INTRODUCTION

During much of the 1990’s, President Lee Teng-hui’s campaign for Taiwanese representation in the United Nations constituted a major element of the Republic of China’s ("R.O.C.") foreign policy. Because of determined opposition by the Peoples Republic of China ("P.R.C."), the campaign has, to do date, been unsuccessful despite the diplomatic energies expended on its behalf. With the democratic change of Administrations in Taipei, it may be a useful point to review the fundamental political and legal issues involved in securing U.N. representation for Taiwan, and to consider what new directions the Chen Shui-bian government may wish to pursue.

Accordingly, this paper initially analyzes briefly the context in which the R.O.C. was originally stripped of its U.N. representation through General Assembly Resolution 2758. In light of that history, and the present political environment, the most appropriate solution, and ultimately the most realistic politically, is to seek repeal of Resolution 2758, and the restoration of Taiwan’s representation. Although seemingly quite difficult if not impossible, this approach provides a better, politically more feasible course of action than simply seeking admission as a "new" member State, or either of the two most-often discussed alternatives: seeking observer State status, or seeking admission into the specialized agencies of the U.N. system.

In the 1970’s, the United Nations was a convenient, indeed preferred, venue for delegitimizing American and Western institutions, values and allies. Leading a long list of outrageous General Assembly actions was the shameful Resolution 3379 of 1975, which sought to delegitimize the state of Israel by equating "Zionism" with "racism." Although Resolution 3379 stands in a special class by itself, it was presaged in 1971 by Resolution 2758, which eliminated the Republic of China from the U.N.’s rolls, and replaced it with the People’s Republic of China.

Both Resolutions were adopted during a period of visibly ebbing U.S. influence at the U.N., and both were intended to project Soviet-bloc and "Third World" influence through the U.N. mechanism of "one country, one vote." Both efforts succeeded in their day, and, in varying measure, had the harmful effects their sponsors hoped to achieve. Ironically, however, the major effect of Resolutions 3379, 2758 and myriad less visible acts of anti-American spite was not only to delegitimize their targets, but to delegitimize the United Nations itself in the eyes of many Americans. Gridlocked in the Security Council by the Cold War, and subjected to unremitting criticism and harassment in the General Assembly, the U.N. sank not only in popular esteem, but in the eyes of foreign policy decision makers looking for effective implements to achieve U.S. objectives.

Although the Bush Administration succeeded in repealing the hateful "Zionism is racism" Resolution in 1991 (in Resolution 46/86), the pernicious effects of the earlier Resolution 2758 persist to the present moment. Thus, as the United States remains locked in its own ongoing debate about the appropriate role of the United Nations, Resolution 2758 stands out as a Cold War relic, as an affront to the often-trumpeted characteristic of U.N. "universality," and as a practical impediment to the more effective operation of the U.N. system, and especially the specialized agencies. In part, it is precisely the anachronistic character of Resolution 2758 that makes it such an inviting target.

Indeed, Resolution 2758 is wholly illegitimate, by its own terms violating the U.N. Charter in multiple respects, and is a virtually dispositive rebuttal to any contention that the United Nations functions within the "rule of law." So flawed is this Resolution that only its effective repeal by the General Assembly can provide any hope of expunging the stain on the U.N.’s escutcheon in the international system. Taiwan partially adopted this strategy, and attempted to begin a debate on the repeal of Resolution 2758 during the Fifty-Second General Assembly. Although turned aside in 1997 by the P.R.C.’s energetic diplomatic lobbying, the issue of the R.O.C.’s status at the U.N. will not disappear.

The crassly political way in which Resolution 2758 violated the Charter, and its larger Charter-breaking implications, have been conveniently forgotten during the years intervening since 1971, but the history of its adoption tells us much about what is politically wrong with the United Nations even today. This history, however, also provides a way out of the present quagmire for those willing to seize it. Failing to seize it -- and especially the failure of the United States to take the lead in solving the problem -- can only have grave consequences for the United Nations, especially given the parlous levels of support it currently enjoys in the American Congress.

