October 2004
Allies in Iraq: The Commander's View
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Mieczyslaw Bieniek |
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Soldiers from twenty-five nations are fighting shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces in Iraq. But with campaigns against Spain, the Philippines, and Nepal as models for success, terrorist activities--including the kidnapping and execution of civilian foreign nationals--are causing other governments to rethink their troop commitments in Iraq. On October 5, Lieutenant General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, the recent commander of the Multinational Division in Iraq, spoke to the New Atlantic Initiative on the challenges of managing a "coalition of the willing."
Lieutenant General Mieczyslaw Bieniek
Second Armored Corps of Krakow, Poland
The Multinational Division was deployed to establish security and stability in the sector of Iraq located south of Baghdad and north of Basra; but quelling the insurgency has proved a difficult task. While every commander would like extra manpower, the number of troops was sufficient for staging a stability operation. When fighting broke out in Karbala during the Ashura celebration, small groups of soldiers in the middle of the city faced not only terrorists but also hundreds of thousands of angry people. In situations like this, it is impossible to avoid civilian casualties. Terrorists do not abide by any laws of warfare. They do not wear uniforms or hesitate to use involuntary human shields. Nonetheless, the allied soldiers never felt alone in this fight. Reinforcements were always available, as were airstrikes.
Anti-coalition forces are concentrated in Karbala and Najaf. Local terrorist and insurgent groups, such as the Iran-backed militia that supports Muqtada al-Sadr, and al Qaeda affiliates have organized numerous suicide attacks against Coalition forces in this sector, and troops from the Multinational Division have arrested suspected terrorists and confiscated drugs smuggled in from Iran and Saudi Arabia to buy weapons. But soldiers have received substantial support from the local population on these operations. The vast majority of Iraqis want to lead normal lives and safely walk the streets; this makes them willing to work with the Coalition. Human intelligence has improved considerably as a result of this cooperation. The problem is not a lack of intelligence, but the great amount of information which has to be analyzed.
The coalition of the willing has been successful, but there are improvements that can be made. The operation in Iraq is a coalition of the willing in a very literal sense, but it is unlikely that this exact model will be repeated in the future. There are too many players with too little in common. Communication is problematic because many foreign officers do not speak good English. National contingents oftentimes need special permission from their own nations to carry out operations, and the process of obtaining authorization can be extremely time-consuming. Different countries have different agreements with the United States regarding their participation in the intervention; some soldiers are not even allowed to leave their bases. Also, much of the classified U.S. and NATO information cannot be shared with non-NATO countries, which makes intelligence-sharing difficult.
It is essential now that Iraqis take responsibility for their country's security. The allies need to train more Iraqi police and Special Forces. Border patrols are also critical.
