Frederick W. Kagan is preparing frequently updated reports on the unfolding situation in the Caucasus at the website of the Institute for the Study of War.

These reports are continued with an expanded focus here.

_______________

Update 17

Current as of 10:00 p.m., Monday, September 1, 2008

Analysis

• The European Council met on 1 September, and developed a strategy of engaging both Russia and Georgia while attempting to freeze the current conflict without resolving it. The EC proposed to send an increased European force, under the rubric of the OSCE, on which Russia sits and can therefore neuter, to monitor the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement. It notes that the Russians have not yet carried out the terms of that agreement, but proposes no meaningful penalties in response. It condemns the Russian recognition of the two republics and proposes increased economic engagement with Georgia and with the two republics. The English text of the EC press release is appended at the end of this document. It summarizes the formal declaration (in French) accurately.
• Medvedev pre-empted the EC session with an interview Sunday outlining the five principles of Russian foreign policy, including a declaration of Russia's sphere of influence, of Russia's right to defend the "lives and dignity" of its citizens wherever they may be, and of its repudiation of the concept of unipolarity, as well as its devotion to the pre-eminence of international law and the search for friendly relations with all states.
• The EC declaration in no way responded to Medvedev's declaration, and does not adequately respond to the situation on the ground in Georgia. The confluence of these two statements appears to indicate de facto European acceptance of the idea of a Russian sphere of influence and Russia's right to protect the lives and dignity of its citizens abroad. If the EU continues in this direction, the Russians will have established a series of imperialistic precedents and declaratory statements unaddressed by any formal international body. Note that any parallel statements by the US at this time would have been greeted with universal condemnation.
• The EC preference for operating through the OSCE virtually ensures that any additional peacekeepers in Georgia will not fulfill their necessary purposes, as Moscow is confident that it can control the activities of the OSCE.
• The Russian General Staff has stopped reporting on the situation in South Ossetia and Georgia generally, and the North Caucasus Military District has been absent in toto from General Staff announcements for the last three days--a dramatic departure from the previous three weeks. It has instead resumed normal reporting of routine military activities, giving great play to ongoing exercises in central Russia and accentuating the participation of "Russia's strategic ally," Kazakhstan, in these exercises. Red Star explicitly noted that these exercises were a timely response to the threats of some Western politicians, "divorced from reality," to apply sanctions to Russia. As described, these exercises must have been planned long before the South Ossetian conflict turned hot. They are now prominently featured as part of a series of new steps designed to accelerate the transition of the Russian military to an all-volunteer, expeditionary force capable of seizing territory and suppressing any resulting insurgency.
• Pressure on Georgia continues with genocide complaints at the ICC and claims of a Georgian terrorist campaign underway in Abkhazia. Rumors are circulating that South Ossetia will ask for Russian military bases in its territory. South Ossetia is definitely negotiating a military alliance with Russia that it expects to be signed soon. South Ossetia's president declared that he would not recognize Kosovo, an "artificial state."
• Bottom line: Russia has now created the conditions on the ground in Georgia that it desires, including pressure points aimed at driving Saakashvili from power without the further use of Russian force in Georgian territory. The EU rhetoric suggests (to me and, I'm sure, to Moscow) that the EU will tolerate Russia's absorption of the republics over time and the "peaceful" removal of Saakashvili--i.e., all of Russia's aims in this conflict. Russian rhetoric continues to suggest, without too much angst, that Moscow simply does not believe that Europe will undertake any meaningful opposition to its aggressions, and that it can quickly escalate to a level that will force Europe to fold. But for the moment, Russian military trends suggest that Georgia is not the end-game. More to follow. . . .

Upcoming Events Timeline

• 5 September 2008: OSCE Council on Collective Security meeting
• 9 September: EU-Ukraine Summit
• 15 September: Submission date for proposal by EU exploratory mission on dealing with the Georgia situation
• 18-19 September: Informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in London
• 9-10 October: Informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Budapest
• 14 November: EU Summit in Nice
• December 2008: NATO Foreign Ministerial