The simplest way to explain the illegitimacy of Resolution 2758 is to state the basic facts that the P.R.C. never actually joined the United Nations, and the R.O.C. was never actually expelled, pursuant to the Charter. Resolution 2758’s only operative (as opposed to preambular) paragraph states in full that the General Assembly:

"Decides to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations affiliated with it."

Although cast in the language of "law," the P.R.C., Albania (the lead sponsor of the draft Resolution) and their supporters adopted the "representation" approach for highly political reasons. Quite clearly, the P.R.C. had no "rights" to "restore," having never previously been a U.N. member. Moreover, recognizing the P.R.C.’s "representatives" is neither an admission of a new member under Article 4, nor acceptance of credentials pursuant to the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure. Similarly, for the general Assembly to "expel" Chiang Kai-shek’s "representatives" has not basis whatever in the U.N. Charter. Significantly, Resolution 2758 itself cites no authority in the Charter, a tacit admission that there is no such authority.

Any objective reading of Resolution 2758 clearly demonstrates its facial violations of the U.N. Charter. It had the de facto effect of admitting a new Member to the United Nations, expelling a sitting Member, and replacing a Permanent Member of the Security Council, 1 all without any Security Council action whatsoever. Strikingly, a majority of the General Assembly persuaded themselves that none of these actions amounted to an "important question," requiring a two-thirds vote under Article 18.

Had the P.R.C. applied directly for U.N. membership on its own, Article 4(2) of the Charter would have required it to be elected "by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." Quite obviously, in 1971, such an approach would have subjected the P.R.C. application to vetoes by the U.S. and the R.O.C. Similarly, efforts to suspend Taiwan from U.N. membership (under Article 5), or to expel it entirely (under Article 6) would have failed both because the substantive provisions of those Articles had not been met, 2 and because General Assembly action under either provision also requires a recommendation from the Security Council, subject to the veto power of the Permanent Members.

Moreover, applications for new U.N. membership, suspensions and expulsions are all explicitly enumerated in Article 18(2) as "important questions" requiring a two-thirds majority of those Members present and voting in the General Assembly. 3 Since 1961, the United States, Taiwan and their supporters had been able to rely on Resolution 1668 and its successors, which decided that "in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question," thus requiring a two-thirds General Assembly vote. On October 25, 1971, however, as evidence of the decline and final collapse of the U.S.-led, pro-R.O.C. coalition, the General Assembly rejected the "important question" draft resolution by a vote of 55 in favor, 59 against, 15 abstentions and 2 absent. The Albanian text that became Resolution 2758 was then adopted by a vote of 76 in favor, 35 opposed, 17 abstentions and 3 not participating.

Using any route legitimately provided by the U.N. Charter, therefore, would have (and had repeatedly prior to 1971) led to a political defeat for the P.R.C. Accordingly, in 1971 the P.R.C. decided to end run the carefully crafted procedural protections of the Charter, and create a new and unauthorized procedure of simply replacing one set of "representatives" with another.

Whether Charter-illegal or not, however, Resolution 2758 was adopted and implemented, and the question now is how to address its consequences. The most obvious option is for Taiwan to seek the repeal of Resolution 2758 and thereby reobtain representation. In effect, the R.O.C. now faces the mirror image of the political problem the P.R.C. faced before 1971: attempting to obtain membership through the normal Charter procedures would almost surely produce a Beijing veto. Accordingly, following the trail blazed by the P.R.C. appears to be Taiwan’s only realistic course, although it is one that will require enormous diplomatic efforts. What Taiwan also requires is the visible support of the United States, which, during the Clinton Administration, has been essentially impossible to obtain. Hence, the Chen Administration needs to consult closely with the winner of the 2000 U.S. presidential election in order to elicit greater American support.

