Many in Asia fear that recent political turmoil will undermine democratic advances in the region. The current instability in Japan, Thailand, Mongolia, South Korea, and Taiwan is due to growing pains associated with achieving a regional environment hospitable to democratic development. With support from the United States in governance, free trade, and military assurances, Asian democrats can construct a viable liberal framework and attain greater regional stability.

Resident Scholar Michael Auslin

Wherever one looks, democracy seems besieged in Asia.

In Japan, the region's oldest and most stable democracy, the second prime minister has resigned within the space of one year, and the 120-year-old Diet is paralyzed, freezing even the most basic legislation. Thailand's prime minister has declared a state of emergency in Bangkok to quell growing street protests, and is under pressure to resign. Mongolia's parliament is just getting to work after a two-month hiatus caused by that country's first-ever riots after an election, but charges of cheating still dog the ruling party. South Korea's president, Lee Myung-bak, saw his popularity implode over the issue of U.S. beef imports, and Seoul's streets were filled with thousands of candle-holding demonstrators, paralyzing the government for several weeks. In Taiwan, which held a peaceful election in March, dark rumors swirl that the new president, Ma Ying-jeou, is really plotting to surrender the island's sovereignty to China.

What's going on? From an optimistic perspective, this is exactly what is supposed to be happening. Democracy is messy, factions abound and the voice of the people is not always measured and harmonious. Except for Japan, the liberal nations of Asia are still only a few decades old. Political theorists quarrel over when a democracy is "real" or "mature," but one measure is that a generation has to pass after the granting of constitutionally based rights before a democratic system is stable. Others hold that there must be at least two peaceful handovers of power between opposition parties before the system can be called stable.

By that measure, many Asian countries are just on the brink of democratic maturity. Both Taiwan and South Korea have passed the two-turnover mark, while none of Asia's democracies have yet reached a generational passage, except Japan. Thus, the cronyism, nepotism, inefficiency and fraud inherent in democracy is largely meliorated by law and political mechanisms in America and Europe, but in Asia those remedies are still developing. If these countries can just hold on a bit, so the optimistic theories go, they should make it through these growing pains and in the process learn valuable lessons about constructing viable political systems.

Pessimists might argue, however, that so-called "Asian values" of harmony, hierarchy and informal networks are incompatible with Western notions of democracy, but nonetheless may serve as a kind of bridging mechanism between liberal politics and unrepresentative governments.

More dispassionate pessimists, however, would say that democratic politics in much of Asia simply have been hijacked by corrupt or incompetent elites, while the needs of the common citizen have been ignored. The belief here is not that transparency, rule of law, a free press and more freedoms are not possible in Asia, but rather that the democratic system has been gamed by those more interested in personal power than in working to create a viable liberal framework. Yet in reality, each national experience is unique, and reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the politicians, voters and special interests in their country.

Those who worry about the fate of democracy in Asia should note the passion that drives millions of voters to the polls, and tens of thousands into the streets to defend causes they believe in. We should also recognize that there are no credible voices calling for a return to authoritarian days, even in Thailand, where democratic elections may well be more circumscribed. However, no one should be blindly optimistic that democracy will somehow work through all its problems in Asian countries. The trust of the people in liberal democratic systems is a fragile thing. Once damaged, it sometimes cannot be repaired.

The United States and other democracies must stand shoulder to shoulder with the democrats of Asia. Our moral support, as well as expertise in democratic governance, should be readily offered, even as we stay out of internal political squabbles. Our economic power should be geared to promoting free trade and technology transfers that can better lives throughout the region. Our military presence can assure nations that the regional status quo will be protected as they work out their domestic issues.

The problems facing Asian democracy today are ones of implementation, not a question of the fundamental suitability of democracy for Asian cultures. Part of the "solution" will be not overstating the problem. A certain amount of messiness is normal in any democracy, and no one should expect that elections will always return wise leaders, or leaders other countries like. Rather, the key is to ensure that elections keep happening--that the public over time has a chance to change its mind, and demand better of its leaders. As democracy entrenches itself, there's every reason to believe that it will become an indelible part of the lives of Asians just as it is for so many of their European and American peers.

Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at AEI.