Adam Lerrick is the Friends of Allan H. Meltzer Professor of Economics at the Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University. He served as a senior adviser to the chairman of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (known as the "Meltzer Commission"), where he analyzed the workings of the World Bank and reassessed its role in the global economy. Previously, he was an investment banker with Salomon Brothers and Credit Suisse First Boston, and he originated and led the negotiation team of the Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency in the $100 billion Argentine debt restructuring.
Chairman, Sovereign Debt Solutions Limited, 2003-present
Friends of Allan H. Meltzer Professor of Economics, Director of the Gailliot Center for Public Policy, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 2001-present
Adviser, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 2001-present
Adviser, House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas), 2001-2003
Member, Commission on the Role of the Multilateral Development Banks in Emerging Markets, 2001
Senior Adviser to the Chairman, International Financial Institution Advisory Commission ("Meltzer Commission"), 1999-2000
Chairman, Lerrick & Company Incorporated, 1990-99
Partner, Voute Coats Stuart & O'Grady, 1989-90
Head of Capital Markets Product Development, Credit Suisse First Boston, 1987-88
Head of Capital Markets International Product Development, Salomon Brothers, 1982-86
Ph.D., economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The European Union's Brussels summit on December 8-9 is its latest, most urgent attempt to calm the bond markets, save the euro, and create firmer mechanisms that promise to ensure long-term fiscal discipline among eurozone nations.
The Euro-Union's scramble to contain a self-inflicted debt crisis provides a cautionary tale of what happens to monetary union when promises are broken, markets are misled, and geopolitical dreams override economic good sense.
Many US municipalities and states are currently facing severe financial pressure. They have huge unfunded pension commitments, and recent forecasts of widespread defaults have resulted in a large sell-off of their bonds. This is not new. Financial history is full of instructive defaults by governments on their debt. Can these past crises teach us about what to do now?