Overview

• The Russian General Staff made no announcements regarding Georgia on its website between 29 August and 1 September--the first such period since the outbreak of hostilities.
• On September 1, the Russian General Staff announced a large-scale "operational-strategic" exercise called "Center 2008" in the vicinity of the Privolga and Ural federal regions. The exercise is said to involve around 12,000 servicemembers and has the objective of "evaluating the readiness of the military's command and control organs for joint operations to localize armed conflicts, liquidate illegal armed formations and terrorist groups, and also the consequences of natural disasters and technological catastrophes." Among other things, the exercise will showcase Russian abilities to command-and-control forces from multiple locations and to change the command-and-control center as needed, including from front-to-rear and rear-to-front as well as among various different main efforts. Some of the troops involved will execute marches (mounted) of more than 1,000 km. The Kazakh armed forces (currently conducting combined exercises in the vicinity of Chelyabinsk) will participate in part of the exercise.[1] The exercise will include reserve call-ups and the reservists will take part actively in the exercise.[2] Krasnaya Zvezda commented: "At a time when a few politicians from various western states, divorced from reality, are calling for the imposition of sanctions on Russia (it is true that it is hard to understand what Western sanctions on our country could really be), the military cooperation of the Russian Federation with its strategic partners is successfully developing."[3]
• On August 29, the Russian Permanent Representative to the EU said that the EU would not send peacekeepers to Georgia. "The EU is still not ready to send peacekeeping forces." He added that "if relations between Russia and the EU worsen because of the disagreement about South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Europe will suffer more from that."[4]
• Georgia recalled all of its diplomats from Russia as of 30 August.[5] The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would stop granting visas for Russian citizens to visit Georgia on 30 August 2008.[6]
• On 30 August, Abkhazia accused Georgia of "undertaking terrorist activities in the Gali region of the republic." This region borders the Zugdidi region of Georgia, which Russian troops have been occupying since shortly after hostilities began. The main road from Georgia to Abkhazia in this area runs directly from Zugdidi to Gali. The Abkhazians accused Georgia of conducting three terrorist attacks in the past week, and therefore of conducting a terrorist campaign. The one incident described was a remote-detonated IED attack against Abkhazian law enforcement forces that caused no casualties.[7]
• On 30 August, South Ossetian president Edward Kokoiti called on other South Ossetian officials to cease public speculation about the possibility of Russian military bases in South Ossetia in the future. "There are individual leaders who can make personal statements, but serious statements can only be made by the president of the republic, and I have not yet made any such statements."[8]
• The Russian Federation minister of education and social development reported to Dmitrii Medvedev that 49 of the 55 schools in South Ossetia would be able to receive students on 1 September. Medvedev said, "See to it most carefully that the children of South Ossetia do not suffer any [bad] consequences, that they can study normally both at home in the republic and in other areas."[9]
• A member of the committee on CIS affairs of the Russian Federation Council (upper house of parliament) invited the South Ossetian parliament to enter into negotiations for inter-parliamentary cooperation.[10] A delegation of South Ossetian parliamentarians was due to arrive in Russia on Monday, 1 September.[11]
• On 1 September, South Ossetian President Kokoiti said that South Ossetia planned to sign an agreement on military cooperation with Russia very soon.[12]
• Russian MoFA spokesman said that Russia was agreeable to an increase in OSCE observers in South Ossetia.[13]
• Kokoiti said on 1 September that he would not recognize Kosovo, which he called an "artificial state."[14]
• South Ossetian citizens submitted more than 300 complaints about genocide against the Georgian leadership to the ICC. Individuals make their claims and the Organization of South Ossetians against Genocide helps them formalize those claims. Hundreds more are on the way.[15]
• From Dmitri Medvedev's 31 August interview:
• "I will base the execution of the Russian Federation's foreign policy on five principles.
• "First basis: Russia recognizes the preeminence of the principles of international law as they define the relations among civilized peoples. And within the framework of these principles, this concept of international law, we will develop our relations with other states.
• "Second, the world must be multipolar. Unipolarity is unacceptable. Domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in which decisions are made by one country, even one so serious and authoritative as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatens conflict.
• "Third, Russia does not seek confrontation with any country. Russia does not wish to be isolated. We will develop our friendly relations with Europe, with the United States of America, and with other states of the world insofar as it is possible.
• "Fourth, an unquestionable priority for us is the defense of the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they are located. We will proceed from this basis in executing our foreign policy. We will also defend the interests of our business community abroad. And everyone must understand that whoever launches aggressive actions will receive a response.
• "And, finally, fifth. Russia, like other states of the world, has regions in which it has privileged interests. In these regions there are countries with which we traditionally maintain friendly, good-neighborly relations, historically particular relations. We will work very attentively in these regions to develop such friendly relations with these states, with our near neighbors. . . ."
• Asked if these "priority regions are the territories bordering Russia," Medvedev answered, "Yes, of course, the border regions. But not only those."[16]

EU Press Release of 1 September

• Meeting in an extraordinary session on 1 September following the conflict that broke out in Georgia, the European Council unanimously expressed its concern at the consequences, particularly in human terms, of this situation and its condemnation of Russia's unilateral decision to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
• It reiterated the unacceptable nature of this decision and called on other States not to recognise this proclaimed independence, emphasising once more that a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity recognised by international law and United Nations Security Council resolutions.
• The Heads of State and Government are pleased that the agreement achieved on the basis of the French Presidency's mediation efforts on behalf of the European Union has led to a ceasefire, improved delivery of humanitarian aid to the victims, and a substantial withdrawal of Russian military forces. The 27 Member States reiterate that the implementation of that plan has to be complete and call on the parties to continue the full implementation in good faith of the agreement they have signed. They emphasised the urgency of finalising the international monitoring mechanism, in which the EU is prepared to participate, and which is provided for in point 5 of the agreement, and to begin the international talks concerning the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia provided for in point 6. The EU is ready to commit itself, including through a presence on the ground, and has decided in particular to send a fact-finding mission charged with defining the modalities for an increased commitment.
• In addition to the emergency aid it is supplying, the EU is prepared to supply aid for reconstruction in Georgia, including in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to examine the enhancement of its relations with Georgia. It is more necessary than ever to support regional cooperation and the EU's relations with its neighbours. The European Council called for the intensification of efforts to ensure the security of energy supplies and the diversification of energy sources and supply routes.
• The European Council has decided to appoint a European Union Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia. It considers that this crisis has placed the relationship between the EU and Russia at a crossroads and that it is in Russia's own interest not to isolate itself from Europe. For its part, the EU has shown itself willing to engage in partnership and cooperation, in keeping with the values on which it is based, and expects Russia to behave in a reasonable manner, honouring all its international commitments. The EU will remain vigilant and examine the various aspects of its relations with Russia, in particular in the run-up to the next summit scheduled to take place on 14 November in Nice.
• The European Council has given a mandate to its President to continue discussions with a view to the full application of the six-point agreement. To that end, the President of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, will go to Moscow on 8 September, accompanied by the President of the Commission and the High Representative. Until troops have withdrawn to the positions held prior to 7 August, meetings on the negotiation of the Partnership Agreement will be postponed.[17]

