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Home >  Short Publications >  Selling America: How Well Does U.S. Government Broadcasting Work in the Middle East?
Selling America: How Well Does U.S. Government Broadcasting Work in the Middle East?
Print Mail
Introductory Remarks
By James K. Glassman
Posted: Monday, May 17, 2004
SPEECHES
AEI event on U.S. broadcasting in the Middle East  (Washington)
Publication Date: May 11, 2004

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Welcome to the American Enterprise Institute's conference on "Selling America: How Well Does U.S. Government Broadcasting Work in the Middle East?"

My name is Jim Glassman. I am a fellow here at AEI, host of the website TechCentralStation.com, and a weekly columnist for both the Washington Post and the Scripps Howard News Service.

Recent events in Iraq, especially in Abu Ghraib prison, emphasize once more the dire need for serious, strategic and properly funded public diplomacy--the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging and influencing people around the world.

On Oct. 1 of last year, the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World, chaired by former Amb. Edward Djerejian, issued a highly critical report on the state of public diplomacy and urged significant changes. That report, while warmly embraced by many in Congress, the press and some elements of the administration, has been greeted with resounding silence by the White House.

Implementing the report might have meant admitting the administration's own deficiencies in public diplomacy. But those deficiencies did not begin with George W. Bush. They stretch back to the end of the Cold War. They are understandable, but they must be remedied.

Perhaps some in the administration believes that efforts to promote the national interest, through official state to state diplomacy and military action, must supersede what is often considered the softer science of public diplomacy--which is viewed almost as sissified, not for tough men and women.

I could not disagree more. The United States is not making a serious effort to tell its story, to convince both its enemies and its friends of our cause--to change minds.

Evidence of that lack of seriousness? The single most important public official in this area is the Undersecretary of State for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy. That job was vacated by resignation in March 2003, just before the Iraq war and was vacant until Dec. 16, 2003, when it was assumed by Margaret Tutwiler. Secretary Tutwiler then announced in late April that she was leaving to take a job at the New York Stock Exchange. She departs on June 30, the date of the changeover to Iraqi control. It is highly unlikely the post will be filled before the end of the year. In other words, for a critical period of 21 months, during which the U.S. invaded Iraq, toppled Saddam Hussein and has sought to establish a democratic regime--a time when America's image in the world could not be more important--there will have been an actual, seated Undersecretary in charge of public diplomacy for just six and a half months. Less than one third of the time.

This is not to say that there has been no activity in public diplomacy. We will today focus on one part of that activity--government-sponsored international broadcasting, overseen by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, whose chairman, Kenneth Tomlinson, will speak shortly. The BBG's Radio Sawa is beaming music and news into several Arab countries, and Al Hurra (Arabic for "the free one") was launched two months ago was an Arabic-language satellite TV service to a region that covers five time zones.

The BBG, in its earlier incarnations and this one, has done fine work. But Ambassador Djerejian's advisory group, of which I was a member, made two recommendations regarding broadcasting.

First, we urged that the BBG, like all other elements of public diplomacy, be "brought under the strategic direction" of the White House--through an office headed by a special counselor to the president with Cabinet rank. Today, BBG spends nearly as much money on public diplomacy as the State Department, yet it operates outside the broader policy agenda.

Second, we urged that the BBG, again like all other agencies that practice public diplomacy, set clear objectives that can be measured. The objective should not merely be to build audience, but to "move the needle"--to change attitudes toward the United States. Evidence of the success or failure of broadcasting entities to meet objectives needs to be publicly disseminated.

There should be no fear that journalistic integrity and credibility will be compromised if these recommendations are followed. The point is to set strategic goals, not to interfere with the way specific news or entertainment is broadcast.

Think of it this way: a broad international security strategy is set; then a public diplomacy strategy is set to help implement it. Then the BBG, as part of the public diplomacy apparatus, operates within that strategy.

As an example, it is our strong national interest is to promote democratic regimes in the Arab and Muslim world. That may be the main reason we are in Iraq. Public diplomacy should follow this same track, even--and, in fact, especially, if it means criticizing existing non-democratic regimes. Public diplomacy can often do that when official diplomacy cannot. We will know Al Hurra is succeeding, says an Egyptian born friend, when Sec. Powell is besieged with complaints from heads of government in the Arab world complaining of mistreatment.

As for the prison abuse scandals, public diplomacy should not merely show what Americans have done wrong and what we are trying to set right but should also highlight prison abuse throughout the Arab and Muslim world. It is not an isolated problem.

If I sound disappointed with the greeting the Djerejian report--and others like it--have received, I am. Yes, many of our enemies will never approve of our policies in the Arab and Muslim world, but many others, given a clear and forceful explanation, will. We need to get serious. That was our message. The best sign of seriousness would be establishing the office and the structure we suggest and to fund public diplomacy adequately. It would not be difficult.

In this effort to promote seriousness, AEI has organized today's conference. Here's the schedule. Danielle Pletka will moderate the first panel, "The Role of Broadcasting in Public Diplomacy," and, since Ken Tomlinson has to leave for a board meeting of the BBG (not great timing), he will speak first and answer questions directly. Danielle will introduce the panel members. At 10:30, I will moderate a panel titled "How Do We Measure Success?" At noon, we will be served lunch, and Rep. Frank Wolf, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, will be our speaker. Before we start, I want to thank Molly McKew for his vigorous efforts to put this conference together.

Danielle Pletka is vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at AEI. She was a senior professional staff member for Near East and South Asia with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for the 10 years ending 2002....

James K. Glassman is a resident fellow at AEI.

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