The bipartisan hysteria over the pending $6.8 billion deal allowing the company Dubai Ports World to oversee operations at key U.S. ports demonstrates how misguided Congress is in matters of homeland security.

The fear over this deal is that Arab control would make it easier for terrorists to smuggle a dirty or nuclear bomb inside one of the approximately 9 million containers that enter U.S. ports every year, blowing up a port and shutting down commerce. Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Rep. Peter King (R-NY) introduced emergency legislation Tuesday to "suspend the handover" of our port operations to Arabs.

Yet, the idea that this deal somehow means turning over the ownership of American ports to foreigners makes no sense. In the age of globalization, foreign ownership is commonplace. Most of the maritime infrastructure that sustains American trade--the ships, the containers, the loading equipment, and the facilities--is owned by foreigners. As the Baltimore Sun pointed out earlier this week, you can see a Greek-owned ship flying a Liberian flag, employing a Filipino crew and carrying cargo from China into a U.S. port terminal managed by a British company that hires American longshoremen.

At least 30 percent of terminals at major U.S. ports are operated by foreign governments and businesses. At the port of Los Angeles, the busiest in the country, it's 80 percent. And let's not forget that the current owner of the port terminals in question is the British company P&O. In fact, very few port terminals are operated by Americans: 24 of the top 25 ship terminal operators worldwide are foreign governments or foreign-based companies.

Furthermore, the notion that this deal will outsource our port security to foreign companies is absurd. The U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials provide security independent of who is operating the terminal. The operator's job is to manage the incoming and outgoing shipments at their facility. This involves scheduling the pick up and delivery of shipments, loading containers on and off the right vessels, and providing storage space for cargo. Like P&O before it, the employees of Dubai Ports World would be local longshoremen who belong to the International Longshoremen's Association, an AFL-CIO-affiliated union. In short, Dubai Ports World would simply be a manager directing American longshoremen to load and unload cargo that is secured by American homeland security officials.

But none of this should matter. Our nation's port security shouldn't rely on who owns what in our ports. Effective port security should keep terrorists and their bombs as far as possible from U.S. shores. In other words, securing U.S. ports at home should be our last line of defense. Not our first.

Our first line of defense should be to make sure that terrorists do not get the dangerous materials necessary to build a bomb. The most cost effective solution would be to keep close tabs on fissile materials. It is easier to monitor a lump of uranium at a known location than to detect uranium smuggling. Part of this exercise might include buying foreign stockpiles or helping foreign governments protect or destroy their stockpiles.

Our second line of defense should be security mechanisms to prevent nuclear devices from arriving in the United States. For instance, we should help officials abroad to tighten security at the foreign ports that feed shipments to the U.S. These efforts could include helping fund systems to bolster foreign countries' ability to detect nuclear material in their ports or placing U.S. agents on site in foreign ports.

Another cost-effective strategy would be to create partnerships with foreign manufacturers and importers. Partners would agree to meet "supply chain" standards establishing a secure chain of custody for every unit of cargo traded overseas. This would ensure that their shipment methods repel potential terrorist attempts to use those shipments for introducing weapons of mass destruction into our ports.

Finally, our last line of defense should be direct on-site protection at local ports. Security measures could include fencing, surveillance cameras, and thorough background checks for foreign companies operating ports in the U.S. Of all defense strategies, on-site port protection is the least cost effective. It is hard to detect highly enriched uranium and almost impossible to detect anything if it is shielded. As such, the effectiveness of the detection devices in use now is dubious. And even if the detection devices were capable of detecting dangerous material, it would still be riskier than the other solutions because the stakes are so high: if the system fails, the illicit material ends up inside the country.

Our current policy focuses on local ports while overlooking the most cost effective security measures. Out of a $2.03 billion port security budget, only $200 million is spent on programs to secure foreign ports. And according to experts, we barely spend $250 million protecting stockpiles of fissile material abroad.

By obsessing about the nationality of a respected ports operator, instead of thinking about what would actually make our nation safer, members of Congress are not enhancing American security.

Veronique de Rugy is a research fellow at AEI.