The first obstacle to a strategy of repealing Resolution 2758 is the question whether the General Assembly -- acting on its own without the Security Council -- has the authority to "reseat" Taiwan. The Charter is silent on this point. Of course, the Charter was explicitly contrary to the ultra vires procedures adopted by the General Assembly when it adopted Resolution 2758, so the problem should not long detain us. Indeed, in 1971, the United States had circulated a compromise Resolution that could have solved the problem had the R.O.C. been willing to accept it, and had the procedural situation in the General Assembly been more favorable.

Recognizing the likelihood during the Twenty-Sixth General Assembly in 1971 that the P.R.C.’s efforts would finally succeed, the U.S. and others proposed "dual representation" of both the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., with the P.R.C. being seated as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Operative paragraph two of the draft American resolution stated specifically that the General Assembly "Affirms the continued right of representation of the Republic of China."

In describing this draft "dual representation" resolution on October 25, 1971, then-Ambassador George Bush queried rhetorically:

"Some may ask where and when the Charter has been used before in precisely the way our resolution proposes. The answer is: nowhere -- because in 26 years the United Nations has never faced precisely this situation."

After reviewing such cases as the three General Assembly votes possessed by the U.S.S.R. (through its own, as well as the Ukrainian and Byelorussian S.S.R.’s), and the U.N. membership of India even before its full independence from the British Empire, Bush concluded by saying:

"In every such case the United Nations has faced a reality, not a theory -- and has acted accordingly, finding new solutions for new problems. We are in a similar situation now. We face a reality, not a theory. Our proper concern must be to do justice to the complex reality that exists today in the form of effective governing entities [i.e., the R.O.C. and the P.R.C.], and the Charter gives us the room to innovate to satisfy that concern."

Because Resolution 2758 was adopted, and because of the R.O.C.’s "withdrawal" from the U.N., the draft "dual representation" resolution never came to a General Assembly vote. Reseating Taiwan today would have the practical effect of adopting the 1971 draft American resolution. Some might argue that the "dual representation" resolution violated the Charter, because its practical effect would have been to add a member to the United Nations without any action by the Security Council, as required by Article 4, just as resolution 2758 violated the Charter. Although the Bush proposal would have resulted in an additional U.N. Member, that outcome cannot be any different in legitimacy than Resolution 2758 itself. It would be absurd to say that the General Assembly is unable to correct the iniquitous effects of an illegal earlier Resolution simply because of doubts about the corrective measure. Otherwise, the General Assembly would be unable to overcome self-inflicted wounds, even when it had the will and the ability to do so. The Framers of the Charter could hardly have expected or allowed such a result, lending confidence to the conclusion that reseating Taiwan in the U.N. through a General Assembly Resolution is permissible.

Second, there is little doubt that Taiwan qualifies as a "state" under Article 4 of the U.N. Charter for membership purposes: it controls a defined territory, has an identifiable population, has a capital city, administers its own internal affairs, and is able to enter relations with other states. The United Nations’ history, as former Ambassador Bush’s remarks concerning the U.S.S.R. and India demonstrated, contains ample precedent for accommodating ambiguous circumstances. Both East and West Germany held U.N. membership prior to their reunification. The two Koreas are both currently U.N. Members, even though their very existence as separate states stems only from the historical circumstances of Japan’s surrendering in 1945 to the Americans on the southern half of the peninsula and to the Soviets in the north. The two Yemens also both held separate U.N. memberships, prior to their merger, as did Tanganyika and Zanzibar before becoming Tanzania.

Contrary to the fears expressed by the P.R.C., and as these precedents amply demonstrate, providing representation to Taiwan would not represent a "two China" policy, nor would it even lead to the conclusion that Taiwan was "independent" from the P.R.C. In all of the cases noted, practical political realities, not the theology of international law, ultimately governed the decisions of U.N. Members. The same conclusion applies here as well.