Notes

1. В период с 1 по 27 сентября 2008 года будет проведено оперативно-стратегическое учение "Центр-2008", 1 September 2008, www.mil.ru.
2. В рамках учения "Центр-2008" будут проведены сборы с военнослужащими, призванными из запаса, 1 September 2008, www.mil.ru. 
3. «Центр-2008»: стратегический эффект, Юрий БЕЛОУСОВ, «Красная звезда». Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 September 2008, www.redstar.ru. 
4. Постпред РФ при ЕС сомневается, что европейские миротворцы отправятся в Абхазию и РЮО, 29 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
5. Грузия отзывает из России всех своих дипломатов, 29 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
6. Граждане России теперь смогут въехать в Грузию только через третьи страны, 30 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
7. В Сухуми заявляют, что Грузия совершила очередной теракт в Гальском районе, 30 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
8. Кокойты призвал политиков в республике воздерживаться от непродуманных заявлений, 30 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
9. Почти 50 школ в Южной Осетии примут учеников 1 сентября, 30 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
10. РФ пригласила Южную Осетию на переговоры об установлении межпарламентских отношений, 31 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
11. Делегация югоосетинских парламентариев прибудет в понедельник в Россию, 31 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
12. Цхинвали планирует подписать соглашение о военном сотрудничестве с Москвой, 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
13. Россия готова к увеличению числа военных наблюдателей ОБСЕ в Южной Осетии, 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
14. Президент Южной Осетии назвал Косово "искусственным государством", 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
15. Жители Южной Осетии направили в международные суды триста исков к грузинскому руководству, 1 September 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
16. Интервью Дмитрия Медведева телеканалам «Россия», Первому, НТВ, 31 August 2008, www.president.kremlin.ru. 
17. Extraordinary European Council meeting on the situation in Georgia, 1 September 2008, www.ue2008.fr.

_______________

Update 16

Current as of 12:00 a.m., Friday, August 29, 2008.

Analysis

• The tensions between Russia and both Georgia and Ukraine are increasing. The Georgian parliament has voted to break diplomatic relations with Russia. Russian newspapers are laying out the legal basis for Russia's re-acquisition of Crimea. The Russian Investigative Commission claims it has demonstrable evidence of Georgian genocide in South Ossetia and is proceeding with the preparation of its case. Human Rights Watch, on the other hand, has produced clear evidence of ethnic cleansing by Ossetians against Georgians in areas under Russian control. Georgia is demanding the removal of all Russian forces from its territory, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Black Sea Fleet has announced that it is increasing security around its facilities in Ukraine due to threats from Ukrainian local courts and civilian groups.
• Russia's neighbors are coalescing into a bloc that not only opposes Russia's actions so far, but speaks of rolling them back in some way. Ukraine has indicated its willingness to participate in efforts to restore the territorial integrity of Georgia. Latvia has called for an increased international presence in the conflict zone. The Baltic States will make an appeal along those lines at the upcoming European Council meeting.
• Russian leaders dismiss with scorn the notion that the West can punish Russia in any way. Putin denigrated the importance of the G-8; he and others scorn WTO; and Russian business newspapers explain that the world cannot afford to do Russia any harm.
• Russia is now in open violation of two key principles of the Sarkozy agreement: It has not withdrawn all of its forces into Ossetia and Abkhazia despite the fact that the Georgians have returned to their permanent garrison stations, and it has unilaterally decided the territorial disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia rather than engaging in international discussions as required in that agreement. Unless Russia not only withdraws its remaining troops but also repudiates its unilateral recognition of those two republics, it will continue to be in violation of the agreement.

Upcoming Events Timeline

• 1 September 2008: Extraordinary Session of the European Council
• 5 September: OSCE Council on Collective Security meeting
• 18-19 September: Informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in London
• 9-10 October: Informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Budapest
• December: NATO Foreign Ministerial
• April: Expiration of Russo-Ukrainian Friendship and Cooperation Agreement

