The passing of Yasser Arafat and the election of Mahmoud Abbas to the Palestinian Presidency have occasioned a flood of hopeful rhetoric. Indeed, it is hard to rid oneself of the sense that much of that rhetoric is pent up; for so many years, people have wanted to say good things about the Palestinians and prospects for peace. And for so many years, it has been impossible to say anything good.

At this moment, there is a genuine opportunity to make progress toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Mahmoud Abbas--Abu Mazen--has been more clear and decisive than any previous Palestinian leader in repudiating violence. The elections were a success. But as we applaud steps forward and work to bolster the Israelis and the Palestinians, we should remember past missteps. 

It has become cliche to note that the Israeli-Palestinian peace process represents the triumph of hope over experience. Understanding where we went wrong during the many other hopeful moments of the peace process will help us avoid such mistakes in the future. Perhaps experience and hope can, for once, walk hand in hand.

Among the graver errors of earlier forays into peace-making was a willingness to lend the benefit of the doubt, to fudge and on occasion, to shade the truth about the compliance of the Palestinian Authority with its own commitments to the United States and to Israel. Under the terms of the PLO Commitments Compliance Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, the Middle East Peace Commitments Act and a variety of other sections of code, the US relationship with and assistance to the PA is governed by a series of restrictions. Among the most important of Palestinian obligations is the pledge to renounce "the use of terrorism and all other acts of violence and [to exert] responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations, and discipline violators."

It is not hard to understand the motivation of those who reported that Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority was in compliance with its commitments.  There was no malicious desire to mislead the Congress. Rather, in the "hope springs eternal" school of policymaking, officials charged with pursuing peace in the Middle East always hoped that the next few months would bring improvement and that the PA would stop supporting and condoning terror.

The fact is that things did not improve and ultimately, President Bush declared the PA in non-compliance. But the years of obfuscation left their mark: Officials of the Palestinian Authority have been trained to believe that the goalposts can always be moved; they have learned that momentum toward peace can outweigh a commitment to abandon terrorism; and they learned that human rights violations are acceptable if they are used to imprison opponents of the peace process.

There is a new team in charge now in the Palestinian Authority. There are also some familiar faces from the Arafat era. Abu Mazen has declared that there will be no more violence, but Hamas, Hezbollah and others have made no such commitment. Nor have certain other PLO affiliated groups. The Palestinian Authority is responsible for bringing these groups into line, one way or another.

Ultimately, however, what is necessary is not another truce or pledge to end violence. What is necessary is an end to terror as a negotiating tactic, as recourse when talking fails, and as a pressure tactic when talks falter.

We must trust Abu Mazen's commitments, and we must do all we can to foster an environment in which they can be honored. But when they are not, we must be honest.

On another front, the election of Abu Mazen and the rapid progress toward a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians have opened the floodgates for aid to the West Bank and Gaza. It is easy to see why aid is necessary; standards of living have plummeted, unemployment is sky high and there are almost no institutions of government standing.

In his State of the Union, the President announced $350 million in additional assistance to the Palestinians over the next two years. The White House says that money will still be channeled through NGOs, at least for the time being. In addition, there is serious discussion of a major $6-8 billion international aid package to the Palestinians. According to the World Bank, that would be the largest per person international aid program since World War II. (Note that the Palestinians are already the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid in the world today.)

Most non-U.S. aid to the Palestinians goes for balance of payments supports--to help the PA meet payroll. In other words, the international community has gotten almost no bang for its buck and helped to perpetuate one of the most corrupt governing authorities in existence.

Experts insist, and the U.S. government appears to agree, that the PA has made some accounting improvements and is working on greater transparency. With Arafat gone that task will be all the easier. However, let us beware that the waves of aid about to reach the PA not exacerbate existing problems. 

Much as the $18 billion for Iraq was meant to send a signal to the Iraqi people that we are 100 percent behind their future, aid to the Palestinians sends a similar signal. And much as it is impossible to spend the all the money as quickly as many would like in Iraq, it will be hard to spend the money legally, efficiently, and accountably in the West Bank and Gaza.

In years past, eagerness to obligate and disburse aid to the Palestinians resulted in programs that did little to serve the Palestinian people. Middle men and consultants in the United States took off their bit; they subcontracted to NGOs and those NGOs in turn subcontracted to other NGOs. Needless to say, accountability was minimal; money may well have gone to groups that support terror.

Yes, it is true that aid is needed to strengthen the PA so that it can take on challengers such as Hamas. But lack of money has not been the PA's main source of weakness. And money, while useful, is not the only answer. Haste and ill-placed generosity will not help the Palestinian people. Ultimately, what will help them is institutions that last from one leader to the next and provide an infrastructure that will sustain them whether peace is in the offing or not. Congress is key in ensuring that the aid that reaches the Palestinians doesn't represent a checked box, but a genuine improvement in quality of life for Palestinians.

Finally, as we work to sustain this moment of opportunity, the United States should remember its place. We are not a party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We are facilitators, not peace makers. When we introduce ourselves into the very fabric of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, we lose our ability to serve our own best interests.

When the CIA began training Palestinian security forces in the 1990s, it was no longer an intelligence gathering service. Suddenly, it became a party to the peace process. And because the Agency was vested in its mission, reporting on the behavior of the Palestinian security services was thrown into doubt. Did that serve U.S. interests?

Surely it is reasonable to ask: Had President Clinton been successful at Camp David and managed to ink a deal creating a jigsaw puzzle Palestinian state, replete with operational terrorist groups, no functioning institutions and 14 separate "security services", would the Palestinian people, the Israelis and the United States have been well-served?

As Ambassador Ross can tell you, the peace process is quicksand to even the most seasoned diplomats. But on this round, the United States should work harder to preserve its distance. We must build an environment in which peace can happen; we must provide a table at which all parties can sit. We must not become vested in the process for the process's sake.

For that reason, I believe it inadvisable for the White House to appoint a special Middle East envoy. It is inevitable that any person in that position becomes wedded to negotiations, to moving the process along when all signs indicate the process should be suspended. Such a person operates outside the diplomatic machinery of the State Department and at the end of the day, his success is defined by the success of the process. Suddenly, failure is not an option.

There may come a time, close to the conclusion of an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, when the President of the United States needs to designate a special envoy to help close the deal. That moment has not yet arrived. For now, peace should be built between the parties.

Thank you.

Danielle Pletka is the Vice President of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.