Now that the United Nations has approved a new resolution on Iraq, one with disarmament provisions that Saddam Hussein apparently accepts, the diplomatic dances between the United States and its European allies have entered a new phase: the quick, swing-your-strategic-partner square dance hoped for by the Bush administration has given way to the sort of elaborate minuet favored in continental capitals.

This may suit the immediate moment, but it is not a propitious sign for the future. The cheek-to-cheek relationship between America and her principal cold-war partners has soured, with perhaps a permanent breakup in the offing. Even if U.S.-European affairs can be patched up, it is time for the Bush administration to play the field and come up with some new geopolitical partners: "Young, fit, sole superpower seeks like-minded democracies for long-term relationship. You must be willing to use military power, even preemptively. Turn-offs: rogue regimes, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, ethnic cleansing. Turn-ons: life, liberty, pursuit of happiness."

The key element in any set of new alliance partnerships will be the nature of our potential partners--specifically, their firmly democratic character. Absent a Soviet-style, superpower enemy, the United States need not tolerate the unsavory regimes it sometimes made common cause with during the cold war. Almost equally important is the willingness to use power in the cause of freedom. But beyond these basic questions of compatibility lie the new strategic considerations shaped by the war on terrorists and terror-loving states in the greater Middle East and by concerns over the future of China, still the most likely candidate as a great power rival--or "future peer competitor," in Pentagonese.

In light of those standards, it shouldn't come as a big surprise that the traditional European "great powers" no longer look so attractive as strategic partners. Since 1945, neither Germany nor France has played a large role outside Europe. Great Britain, by contrast, retains some of the trappings and attitudes of the Empire. British military forces remain very professional and are generally well equipped, but the British army numbers less than 110,000 soldiers. Russia shares many American concerns in the Islamic world and about China, but its transition to democracy is far from complete. Yet, ironically, of the nineteenth-century European great powers, our former enemy might well be the most likely candidate for future strategic partnership.

Smaller eastern European nations can help compensate for some of the weaknesses of the great powers. In general, easterners are far less ambivalent about the exercise of American power than western Europeans. Southeastern Europeans, in particular, are ready to do what they can to help in a war on their doorsteps; Bulgarians and Romanians are in fact hoping to provide a home to future NATO or U.S. bases in the region. Both have opened their own bases and airspace for use in operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan and invested part of what little military investment funds they have to begin to improve their facilities to NATO standards.

Still, in a theater of war that stretches from the eastern Mediterranean to Southeast Asia, these are but marginal contributions. And in a struggle that promises to last decades, something more than an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" will be needed to secure a lasting victory. The United States must look further afield to find its strategic true love.

India's Allure

Perhaps the most alluring partner for the United States in the coming century is India. Although underreported in the American press at the time, one of the major initiatives of the early Bush administration was an opening to New Delhi undertaken by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. While there is much work to do to repair past decades of rancorous relations between India and the United States--and to overcome many misconceptions, such as the perceived danger of India's nuclear program--a sound basis for future cooperation exists.

First and foremost, India is a strong democracy. Not only is India the world's largest democracy, but it is an increasingly stable one. It also arguably boasts the world's largest Muslim population--more than 120 million--that is genuinely free; democracy in Turkey, for instance, is limited in comparison.

As its democracy has deepened, India has become, haltingly, a more decent society. Despite the epic violence of the past and the intermittent violence that continues to plague the country, "today's India," observes Ralph Peters in the U.S. Army War College journal Parameters, "is to a far greater degree, the story of the dog that didn't bark, of the hundreds of millions of Hindus and Muslims (as well as those of other faiths) who do not kill each other and who, despite seductive prejudices, work together as Indians first, whether in the government, in the military, or in business."

That might sound like faint praise, but when one considers the Islamic extremism that daily threatens the fragile order in Pakistan (or in Bangladesh), or India's own bloody past, contemporary India does indeed seem a remarkably tolerant society. "Hindu fundamentalism," while sporadically violent, has no Osama-like terrorist leader nor an al Qaeda-like network. Nor is it a rejection of modernity.

India's government also has behaved remarkably responsibly over the past year, even at the height of tensions over Kashmir. The Vajpayee government has seemed to understand the Bush administration's need for a temporary accommodation with Pakistan; New Delhi's patience can only buttress its case as a reliable and stable future partner.

Moreover, the Indian military is a serious force, not simply on land but in the Indian Ocean. It is saddled with too much Soviet-style equipment, but it has a professional officer corps and is firmly under civilian control. And the "problem" of nuclear weapons in South Asia is overwhelmingly a problem of Pakistan; that is, the real danger is the regime's instability, not the balance of armaments.

President Bush has rightly framed the post-September 11 "war on terrorism" as a struggle to stabilize and democratize the Islamic world. That is an immense undertaking, one clearly intimidating to Europeans. But their weakness should send us in search of new partners--perhaps beginning in New Delhi but not ending--lest we dance alone.

Thomas Donnelly is a resident fellow at AEI.