Overview

• Medvedev said that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization concluded that the aggressor who started the South Ossetian war was responsible for its consequences, and that he was "completely satisfied" with the conversation.[1] He added that the SCO was growing in strength and significance, that it is not a military bloc and is not designed to oppose NATO, but that "it does not just make proposals, but it also makes decisions." Many states are now asking to join the SCO, he said, but the organization has placed a moratorium on new accessions and established a working group to consider further expansion.[2]
• On August 28, Russia announced that Georgian military forces had attempted to block off the Akhalgori [the Russians are calling it by its former name, Leningori] region in South Ossetia and force out the Ossetians. The Russian spokesman also noted that a company of Georgian infantry had redeployed to its permanent garrison in Gori and an engineer unit was moving back to its permanent garrison in Senaki.[3] The Russians also announced that the Black Sea Fleet was continuing to patrol the Abkhazian coast to protect it from the actions of the foreign warships that had entered the region.[4] In addition, Russian forces announced that they had built 21 peacekeeping posts in South Ossetia.[5] 
• The Russians also announced that they had recovered the passport of an American citizen from Texas in an area used by Georgian special forces to prepare for an attack.[6]
• Human Rights Watch presents definitive evidence from satellite imagery, local photography, and interviews, of widespread looting and the systematic burning of houses in ethnic Georgian villages around Tskhinvali by Ossetian militias in the days following the Russian recapture of Tskhinvali.[7] "All of this adds up to compelling evidence of war crimes and grave human rights abuses. This should persuade the Russian government it needs to prosecute those responsible for these crimes,"said Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch.
• On August 28, Human Rights Watch said, "The European Union should act to protect Georgian civilians from continued attacks by Ossetian militias and opportunistic violence." It called for the immediate deployment of an ESDP mission and the establishment of an international peacekeeping mission.[8] Confirming details were provided by the UN High Commission on Refugees, which also reported that 128,000 people have been displaced within Georgia and 30,000 fled to Russia. UNHCR had already been assisting 220,000 IDPs in Georgia before the conflict.[9]
• Human Rights Watch has also described a pattern of "indiscriminate use of force" by Georgian troops during their movement through Tskhinvali, particularly the use of Grad missiles and a protracted and indiscriminate artillery barrage. Details of the report also indicate that militias took refuge in occupied civilian dwellings, and that some civilian casualties at least were caused by Georgian forces firing on legitimate military targets but without adequately weighing the danger to civilians against the military advantage (a key element in the legitimacy of collateral damage). It does not appear that Georgian forces engaged in war crimes, and certainly not in genocide.[10]
• The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on 27 August, noting "For the time being the ethnic cleansing of Georgians on the Russian occupied territories, both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and beyond is still under way. Moreover, after the Russian President's recognition of independence of the separatist regions, the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population has become even more intense. It provides yet another proof that persecution of ethnic Georgians on the occupied territories is a deliberate policy aimed at achieving political goals rather than being isolated cases of violence." There is sufficient independent confirmation of this assertion to substantiate it.[11]
• Kuwait has announced its intention to provide Georgia with $2 million in humanitarian aid.[12]
• The President of Abkhazia will make his first "official visit" to Russia in September.[13]
• Medvedev announced that he will visit Afghanistan at Karzai's invitation.[14]
• Putin denigrated the importance of the G-8, noting that India and China were not members.[15]
• On 28 August, Ukrainian President Yushchenko "informed Javier Solana that Ukraine condemns Russia's decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia and expects international community to join efforts in restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity."[16] In the Ukrainian version, this text ends "and expressed his readiness to take active part in that process."[17] The Russian press picked it up in that form: "Ukraine is not against taking part in "reestablishing the territorial integrity of Georgia."[18]
• The Georgian Parliament voted to break diplomatic relations with Russia following Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It also voted to order the government to repudiate all agreements permitting Russian forces on Georgian soil, including peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and to demand the immediate withdrawal of those forces.[19]
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet announced that it was taking measures to increase security of its facilities in Ukraine "after receiving information about intended provocations by [Ukrainian] judicial instances and an array of Ukrainian social organizations."[20]
• The leadership of the Russian Federation Counternarcotics Service said that the "ineffective actions of NATO in the war on narcotics in Afghanistan have led to 'explosive growth' in the production of heroin in that country . . . [and] that narcotics from Afghanistan are a major threat for Russia and Central Asia."[21]
• Abkhazia and Russia expect to complete preparations for diplomatic relations within a month, "and an array of documents about military cooperation will also be prepared."[22]
• The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Prosecutor-General announced that" as of 28 August, we have information about 1,692 people who died and 1,500 who were injured as a result of Georgian aggression." It claimed that "the investigators interviewed 15 Georgian servicemembers, who were taken prisoner, who said that they had received military orders to 'enter the territory of South Ossetia and free it of foreigners.'" NB: International law prohibits the interrogation of prisoners of war. Also note that these figures are likely to prove very difficult to reconcile with the reports of Human Rights Watch, the UNHCR, and other NGOs on the ground.[23] On August 26, the Investigative Committee had announced that "the facts of genocide against the Ossetian people in South Ossetia are fully confirmed. 'It is established that in the period from 7 to 12 August the armed forces of Georgia, pursuing the goal of the complete annihilation of the Ossetian national group living in the territory of South Ossetia, invaded the territory of the unrecognized republic. They spared no one. We found a woman killed with a shot to the head. The was eight months pregnant. The unborn child also died. . . . Not only in Tskhinvali, but also in many villages hundreds of houses were destroyed--the aggressors wiped them from the face of the earth in order to leave no traces of the presence of Ossetians on the earth.'" The preparation of a criminal case in the Russian Federation continues.[24] NB: The reports of HRW make it very likely that hundreds of houses were destroyed deliberately, but in Georgian villages by Ossetian militias.
• On 29 August, a long signed article appeared in Izvestia laying out the path toward Russian re-acquisition of the Crimea--and possibly of the "nine" other "Russian-speaking" areas of Eastern Ukraine. The gist is that the Russo-Ukrainian Agreement about Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1999 is due for renewal in April 2009. That agreement, according to the article, is the one in which Russia guarantees Ukrainian territorial integrity. It also requires both sides to maintain cordial relations with one another. Ukraine has not met its commitments, the author argues, noting the "oppression of the Russian-speaking population, the honoring of Fascist veterans, and the intention of joining NATO." There follows a convoluted legal argument to prove that a Soviet decree of 1948 giving the Crimea to Russia has not been repealed and is still in force, apart from the friendship and cooperation agreement of 1999. If that agreement is not renewed, then Russia has every right to insist upon the return of the Crimea. All of this, the author claims, is the fault of Yushchenko, who is a "clone of Saakashvili." An internet poll appended at the end of the article asks "Does Russia Need Crimea?" The answers: "45%: Yes, we fought for it for centuries; 25%: Russians and Ukrainians are brothers; it doesn't matter where Crimea is; 16%: Obviously, this is a strategic base for our fleet; 10%: It's gone, now it belongs to another state; 4%: No, Crimea is not worth the problems it would cause."[25] Another article, headlined "A 'fifth column' is discovered in Crimea" describes the support of local Crimeans for Russia (visible in the [probably staged] welcoming home of the Black Sea Fleet), which Yushchenko has given orders to suppress.[26]
• A Russian business journal reported (linked to by Izvestia): "America is powerless to punish Russia: Attempts of any variety to isolate and punish Russia for its military activities in Georgia will have the opposite effect. As Russia's economic power grows, its role in world politics will grow."[27]
• Poland, the Baltic States, and Ukraine harshly condemned and rejected Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Latvia called for an increase in the international presence in the conflict zones.

