North Korea conducts its 5th nuclear test

Editor’s note: The next president is in for a rough welcome to the Oval Office given the list of immediate crises and slow-burning policy challenges, both foreign and domestic. What should Washington do? Why should the average American care? We’ve set out to clearly define US strategic interests and provide actionable policy solutions to help the new administration build a 2017 agenda that strengthens American leadership abroad while bolstering prosperity at home.

What to Do: Policy Recommendations for 2017 is an ongoing project from AEI. Click here for access to the complete series, which addresses a wide range of issues from rebuilding America’s military to higher education reform to helping people find work.

While the “pivot” has focused largely on stemming the advance of China’s maritime ambitions in the South China Sea, the Korean peninsula is and will always remain the “cockpit” of Asia (in the words of Nick Eberstadt). The US fought its only war with China on the peninsula last century and it has been the battleground of the great powers for centuries, particularly struggles between China, Russia, and Japan.

Given its geostrategic position, the Korean Peninsula’s strategic importance will not change. Now add to that the fact that half the peninsula is governed by a reckless young member of the Kim clan who has an ever increasing nuclear arsenal at his disposal.

North Koreans walk past near a huge screen broadcasting the government’s announcement on North Korea’s fifth nuclear test in Pyongyang, North Korea, September 9, 2016. Kyodo/via REUTERS.

Some initial thoughts on the latest North Korean (DPRK) nuclear test:

1)    Timing: It seems that Kim Jong Un felt ignored by the great powers at the recent G20 meeting in Hangzhou – there is nothing like a nuclear test to make Kim a relevant player again. In addition, September 9th is 68^th anniversary of the DPRK.

2)    DPRK’s Strategic Objective: The DPRK has one consistent strategic objective: unifying the peninsula and driving the United States from Northeast Asia. Testing ever more power nuclear weapons and developing missiles capable of delivering miniaturized warheads are an effective part of this strategy.  Pyongyang want to raise doubts in the minds of Seoul and Tokyo’s leaders over the credibility of Washington’s extended deterrence commitments. Kim and his clan want its enemies to consider whether the US will “trade Los Angeles for Pyongyang.”
The risks of action for Beijing are still far greater than the risk of inaction. Only Washington can change that risk calculus. 
3)    China’s reaction: Unless it seems to Beijing that the US will really move to more aggressive actions, including crippling sanctions, more muscular demonstrations of force short of war, and reinvigorating the Bush administration’s “illicit activities” initiative that treated the Kim family as a criminal enterprise to be rolled up and stopped, Beijing will do very little to reprimand North Korea. The risks of action for Beijing are still far greater than the risk of inaction. Only Washington can change that risk calculus. The only short term cost to Beijing right now will be the definite deployment of the THAAD high altitude missile defense system.

4)    Seoul and Tokyo’s reactions: Already these two allies have separately put in place more robust conventional military capabilities. Over time, if the US continues its strategic flightiness and underfunded defense strategy, the possibility of one or both countries acquiring nuclear weapons will rise.

5)    US Strategy: Currently we don’t have one. “Strategic patience” is not a strategy, but instead a sophisticated term for procrastination. There is but one viable US strategic option and it worked relatively well from 2003-2006, when the US aggressively rolled up North Korean illicit assets around the world, bringing intense pressure to bear on the regime. The US objective regarding North Korea must be the irreversible destruction of all of Kim Jong Un’s nuclear capabilities – there can be no “Iran deal” in which the DPRK retains nuclear infrastructure.

To achieve this objective, the US must once again squeeze the regime using crippling sanctions, including against any complicit Chinese entities, and organize an international coalition to dry up all of the Kim family’s ill-begotten revenue.
“Strategic patience” is not a strategy, but instead a sophisticated term for procrastination.  
Furthermore, the US must continue to develop a robust force posture that puts enormous pressure on Pyongyang and demonstrates to Beijing that we will be more present in and around the peninsula.  This will increase Beijing’s liabilities in its DPRK “holdings.”  Most importantly, the US needs to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent that includes the heightening of nuclear cooperation and planning with Japan and South Korea.

6)    Pitfalls and Obstacles.  Oddly the US “pivot” to Asia has ignored the very stressing requirements of any Korean peninsula crisis. If US pressure worked and the Kim regime collapsed, the US ground force requirement to stabilize the peninsula is more than our forces can bear (US Army end strength is declining to 450,000 troops, down from 566,000 is 2011). This also holds in the case that Kim attempts to start a war with South Korea in response to pressure. Additionally, the US must be mindful of China’s own plans to shape the peninsula in the case of crisis.

Of course the outcome we should hope for is a peaceful one in which Kim, or a clique that replaces him, negotiates the end of the DPRK nuclear program. But our strategic planning must prepare for other outcomes.