Sanctioning Talk on Darfur
On Wednesday, President Bush announced that the U.S. is imposing tougher sanctions on Sudan. The announcement, which many believed the President would make six weeks ago in a speech at the Holocaust Memorial Museum, laid out four steps that the government will now take to attempt to bring an end to what the White House has called the “genocide” taking place in Darfur.
First, the State Department released the names of 31 Sudanese companies that are, effective immediately, barred from doing business in the U.S. or transacting business anywhere in the world in American dollars. Second, the U.S. imposed individual sanctions on two top Sudanese officials and one rebel leader who have incited violence and obstructed the peace in Darfur. Third, the U.S. will increase enforcement of the existing economic sanctions against the 130 Sudanese-owned or controlled companies that are already barred from doing business with the U.S. Fourth, and most importantly, the White House has instructed Secretary Rice to work with the UK and our other allies to seek UN approval for an international arms embargo against Sudan and the imposition of a military no-fly zone in Darfur.
What does the U.S. hope these sanctions will accomplish? The State Department has said that it wants to see an immediate end to all aerial bombing attacks on villages in Darfur, which have continued, and even increased, since the President’s April 18th speech. It wants the Sudanese government quickly and without reservations to accept the Hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping force and support the peace process. And it wants the government to disarm the Janjaweed militias, nomadic Arab tribes whose marauding has enjoyed intermittent support from the national government in Khartoum.
Why announce the sanctions now? They were going to be unveiled six weeks ago, but the day before the President’s speech, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon requested a delay so that he could continue to negotiate with Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir. The President agreed, and did not make the much-anticipated announcement at the time.
The timing of Wednesday’s announcement also ties in with a major diplomatic meeting planned for next week: the 2007 G-8 Summit in Germany, where Darfur features prominently on the docket. Today, Secretary Rice is in Germany meeting with her Group of Eight counterparts to draw up consensus among member countries before the presidents meet next week. The President’s decision to make the announcement yesterday sets the stage for Secretary Rice to begin talks on the Darfur crisis.
Some have argued that the new sanctions are too little, too late. While it is certainly true that these sanctions could have come sooner, and that they could be tougher, they do show Khartoum—and the international community—that that the U.S. is prepared to take at least some concrete action in response to the genocide.
It is laudable, especially in light of our recent history with the UN over Iraq, that the President gave Secretary Ban more time to talk to Bashir and try to work out a diplomatic solution. But six weeks was plenty of time to see change. Instead, Khartoum has continued to support the Arab militia, has not accepted the UN-AU Hybrid Force, has not implemented a March 28th human rights communiqué, and has continued to bomb villages in Darfur, once even in a Sudanese military aircraft painted white to look like a UN airplane. The time for diplomatic discussions is over.
What effect will these new sanctions have? Realistically, not much. According to State Department officials, most of the 31 companies already do not do business in the United States or with U.S. companies. Many of them do the majority of their business in U.S. dollars, but the U.S. government is realistically in no position to stop them from doing so.
Strengthening enforcement on the previously-sanctioned Sudanese companies is, likewise, an admirable act, but it will have little effect on Khartoum. Only four of those 130 companies are in oil and gas, the industry from which the Sudanese government derives 70% of its export revenue.
The policy’s Achilles heel, however, is that China has no part in these unilateral sanctions and is unlikely to comply with multilateral ones. Beijing buys 70% of Sudan’s oil. The country also has substantial direct investment in Sudan, and does not tend to constrict its economic activities on moral grounds. Since 1996, China has invested more than $10 billion in Sudan and has repeatedly threatened to veto any Sudan sanctions resolution that comes before the UN Security Council.
On the other hand, the symbolic content of yesterday’s announcement is to move Darfur to the top of the agenda for international discussion. The U.S., having done much of what it can alone, will now turn to its allies and to the UN to ask them to come alongside it in support. The G8, from which China is excluded, will have a jump-start on discussing this issue and hopefully coming to a loose agreement, though Russia, which shares China’s taste for trade with rogue states, may prove difficult to persuade.
In the meantime, the U.S. should continue to call the crisis in Darfur what it is, genocide, and continue to do all it can alone while insisting that its friends and allies join it in pressuring Khartoum to end the violence. Likewise, the White House should, if things do not improve, consider putting sanctions on Bashir, himself. Most importantly, the White House should use all means and fora possible, including the G-8, the UN, and the Beijing Olympics, to pressure China to follow its lead. Because in Sudan, the yuan talks louder than the dollar.