Notes

1. Страны ШОС считают, что организаторы агрессии против Южной Осетии должны отвечать за ее последствия, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
2. Президент РФ рассказал участникам саммита ШОС о событиях в Цхинвали, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
3. Грузинские военные пытаются заблокировать Ленингорский район и вытеснить из него осетин, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
4. Российские военные корабли продолжают находиться у берегов Абхазии, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
5. Для обеспечения безопасности населения Южной Осетии там выставлен 21 миротворческий пост, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
6. На позициях разбитого грузинского спецназа найден паспорт американца, 28 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
7. Georgia: Satellite Images Show Destruction, Ethnic Attacks: Russia Should Investigate, Prosecute Crimes, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/28/georgi19712.htm, 29 August 2008.
8. EU: Protect Civilians in Gori District: Security of Civilians Should Be Central to Summit Discussions on Russia, 28 August 2008, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/27/georgi19704.htm. 
9. Displaced meet in Gori as they flee new violence or try to head home, 27 August 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/48b56d214.html. 
10. Georgia: International Groups Should Send Missions Investigate Violations and Protect Civilians, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/17/georgi19633.htm, 18 August 2008. 
11. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 27 August 2008, www.mfa.gov.ge. 
12. Information for the Press, 27 August 2008, www.mfa.gov.ge. 
13. В начале сентября президент Абхазии посетит Россию уже в новом качестве, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
14. Медведев посетит Афганистан по приглашению президента этой страны, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
15. Путин заявляет о неполноценности клуба "Большой восьмерки", в котором нет глав Индии и Китая, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
16. Victor Yushchenko talks to Javier Solana, 28 August 2008, www.president.gov.ua. 
17. Президент також зазначив, що Україна розраховує на об'єднання зусиль міжнародної спільноти щодо відновлення територіальної цілісності Грузії та заявляє про свою готовність брати активну участь у цьому процесі. Президент провів телефонну розмову з Генеральним Секретарем Ради Міністрів ЄС Х.Соланою, 28 August 2008, www.president.gov.ua. 
18. Украина не против принять участие в "восстановлении территориальной целостности Грузии", 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
19. Парламент Грузии проголосовал за разрыв дипотношений с Россией, 28 August 2008, www.izvestia.ru. 
20. Руководство ЧФ усиливает охрану своих объектов, опасаясь провокаций с украинской стороны, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
21. ФСКН: операция НАТО в Афганистане вызвала рост наркопроизводства в этой стране, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
22. В Сухуми рассчитывают за месяц подготовить дипломатические и военные соглашения с Москвой, 28 August 2008, www.interfax.ru. 
23. Прокуратура уточнила число жертв грузинской агрессии в Южной Осетии, 28 August 2008, www.pravda.ru. 
24. Найдены доказательства геноцида осетинского народа, 26 August 2008, www.pravda.ru. 
25. Вторая Крымская: Готова ли Россия вернуть полуостров? Ксения Фокина, Izvestia, 29 August 2008, www.izvestia.ru. 
26. В Крыму выявляют "пятую колонну", 27 August 2008, www.izvestia.ru. 
27. Америка бессильна покарать Россию, 25 August 2008, www.dpmoney.ru.

_______________

Update 15

Current as of 12:30 a.m., Thursday, August 28, 2008.

NB: This is a partial update covering only Russian MoD releases since 22 August; more to follow.

Analysis

• The deployment of NATO warships to the Black Sea has definitely gotten Moscow's attention, drawing a combination of bravado, threats, and shrugs from the Russian military. The key issue is most likely that Russia cannot match the naval buildup it sees coming in the Black Sea with its own vessels, at least not in a timely fashion. Moscow is reacting as though it has confidence that NATO ships will not do anything but sail around for a few weeks and leave, but it is manifesting its discomfort at the demonstration that it does not control the Black Sea.
• Russia continues to accuse Georgia of planning to re-attack South Ossetia, and has served notice that any American attempt to rearm Georgia to pre-war levels will be seen as American encouragement for such an attack.
• Russia is expanding its peacekeeping perimeter, but refuses to define its "security zone" with any precision. It acknowledges the presence of Russian forces in Poti, but obfuscates the basis and nature of that presence. Russian forces are cleansing South Ossetia of Georgians, but the evidence in the MoD releases is naturally oblique, and I will return to this issue in subsequent updates.
• Moscow is exerting a combination of pressures and promises on Ukraine, holding out the possibility of continued military-industrial collaboration but denouncing Ukrainian haggling over the Black Sea Fleet's presence in Sevastopol. In general terms, the tenor of Moscow's messages to Ukraine appears to be calming from its initial flurry of indignation. On the other hand, the Russians ostentatiously sortied the Black Sea Fleet flagship from Sevastopol, giving the Ukrainians no notice and initially offering a false explanation of its destination and the purpose of its mission. Moscow has thereby served notice that it will not respect President Yushchenko's demands for notification of planned sorties, their destinations, and their purposes.
• Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, China, and the Czech Republic have all been singled out in MoD releases for supporting Russia either by offering humanitarian aid to South Ossetia or by considering sending military advisors there under the auspices of the OSCE.
• The General Staff also announced that it is reviewing the experience of this conflict for lessons for Russian military modernization, particularly in the areas of suppressing enemy air defenses and in information operations.
• Strong evidence suggests that Moscow still aims to encourage the Georgians to remove Saakashvili from power and will continue to exert various forms of leverage, including the occupation of Georgian territory, to that end.

