Traffic nerds alert! A congestion pricing caveat
AEIdeas
The economic logic behind congestion pricing is pretty straight forward. Tolls paid by drivers spread demand more evenly throughout the day. With a price attached to their decisions, people will make better commuting choices — maybe leaving earlier or later –reducing delays. Yay, efficiency! London already has congestion pricing, and many economists recommend the same for US urban areas. But Philly Fed economist Jeffrey Brinkman offers a caveat in a recent paper:
However, once we consider business location decisions, the efficacy of this policy comes into question. The policy, by design, will make it more costly for people to travel into dense business districts, and workers will therefore require higher wages to do so. Paying these higher wages might not be worth it for businesses, and therefore, some businesses will leave the business district, reducing employment density. Given the strong evidence for agglomeration economies, or some proximity-related economies of scale, there will be some loss in production. Understood in this way, the efficiency of congestion pricing becomes ambiguous. This suggests that a better policy may be to reduce the costs associated with congestion rather than charge fees to discourage commuting into dense areas.
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It is almost a given that anytime the government intervenes in our public, economic life that the unintended consequences that inevitably arise create a problem that is often worse than the original problem that needed to be “solved”.
I am getting my PhD in transportation engineering. This paper is weak, and I dearly hope it does not get any more press. It is based on an economist’s vague understanding of pricing externalities in general, not traffic flow theory, and none of the papers cited pertain to the theory of traffic flow. Check out this paper instead, from economists who actually study engineering facts: http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juecon/v76y2013icp122-134.html