Resident Fellow Dan  Blumenthal

From Hu Jintao's perspective, the 17th Party Congress must accomplish one overarching task: The Chinese Communist Party must adapt to maintain its monopoly on power over a more pluralistic and restive society. It must improve its administrative and management capabilities to deal with a myriad of social problems, from environmental degradation to increasing popular anger over endemic corruption.

And the party must deal with these growing internal problems while it continues to increase its global power and influence.

After the Tiananmen uprising of 1989 many Western analysts thought that the Communist Party would be consigned to the dustbin of history, like so many of its party brethren in Eastern Europe. Unlike those parties, however, the party has shown a remarkable adaptability.

Through a two-pronged strategy of co-opting the political and economic elite on the one hand, and coercion of those unhappy with the party's autocratic rule on the other, the party is still very much alive. It has powerful supporters in the military, the world of business and even the intellectual elite whose continued well-being depends upon the party staying in control.

The disaffected and dissatisfied face a sophisticated system of state repression. More than 30,000 cadre monitor the Internet. The internal security services have grown in size and professionalism, seeking to put down protests without resorting to deadly force. Activists and lawyers for society's less fortunate are targeted for imprisonment and harassment. The Communist Party has managed to destroy any organized opposition.

Westerners should not be fooled by talk of the party's talk of democracy. This rhetoric means democracy of, for and by the party. Internal reform aims to make leadership succession and cadre selection more orderly. The people still have no say over who will lead them.

If the party congress is a success in Hu's eyes, what does it mean for the U.S.? When American policymakers agreed to allow China into the World Trade Organization, the great hope was that China's integration into the international economy would lead the Chinese inevitably down the road of political reform and liberalization. With similar values, the two countries would find more common ground and China's rise would be greeted with less suspicion in Washington.

Instead Beijing has grown richer and stronger, but is no less authoritarian. No longer driven by revolutionary ideology and closed to the world, the People's Republic of China is a resilient autocracy that has succeeded in growing its military power and economic influence and has exhibited a remarkable diplomatic agility.

While trying to avoid direct confrontation with the more powerful U.S., Beijing is seeking to expand its international influence at Washington's expense. America's dominance is not a happy state of affairs for any authoritarian country--even less so for a China with a deep sense of historical grievance. Washington pushes countries toward democracy, protects Taiwan and, in Chinese eyes, seeks to deny Beijing its rightful place on the world stage.

China is carefully courting its own allies, and trying to build Sino-dominated regional institutions. On issues where Washington seeks its help such as Burma, North Korea or Iran, China does the minimum to keep Washington from exerting more pressure upon Beijing--and usually in exchange for American concessions on other fronts, be it economic, diplomatic or Taiwan.

Washington and Beijing, however, have sharply contrasting views of world order. America is outraged by Burmese atrocities and wants China to push for change. But why would a country itself so fearful of student protests and the free practice of Buddhism in Tibet care about students and monks in Burma?

Contrary to Western theories that trade leads to democracy, a rich and stable autocracy in competition for influence with the world's leading power is the historical norm. The Kaiser's Germany traded with imperial Britain just as it competed for diplomatic and military influence. Imperial Japan traded with Britain and America. While the new China--politically authoritarian, economically dynamic and diplomatically dexterous-- may be familiar to early 20th century statesmen, it is less familiar to contemporary democratic leaders.

American policymakers must stop deluding themselves that a democratic China coming into alignment with Washington's worldview is just around the corner. Far more likely is a protracted competition for power and influence even while commerce between the two nations increases.

In the near term, Washington faces a real threat of war in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan has forged its identity as a de facto independent country and Beijing's historical and continuing hard line on this issue still will not accommodate a separate Taiwan. In the longer term Washington's position is Asia and its ability to accomplish foreign policy goals such as Iran's disarmament will be complicated by China's growing influence.

The Chinese Communist Party is not destined to maintain power forever. Many Chinese citizens view the party as corrupt and unjust. They want the same freedom and justice that they see in democratic countries. But the safe bet is that a party with the military and security services at its side, supported by an elite benefiting from unequal economic growth and increasingly sophisticated in the arts of repression, will hang together for some time to come.

Washington must respond with a diplomatic agility of its own. It must continue shoring up its Asian alliances, build institutions congenial to the Asian democracies and deter the Chinese from more forceful action.

If China does reform, however, the prospects for Sino-American friendship are promising. The Chinese and American people have already forged close ties in commerce, science and academic exchanges. Though many Chinese do not believe it, America really does welcome the rise of a peaceful, prosperous and democratic China.

Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at AEI.