Senior Fellow John R. Bolton

Weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological and nuclear--in the hands of authoritarian regimes and theocratic terrorists constitute the gravest near-term threat the United States could face. Eliminating this threat--not simply managing it--must be the top priority for the next president and his or her secretary of State. This is why the 2008 election is so consequential for national security--despite the efforts of many candidates to ignore the issue, or to concentrate on President George W. Bush's handling of Iraq.

The danger posed by WMD is not directed at America's military. These are terrorist weapons that could threaten or attack innocent civilians in the United States or its allies. It does little good to talk of cold-war-style deterrence when dealing with people who prize the next life more than this one, or who calculate costs and benefits more like Hitler in his bunker than Soviet-era apparatchiks.

Even though we no longer face the kind of existential threat that characterized the cold war, today's WMD danger is no more bearable. Nor would retaliation after mass murder be a satisfactory response. The current threat must be stopped while still in its early stages. Eliminating Saddam Hussein's regime was a major strategic victory in this regard, despite the conflict in Iraq that followed. So, too, was Libya's decision to renounce its nuclear-weapons program after it was discovered to be participating in the AQ Khan smuggling network.

While few will take issue with the goal of rolling back WMD proliferation, the means remain vexing. There are especially big differences between the U.S. and European approaches. But such differences aren't new or insurmountable. The United States and its European friends argued about similar questions for at least 200 years, since Washington chose to use force against the Barbary pirates--the terrorists of their day--rather than trying to buy them off, as Europe favored. The Europeans eventually came around then; it's hoped they will today as well.

Negotiating from a real position of strength should remain part of the U.S. strategy; the Libyan case highlights how effective talks can be. But negotiations for their own sake--as typified by Europe's failed effort to chitchat Iran out of its nuclear-weapons program--are naive and dangerous. So is the Bush administration's "trust but don't verify" approach to North Korea. Talks will work only if regime change and the direct use of military force remain highly visible options.

Perhaps the most important battle to be fought is at home, against those who believe rogue states can be contained by diplomatic massaging and terrorists defeated through aggressive litigation. Weapons of mass destruction are not simply blips in a smooth diplomatic terrain, but true tectonic disturbances--just as terrorists are not like especially bad bank robbers, but are potential WMD delivery systems masquerading as civilians.

Of course, more-traditional diplomatic and military threats to U.S. interests will also emerge in the years to come, whether from a China or an India gone wrong or from Russia's reassertion of its military power. None of these possible threats should be overshadowed by the need to address the more urgent danger of WMD. But the United States must not succumb to the delusion that it has passed beyond history, and that all threats ultimately ripen into benign opportunities.

John R. Bolton is a senior fellow at AEI.