Third, for most of the U.N.’s history, Third World majorities argued successfully that the actions of one General Assembly could not be overturned by subsequent General Assemblies. In fact, this argument, although politically powerful, was always a myth. As early as November 4, 1950, the General Assembly repealed a resolution adopted by an earlier Assembly. There, the Assembly, in Resolution 386 rescinded Resolution 38 of December 12, 1946, which had barred Spain (as a former "enemy state") from U.N. membership, and recommended the withdrawal of diplomatic representation from Madrid. Subsequently, other former "enemy states" (such as Germany and Japan) were admitted to the U.N. without a General Assembly vote revoking their "enemy state" status because of Second and Third World fears of the impact of repealing earlier General Assembly resolutions.

Whatever doubts existed about the authority of the General Assembly were completely dispelled on December 16, 1991, when the operative language of the "Zionism is racism" Resolution was repealed by a vote of 111 in favor, 25 opposed, 13 abstaining, with the remainder not participating. During the course of the diplomatic lobbying in favor of repealing Resolution 3379, opponents raised the argument against such an action, based on the "conventional wisdom" prohibiting repeals, but it was never taken very seriously, as least in most capitals. Having directly faced the issue, and overwhelmingly accepted that repeal is possible, the General Assembly would now be extremely hard-pressed to reverse itself. Significantly, Israel could not, of course, have obtained the repeal of Resolution 3379 on its own; only a massive effort by the Bush Administration, together with Israel and other close allies, resulted in the historic repeal vote.

Fourth, the "important question" issue might be raised by opponents of repeal, thus requiring a two-thirds General Assembly majority under Article 18 of the Charter, and making repeal much more difficult politically. As noted above, for many years, the R.O.C. and its supporters used Article 18 successfully in the General Assembly to thwart the P.R.C.’s membership efforts. Initially, on December 15, 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1668 (XVI) deciding that "in accordance with Article 18 of the Charter, any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question." Resolution 1668 was reaffirmed in several subsequent General Assemblies. In 1971, however, the Twenty-Sixth General Assembly narrowly rejected the "important question" draft resolution. Once this important procedural protection was lost, the draft that became Resolution 2758 was easily adopted.

Of course, since Resolution 2758 itself was not decided as an "important question," there is no reason why its repeal should be subjected to the two-thirds majority-vote requirement. Although this perspective appears to be a matter of simple logic, there is every reason to believe that the P.R.C. and its supporters (ironically, reversing their 1971 position) will attempt to use the "important question" maneuver to block repeal of Resolution 2758. The resolution of this procedural issue is entirely political: if there is truly a majority in the General Assembly with the necessary political will to reseat Taiwan, there will be a majority to determine that the repeal of Resolution 2758 and adoption of the "dual representation" concept is not an "important question."

Fifth, some might argue that, whatever the Charter legality of Resolution 2758, the R.O.C.’s 1971 attempt to withdraw from the U.N. means that Taiwan renounced its status as an original U.N. Member, and that it must now reapply under Article 4 as a new Member. Taiwan’s "withdrawal" occurred on October 25, 1971, when, shortly after the vote was lost on whether to declare the Albanian draft text (which became Resolution 2758) an "important question," the R.O.C. delegation made a point of order in the General Assembly, saying that it would no longer take part in any further proceedings. The delegation then left the General Assembly hall. The next day, President Chiang Kai-shek said "[b]efore this infamous [Resolution 2758] could be put to a vote, this country announced its withdrawal from the United Nations, an organization which it took part in establishing. . . . Although we have withdrawn from the United Nations, which we helped establish, we shall continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in the international community, and shall continue to fight courageously for international truth and justice and for world peace and security."

The U.N. Charter deliberately made no provision for the withdrawal of member governments, largely to prevent the threat of withdrawal from being used as a form of political blackmail, or to evade obligations under the Charter. Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in March, 1933 (to signal its repudiation of the League’s condemnation of Japan’s invasion of China) was very much on the minds of the Charter’s drafters. (The other two Axis powers, Germany and Italy, also withdrew from the League.) Some have questioned, therefore, whether it is even permissible for Members to withdraw from the U.N. The only other example of an effort to withdraw -- by Indonesia in 1965 -- actually tends to show that withdrawal, at least in the short term, has no force or effect.