Overview

• On August 22, the Russian General Staff announced that it would not provide a depth for the security zone in South Ossetia because the demarcation line is too broken, but that it would be from 6 to 18 kilometers. There were 18 Russian peacekeeping posts, 8 in the "first line" manned by 272 Russian peacekeepers, and 10 in the second line with 180 peacekeepers.[1]
• Russian General Staff denounced on August 22 Ukrainian statements suggesting that terrorist actions were being prepared against ships of the Black Sea Fleet as "an attempt to disrupt the cooperation of Russia and Ukraine within the framework of the basing agreement for the Black Sea Fleet." [2]
• On August 22, the Russian General Staff said that it was considering a Ukrainian proposal to renew work on a joint project to build a medium-range military transport aircraft, An-70.[3]
• The Russian General Staff announced joint military exercises with Kazakhstan to be held from 1-5 September in Russia (Chebarkul'skii training area, Chelyabinsk oblast').[4]
• China and the Czech Republic offered to send humanitarian assistance to South Ossetia. Russian spokesman made much of the Chinese offer on 23 August; noted the Czech offer.[5]
• On August 23, the Russian General Staff noted that the frigate Mirage returned to Sevastopol. "We did not notice any effort by the Ukrainian powers to oppose this."[6]
• On August 23, the Russian General Staff announced that all of its peacekeeping forces had been withdrawn to the "first line" of peacekeeping posts, including 8 posts on the south bank of the Inguri River and 10 on the north bank.[7]
• The Russians complained on 22 and 23 August that the increase of NATO naval forces in the Black Sea was not conducive to stabilizing the region.[8]
• On August 23, the Russian General Staff warned that the Georgian "military-political leadership is continuing to seek ways of reversing the consequences of its armed action in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Units and sub-units are concentrating in the central part of the republic [presumably South Ossetia, but not entirely clear from context] and undertaking preparations for further actions. . . . Georgian special forces are establishing caches with reserves of material in order to prepare for armed action in the zone of conflict through collaborators, including undertaking diversionary operations on the territory of South Ossetia and in neighboring areas."[9]
• "Head of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin" visited a military hospital on August 23.[10]
• Flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva returned to Sevastopol on 23 August.[11]
• The Russian General Staff has announced that it will study the lessons of "the information war that accompanied the events around South Ossetia." "The media is one of the most powerful organs for forming public opinion on a global scale. We will study our experiences and draw conclusions about this question. . . . This informational globalism is the future. And counteraction in this sphere will only develop more. It is difficult to predict how it will develop, but this is a very serious question and we will study it."[12]
• On August 25, the General Staff spokesman repeated the accusation the Georgia was preparing to renew the conflict. "The potential of the Georgian armed forces is growing only for a repeated aggression. No one threatens Georgia in this region. However in the effort at any price to resolve the territorial problem preparations for a third conflict have appeared--two was no enough for them."[13]
• On 25 August, the General Staff announced that Russia might increase the number of its peacekeepers in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia if the US "decides to rearm the Georgian army." "We are constantly studying the situation, drawing conclusions about whether the Pentagon will act on its promise, about which the Georgian ministry of defense asked, rapidly to rebuild it [the Georgian military] to the level it had before the aggression. This is not our choice, it is thrust upon us. But military professionals must draw conclusions from these indications, and, most important, these actions. And we are doing that."[14]
• On August 25, the Federation Council unanimously approved the deployment to South Ossetia and Abkhazia of additional Russian peacekeepers. "The question about how many will be sent and precisely where is the prerogative of the Commander in Chief, and he alone decides how many and where."[15]
• The Russian General Staff also reiterated that it will never agree to the replacement of Russian peacekeepers with OSCE forces."[16]
• On August 25, the General Staff said that the increase in NATO ships in the Black Sea was increasing tension in the region. The spokesman said that there were now "9 foreign ships" in the Black Sea, including two American, one Spanish, one German, one Polish, and four Turkish. It is rather odd to define Turkish ships as "foreign" in the Black Sea.[17]
• On 25 August the Russian General Staff declared that "Russian peacekeepers are patrolling the port of Poti in strict accord with . . . the decisions established in the six principles of the presidents of Russia and France Dmitrii Medvedev and Nicolas Sarkozy. 'Our peacekeepers are maintaining control of the situation in that region, including the port of Poti, in the nature of patrolling, which does not contradict our peacekeeping obligations.' Responding to questions of journalists, A. Nogovitsyn said that the functions of Russian peacekeepers do not include inspections of ships entering the Georgian port."[18]
• Effectively suppressing the Georgian air defense system was hindered by its reliance on passive location. "The fact that pieces of equipment were not discovered locationally while in ambush we explain in part by the fact that we are talking about elements of passive location which have no signature." These systems "are difficult to observe and this is a problem for reconnaissance and the suppression of enemy air defense systems. We are working on this issue." Apologies for bad translation--Russian was pretty bad: «То, что локационно не были вскрыты образцы вооружений при действии из засад, отчасти мы относим к тому, что речь идет об элементах пассивной локации, которые не заявляют о себе», - сообщил заместитель начальника Генштаба ВС РФ генерал-полковник Анатолий Ноговицын. По его словам, эти средства «трудно обнаруживать, и это является проблемой для разведки и подавления систем ПВО». «Мы над этим вопросом работаем», - сказал А.Ноговицын.[19]
• Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics on August 26. The final paragraph of that recognition reads: "Russia, earnestly feel friendship and sympathy for the Georgian people, is certain that sooner or later it will turn to worthy leaders who can take care of their country as before and develop mutually-respectful, equal, and good-neighborly relations with all of the peoples of the Caucasus. Russia will always be ready to assist with that."[20]
• Russia established a new peacekeeping post in the Kodori Gorge on 26 August 2008.[21]
• On 26 August, the guided-missile cruiser Moskva sortied from Sevastopol for refitting.[22]
• The Russian General Staff is seriously concerned about the concentration of NATO warships in the Black Sea, saying that the number will rise to 18 ships and that they carry "strategic weapons with a range of more than 2,500 km."[23] The Russians expressed doubt that the ships were carrying humanitarian aid to Georgia, noting that they had over 100 cruise missiles. "The Americans have the experience of conducting operation "Desert Storm," when they chartered merchant ships and transported military supplies on them." It's hard to follow the logic here, even for the Russians--if the claim is that we are sending military aid on military ships, that's one thing, but it's hard to see how the Desert Storm analogy fits in.[24]
• On 27 August the Russian General Staff called attention to provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1936 governing the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits and their permissible time-on-station in the Black Sea. It did not at this time suggest that NATO ships were in violation of the convention.[25]
• On 27 August the Russian General Staff announced that the guided missile cruiser Moskva had entered the port of Sukhumi at the invitation of the president of Abkhazia. This announcement contradicts the statement given on 26 August about the planned-nature and purpose of the Moskva's sortie. In any case, it violates the demand of Ukrainian President Yushchenko for 10 days' notification of Russian sorties from Sevastopol with explanations of the purpose of the sortie. On 27 August, the General Staff added that Russia intends to abide strictly by its agreements with Ukraine regarding Sevastopol, including the date of departure of the Russian fleet--meaning that Russia would not consider accepting an earlier date. The Russians also called attention to the fact that "many Ukrainian deputies criticized the decree of the Ukrainian president that ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet had to inform Ukraine about their sorties."[27]
• Russia announced on 27 August that it was establishing an additional peacekeeping post in the village of Mosabruni in South Ossetia. Georgian forces, according to the Russian General Staff, had been performing police functions in the village "in order to re-establish Georgian administration on the territory of South Ossetia." "An assault company advanced and a peacekeeping post was organized and in that way the situation was brought under control."[28] Russia also announced that a Georgian UAV had overflown South Ossetia on the 26th conducting reconnaissance in violation of the six-point agreement. In addition, the General Staff reported that Georgia "is undertaking measures to regroup its army units from the east and central parts of the country and to reestablish the combat-capability of its troops."[29]
• Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia have expressed an interest in participating under the umbrella of the OSCE in serving as military observers in South Ossetia.[30]

