The leadership of the Arab world is not doing enough to help the United States in the war on terrorism. Most Arab governments are not allies in this fight; they are reluctant and occasional partners if and when the United States chooses to use significant political muscle to force the issue. Some are better than others, but few are really good. And some are adequate in some areas, but deficient in others.
The fundamental problem is simple: Most Arab leaders do not agree with us as to what constitutes terrorism; arguably, some have a vested interest in allowing it to continue; and they know that 99 percent of the time, they will not be called to account by the United States government.
The question before us at this hearing -- are our Arab allies doing enough to assist the United States in the war on terrorism -- raises two more questions.
One, who are our Arab allies? We can reel off a list of countries that come to mind: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, plus or minus a few more depending on the state on the world on any particular day. But what really makes them our allies? Military bases? Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation? A willingness to accept U.S. assistance? Shared values and systems of government?
On the question of values and government, the answer is clearly no. None of these nations share basic American values, nor does any one of them share our democratic system of government. Several of the states I mentioned host our troops, but not necessarily for the same reasons we choose to deploy those troops to the region. In no instance does the hosting of U.S. troops appear to reflect much more than a keen understanding of realpolitik in the Gulf. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the stated reason is the continued duties associated with the Gulf War, but the Saudi government imposes limitations on our ability to carry out those duties, and other military operations launched from Saudi territory have posed even more significant problems. We are fortunate that states such as Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain have been more forward leaning toward our military.
Nor do aid programs buy allegiance. If that were the case, Jordan (now one of our better friends in the Middle East) would not have sided with Iraq during the Gulf War and President Mubarak would not have undercut us at Camp David two years ago. We cannot expect any one of these countries to instinctively want to cooperate with us and support us like the British, the Germans or even the Turks. In most respects, ours is a relationship of convenience.
The second question is what is the war on terrorism? If it is a war on al Qaeda, or more broadly on Afghanistan and al Qaeda, then its scope is very narrow indeed. Under that definition, the war on terrorism could end at any moment with some good intelligence, a few lucky shots and some modest engagement in stabilizing Afghanistan.
If the war on terrorism is something much broader, as President Bush has said on more than one occasion, and if it encompasses all those who use the tools of terror (random attacks, targeting civilians) to attain political aims -- free Palestine, free Kashmir -- then the war on terrorism is something more akin to the Cold War than anything else. It is a clash of ideologies and ways of life.
The clash of ideology is key. Up until now, we have focused on narrow questions: Have you frozen bank accounts? (A few.) Have you arrested people and provided intelligence? (A bit.) Are you assisting us with our military requirements? (Egypt, Bahrain and Qatar are, Saudi Arabia is a bit, others aren't much.) But too much of this assistance is temporary, based on the aftermath of September 11 and eked out by insistent U.S. diplomacy.
These are only battles in a larger war, and when it comes to many of our Arab partners, we're never certain they're going to be with us when time comes to fight the next battle. They are not allies in the war on terrorism because they will never embrace the principles that winning the war requires.
The United States has managed to persuade some Arab governments to institute financial controls on certain people and certain charities. But enforcement of those controls will be situational. And even if the legal infrastructure is in place, the issue of enforcement remains.
Take two different examples to see why the question of whose side you're on is so vital: One, our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Last year, 14 people were indicted in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing that killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel. Eleven of those suspects are in Saudi Arabia and will not be handed over to the United States. If the Khobar investigation was an early stage of the war on terrorism, Saudi Arabia can only be judged evasive, unhelpful, and, ultimately, uninterested in justice.
Two: The government of Lebanon, home to most of the world's terror groups. Lebanon has frozen the assets of some groups associated with al Qaeda, and its laws appear to be good enough to do that. But in the case of other groups such as Hezbollah or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Lebanon's laws are selectively applied. These are not terrorist groups in the eyes of the government of Lebanon.
If we cannot agree on the basics, how can we move forward together in a comprehensive campaign to defeat terrorism?
The answer, of course, is that we can't. For as long as nothing is done to address the underlying problem in the Arab world B the ever-growing gap between the governing and the governed, and the anger and hostility that results B there will be an incentive for Arab leaders to redirect the hostility of their people onto the West, particularly the United States and its allies. That is why Arab media is so unrelentingly anti-American, why education systems throughout the Arab world teach hatred, and why many Arab states continue to support terrorism in at least some of its forms.
Until there is significant reform in the Arab world, and until it no longer serves the interests of many Arab regimes to deflect popular anger onto the United States, we will, for the most part, be alone in the war on terrorism. We can expect help in a battle here and there, but we should not fool ourselves into believing we are fighting the war together.
Danielle Pletka is the vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at AEI.
