October 2005

The Future of Kosovo: Transatlantic Policy toward the Balkans

The Balkans return to the headlines this month, as the United States and Europe prepare to launch negotiations to determine whether Kosovo--the breakaway Serbian province over which they went to war in 1999--becomes an independent state. Can diplomacy at last bring peace and stability to the Balkans, or do negotiations over Kosovo risk reigniting the wars of the 1990s? What is the geopolitical future of the Balkans, and how will the European Union’s internal debate over expansion affect the integration of Kosovo and Serbia into the transatlantic world? What are the lessons of the Balkan experiment in nation-building, and what clues do they hold for Iraq and Afghanistan. These and other questions were the subject of an October 13 New Atlantic Initiative panel discussion.

Joshua Black
U.S Department of State

The next ten years will be a turning point for the Balkans. Kosovo, in particular, is seeing sustained, major international tension. Even though it has been the policy for years to deal with “standards” before “status,” the issue of the future status of Kosovo will have to be addressed in order to settle the tension. The current situation is one of a dangerous status quo.
 
What does this future process look like? It will necessarily deal with issues such as governance, security, and human rights. A senior EU envoy appointed by the UN will take the lead, and the United States will be involved at a senior level. The process itself consists mainly of dialogue and negotiation. Even though it is not up to us to determine what Kosovo’s future status should be, all parties agree that the final outcome of the process should lead to the full Euro-Atlantic integration of Kosovo. It is, moreover, very important that Kosovo’s non-Albanian citizens--its Serb minority in particular--are protected. Lastly, after its future status is resolved, Kosovo will have to remain subject to an international presence. The EU will take a more active role in cooperation with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). The word “compromise” is a dirty word in Kosovo and something they do not want to do; we are in the process of trying to convince them otherwise. Although it is dangerous to make predictions regarding the Balkans, it should be noted that two factors seem to play in favor of a positive outcome: (1) there is senior U.S. engagement in the area, and (2) the local real estate market could create many business opportunities in the near future.
 
Janusz Bugajski
Eastern Europe Project at CSIS

This is a pivotal time in the West Balkans as the status of Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro will be determined in the near future. International involvement, rather than diplomacy, is essential for soothing the outstanding issues that these three units have to face. Without legitimate status, there will be no democratic or economic progress, but, instead, a risk of violence which will not only be directed towards other ethnic groups but also against international agencies. Talks on the future of Kosovo cannot be delayed much longer. Standards cannot be met without status. There are only two pathways that the region can follow: Europeanization or marginalization. If there are long delays in the process, the region will eventually become a pauperized periphery.
 
As to the question of the establishment of a legitimate and lawful state, we have to point to the numerous failures of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and other international players and suggest improvement for the future by creating dependency relationships.
 
John Norris
International Crisis Group

The contours of a final agreement are no return to the pre-1999 status quo, no creation of a Greater Albania, no partitioning of Kosovo, and greater EU involvement and eventual integration. For all the reasons states above, the only solution is conditioned independence.
 
This is a watershed moment for both Kosovo and Serbia, and the Kosovars should realize that “final status” and “conditioned independence” are a beginning, not an end. Serbia, on the other hand, should use this opportunity to shed the nationalism that has so harmed the country’s reputation.
 
Helga Flores-Trejo
Heinrich Böll Foundation

The key to the solution is Serbia: if domestic reforms in Serbia do not move, the whole region will not move. The decision that Serbia has to face is whether it wants to move towards Kosovo or whether it wants to move towards the EU--in other words, whether it wants to move forward or backward. Serbia is a country in transition and, as such, all the problems that it is facing are normal. On top of that, however, the country has to deal with specific problems related to the legacy and responsibility of the war. The current Serbian government, from its side, is failing in reform and in dealing with the past. Because of these failures Serbia has stagnated over the past years. This stagnation is the main reason for the current situation.
 
Serbia would be far better off without Kosovo, as it imposes a burden for reforms. The present government only complicates the transition. Serbia should decide to join the EU and make the necessary reforms.
 
Vance Serchuk
AEI

The current push for final status talks is a function of the failure of March 2004, not of success. The Kosovar and Serbian communities are not coming closer to compromise. Instead, there is a great deal of frustration and exhaustion on the part of the international community.
 
The international community and the contact group are stuck between the high-flying rhetoric of multiethnicity, democracy, and cooperation, and the low-energy and cynical realism of the situation on the ground. This gap is the most dangerous aspect of the situation as it creates an opening for other actors who can behave as spoilers. Despite its Euro-Atlantic integration rhetoric, UNMIK seems to be first and foremost committed to an exit strategy. Additionally, many parties in Serbia and Kosovo do not have forms of clearly defined and cohesive leadership. All this is not to say that final status talks are not necessary--for symbolic and psychological reasons they are--but it is important to remember that 90 percent of Kosovo’s problems are not status-related.