Because Resolution 2758 is itself such an anomaly, however, the applicability of the Indonesian example is questionable. Moreover, the R.O.C.’s "withdrawal" is so completely intertwined with Resolution 2758 that it is doubtful whether the purported withdrawal should play any role here at all. Any fair reading of the situation in 1971 demonstrates that the R.O.C.’s various expressions of intent to withdraw all involved the actual or expected adoption of the Albanian draft, and should be taken as part of a single transaction which expelled Taiwan’s representatives and installed those of the P.R.C. President Chiang’s statement October 26, 1971 statement was obviously made after the adoption of Resolution 2758. If the Resolution has never been passed, no such statement would have been necessary. It follows, therefore, that if Resolution 2758 is repealed, President Chiang’s statement can simply be withdrawn in light of subsequent events. Accordingly, the repudiation of Resolution 2758 eliminates the need for the R.O.C.’s withdrawal, making it moot today.

Although there have been a plethora of suggested alternative strategies for Taiwan to seek something less than full Member State status at the United Nations, two have received particular attention. Both are conceived as intermediate strategies, or steps toward achieving full membership, rather than final objectives. This section reviews the possibility of seeking status as an "observer" State, that would not involve all of the rights and privileges of membership, but which would at least recognize the R.O.C. as a "State." The next section will consider the possibility, which has been pursued under President Lee, of seeking membership first in the U.N. specialized agencies, rather than the U.N. itself.

The Observer State Option. The first observer State in the United Nations was Switzerland. Because of the United Nation’s origins in the anti-Axis alliance, the Swiss believed that full membership would violate their national commitment to neutrality. Accordingly, Switzerland, in the summer of 1946, established the first "permanent observer mission" in New York, thus establishing the precedent for observer State status, as well as the procedural route for obtaining that status. The first U.N. Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, simply accepted Switzerland’s actions, offering to provide the unspecified assistance of the Secretariat. Lie cited no Charter authority for the Secretary-General to accept observer credentials, but neither were there any Charter inhibitions to his doing so. No Member States objected, thus resting responsibility with the Secretary General, where it remains. Currently, in addition to Switzerland, only the Holy See is a fully-recognized observer State, having established its permanent observer mission in New York in 1964.

As a practical matter, observer State status in the U.N. system, based as it is on custom and usage rather than any formal sanction in the Charter, is hard to define, either as a matter of international law or of diplomacy. There are no hard and fast legal prescriptions or even clear road maps to follow. Permanent observer missions can be large or small, and their influence can be significant or invisible. During the Cairo Population Conference, for example, the Holy See was unquestionably one of the most important and prominent players. By contrast, in the United Nations' daily work on issues involving international peace and security, the Vatican has almost no role.

Nonetheless, becoming an observer State is an understood and sought-after achievement precisely because it is perceived as conferring a higher status within the organization than simply being a "non-Member." The real issue, of course, is what exactly is afforded by achieving observer State status, and what responsibilities that status implies. The permanent observer missions can interact with delegates from full Members, as well as keep their capitals informed about pertinent developments within the United Nations. Nonetheless, in practice, access to meetings of U.N. bodies and U.N. conferences is essentially the same as for members of the general public, and the actual ability to participate (as opposed to simply "observing") is quite limited. Voting and speaking in official sessions are almost never permitted to observer States. In this and many other aspects, therefore, the gulf between "observer" and "Member" state status is quite broad.

Any consideration of observer State status should pass the test of whether it helps achieve the ultimate objective of full U.N. representation. Ostensibly, observer State status would seem to be a logical preliminary step toward obtaining full U.N. membership. Throughout U.N. history, other would-be Members have used observer status as a way station, although these States had not previously been represented at the United Nations. Many States that became observers during the course of the U.N.'s history initially chose the observer option during the Cold War in order to avoid a Security Council veto.