Notes 

1. Зона безопасности в Южной Осетии имеет ломанную линию, составляя глубину на разных участках от 6 до 18 км, 22 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
2. У Генштаба РФ нет данных о возможных диверсиях против кораблей Черноморского флота в Крыму, 22 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
3. Россия не утратила интереса к проекту российско-украинского военно-транспортного самолета Ан-70, 22 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
4. В период с 1 по 5 сентября с.г. на Чебаркульском полигоне ПУрВО (Челябинская область) пройдут совместные российско-казахстанские учения, 22 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
5. Оказать гуманитарную помощь Южной Осетии готовы Китай и Чехия, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
6. ЧФ РФ продолжает обеспечивать благоприятный оперативный режим в восточной части Черного моря, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
7. Российские войска вышли за первую линию миротворческих наблюдательных постов вовремя, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
8. Наращивание группировки НАТО в Черном море не способствует стабилизации, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
9. Грузия готовит новые силовые акции в Южной Осетии и приграничных регионах, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
10. Председатель Правительства РФ Владимир Путин посетил военные госпитали, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
11. Флагман Черноморского флота РФ ракетный крейсер "Москва" возвратился в Севастополь, 23 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
12. В российском Генштабе учитывают опыт информационной войны, сопровождающей события вокруг Южной Осетии, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
13. В российском Генштабе полагают, что Тбилиси готов вновь развязать войну, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
14. Россия может нарастить группировку миротворцев в зоне конфликта, если США решат перевооружить грузинскую армию, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
15. Сенаторы поддержали обращение Медведева о направлении в зону грузино-осетинского конфликта дополнительных сил миротворцев, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
16. Москва никогда не давала согласия на замену российских миротворцев в Южной Осетии на силы ОБСЕ, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
17. Наращивание группировки кораблей НАТО в Черном море усиливает напряженность в регионе, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
18. Российские миротворцы выполняют патрулирование у порта Поти в строгом соответствии с принятыми договоренностями, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
19. Эффективно подавлять грузинские средства ПВО в ходе конфликта в Южной Осетии мешало то, что они работали на принципах пассивной локации, 25 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
20. Заявление МИД России, 26 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
21. В Кодорском ущелье выставлен пост российских миротворцев, 26 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
22. Ракетный крейсер "Москва" совершает плановый выход, 26 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
23. Группировку боевых кораблей стран НАТО в Черном море планируется довести до 18 единиц, 26 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
24. О применении двойных стандартов НАТО, 26 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
25. НАТО не может постоянно наращивать группировку кораблей в Черном море, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru. A summary of the convention is at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/naval-arms-control-1936.htm and http://www.ntip.navy.mil/montreux_convention.shtml. 
26. Корабли Черноморского флота прибыли в Сухуми, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
27. Россия строго соблюдает договоренность с Украиной о сроках базирования Черноморского флота, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
28. Российские миротворцы выставили дополнительный пост у села Мосабруни в Южной Осетии, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
29. 26 августа грузинский БЛА вел разведку российских войск в Южной Осетии, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru. 
30. В состав военных наблюдателей ОБСЕ в зоне грузино-югоосетинского конфликта войдут представители ОДКБ, 27 August 2008, www.mil.ru.

_______________

Update 14

Current as of 10:40 p.m., Friday, August 22, 2008.

Analysis

• The Russians claim to be withdrawing their troops from Georgia, and reducing their presence in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the levels set according to the 1992 agreement ending the first Georgian-Ossetian conflict (a translation of that agreement is below). But they have also announced that Russian troops continue to patrol Zugdidi (which is in Georgia proper) and did not indicate any time frame for the withdrawal of those troops. They announced that Russian aircraft were being "withdrawn," but that some would remain on the Georgian border. They did not specifically address the presence of Russian forces in Gori.
• Political tension within Ukraine continues to run high, with opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich attacking the support of President Victor Yushchenko for Georgia as serving his personal interest rather than the interest of the state.
• The Russians continue to produce "evidence" that Georgia is an aggressive state that has been "leading the world" in the rate of increase of its defense expenditures. Moscow, meanwhile, has announced that it is revising its 2010-2020 defense program.
• Russian troops are establishing outposts along the "northern bank of the Inguri River," which will probably consolidate a recent land-grab by Abkhazian forces seizing Georgian territory.
• South Ossetia released its formal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), requesting immediate Russian and international recognition. Russia has indicated that it is likely to accommodate this request. I can provide a translation if anyone is interested--the key assertion is that South Ossetia was never legally a part of the territory of the independent state of Georgia and that this UDI is, therefore, not an attack on Georgia's territorial integrity.
• The Russians will probably withdraw most of their forces from strictly Georgian territory, although they may continue to delay on a variety of pretexts, primarily to show that they can, since it seems likely that they have accomplished all of their major goals.
• The Russians will react to any effort to rearm Georgia as a provocation and as direct support for Georgian plans to commit offensive operations against Ossetia and Abkhazia, and Russia.
• The exhortation by jihadist groups to mujahideen in Chechnya, Georgia, and Russia to undertake terrorist attacks against Russia will be conflated by the Russians with supposed operations by Georgian special forces. If the jihadists manage to conduct a terror attack within the Russian Federation, Russia may choose to regard that as an act of war by Georgia, despite all the evidence to the contrary.

