The sudden shift of emphasis from victory in war to European reconstruction came as something of a shock to most of the Latin American countries. With the exception of Argentina, and to some extent Chile, most had supported the United States in the conflict; Brazil had even sent a brigade to fight alongside American troops in Italy. Mexico's diplomatic enthusiasm for the U.S. war effort was utterly without precedent; it even sponsored a conference in 1945 at Chapultepec Castle to discuss postwar problems. In exchange for these demonstrations of solidarity, the Latin American countries expected that, with the war behind it, the United States would refocus its energies on its own hemisphere. Instead, the Latin American agenda was abruptly put on the back burner. Indeed, the only major U.S.-sponsored initiative in the region after the war was a mutual security treaty among the American states (commonly known as the Rio Treaty, or TIAR, for its initials in Spanish and Portuguese). Needless to say, security issues were not Latin America's highest priorities at the time, but most countries of the region went along with Washington, hoping to earn a hearing for the issues that mattered to them. No such luck. The long period of insensitivity and inattention came to an end only with a revolution in Cuba in 1959 and 1960, when the United States suddenly discovered the broader problems of the region.

Past and Present Compared

Let us now consider the similarities to our present situation. With the end of the cold war a decade ago it was widely assumed in Latin America that the United States would redirect its attentions to its own hemisphere. Several factors supported that assumption. The emerging European Union would presumably erect new barriers to U.S. exports, forcing Washington to reinforce its access to open markets nearby. The collapse of communism, and of the socialist ideal generally, provoked a wave of economic reforms throughout the region, thereby creating new opportunities for investment. Long-standing prejudices against economic cooperation with the United States went by the wayside, first in Mexico, which concluded a free-trade agreement that was ratified by the congresses of both countries (and the Canadian parliament) during the early days of the Clinton administration.

The subsequent election of a governor of Texas to the presidency of the United States was likewise seen as another favorable augur. For with the possible exception of Florida, no state in the union has such intimate ties with Latin America, and none has a business and political community as well informed and positively focused on the region.

For his part, President George W. Bush made it clear from the beginning that he planned to make Latin America a high priority in his administration, even slighting the Canadians by breaking with tradition and making his first foreign visit to Mexico. There he renewed a personal friendship with President Vicente Fox that dated back to the days when both were governors of their respective states. And of course every Latin American knew that the original idea for a hemispheric free trade accord had been launched by the president's father during the early days of his own term (1989-1993). The Republican control of Congress, narrow as it was until it ended with the defection of Senator James Jeffords, was likewise thought to harbor great possibilities for Latin America, since it meant that the majority party would include more proponents of free trade.

Then two things happened. One was the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The other was the decision of the Bush administration to disarm Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. The first development immediately put paid to any plan to liberalize immigration from Mexico--the highest priority of the Fox administration. The second has unleashed a torrent of other complications, the results of which will not be known at the time this Outlook is published or possibly for many months thereafter.

But even the best-case scenarios do not hold out much hope for Latin America. As both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have repeatedly stated, the war against terror is likely to last for the rest of our lifetimes; it may never come to a definitive conclusion. And even an easy victory in Iraq would impose enormous costs on the United States--possibly more than $200 billion. It might also require a virtually open-ended postwar presence of U.S. troops, aid officials, and others. Even assuming an infinity of resources at the disposal of the United States, only so much policy time is available to devote to other geographical areas. That Latin America might become as much as the second-ranking priority for the White House, the State and Treasury Departments, and the Pentagon, might well be too much to hope for.

Meanwhile, South of the Border . . .

Let's take a look at what is happening in parts of Latin America while Washington's attentions are focused elsewhere.

Venezuela. In Venezuela, we note an increasingly acute political crisis. Although democratically elected, President Hugo Chávez is evidently determined to push his country into an authoritarian truss. Mentally unbalanced, but still possessed of a powerful charisma that ignites enthusiasm among roughly a third of the population, and supported by the armed forces, he is not, in fact, creating "another Cuba" or anything like it. What he is doing is undermining his country's civil peace and social compact and destroying its only important source of revenue--the oil industry. He has managed to survive a massive nationwide strike by the opposition and has postponed any serious reckoning to the end of the year, when his own constitution permits a plebiscite in which he could be recalled from office.

Since April 11 of last year, when Chávez was almost ousted by a civil-military coup, Venezuela's domestic politics have been in turmoil. Diplomatic efforts spearheaded by the Organization of American States, in the person of its secretary-general César Gaviria, have gone nowhere, largely because Chávez regards his opposition--indeed any opposition--as illegitimate, if not "fascist," and because the opposition views any solution to the conflict other than the president's immediate departure from office as unacceptable.