For the R.O.C., however, this apparent similarity masks profound political and legal differences. Indeed, because of this unique history, the R.O.C. may actually prejudice its argument for full representation by seeking the lesser status. Other countries had no alternative than to accept a status less than full U.N. membership; for them, observer status represented a "step up" in their relationship with the United Nations. By contrast, observer status for the R.O.C. would represent a "step down" from the full representation to which it is politically and legally entitled. It would represent a retreat from the powerful argument for outright repeal of Resolution 2758. Thus, there is no ultimate advantage for Taiwan to undergo an apprenticeship as an observer.

Moreover, all former observers that later became full Members have acknowledged that they were required to follow the path to membership prescribed in Article 4 of the U.N. Charter. For the R.O.C. to accept observer State status amounts to tacit acquiescence in the proposition that it also, at some later date, must follow the Article 4 approach, and is thus abandoning its fundamental argument that Resolution 2758 was illegal. As noted above, the Article 4 procedure for membership brings the near certainty of a P.R.C. veto.

Consider simply a comparison of the costs and benefits of a diplomatic campaign for observer status, versus the costs and benefits of a campaign for full membership. In the past, for most countries, obtaining observer status was less difficult politically than obtaining full membership for Taiwan. Thus, in their respective political calculations, although becoming an observer had a lower "payoff" than full membership, the lower costs of becoming an observer nonetheless made the option attractive as an interim step. Observer status seemed to these States better than no relationship at all, and it did not prejudice a subsequent attempt to achieve full membership.

In Taiwan's case, however, the calculus is different. It is not at all clear that achieving formal observer status at the United Nations is measurably better than the position the R.O.C. currently has in international circles. Although not formally designated as an observer, R.O.C. diplomats are present in New York and other U.N. cities. Full U.N. membership, by contrast, does represent a material change from Taiwan's present situation, affording as it does the ability to participate fully -- not merely to observe -- in decision making within the U.N. system, in becoming a State party to many important international treaties and conventions, and in more fully benefiting from its growing importance as an economic power in the world. Even the assessed contributions the R.O.C. would face as a full member, do not differ substantially from the voluntary financial burdens that it would likely face as an observer. Observer States have often contributed as if they were full Members, hoping to show that they were ready, willing and able to assume the responsibilities of full membership. Presumably, the R.O.C. would be willing to do so as well, meaning that the financial costs of observer status and full membership would be essentially equivalent.

Moreover, it is hard to say that seeking full representation through repeal of Resolution 2758 is measurably more difficult than obtaining observer status. Under either alternative, Taiwan starts from the same point -- the absence, at present, of any formal status in international organizations. As to either membership or observer status, there is every reason to believe that the P.R.C.'s opposition will be extremely vigorous. In both cases, a major diplomatic initiative will be required, sustained over a number of years. Thus, at least for now, it is very difficult to argue that the costs of seeking observer State status are substantially less than the costs of seeking the restoration of full representation.

Accordingly, why bother with just seeking observer status, rather than full membership? Since the benefits of observer status are not that much greater than the R.O.C.'s present situation, and since the costs of the two alternatives are not obviously different, Taipei should not settle for the lesser status, but simply continue to seek full membership, without diverting attention and resources toward seeking the lesser objective.

Membership in the Specialized Agencies. In the past several years, Taiwan has made substantial efforts to join the World Health Organization ("W.H.O."), one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations system, as an alternative to direct confrontation with the P.R.C. in the U.N. General Assembly in New York. The Lee Administration has argued that attempting to join one or more of the specialized agencies lowers the level of political confrontation with Beijing, allowing Taipei to demonstrate that it does not seek to make a political point unacceptable to Beijing. Although understandable in these terms, following the "specialized agency" approach brings with it all of the political costs associated with a direct campaign for full representation in the United Nations itself. Indeed, because of longstanding American opposition to deciding political questions in the specialized agencies, the odds of Taiwan succeeding are even more remote than obtaining representation in the United Nations. Moreover, unlike U.N. membership, joining the W.H.O. does not automatically guarantee representation in any of the other specialized agencies, and therefore promises far fewer benefits.

