In the West, religious individuals are, more often than not, expected to self-identify as members of a particular religion or sect. But this is not necessarily the case in China, where the distinction between superstition and organized religion is often unclear. For instance, it is not uncommon for an individual to identify himself as a Christian, Buddhist, and Confucian, and to observe various local religious traditions, as well. Indeed, many popular or folk religions--whose deities can be local, regional, or national--incorporate elements that are unique to particular families or villages. Not surprisingly, these religions do not normally have the doctrinal and theological foundations associated with the predominant Western religions found in the West. Rather, they are made up of individual teachings and myths which are interpreted differently according to locales.

Recent years have seen a revival of folk religion in China, which manifests itself in everything from active temple associations, a renewed interest in ancestor worship, and an increase in various religious festivals. This revival has primarily been a rural phenomenon, partly because of limited state-party control in these areas. In the absence of religious institutions and social services, popular religions, much like house churches, have stepped in to fill the void left by the state. In some areas, house churches and popular religions have merged, though the degree of organizational structure among popular religions remains varied.

Popular religions can become the source of cults or other sects that are seen by the state and the Party as subversive. This is particularly true in the wake of the rise and crackdown on the Falun Gong. In recognition of the growing significance of these popular religions, a new division was recently added to the Religious Affairs Bureau to monitor and track their cross-regional activities. Indeed, any group that has a clearly-defined organizational structure, attempts to establish cross-regional ties, or has larger ambitions of cultivating a community of followers, has the potential to be repressed or outlawed by the CCP. 

Both Chinese and Western scholars have started paying greater attention to folk religions.  However, while Western scholars have studied them primarily to see if they pose a challenge to the government, some scholars within China have begun to study them from the viewpoint of cultural heritage. Some even believe that the government is attempting to legitimate the more moderate aspects of folk religion as an alternative to Western influences (such as Christianity) and to promote them as a form of Chinese cultural identity.

The reemergence of popular or folk religion is part of a larger trend in which Chinese society is outgrowing the state's monopoly on association. Western observers have hoped that the associative elements of popular religions might serve as the seeds for a more robust Chinese civic culture. Popular religions are not necessarily revolutionary in nature, but they do provide independent associations with which individuals may identify themselves, and within which they can--up to a point--act freely. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that popular religions alone will serve as a basis for a new Chinese civic society, as they are so locally oriented and, in most cases, lack a larger vision for society as a whole. Also, as noted above, very few folk religions have a distinct organizational structure. In addition, while there is some connection between the traditions of popular religions and the daily ethics practiced by the Chinese, this is not universally true. 

Perhaps most important, the distinction between religion and philosophy--which Tocqueville saw as a moderator on the claims of each to have the decisive say in how society is governed, and hence essential to the development of liberal democracy in the West--may not similarly exist in Chinese culture.

I. Alexis de Tocqueville on Religion
II. The Role of Christianity in China
IV. The State’s Response: Confucianism and Morality Campaigns