No one can predict the outcome of the Venezuelan crisis, but it is difficult to imagine one constructive, peaceful, and favorable to the country's long-term interests. If Chávez is ousted, a civil war is bound to follow, leaving many dead and opening wounds that will take generations to heal. If he remains in power, most of the country's able business, technical, and professional leadership will emigrate; what capital remains in the country will flee abroad; Venezuela's oil industry will deteriorate; and poverty will become even more widespread than at present.

In diplomatic circles one hears complaints now that the United States has not supported the mediation effort with sufficient force--as if that alone would bring two irreconcilable elements together. The frequent allegations of U.S. complicity in the events of April 11--however poorly founded in fact, but constantly repeated by the media--hover like a dark cloud over the U.S. embassy in Caracas, and naturally enough do not inspire Washington to get more deeply involved in Venezuelan events. Moreover, a regime change in Iraq, and possibly one following in Iran, would likely drive down the price of oil and radically devalue Venezuela's immediate geopolitical significance. Such a turn of events would also significantly deepen the country's domestic political crisis.

Columbia. While the United States might well derive some short-term schadenfreude from such an outcome, the long-term impact on U.S. interests would not be favorable. Venezuela is already becoming a haven for guerrilla forces from neighboring Colombia, and much evidence suggests that Chávez regards them as strategic allies. Whereas Washington might well regard the regime in Venezuela as something its people richly deserve, the U.S. government cannot view the political woes of Colombia with the same sort of insouciance. There, Washington has deepened a commitment that began during the Clinton administration, adding more troops and more weaponry to help the government there to liquidate the threat represented by 17,000 guerrillas.

What makes Colombia central to U. S. security is obviously drug trafficking, an industry that threatens to dwarf all others in what should be one of South America's most prosperous and dynamic countries. This, combined with the terrorism connection, places Colombia in a position to command the attention of the United States far more than most other Latin American nations. But the kind of war being waged there naturally invites the attention of the human rights community because of the rich possibilities the war affords to discredit both Colombia's leadership and Washington's policies. The only reason critics are not raising more of a fuss about Colombia's being "another Vietnam" is that they are preoccupied with attacking the administration on its performance in the Middle East--perhaps the only advantage Colombia derives from the current geographical redirection of our attentions.

Argentina. Argentina is undergoing one of the greatest tragedies in modern history--the destruction of the firmest middle-class society in Latin America. A combination of economic mismanagement, corruption, and excessive indulgence by international lenders (followed by a precipitous withdrawal of support) has reduced the region's richest nation to poverty in a matter of months. Indeed, it is nothing short of miraculous that Argentina remains relatively stable, and will go to the first round of national elections this month. The very fact that Argentines are willing--under present circumstances--to seek an orderly renewal of their authorities hints at the enormous potential that remains within that society. On the other hand, both the sheer number of presidential candidates--almost a dozen--and their lack of clear proposals remain troubling. Elections in and of themselves do not solve economic problems, but a broadly representative and legitimate government would at least be in a position to speak for its people. Will such a government emerge in the next two months? Will it advance realistic proposals? If it does, will the United States and the international community be prepared to help it?

Brazil. Brazil is an even bigger question mark. No one needs to emphasize its size, importance, and geopolitical weight. It is, after all, not only the world's tenth largest economy but also now one larger than all of the other South American economies combined. Even so, most qualified observers believe that under present circumstances it cannot realistically meet its foreign obligations. Although much attention was given by the international press to the recent election of a left-of-center president there, in fact the dilemma would have remained the same regardless of the outcome of that race. The fact that President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva was swept into office on a broad program of social reform (all presidential candidates propose roughly the same measures during their campaigns) is far less significant than that he represents the orderly incorporation of have-nots into the political system. It is in the interests of the United States and the international financial community that he succeed. Will Brazil be treated better than Argentina? Will Brazil make it easy for others to come to its aid? What would be the impact of a Brazilian default on the international financial markets? These questions deserve more attention than they seem to be getting in Washington.

Signs of Hope

To be sure, there are some bright spots in the Latin American picture. Mexico's economy will grow this year at more than 3 percent--inadequate in terms of its real needs, but impressive by regional standards. Chile's economy continues to move along at a respectable pace. The United States is about to conclude a free trade agreement with that country and is beginning to discuss the same kind of arrangement with the Central American republics. These initiatives, however, were already well underway at the time that Washington's attention suddenly shifted to the Middle East. Unfortunately they may be the last for a very long time, regardless of how things turn out in Iraq.

Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at AEI.