Cleric Speaks on Iran’s Foreign Militias

The Iranian press increasingly covers tension between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and President Hassan Rouhani. While the Western media sometimes paints this as a conflict between hardline and reformist factions, both parties are absolutely committed to the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 Islamic Revolution; rather, their dispute often revolves around tactics or power.

In the accompanying excerpted article, from a news outlet affiliated with the IRGC, Ali Shirazi, the Iranian Supreme Leader’s special representative to the Qods Force, pens an open letter to Rouhani. The general thrust of his essay is to criticize Rouhani for compromises and diplomacy with the West. He castigates Rouhani for compromising revolutionary values in order to negotiate with the West on such issues as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Financial Action Task Force (see: “Accepting FATF is Absolutely Forbidden,” OE Watch, August 2018), and the Counter Terrorism Finance agreements. Iran continues to object to the latter two agreements in part, if not in whole, because of restrictions it would impose on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas which the United States and other Western countries designate as terrorist groups, but which the Iranian government sponsors as resistance movements.

Perhaps the most important aspect of Shirazi’s letter, however, is his embrace and endorsement of various militias, not only Lebanese Hezbollah which the IRGC helped found, but also Ansarallah, the main Houthi military group in Yemen. Iranian diplomats sympathize with the Houthi cause in Yemen, but are careful to deny direct links; Shirazi appears—not for the first time—unconcerned about such diplomatic nuance. In addition, Shirazi claims that Iran finds strength and influence in other groups, such as the religious, pro-Iranian “Haydariyun” in Iraq as well as the Popular Mobilization Forces, many of which remain under Iranian command and control in Iraq. Shirazi also talks about the Zeynabiyun and the Liwa Fatemiyoun, two groups fighting in Syria whose members, respectively, are drawn from Pakistan and Afghanistan, as being under general Iranian control. That he sees the proliferation of these groups as a sign of Iranian strength suggests the creation and deployment of proxy groups remains a key component of IRGC’s strategy. That Shirazi represents the supreme leader suggests that Ali Khamenei also backs the proxy group strategy.

Lastly, Shirazi cites Iranian progress in developing missiles and drones as a sign of its technical prowess and ability. Curiously, he uses public statements by a retired Israeli missile expert to support his claims.