Denying critical technology to potential adversaries is as important to America’s security today as it was during the Cold War. In Safeguarding Defense Technology, Enabling Commerce (AEI Press), Seth Cropsey examines the record of export controls from their origin in the late 1940s to their status in the Clinton administration. The author warns that the United States is still following policies established during the Cold War as a result of inertia and that, while the government must make serious efforts where possible to stop the export of critical defense technologies, it cannot trust in these measures alone as guarantors of our security. It makes no sense to try to control the export of equipment that is generally available around the world. This is particularly true in the areas of computers. The general and increasing availability of computers around the world--from numerous sources--makes any attempt to control them unrealistic. 

In addition, Cropsey recommends that the United States be more restrictive about exporting "dual-use" technology (i.e., technological elements of the everyday world that can be used for more sophisticated capabilities). He points out that this now commonplace practice has brought advanced technology within the reach of countries such as Iraq and North Korea. China is now the most active importer of American goods that require export licenses (67 percent in 1998), and Japan is a large exporter of dual-use equipment to China. Examples of dual-use technology listed include high-temperature furnaces--such as those sold by Germany to China--which can be used to make composite materials used in nose cones and nozzles of ballistic missiles. Machine tools are another critical area, as they give an importing nation the capability of building its own equipment. These tools can be instrumental in the production of submarine propellers silent enough to avoid acoustic detection, or extremely durable, high-performance jet-engine components that give aircrafts speed, maneuverability, and longevity. 

Cropsey and Richard Perle--who wrote the introduction to this study and who is also the chairman of the Defense Policy Board, a group that advises the Secretary of Defense--remind us that the strength of America's armed power is the technological edge that enables us to field the world's most powerful military. Our fundamental aim must be to make sure that our technology remains the best. We have to guard against hindering technological growth and development, because the real engine of technological growth in this country is in the civilian sector. Improvements in civilian technologies, such as the search for cheap and rapid data processing, for better sensors to control automobile performance, or for faster communication on the Internet, will all have military benefits. The development of new technologies has already created a revolution in military affairs, a revolution that now enables us to destroy the overwhelming majority of targets at which we aim and also allows our military to launch weapons at a safe distance from the enemy. 

The study concludes with recommendations based in part on the findings of a panel of three defense experts who reviewed the basic elements of American defense superiority in future warfare. They determined that while the United States must continue to focus on how best to exploit superior technology against an enemy, it must also devote serious efforts to prevent others from using advanced technology against America. The seven recommendations are:

1. The Department of Defense should assess immediately which technologies are critical to the United States' future military advantage and should determine which are least accessible to potential competitors.
2. In order to make the existing export-control system effective, a sharp distinction must be made, perhaps by a working group of experts and manufacturers, between controllable and uncontrollable technologies.
3. The Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use technologies must be renegotiated and strengthened for effective control of dual-use technology. It should provide a list of countries of concern, a focused list of critical technologies of military significance, a more effective process for review before sensitive exports are licensed, and mandatory national sanctions against violators.
4. Because national security issues are not always widely understood, the Defense Department should replace the Commerce Department as the lead cabinet-level department for issuing export licenses.
5. Congress and the administration should upgrade the Defense Technology Security Administration--the Defense Department office responsible for technology-transfer policy and its application--as soon as possible. This should speed up the process for issuing export licenses and avoid a negative impact on American businesses.
6. The United States should increase its investments in maintaining and increasing America's technological edge.
7. America must also concentrate on defending its existing technologies, from nuclear secrets and applied biological and genetic research to the computer infrastructure critical to the nation's economy.

Seth Cropsey is a director of the Government Affairs Division of Greenberg Traurig. An officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve, his past government service includes serving as the deputy undersecretary of the navy and assistant to the secretary of defense.