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Home >  Research >  Tocqueville on China >  Sessions > II. Classifying Chinese NGOs
II. Classifying Chinese NGOs
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While an effort to get a handle on the somewhat confusing classification system for NGOs in China may be of help as an academic matter, the existing system of classification, though vague, has not impeded the ability of social groups to form and operate. Furthermore, the typology matters little to those engaged in Chinese social organizations, as they are well aware that they will face the threat of repression from the government regardless of how they are classified. Though there have been rumors that the government plans to revise its regulations on the creation of social organizations--making it easier for groups to register under terms that reflect their actual institutional status and mission--it is unlikely that state registration processes will be substantially modified.

Not surprisingly, it is difficult to accurately determine the number of active NGOs in China. According to one source, in 2006 there were an estimated 186,000 registered social organizations and 159,000 non-profit enterprises operating in the country. There is speculation that these estimates are too low, however, as many Chinese civic groups do not register with the state or exist only on the internet. Nevertheless, broad trends in the growth of social organizations are clear: between 1980 and the mid 1990s, the number of social organizations in China spiked dramatically, reaching a peak in 1996. Taking into account the resurgence in the formation of civic groups since 2001, some estimates now place the number of social organizations in China between one and eight million. Organizations formed below the county or township level account for a large number of the undocumented organizations noted above. To further complicate the matter, the legal standing of sub-township associations is not addressed in the government’s regulations for social organizations. The fate of sub-township-level groups, therefore, is left largely to the judgment of local government officials, and depends to a great extent on whether the group is believed to be helping or hindering the government’s goals. GONGOs and NGOs alike are prone to seek positive relationships with government officials, if only in the hope of procuring further resources and maintaining operational independence. As social organizations have become more numerous, however, the government has found itself struggling to contain and control them.

Chinese social organizations have been assessed from a number of different perspectives. NGOs and GONGOs have been variously understood as corporatist organizations, reservoirs of social capital, civil society vehicles, or as a function of broader social movements. The corporatist model suggests that NGOs exist primarily as a mechanism of the state for communicating its interests to society. This may be true in the case of most GONGOs, and the government’s extensive regulation and monitoring system certainly validates the corporatist perspective. The large number of unregistered organizations in China, however, casts doubt on the broader applicability of a purely corporatist model. And while many analysts see NGOs as sources of social capital--that is, the collective sense of trust and cooperation developed among individuals linked in voluntary association--the percentage of the Chinese population that participates in such organizations is still relatively small.
 
Western scholars have been concerned with understanding the character of Chinese civil society for as long as the West has been in contact with China.  And, of course, that interest has only increased since the post-Moa era began in the late 70s.  Some analysts and observers are quick to interpret any growth in Chinese civil society initiatives as a precursor to democracy. But others warn that it would be premature to conflate the changes in Chinese civil society with incipient political reform. As noted above, the relationship between the government and NGOs is fluid and complex: a number of NGOs have reached out to the state for support, and in some cases, the state has acknowledged the social benefit of civic organizations. The implications of these dynamics for Chinese civil society remain unclear.

For obvious reasons, the Chinese government feels particularly threatened by social movement organizations which provide a forum for citizens to express their social and political grievances en masse. While most NGOs in China would be reluctant define themselves as such, the Chinese government has not hesitated to stigmatize many non-profit groups as social movement organizations.

The growth of NGOs and GONGOs in China also has an economic element to it, providing an increasing source of employment. GONGOs, for instance, often provide a second income or sinecure for recently-retired government officials. NGOs, despite retention difficulties, sustain a growing workforce, as well.

I. NGOs in China: An Overview
II. Classifying Chinese NGOs
III. The Influence of NGOs on Chinese Society
IV. Alexis De Tocqueville on Civic Associations
V. NGO Cooperation in China: The View from the Ground
VI. NGOs and China's Citizen Movement

The project has commissioned a series of papers intended to highlight important aspects of civic culture in contemporary China.

The second of these, by Carol Lee Hamrin of the Global China Center, is available below: 

Download file China's Protestants: A Mustard Seed for Moral Renewal?


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