Overview

• The Russians claim to be withdrawing all of their forces to within the peacekeeping zones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; the withdrawal should have started today. They say they will leave only 500 peacekeepers in 8 outposts in South Ossetia. They have also begun to lay the basis for a return to their definition of normalcy in the region, which includes Russian but no other peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They deny that Georgia has the right to abrogate the 1992 peacekeeping agreement unilaterally, and they claim that their continued presence is based upon that agreement.[1]
• In Ukraine, opposition leader Victor Yanukovich attacked President Victor Yushckenko for his support of Georgia.[2]
• Russia announces that it is revising its armaments plan for 2010-2020.[3]
• On August 22, the Russian MoD announced that the Russian General Staff is "extremely disturbed by the rise of the offensive potential of the Georgian Army." "'Between 2005 and 2008 the purchase of weapons rose sharply with an accent on offensive types. And the balance of its offensive and defensive potentials was such that at the start of the aggression in South Ossetia, 40% of the equipment was in the first [offensive] category,'" according to General Staff spokesman Nogovitsyn. "He emphasized that in recent times Georgia has moved into first place in the world in the speed of the growth of its military expenditures: if in 2002 the military budget of this republic was $18 million, then by 2008 it had grown 50 times. During the period of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's rule the process of the militarization of Georgia took on a scale inappropriate to its defensive needs and encompassed almost all spheres of military expansion. . . . Expansion of the numerical size of the Georgian army occurred, a widespread improvement in weaponry occurred, a system of preparing mobilized reserves was established.' In the period 2006-2007, the number of personnel in the Georgian army doubled.'. . . From 1 January 2005 to 1 January 2008 the number of tanks in the Georgian army's parks grew almost double, from 98 to 183; armored personnel carriers more than one and a half times, from 83 to 134; artillery with a caliber of more than 100mm, three times; attack helicopters, three times, from three to nine; and military aircraft from seven to nine. . . .He emphasized that Russia 'has shown in detail that a methodical unilateral arming of Georgia, in spite of existing agreements, is taking place and this is aimed at open military conflict that might encompass the entire region.'"[4]
• On August 22, the Russian MoD announced that because the aviation task forces operating in support of Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia had accomplished their mission, they were returning to their permanent bases. The General Staff identified 25 ground-attack aircraft and 3 fighters as the planes that were being redeployed. The spokesman also said that "part of the aviation structure would remain near the border with Georgia. . . . The aviation task force is at the airfield in readiness to perform tasks that might arise suddenly."[5]
• The Russian General Staff also explained on 22 August that its peacekeepers were protecting administrative buildings in the Georgian city of Zugdid [which is in Georgia proper and not in Abkhazia or South Ossetia]. The spokesman did not indicate how long it was expected that Russian troops would remain in Zugdidi.[6]
• Translation of the Agreement on the Principles of Regulating the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict, signed in Sochi on June 24, 1992, which the Russian Federation now cites as the legal basis for its activities in Georgia:
• Striving for the rapid ending of bloodletting and the multilateral regulation of the conflict between the Ossetians and the Georgians;
• Guided by the desire to reestablish peace and stability in the region;
• Confirming the commitment to the principles of the Charter of the UN and the Helsinki Final Act;
• Acting in the spirit of the respect of human rights and liberty, but also of the rights of national minorities;
• Taking into account the agreements reached in Kazbegi on 10 June of this year;
  Agreed to the following:
• Article 1
• 1. From the moment of the signing of this Agreement, the warring parties are obliged to take all measure to end military conflict and complete ceasefire by 28 June 1992.
• 2. From the moment of the ceasefire of 28 June 1992 the opposing sides will withdraw their military formations with the aim of establishing a corridor coinciding with the line of ceasefire. The withdrawal of forces will be completed within three days;
• The extent of the ceasefire line, the corridor, and its width will be determined by joint groups of observers.
• Article 2
• With the aim of demilitarizing the region of conflict and eliminating the possibility of the involvement of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the conflict, the Russian Side will withdraw its forced deployed in the region of Tskhinvali, the 37th Sapper Regiment and the 292 Separate Military Helicopter Regiment with all attached support and security units within 20 days from the ceasefire and the separation of the warring sides.
• Article 3
• 1. With the aim of securing control over the ceasefire, the withdrawal of armed formations, the disposition of self-defense forces and implementing a security regime in the designated zone a Joint Control Commission will be established composed of the sides involved in the conflict, which will perform its functions in cooperation with the group of armed observers established in accord with the agreements in Kazbegi.
• 2. Each side, participating in the work of the commission, will designated its own representatives. The location of the Control Commission will be Tskhinvali.
• 3. For the execution of the designated tasks, combined forces are established under the Control Commission as agreed by the sides to establish peace and maintain civil order. A combined group of observers, distributed along the perimeter of the security zone, will be established under the Commission.
• 4. The Control Commission and the forces under it will immediately undertake the execution of the tasks laid upon it in the current Agreement.
• 5. In the event of a violation of the conditions of this Agreement, the Control Commission will investigate the circumstances and will take timely measures to reestablish peace and civil order, and also to prevent further violations.
• 6. Financing of the activity of the Control Commission and its subordinate forces will be provided by the Sides on an equal basis.
• Article 4
• The sides will immediately enter into negotiations about the economic reconstruction of the regions located in the zone of conflict and the establishment of conditions for the return of refugees.
• The sides consider impermissible undertakings of economic sanctions and blockades, or any other interference in the free movement of goods, services, and people and undertake to secure the conditions for the provision of humanitarian aid to the population.
• Article 5
• The sides will work toward the objective and timely provision of information about the process of regulating the conflict to the media. To this end, a special multilateral press-center is established under the Control Commission.
• Article 6
• The present Agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature. Completed in Sochi, 24 June 1992 in Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian, and all texts have the same force.
• Signed for the Republic of Georgia by E. Shevardnadze
• For the Russian Federation, B. Yeltsin[7]
• According to a translation provided by the SITE Intelligence Group (which I cannot forward), a jihadist group has exhorted the Chechen mujahideen to undertake terrorist attacks against Russian troops in Chechnya, Georgia, and Russia. It condemns equally accepting aid from the West while calling for jihad against the Russians.[8]

Notes

1. Various reports from www.mil.ru on 21 and 22 August 2008.
2. Янукович ос&#