By way of illustration, consider the unsuccessful campaign of the Palestine Liberation Organization ("P.L.O.") to join the United Nations system in the late 1980s. The United States vigorously opposed the P.L.O. efforts, and ultimately prevented it from joining. Without a similar campaign on Taiwan’s behalf in the specialized agencies, which no American Administration, Republican or Democrat is likely to support, Taiwan’s chances are remote. Considering also that the P.R.C. opposition would be at least as vehement as the American position against the P.L.O. a decade ago, an objective analyst must conclude that a strategy of pursuing membership in the specialized agencies is far less desirable than the direct approach in the United Nations itself. A brief examination of the P.L.O. case emphasizes this point.

In early 1989, some ninety nations acknowledged the P.L.O. as a "state," representing Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories of the Jordan River’s West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the P.L.O. began a wide-ranging effort to join various agencies in the U.N. system to further "confirm" its status under international law as a "state." Since almost all U.N. bodies provide full membership only to "states," the P.L.O. saw the membership issue as an important validation of international legitimacy, and an important source of political assistance in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Israeli officials signaled that they were quite concerned about P.L.O. initiatives to join the W.H.O. and other specialized agencies. The United States agreed that the P.L.O. was not a "state" within customary international law, and had no rightful claim to join any U.N. organization as a "Member State." Moreover, the United States was insistent that the diplomatic and legal issues surrounding the P.L.O.'s status should not be contested in the specialized agencies, where the U.S. has long resisted the politicization of such organizations.

By April, 1989, however, it seemed quite likely that the P.L.O. would succeed in its efforts to obtain membership in the W.H.O., if for no other reason than that a majority of W.H.O. members had already recognized the P.L.O.'s "statehood." Given these circumstances, only a vigorous effort by the United States could derail the P.L.O. campaign. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III personally ordered the Department's regional bureaus to join daily strategy meetings, chaired by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, to coordinate the international diplomatic efforts necessary to prevent the P.L.O. from joining W.H.O. One of the first of these efforts was a world-wide cable to all American embassies, instructing them to approach foreign ministries at the highest possible level to explain the American position, and to stress the importance the United States attached to the issue. Similarly, the Department called in foreign Ambassadors in Washington to make the same points. Nonetheless, P.L.O. leader Yassir Arafat was engaging in an extensive disinformation campaign, asserting that the United States was actually "indifferent" to whether or not the P.L.O. succeeded, and that U.S. "opposition" to the its efforts was purely for domestic American political consumption.

When Congress learned of the P.L.O. efforts, and Republican Senators such as Jesse Helms and Bob Kasten spoke openly about not paying the U.S. assessment to any U.N. agency that admitted the P.L.O. There soon appeared to be a broad bipartisan support for this strategy in Congress. Secretary Baker accepted this approach, and stated it publicly on May 1, 1989: "I will recommend to the President that the United States make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, to any international organization which makes any change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer organization." Obviously, Secretary Baker had already spoken to President Bush, and was confident that his recommendation would be accepted, if necessary.

Secretary Baker's public statement, coming just days before the opening of the World Health Assembly in Geneva on May 7,1989, had a dramatic effect. First, it proved conclusively just how strongly the United States opposed the possibility of the P.L.O. joining the W.H.O. Second, it demonstrated in American domestic political circles the importance the issue had for the President and Secretary of State. Third, it got the attention of U.N. officials around the world, who finally began to realize the potentially enormous impact of an international decision to admit the P.L.O. to any U.N. agency. When the World Health Assembly formally opened, the issue of the P.L.O.'s status was still very much unresolved. "Compromise" resolutions floated by several Western governments in Geneva seemed to imply that P.L.O. membership in the W.H.O. (and then other specialized agencies of the U.N. system) was only a question of timing rather than substance ("when" rather than "whether"). The Western Group was divided and uncertain, and the other regional groupings seemed perfectly inclined to allow the P.L.O.'s application to succeed.

