February 2005

Europe, China, and the Arms Embargo: The Implications of Sino-European Partnership for American Interests

Robin Niblett, Ellen Bork, Dieter Dettke

Representatives of the European Union have recently announced plans to drop the arms embargo that was levied against the People’s Republic of China in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. This development will likely provide China with advanced military technology to deploy against Taiwan and the United States, while Europe stands to gain what its leaders perceive as a strategic and economic partner. What will be the benefits to Europe and China of this strategic partnership? How will ending the arms embargo affect Chinese military modernization and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait? Does this move portend the further deterioration of transatlantic relations? How should the United States adjust its diplomatic and military posture in response to these developments? At a February 1 AEI conference, experts discussed these and other issues affecting U.S. foreign policy.

Radek Sikorski
NAI

Three memorable events occurred in the summer of 1989: Ayatollah Khomeini died; Solidarity dominated the first Polish democratic elections; and the Chinese military crushed protestors in Tiananmen Square. Fifteen years later, Europe is moving to lift the arms embargo that it passed in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. Today’s panelists will discuss the many dangers that this move poses for transatlantic relations.

Daniel Blumenthal
AEI

European Union moves to drop its arms embargo against China caught the U.S. government flat-footed. We did not realize until too late the seriousness of Europe’s intent to remove its arms embargo. As the United States rushes to respond, there are three aspects of this issue that it should address: the risk of destabilization East Asia, the consequences for transatlantic relations, and the statement that this move makes about Europe’s commitment to human rights.

David Shambaugh
Brookings Institution and George Washington University

The important questions are how and why this development has occurred, not just what it consists of. The first answer to these questions is that this relationship has been driven by the Europeans, principally from Brussels, and that China has been responding to European overtures.

The Chinese response has been determined by three factors: it is an aspect of China’s omni-directional foreign policy, China’s preference for promoting a multipolar world, and China’s desire to access superior European commercial technology. The result of this relationship is that the EU is now China’s largest trading partner, and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner. Meanwhile, political relations between EU member states and China have also developed rapidly. At the aggregate level, there are thirty-five separate EU-China working groups.

In terms of military and strategic relations, all exchanges are still at the bilateral level between EU member states and China. There have been extensive exchanges between defense officials and military officers, although they vary by country. One interesting aspect is that European countries have been prominent in providing the Chinese military with training to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Robin Niblett
Center for Strategic and International Studies

It is a shame that the transatlantic debate on China has been overtaken by the arms embargo question. The result is that we are focused on near-term damage control instead of cooperative strategic planning for the long term. It is therefore appropriate to take this opportunity to assess Europe’s strategic perception of China and compare it to that of the United States.

Europeans see China at the center of most transnational issues: human rights, proliferation, pollution, global health issues, and economic growth. The result is that Europeans want to engage China on each of these issues. On the topic of multipolarity, an important distinction between Europe and the United States is that Europeans believe that they are not trying to create a multipolar world, but are already living in one. In this world, China is an important pole, and Europeans view it as their responsibility to compensate for U.S. maltreatment of China. Also, Europe is flattered because it receives reciprocal treatment from China as a strategic partner.

The arms embargo is but one factor of this strategic partnership. It is a fact that EU exports of defense technologies doubled in 2003 under the embargo. Recognizing this state of affairs, we need a mechanism to manage the transfer of non-lethal technology from Europe to China, a role that the current embargo has failed to play. The focus should now be for the United States and Europe to work together to strengthen the code of conduct or negotiate informal side agreements in order to restrict specific technologies that the United States seeks to keep out of China’s control.

Ellen Bork
Project for the New American Century

There are obviously major differences in American and European responsibilities and interests in Asia. Even German analysts recognize that Europe principally has economic interests in Asia and that steps to lift the embargo have been taken without sufficient consideration of their strategic consequences. Americans believe that we should consider three criteria for lifting the embargo: human rights, China’s categorization with other rogue states, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait.

In terms of human rights, there have been no quantitative or qualitative improvements. Religious oppression, the abuse of the death penalty, labor repression, and the oppression of Tibet and Xinjiang all indicate the dire state of human rights in China. There are prominent Chinese dissidents, including late premier Zhao Ziyang’s associate Bao Tong, calling for Europe to maintain the embargo.

Another criterion is the question of whether China belongs in the same category as Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Burma. This category does not have uniform criteria for admission. Zimbabwe, for example, actually has an opposition party, although it is repressed. And neither Zimbabwe nor Burma is seeking arms in order to invade a democratic country. The Chinese Communist Party has done little to distinguish itself from these other tyrannical regimes.

Lastly, the Taiwan Strait situation is one in which the lack of European security interests in the region has prevented the EU from undertaking the type of serious strategic assessments that are necessary for moves of this importance. As long as European leaders dismiss the threat to Taiwan, they will not play a constructive role in the region.

In conclusion, we should point out China’s proliferation record: the Bush administration has recently sanctioned eight Chinese firms for proliferating to Iran. China has neither the legal framework nor the political will necessary for effective non-proliferation. Selling military technologies to China guarantees that they will end up in even more dangerous hands elsewhere.

Dieter Dettke
Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Europe and the United States agree on their “One-China” policy, and Europe cannot be held responsible for Chinese proliferation. The fact is that while China imports 2.7 percent of its arms from Europe, it imports 6.7 percent from the United States. The current embargo system, for both sides of the Atlantic, is leaking and brittle. What we need is a strategic dialogue on this issue based upon the facts.

It has been demonstrated in the fifteen years since 1989 that our China policy is more effective when we engage China. This fact is evident in many fields, including non-proliferation, human rights, and economic relations. The Code of Conduct is similar to China’s WTO commitments, as it provides incentives for adopting improved human rights and a more robust legal system, while providing penalties for violating its commitments.

The most important task for the transatlantic dialogue is to determine how to improve the tools that we have. Europe has the Code of Conduct, which sets conditions on the trade in arms to foreign countries, and we should be discussing how it can be strengthened. Europe shares America’s interests in a stable, peaceful Asia, and trading with China through a strengthened Code of Conduct and national export laws will allow us to achieve them.

Richard Fisher
International Assessment and Strategy Center

Europe’s moves are disappointing and reveal that despite the earnest, polite efforts of the Bush administration to convey the importance of the embargo, the EU is not interested in a strategic dialogue. This move is a strategic backstab by Europe that will help arm a dictatorship in its plans to murder the democracy in Taiwan. President Bush should use his upcoming European tour to implore the EU to strengthen the embargo.

There are three delusions that explain Europe’s current moves. First, the Europeans believe that the embargo worked, although it has been terribly leaky. Second, they believe that the Code of Conduct will strengthen the current embargo. This is also untrue, as France has been loudly indicating that it will oppose any efforts to make the Code of Conduct binding or effective. Third, Europe is wrong to believe that it does not have any significant interests in Asia, when it would be directly affected by a war in the Taiwan Strait.

Given Europe’s moves to arm China, we must take unilateral measures to defend ourselves. The Congress should sanction European arms manufacturers that deal with China. To do otherwise would be to ignore Europe’s indifference to Chinese nationalistic militarism and even totalitarianism.

AEI research assistant Chris Griffin prepared this summary.