Resident Scholar  Michael Auslin

President Hu Jintao of China is in Japan this week, repaying Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda for his visit last autumn. It is the first time in a decade that a Chinese head of state has come to the land that most Chinese still love to hate.

During a visit to Japan in 1998, former President Jiang Zemin accused the country of not fully apologizing for its wartime atrocities, and left relations worse off than when he arrived. This time, a stronger, more confident China is sending messages of conciliation.

For the first time, the Japanese are getting the Chinese diplomatic embrace already experienced by millions of Asians, from Indians to Singaporeans. The stakes are higher with Japan, though, for it remains Asia's largest economy by far and, whatever the pundits proclaim, is admired for its political and social stability, not to mention its sophisticated military. Chinese attempts to draw Japan closer to its orbit could have profound effects on the future of Asia.

Japan thus finds itself in a dilemma. Like almost all nations around the globe, the United States included, it doesn't know what to think of the Chinese colossus.

On the one hand, nearly 20 percent of Japan's exports go directly to China, and the mainland is the biggest exporter into Japan. Japanese firms employ 9 million Chinese inside China and joint enterprises have grown in recent years.

At the same time, Japanese watch warily as Beijing's military budget increases by double digits every year and as the People's Liberation Army deploys weapons systems like ballistic missiles, new submarines and advanced fighters that inherently threaten Japan's national security.

Tokyo also groans every time China signs a new free-trade agreement or political pact with Asian nations, seeing economic and political isolation just over the horizon.

Japan's political leaders know that closer economic relations are critical to their attempts to maintain a fragile economic recovery now threatened by the U.S. slowdown. Yet they worry that precisely the type of growth in China that indirectly helps Japan will result in greater Chinese influence and power in Asia. And given the still smoldering memories of World War II in China and traditional Japanese fears of Chinese hegemony in Asia, no Japanese leader can blithely dismiss fears of what China's ascendance means for Japan.

The result is a precarious balancing act, one that likely will grow more difficult over time. Tokyo understandably courts warmer relations with Beijing, but also seeks greater security assurances from Washington.

The Ministry of Defense hopes to buy more advanced defensive systems, from missile interceptors to the F-22 Raptor jet fighter. Finally, Tokyo looks to blunt (read: hedge) Chinese influence by trying to create stronger relations with other democracies in Asia, like South Korea, Australia and India. The goal, of course, is to ensure that the Chinese become less threatening and ultimately cooperative.

It is one thing to cobble together a fairly effective short-term deterrent to potential Chinese threats, but quite another to hope permanently to change China's preferences. What Tokyo fears most is that the ultimate guarantor of security in the Asia Pacific region, the United States, will decide to accommodate the expansion of Chinese influence or come to believe it too costly to maintain its strategic position in Asia. That would remove the strongest incentive for China to accommodate itself to the norms of international behavior that have kept the peace in the Pacific for the past six decades.

Beijing, too, knows that its current growth is dependent on peaceful relations with its neighbors, and that too aggressive a posture could result in a natural balancing of Asian nations against China. Yet in a region where nationalism is rife, territorial disputes fester, and arms races abound, miscalculation or misplaced hubris could lead to tragedy.

Japan's role as a democratic bulwark in Asia is thus more important than ever before. It can play a unique role in helping spread liberal systems and provide a clear model for national development. However, its politicians have to move beyond their petty domestic political squabbles so that the country can play a role commensurate with its economic power. The balancing will go on, but a Japan confidently accepting its regional responsibilities will be more able to work with its American partner to ensure that China's path remains a productive one.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at AEI.