The American delegation was unequivocal that it would not accept any compromise on the basic point that the P.L.O. was simply not qualified to be a W.H.O. member because it was not a "state." The firmness of the U.S. position surprised many delegations, but had there been any willingness to compromise, the entire American effort would have failed. There was considerable resentment about the financial "threat" made by the United States, but there was no question that the message had gotten across to other Members who were much more willing to accept a compromise proposal. When the floor debate in the World Health Assembly finally began, confusion was rampant. The final vote rejecting the P.L.O. application, as The New York Times reported, "came after six hours of tumultuous and confused parliamentary maneuvering."

Despite this defeat, the P.L.O. continued its efforts within the U.N. system to enhance its status. In U.N.E.S.C.O., for example, the P.L.O. sensed a prime target because both the United States and the United Kingdom had earlier withdrawn from the organization, and because the Western Group was probably the weakest in any U.N. agency. The U.S. made it clear at the time, however, that there was virtually no chance that the United States would ever rejoin if the P.L.O. were admitted to U.N.E.S.C.O. as a member State. That unequivocal position stopped the P.L.O.'s application immediately.4

The P.L.O. tried one more time in late 1989 to enhance its status in the United Nations. As an observer "national liberation movement" in the General Assembly, the P.L.O. had previously changed its nameplate from "P.L.O." to "Palestine," implying that it was more of a "state" than an "organization." In late 1989, the P.L.O. announced that it would seek to change its name yet again to "The State of Palestine," another transparent effort to enhance its diplomatic position. The P.L.O. also tried to move its chair on the side of the General Assembly hall closer to the position of the "observer states." All these efforts failed because of strong American opposition, and the P.L.O. campaign came to an end.

In short, the P.L.O. sought prematurely what it could not yet demonstrably justify, and its efforts failed. Of course, the P.L.O.'s efforts failed not just because of the errors and inadequacies of their arguments, but also because of the massive diplomatic campaign waged against their efforts by the United States, Israel, and a small number of other like-minded States. Not only did the P.L.O.'s efforts fail, but during their exertions, they consumed extraordinary amounts of the P.L.O. leadership's time and attention, diverting them from other initiatives which ultimately might have proven more fruitful to their supposed constituents.

One conclusion from the P.L.O.'s experience is that diplomatic strategies should be congruent with international realities. In the case of the P.L.O., it aimed to achieve far beyond what its actual status was, and consumed enormous political capital and resources in what ended ultimately as a serious failure. For the R.O.C., it would be equally a mistake to aim too low, consume large amounts of political capital and resources, and still end up with less than it might otherwise have achieved.

When the General Assembly adopted the 1975 "Zionism is racism" Resolution, U.S. Permanent Representative Daniel Moynihan declared in ringing terms that: "The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and before the world, that it does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act." No such gesture of defiance was made in 1971 by then-U.S. Permanent Representative George Bush, perhaps because Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was too concerned with playing the "China card" to allow the U.N. to get in the way.

Nonetheless, legitimacy is a precious asset for any institution, and never more so for one created ex nihilo like the United Nations. Losing that legitimacy is relatively easy, as the United Nations has repeatedly proven, but regaining it is a lengthy and arduous task, especially in U.S. domestic political terms. Today, the real question for U.N. Members is whether the stain of Resolution 2758 can be expunged, or whether its corrosive effects will continue to constrain the organization’s reputation and effectiveness. President Chen’s Administration will have a critical role to play in answering that question.

John R. Bolton is a senior fellow at AEI.