The Promise, and Peril, Ahead for Iraq
President Barack Obama addresses U.S. |
During his visit to Iraq this week, President Barack Obama commended U.S.
forces for their invaluable work there: “From getting rid of Saddam, to reducing
violence, to stabilizing the country, to facilitating elections–you have given
Iraq the opportunity to stand on its own as a democratic country. That is an
extraordinary achievement.” But the president also cautioned that “now is not
the time to lose focus” for the next 18 months will be a “critical period.”
He’s absolutely right.
Iraq has undergone a quiet transformation since Mr. Obama’s first visit to
the country as a senator in July 2008. We can no longer speak of Iraqi politics
at a standstill, or a lack of political accommodation, or an unwillingness of
the Iraqi government to take responsibility. The issues facing the president in
Iraq, and his military commanders, are fundamentally different from those of
2007 and 2008.
On a visit to Iraq last month, we had the opportunity to see the
transformation firsthand. Iraq is now a fully sovereign country. U.S. Commander
Gen. Ray Odierno has insisted on the most rigorous implementation of the
U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, which gives Iraqi authorities greater
responsibility than ever before. U.S. forces now detain Iraqis only after
securing arrest warrants from Iraqi judges, and they are releasing or
transferring to Iraqi custody all of the detainees they now hold. The U.S.
maintains forces and bases only where the Iraqi government wants them. The U.S.
has already turned responsibility for the security of the Green Zone over to the
Iraqi government, and Iraqi Security Forces have responsibility for an
ever-growing proportion of Baghdad well in advance of the agreement’s June 30
deadline.
Moreover, Gen. Odierno and the U.S. Embassy have established joint committees
with Iraqi military and political leaders at the highest levels both to
coordinate operations and to monitor and ensure adherence to the agreement.
There is a committee for each article of the agreement that reviews all
questions of implementation and investigates all accusations of infringements.
Both sides have agreed that the approved minutes of these committees are legally
binding.
particularly over the status of Kirkuk, are still capable of destabilizing the
country rapidly and profoundly.
January’s peaceful provincial elections have reinvigorated Iraqi democracy.
Iraqis voted in large numbers and, as dissatisfied voters often do, they voted
the incumbents out. This was an important step, demonstrating that Iraqis
believe that their vote counts and their leaders are held accountable. Iraqi
politicians have gotten the message. The losing parties are working to develop
platforms to win back their voters in the upcoming national elections. The
struggle to form coalitions in the provinces has forced competing parties to
compromise with one another at the local level.
Mr. Obama also said that Iraqis must “decide that they want to resolve their
differences through constitutional means and legal means.” Iraqi leaders of many
parties are already showing their determination to do precisely this. For some
time, rivals (and even allies) of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have been
concerned about his apparent efforts to concentrate too much power in his own
hands through the establishment of extra-constitutional government bodies. The
Council of Representatives has used the 2009 budget to clip the prime minister’s
wings by eliminating all funding for these “illegal” bodies. In other words,
Iraqi representatives have discovered the power of the purse. It is a remarkable
advance in Iraqi politics that the parliament could act against the prime
minister and his party, while nonetheless passing a law that is constructive for
the state.
But the country faces three major challenges in coming months: national
parliamentary elections, most likely in January 2010; major budget constraints,
resulting from the low price of oil; and the threat of growing Arab-Kurd
tensions in the north.
The national elections will lead to the first transfer of power in the
democratic Iraqi state. This is always a critical moment in the birth of a new
democracy. In Iraq it will be especially challenging because of its
parliamentary system. Voters must first elect a new Council of Representatives,
which must then elect a prime minister and approve a cabinet. The parties must
agree not only on a leader but also about how all of the ministries will be
parceled out among parties and ethno-sectarian groups. In 2006, this process
took five months. U.S. forces will play a critical role in helping the Iraqis
secure the elections, but they will also play an important role after the vote
supporting the Iraqi Security Forces and deterring dissatisfied groups from
resorting to violence.
Meanwhile, the fall in the global price of oil has presented a major problem
for Iraq’s balance of payments. The current Iraqi budget is based on the
assumption that oil would sell for an average of $50 per barrel. Oil prices have
been lower than that for most of the year, generating a significant shortfall of
revenue so far and forcing the Iraqi government to slash spending and dip into
its reserves.
If prices remain low, important programs that maintain Iraq’s security and
internal stability may be threatened. Revenue shortfalls have already halted the
planned expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces and disrupted plans to acquire
equipment for them. And since the Iraqi government is the principal employer in
the country, any significant reduction in its spending limits its ability to
create jobs, including those central to the process of reconciling former
insurgents.
The budget crisis, if protracted, can also prevent the newly elected
provincial governments and even the central government from providing the
services that the population expects, possibly leading to general
disillusionment with the political process if not to a resurgence of violence.
Tensions between Iraq’s Arabs and Kurds, particularly over the status of Kirkuk,
are still capable of destabilizing the country rapidly and profoundly. The
unexpected success of the Arab al Hadba Party in Ninewah Province shifted the
focus of these tensions from Mosul back to Kirkuk. But the friction over
Kirkuk’s status is not simply one of rival ethnicities. It also involves
fundamental constitutional questions about the relationship between the central
government, provincial government, and federal regions.
There is little enthusiasm in Kirkuk itself for a violent resolution of the
dispute, and the presence of an American brigade near the city has helped keep
the peace by helping Kurdish and Iraqi forces to understand each other’s
positions and actions. But rhetoric and posturing in an election year could
inflame this delicate situation, and the presence of U.S. forces there is
necessary.
Mr. Obama has stated his objectives in Iraq clearly: The U.S. must “make sure
that Iraq is stable, that it is not a safe haven for terrorists, that it is a
good neighbor and a good ally.” This is an attainable goal. Iraq has undergone a
profound transformation–it is no longer a predatory, dictatorial state or a
maelstrom of sectarian violence. It no longer threatens its neighbors or
stability in the region. Indeed, Iraq has become an attractive political and
economic partner for states throughout the Middle East.
But Iraqis remain most interested in establishing a strategic partnership
with the U.S. and the West. In the long run, this partnership will not be
defined by the numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq but by the depth of our economic
and political cooperation, diplomatic support, and strategic alliance. As Mr.
Obama said in Baghdad, America must be “a stalwart partner” and Iraqis must
“know that they have a steady partner with us.”
Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. Kimberly Kagan is the
president of the Institute for the Study of War and the author of The
Surge: A Military History.
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