This study demonstrates the futility and unintended negative consequences of attempting to utilize antidumping laws to foster and protect high-tech sectors; semiconductors, supercomputers, flat-panel displays, and steel. The key findings and recommendations are:
 
Findings:

Negative Consequences of Antidumping Actions Far Outweigh the Benefits to the U.S. Economy

• The threat of antidumping actions, resulting in an agreement to raise the domestic price of semiconductor chips, caused the transfer of $4–5 billion from the U.S. computer industry—and ultimately from U.S. consumers—to Japanese semiconductor manufacturers;
• Antidumping actions on flat-panel displays drove U.S. and foreign manufacturers offshore, displacing thousands of American workers;
• Since the late 1960s, the subsidies and protection in the antidumping actions of the steel industry have cost U.S. taxpayers $46–74 billion;
• Political intervention by government agencies with regard to supercomputers and flat-panel displays hurt the integrity of U.S. administrative procedures;
• The appearance of new technologies has rendered antidumping actions to protect semiconductors and supercomputers irrelevant over the long run, while still imposing substantial short-term costs.

Antidumping Reform Proposals:

• Repeal antidumping laws and substitute antitrust actions. Only predatory (monopolizing) dumping is harmful to the U.S. economy, and that can be handled by the Justice Department;
• If repeal is impossible, reform antidumping laws to place the burden of proof of the exporters’ anticompetitive behavior on the U.S. industry. Specifically, if a “sanctuary” market in a foreign country is alleged, evidence that the foreign government’s policies have created such a “sanctuary” must be required;
• Give the final responsibility for determining antidumping cases to the president and remove it from the independent U.S. International Trade Commission;
• Give the president the additional mandate to weigh the total national economic interest—including the interests of consumers (industries and individual)—against the interests of domestic producers;
• When trade relief is needed, safeguard actions should be substituted for antidumping actions. Safeguard actions are more honest and straightforward: a nation simply asks for a breather, with the explicit admission that it cannot compete temporarily and must seek protective relief.