Richard A. Epstein and Michael S. Greve present a series of essays aimed at untangling the "intractable problem of antitrust jurisdiction" in Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy. Distinguished authors, including Judge Richard A. Posner and William Kovacic, general counsel of the Federal Trade Commission, grapple with the jurisdictional and procedural problems arising from multiple enforcement authorities and overlapping--and frequently conflicting--antitrust laws on the domestic and international fronts. In the United States, the federal government, individual states, and private parties share antitrust enforcement duties but by no means agree on either procedural or substantive goals. Internationally, similar problems exist between individual nations and supranational bodies. Problems of discrimination and extraterritoriality in antitrust are seemingly universal; the essays in this volume suggest solutions to the institutional design flaws that underlie those more obvious problems.

The pertinent questions concern the current rules and the potential alternatives. Ex ante contracts are enforced because they typically generate profit between parties with no adverse and some positive effect on third persons. But what about contracts that do have negative impacts on non-parties, such as collusive contracts or monopolies? Should all contracts be enforced under their terms, and should the freedom of contract be upheld in all cases even if a different regime could be established to the benefit of all parties? Without abandoning traditional libertarian principles, editors Epstein and Greve argue that the possibility of sensible antitrust enforcement requires the qualification of contractual freedom. States, nations, and supranational bodies may impose restrictions on businesses, but the decision to do so opens a new world of uncertainty. On what basis will they reject contracts or penalize businesses? In a case involving a multinational corporation, which body of law will govern the antitrust action? And if one government acts, how should other governments respond?

Domestic enforcement issues mainly concern state-federal overlap and especially the potential for state overreach. In his landmark piece on antitrust and federalism (the one essay reprinted in this volume), Judge Frank Easterbrook argues that states should be barred from abusing their antitrust immunity for the purpose of exploiting citizens and producers of neighboring states. William Adkinson's essay asserts that the federal government lacks authoritative means to shut down ill-conceived state enforcement proceedings.

On the international front, authors offer a range of solutions from adopting a universal World Trade Organization rule to allowing nations to pursue their own antitrust laws, provided they do not violate treaties or impose additional burdens on foreign nations.

From the essays in the volume, three general principles emerge for antitrust reform: First, any reform should not seek one comprehensive solution but rather first tackle institutional errors upon which everyone agrees. Judge Easterbrook, Judge Posner, and Michael DeBow, among others, offer domestic policy proposals to fix inefficiencies. Judge Diane Wood observes that the international arena provides ample opportunities for low-cost elimination of inefficiencies and exploitation.

Second, serious consideration should be given to an international nondiscrimination or national treatment principle in antitrust cases. The editors caution that the establishment of a nondiscrimination principle may cause states to simply shift emphasis "from discriminatory rules to discriminatory enforcement." It would be better, on balance, to establish a system primarily designed to get the easy, day-to-day cases right.

Third, there should be a sustained effort to build an international consensus on which antitrust practices should be legal and which should not. A cooperative discussion of goals and policies may help to reduce both friction and substantive disagreement, while opening the door to "an incremental migration to free trade and competitive markets up and down the line."