Research Fellow John C. Fortier

Barack Obama and John McCain are measuring for curtains in the White House. They are thinking about who will work in their administrations, planning for the transition after the election and looking ahead to their first hundred days in office.

Presumptuous?

No. Prudent.

It would be easy in the heat of the campaign for Obama and McCain to focus only on the task of getting elected. It would be politically correct for the candidates to feign modesty and deny that they have had discussions about their plans after taking office.

But the transition from one president to the next is too important to disregard.

The good news is that Obama, McCain and the Bush administration are taking the coming transition seriously. The Wall Street Journal reported last week that both campaigns are identifying key people who may serve in sensitive national security positions in the next administration. The Bush administration is committed to begin clearance procedures for these nominees early. And the presidential nominees may consider asking several key appointees to stay in their positions for several months as the transition unfolds.

The problems of a presidential transition in a time of war and terrorism are particularly acute. Last month, the National Academy of Public Administration highlighted such difficulties in the coming transition at the Department of Homeland Security. America's enemies hope that in the early days of a new administration, key vacancies or a long learning curve for new appointees would degrade our ability to detect, deter and respond to terrorist attacks.

But presidential transition issues are not limited to war and national security appointments.

America is unique in the world in the scale and complexity of its transitions of power. In most parliamentary systems, career civil servants hold positions at the highest levels, and there are very few political appointments.

America certainly has high-level and high-quality civil servants, but it employs political appointees in the top four or more rungs of political power. Just in Washington-based positions alone, more than 3,000 political appointees will be brought into a new administration to run departments and agencies. More than 600 of them will require Senate confirmation. It is a major undertaking to find, vet and confirm these nominees.

Unfortunately, the political appointment process is near broken. Under President John F. Kennedy, it took just over two months from the inauguration for the typical political appointee to take office. For the two most recent administrations, it took over nine months. The reasons for this backup are many. There are more political appointees. The "gotcha" political atmosphere in Washington has spawned thorough FBI background checks for all nominees, even those without security positions. The Senate often holds up nominees as leverage over unrelated matters.

This is an area that calls out for congressional reform. But it also illustrates why early planning for the transition by presidential candidates is more necessary than ever.

Past transition successes and failures point out four general rules that Obama and McCain should follow.

First, plan for people early. President Ronald Reagan had Pendleton James, whose background was in the executive search business in the private sector, working on developing lists of potential nominees months before the election. He stayed on to become personnel director, and Reagan's transition benefited from the expertise and continuity. James was also close to Reagan, and his efforts were respected and coordinated with other aspects of the campaign. By contrast, other transitions have been plagued by multiple transition teams, blurred lines of responsibility or last-minute changes of the people in charge of personnel.

Second, focus especially on White House staff. Mark Gearan, who was integral to President Bill Clinton's transition in 1992-93, lamented after the fact that the administration had spent time on nominees for the Tuna Commission but had not paid enough attention to the White House staff around the president. Especially early in an administration, much of policy is made by the team surrounding the president. President Bush offered Andy Card the position of chief of staff even before the November 2000 election, and much of his team was in place even during the contentious recount period.

Third, mix Washington insiders with people from your home state and your campaign. Many presidents have run as outsiders and have been disdainful of Washington experience in their administration. It's best to include some steady old hands familiar with the ways of Washington along with the energetic and loyal campaign staffers.

Fourth, have a few big legislative objectives in the early days of your administration and respect the role of Congress. Many presidents bring up new priorities that voters did not anticipate or send an agenda to Congress that creates a bottleneck in key committees. A sensible start would tackle a few broad, well-vetted legislative proposals, show respect for Congress and operate under a reasonable timetable for these accomplishments (the first six to nine months, not 100 days).

It is a huge undertaking, but kudos to Obama and McCain for their start in thinking ahead to governing and not just concentrating on campaigning.

John C. Fortier is a research fellow at AEI.