upholding our successful pattern. The U.S. needs to continue to maintain a quiet deterrence to any mainland military action against Taiwan. But just as arms sales, deterrence and the Taiwan Relations Act are leverage for Taiwan, China has in its favor the Three Communiqués the U.S. signed with Beijing, military power and geographical advantage.
The U.S. has done more than any other country in bringing the two sides together. We are not "splitists" and we did not "tie the knot and so must untie it" as the Chinese are wont to say. We can help China tackle its serious problems of financial reform, and we can assist both sides in working on down-to-earth practical programs on such issues as standardized banking regulations or a demilitarized zone in the Taiwan Strait that could convert Taiwan's overly militarized Quemoy Island into a free economic zone or, if you will, Disneyland East. For the U.S. to get mired in Chinese rhetoric or to impose Western solutions is not the answer. To get on top of the current economic trend is.
Vice President Cheney has just returned from visiting our three key friends and allies in Asia: China, Korea and Japan. We have common interests on North Korea, counterterrorism and, one hopes, on Iraq and Afghanistan. From the beginning with Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Mao and Zhou Enlai, summitry has been vital in kick starting constructive processes, and this is where our emphasis must be.
James R. Lilley, a former ambassador to China and former chief U.S. representative in Taiwan, is a senior fellow at AEI and the author of China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia, to be published in May by Public Affairs.
